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Abstract	
	
This	thesis	aims	to	propose	and	defend	a	new	way	of	analysing	and	understanding	
the	origin	of	genetics	(from	Mendel	to	Bateson).	Traditionally	philosophers	used	to	
analyse	the	history	of	genetics	in	terms	of	theories.	However,	I	will	argue	that	this	
theory-based	approach	 is	highly	problematic.	 In	Chapter	1,	 I	 shall	 critically	 review	
the	 theory-driven	approach	 to	 analysisng	 the	history	of	 genetics	 and	diagnose	 its	
problems.	In	Chapter	2,	inspired	by	Kuhn’s	concept	“exemplar”,	I	shall	make	a	new	
interpretation	 of	 exemplar	 and	 introduce	 an	 exemplar-based	 approach.	 Before	
introducing	my	exemplar-based	analysis,	 I	 find	it	necessary	to	scrutinise	the	origin	
of	genetics	from	Mendel	to	Bateson.	In	Chapter	3,	I	shall	reinterpret	Mendel’s	work	
on	Pisum	by	re-examining	Mendel’s	paper	(1865)	and	its	historical	research	context.	
In	 Chapter	 4,	 by	 carefully	 examining	 the	 conceptual	 changes,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	
rediscovery	 event	 in	 1900	 should	 be	 better	 characterised	 as	 attempts	 of	
incorporating	 Mendel’s	 work	 with	 the	 work	 of	 “rediscoverers”	 (i.e.	 de	 Vries,	
Correns,	Tschermak,	and	Bateson)	 rather	 than	a	mere	 reintroduction	 to	Mendel’s	
work.	 In	 Chapter	 5,	 I	 shall	 use	 the	 exemplar-based	 approach	 to	 analysing	 and	
interpreting	 the	 origin	 of	 genetics	 from	Mendel	 to	 Bateson.	 In	 Chapter	 6,	 I	 shall	
defend	my	exemplar-based	characterisation	of	the	origin	of	genetics	by	dismissing	
the	potential	responses	from	the	theory-driven	one,	critically	examining	a	potential	
mechanism-based	 analysis,	 and	 making	 the	 further	 notes	 on	 the	 implication	 of	
taking	the	exemplar-based	approach	to	investigate	scientific	practice.		 	
	 6	
Contents	
	 0.	Introduction	...........................................................................................................................................	10	1.	The	Theory-Driven	Approach,	the	Theory-Centric	View,	and	the	Philosophical	Analyses	of	the	History	of	Mendelian	Genetics	...........................................................................	20	1.1	Philosophy	and	the	History	of	Genetics	..............................................................................	20	1.2	Traditional	Philosophical	Understandings	of	Mendelian	genetics:	From	Laws	to	Patterns	of	Reasoning	........................................................................................................................	26	1.3	Criticisms	of	the	Theory-Driven	Approach	and	Theory-Centric	View	..................	42	2.	An	Introduction	to	the	Exemplar-Based	Approach	...............................................................	50	2.1	The	Kuhnian	Analyses	of	Mendel’s	Contribution	...........................................................	50	2.2	Revisiting	Kuhn’s	Paradigm	.....................................................................................................	53	2.3	The	New	Definition	of	Exemplar	and	the	Exemplar-based	Approach	..................	62	3.	Mendel’s	Versuche	Revisited	...........................................................................................................	68	3.1	Gärtner’s	Legacy	and	Mendel’s	Real	Concern	..................................................................	69	3.2	Mendel	on	his	Achievement:	The	Ratios	and	Laws	.......................................................	88	3.3	Understanding	Mendel	on	Pisum:	It	isn’t	about	Heredity	at	all!	..............................	98	4.	Demystifying	the	Rediscovery	Story	........................................................................................	106	4.1	The	Problem	of	Independence	............................................................................................	106	4.2	“Rediscovery”:	A	Misleading	Characterisation	.............................................................	132	4.3	The	Great	Incorporation:	When	Mendel	Met	Heredity	.............................................	150	5.	Exemplarising	the	Prelude	of	Genetics	....................................................................................	155	
	 7	
5.1	The	Problems	of	the	Theory-Driven	Analysis	of	Mendel	and	the	Rediscoverers	...................................................................................................................................................................	155	5.2	Mendel’s	Exemplary	Practice	on	Pisum	...........................................................................	159	5.3	The	Rediscoverers’	Exemplary	Practices	........................................................................	172	5.4	The	Road	to	1900:	Mendel’s	Legacy	..................................................................................	181	5.5	Reconsidering	the	Problem	of	Long	Neglect	.................................................................	192	6.	Why	Exemplars?	A	Defence	and	Further	Articulation	......................................................	203	6.1	The	Potential	Responses	and	Challenges	from	the	Theory-Driven	Approach	203	6.2	A	Mechanistic	Salvage?	...........................................................................................................	214	6.3	Further	Notes	on	the	Exemplar-Based	Approach	.......................................................	222	7.	Conclusion	............................................................................................................................................	226	Appendix	1	................................................................................................................................................	230	Appendix	2	................................................................................................................................................	234	Appendix	3	................................................................................................................................................	237	Appendix	4	................................................................................................................................................	239	Appendix	5	................................................................................................................................................	241	References	................................................................................................................................................	284	
	
	 	
	 8	
List	of	Tables		Table	1	................................................................................................................................................	22	Table	2	................................................................................................................................................	28	Table	3	................................................................................................................................................	29	Table	4	................................................................................................................................................	31	Table	5	................................................................................................................................................	73	Table	6	................................................................................................................................................	94	Table	7	.............................................................................................................................................	108	Table	8	.............................................................................................................................................	112	Table	9	.............................................................................................................................................	118	Table	10	...........................................................................................................................................	147	Table	11	...........................................................................................................................................	169	Table	12	...........................................................................................................................................	170	Table	13	...........................................................................................................................................	171	Table	14	...........................................................................................................................................	174	Table	15	...........................................................................................................................................	176	Table	16	...........................................................................................................................................	176	Table	17	...........................................................................................................................................	180	Table	18	...........................................................................................................................................	183		
	 	
	 9	
List	of	Figures		Figure	1	Crossing	Over	................................................................................................................	43	Figure	2	(Sturtevant,	1926,	p.	699)	........................................................................................	44	Figure	3	...............................................................................................................................................	55	Figure	4	...............................................................................................................................................	90	Figure	5	............................................................................................................................................	125			 	
	 10	
                                                                       	
	
0 
	
0.	Introduction	
The	Practical	Turn	in	the	Philosophical	Examination	of	History	of	Science	
History	 of	 science	 has	 been	 important	 for	 philosophers	 of	 science.	 Philosophers	
were	 interested	 in	 reconstructing	 the	history	of	 sciences	 to	 study	 the	nature	and	
pattern	of	the	development	of	science:	 Is	the	development	of	science	progressive	
through	the	history?	Is	the	history	of	science	a	cumulative	and	continuous	progress?	
In	 addition,	 considering	 that	 science	 has	 been	 a	 highly	 successful	
knowledge-gaining	 enterprise,	 philosophers	 used	 to	 believe	 that	 a	 careful	
examination	 of	 the	 history	 of	 science	 sheds	 light	 on	 many	 central	 problems	 in	
philosophy	 of	 science,	 or	 even	 in	 more	 general	 philosophy.	 For	 example,	 the	
question	of	whether	 the	development	of	science	 is	continuous	was	central	 to	 the	
scientific	 realism/antirealism	 debate.	 (Hardin	 &	 Rosenberg,	 1982;	 Laudan,	 1981;	
Leplin,	 1981).	 Moreover,	 some	 philosophers	 (for	 example,	 Lakatos,	 1970)	 even	
contended	 that	 historians	 could	 and	 should	 learn	 from	 the	 philosophical	
reconstruction	of	the	history	of	sciences.	In	short,	history	of	science	has	been	one	
of	the	central	topics	in	the	contemporary	philosophy	of	science.	
In	 the	past	 three	decades,	 there	has	been	an	ongoing	change	 to	 the	 focus	of	 the	
philosophical	 examination	 of	 the	 history	 of	 science.	 Traditionally	 philosophers	 of	
science	focused	attention	on	scientific	knowledge.	The	history	of	science,	according	
to	this	traditional	approach,	 is	often	depicted	as	a	history	of	scientific	knowledge,	
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structure,	dynamics	and	interrelation	of	scientific	knowledge	in	the	history.	 In	this	
regard	 the	 question	 of	 how	 best	 to	 characterise	 scientific	 knowledge	was	widely	
discussed.	 In	 particular,	 some	 argued	 that	 it	 was	 best	 characterised	 in	 terms	 of	
theories	 (Popper,	 1959),	 paradigms	 (Kuhn,	 1962,	 1970b),	 research	 programmes	
(Lakatos,	 1968,	 1978),	 disciplines	 (Toulmin,	 1972),	 research	 traditions	 (Laudan,	
1977),	 or	 fields	 (Darden	 &	 Maull,	 1977).	 It	 was	 also	 debated	 whether	 the	
interrelation	of	successive	bodies	of	scientific	knowledge	is	reduction	(Nagel,	1961),	
comparable	 replacement	 (Popper,	 1959),	 incommensurability	 (Feyerabend,	 1962;	
Kuhn,	1962),	or	explanatory	extension	(Kitcher,	1984,	1989).	
Despite	these	disagreements,	scientific	theories	were	once	widely	considered	to	be	
a	best	candidate	to	reflect	and	represent	scientific	knowledge	and	its	development.	
As	 Frederick	 Suppe	 puts	 it,	 “theories	 are	 the	 vehicle	 of	 scientific	 knowledge.”	
(Suppe,	 1977,	 p.	 3)	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 this	 theory-based	 understanding	 of	
scientific	knowledge	does	not	merely	refer	to	the	doctrine	that	scientific	knowledge	
should	be	equated	with	theories.	For	example,	Karl	Popper	once	claimed	that	"[t]he	
empirical	 sciences	 are	 systems	 of	 theories.	 The	 logic	 of	 scientific	 knowledge	 can	
therefore	be	described	as	a	theory	of	theories."	 (Popper,	1959,	p.	37)	 In	addition,	
many	philosophers	(for	example,	Lakatos,	1968;	Laudan,	1977),	although	rejecting	
the	claim	that	scientific	knowledge	are	just	theories,	still	believed	that	theories	are	
fundamental	components	of	scientific	knowledge.	For	example,	Larry	Laudan,	who	
was	 well	 known	 for	 analysing	 the	 history	 of	 scientific	 knowledge	 in	 terms	 of	
research	traditions,	still	 identifies	that	“[e]very	research	tradition	has	a	number	of	
specific	theories	which	exemplify	and	partially	constitute	it.”	(Laudan,	1977,	p.	78)	
Accordingly,	 scientific	 changes	 (e.g.	 the	 Copernican	 revolution	 and	 the	 Chemical	
revolution)	 have	 also	 been	 widely	 characterised	 as	 shifts	 from	 one	 theory	 to	
another,	 though	 the	 relation	 of	 two	 successive	 theories	 is	 under	 debate.	 (Nagel,	
1961;	 Popper,	 1959)	 All	 these	 philosophical	 treatments	 are	 implicitly	 rooted	 in	 a	
consensus	 among	 many	 philosophers	 of	 science	 before	 the	 1980s1:	 Scientific	
knowledge	 and	 its	 development	 is	 best	 characterised	 and	 structured	 by	 theories.	
																																																								1	 Nevertheless,	this	consensus	was	still	influential	after	1980s.	(For	example,	Gardenfors	&	Zenker,	2013;	Rivadulla,	2004;	Sterelny	&	Griffiths,	1999;	Vance,	1996)	
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This	consensus	underlies	a	popular	“theory-driven”	approach	 in	 the	philosophy	of	
science,	which	is	perfectly	summarised	by	C.	Kenneth	Waters:	
Philosophers	(perhaps	I	should	say	we)	typically	analyze	scientific	knowledge	
by	 identifying	 central	 explanatory	 theories.	 Then	 for	 each	 theory,	 we	
analyze	 its	 central	 concepts	 and	 principles	 (or	 laws),	 detail	 how	 it	 can	 be	
applied	 to	 explain	 the	 phenomena,	 reconstruct	 how	 it	 is	 justified,	 explore	
how	 it	might	be	 further	developed	or	how	 its	explanatory	 range	might	be	
extended	(the	so-called	‘research	program’),	and	consider	how	it	should	be	
interpreted	 (for	 example,	 instrumentally	 or	 realistically).	 (Waters,	 2004,	 p.	
784)	
In	short,	the	theory-driven	approach	assumes	the	centrality	of	the	role	of	theory	in	
science,	 and	 guides	 philosophers	 to	 articulate	 the	 nature,	 structure,	 and	
implications	of	scientific	knowledge	in	terms	of	theories.	 In	addition	to	be	applied	
to	characterise	scientific	knowledge	and	its	history,	this	approach	is	well	illustrated	
in	 many	 discussions	 in	 philosophy	 of	 science.	 The	 problem	 of	 demarcation	 of	
science	from	pseudoscience	had	been	a	question	of	whether	a	theory	is	falsifiable.	
The	 debate	 between	 scientific	 realism/antirealism	 is	 typically	 portrayed	 as	 the	
questions	 of	 whether	 certain	 terms	 in	 scientific	 theories	 refer	 to	
mind-independently	 objects	 and	 of	 whether	 scientific	 theories	 are	 (at	 least	
approximately)	true.	Relativism	is	traditionally	understood	as	the	view	that	choice	
in	 scientific	 change	has	no	“rational”	basis.	Even	 today,	 it	 is	 still	 a	 fact,	as	Ronald	
Giere	 points	 out,	 that	 “so	 many	 topics	 in	 contemporary	 philosophy	 of	 science	
continue	to	be	framed	in	terms	of	theories.”	(Giere,	2000,	p.	515)	
Before	evaluating	this	approach,	I	find	it	necessary	to	briefly	clarify	what	a	theory	is	
for	 philosophers.	 A	 scientific	 theory	 is	 conventionally	 thought	 to	 be	 a	 corpus	 of	
statements,	 which	 explains	 the	 phenomena	 in	 the	 empirical	 world	 by	 employing	
concepts,	 hypotheses,	 and	 principles	 (or	 laws).	 For	 example,	 the	 theory	 of	
Newtonian	mechanics	 consists	 of	 Newton’s	 three	 laws	 of	motion	 and	 the	 law	 of	
gravitation	 by	 employing	 the	 concepts	 like	 force,	 velocity,	 etc.	 Among	 various	
interpretations,	there	are	two	dominant	philosophical	analyses	of	scientific	theories.	
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One	 is	 the	 syntactic	 view2	 (also	once	 called	 the	 received	view).	According	 to	 this	
view,	 a	 scientific	 theory	 is	 a	 set	of	 statements,	which	 can	be	 reformulated	 into	a	
deductive	 axiomatised	 system	 written	 in	 first-order	 logic.3 	 The	 other	 is	 the	
semantic	view	(for	example,	Suppe,	1989;	Suppes,	1967;	van	Fraassen,	1980),	which	
construes	scientific	theories	as	extralinguistic	entities	in	terms	of	families	of	models.	
A	model	is	a	mathematical	structure	that	satisfies	a	theory,	though	there	is	still	no	
consensus	 on	 what	 a	mathematical	 structure	 is.	 Some	 (for	 example,	 da	 Costa	 &	
French,	 1990;	 Suppes,	 1967)	 identify	models	 as	 set-theoretical	 structures4,	 while	
other	 (van	 Fraassen,	 1980,	 1989)	 regard	 models	 as	 state-space	 structures 5 .	
Although	 even	 now	 no	 agreement	 on	 the	 nature	 or	 interpretation	 of	 scientific	
theories	 has	 been	 forthcoming,	 it	 has	 become	 a	 canonical	 problem	 in	 the	 20th	
century	 philosophy	 of	 science.	 As	 Suppe	 observes,	 “If	 any	 problem	 in	 the	
philosophy	of	science	justifiably	can	be	claimed	the	most	central	or	important,	it	is	
that	 of	 the	 nature	 and	 structure	 of	 scientific	 theories…	 It	 is	 only	 a	 slight	
exaggeration	to	claim	that	a	philosophy	of	science	is	little	more	than	an	analysis	of	
theories	and	their	roles	in	the	scientific	enterprise.”	(Suppe,	1977,	p.	3)	No	matter	
what	 a	 scientific	 theory	 should	 be	 best	 represented	 as,	 this	 debate	 itself	 is	 an	
instantiation	of	the	theory-driven	approach.	If	the	role	of	theory	is	not	so	important	
in	 understanding	 science	 and	 its	 history,	why	 is	 there	 so	much	discussion	 on	 the	
nature	of	a	scientific	theory?	
However,	the	theory-driven	approach	has	been	criticised	by	many	philosophers	 in	
the	1980s	and	1990s.	Firstly,	the	theory-driven	approach	overlooks	the	significance	
of	 experiments	 and	 other	 non-theoretical	 aspects	 in	 science.	 (The	 Problem	 of	
Practice)	 As	 Ian	 Hacking	 points	 out,	 “Philosophers	 of	 science	 constantly	 discuss	
theories	 and	 representation	 of	 reality,	 but	 say	 almost	 nothing	 about	 experiment,																																																									2	 Classical	statements	of	the	syntactic	view	can	be	found	in	Braithwaite	(1953),	Hempel	(1965),	and	Nagel	(1961).	3	 Carnap	was	explicit	on	the	point	that	if	a	theory	does	not	admit	of	a	reformulation	satisfying	the	conditions	of	the	syntactic	view,	it	is	not	a	genuine	scientific	theory.	(Carnap,	1963,	pp.	422–423)	4	 According	to	this	definition	of	model,	a	scientific	theory	is	a	mathematical	structure	defined	via	the	language	of	set	theory.	5	 According	to	this	definition	of	model,	a	theory	is	a	state-space	structure	which	represents	the	behaviour	of	all	physical	systems	that	are	idealised	replicas	of	phenomena	within	the	scope	of	the	theory.	If	the	theory	has	n	parameters,	then	the	state-space	is	an	n-dimensional	space.	The	behaviours	of	the	physical	systems	are	represented	by	various	configurations	imposed	on	the	state	space.	
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technology,	 or	 the	 use	 of	 knowledge	 to	 alter	 the	world.”	 (Hacking,	 1983,	 p.	 149)	
Many	 (for	 example,	 Cartwright,	 Schomar,	 &	 Suárez,	 1995;	 Hacking,	 1983)	 feel	
dissatisfied	with	this	misleading	approach.	One	lesson	that	can	be	learnt	from	these	
criticisms	 is	 that	 the	 history	 of	 science,	 even	 if	 from	 a	 philosophical	 perspective,	
should	be	much	more	than	a	history	of	scientific	theory.	 	
Secondly,	 the	 traditional	 consensus	 that	 theories	 are	 carriers	 of	 scientific	
knowledge	about	 the	empirical	world	has	also	been	challenged.6	 (The	Problem	of	
Theories	as	Vehicles	of	 Scientific	Knowledge)	 Some	suggest	 that	 it	 is	 that	models7	
rather	 than	 theories	 represent	 what	 happens	 in	 the	 empirical	 world.	 As	 Nancy	
Cartwright	argues,	“[F]undamental	theory	represents	nothing	and	there	is	nothing	
for	 it	to	represent.	There	are	only	real	things	and	the	real	ways	they	behave.	And	
these	 are	 represented	 by	 models,	 models	 constructed	 with	 the	 aid	 of	 all	 the	
knowledge	 and	 techniques	 and	 tricks	 and	 devices	we	 have.	 Theory	 plays	 its	 own	
small	 important	 role	here.	But	 it	 is	a	 tool	 like	any	other;	and	you	can	not	build	a	
house	with	a	hammer	alone.”	(Cartwright	et	al.,	1995,	p.	140)	As	we	shall	see,	both	
these	reactions	highlight	a	gradual	shift	of	the	focus	of	the	philosophical	analysis	of	
science,	and	correspondingly	influence	the	philosophical	examination	of	the	history	
of	science.	 	
Thirdly,	 these	 theory-driven	 analyses	 of	 the	 history	 of	 science	 overlook	 one	
significant	 aspect	 of	 scientific	 theory:	 the	 construction	 and	 development	 of	 a	
theory.8	 (The	Problem	of	Theory	Construction)	As	Kuhn	once	insightfully	points	out,	
“[Philosophy	 of	 science]	 is	 comparatively	 little	 concerned	 with	 the	 temporal	
development	of	theory.”	(Kuhn,	1977b,	p.	14)	In	particular,	despite	the	importance	
of	 theory	 in	 the	analysis	of	 the	history	of	 science,	philosophers	seem	to	 forget	 to	
																																																								6	 Although	Kuhn	(Kuhn,	1970b,	p.	181)	already	argued	that	the	conventional	understanding	of	a	theory	failed	to	represent	scientific	knowledge	“in	nature	and	scope”,	this	early	examination	of	theories	as	vehicles	of	scientific	knowledge	was	not	taken	seriously	at	that	time.	7	 Note	that	“models”	in	this	context	are	not	what	constitute	the	theories	as	defined	in	the	semantic	view.	8	 It	should	be	highlighted	that	the	neglect	of	the	problem	of	the	construction	and	development	of	a	theory	is	not	a	logical	consequence	of	taking	the	theory-driven	approach,	but	the	philosophers	of	science	who	take	the	theory-driven	approach	do	pay	insufficient	attention	to	investigating	the	construction	and	development	of	a	theory.	
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study	how	a	 theory	 is	 established	 and	 constructed.9	 As	Norwood	Russell	Hanson	
emphasises,	“The	 issue	 is	not	 theory-using,	but	 theory-finding.”	 (Hanson,	1958,	p.	
3)	 	
Given	these	problems,	newer	philosophical	approaches	 in	analysing	the	history	of	
science	 shift	 attention	 from	 scientific	 knowledge	 to	 scientific	 practice10,	 from	
theories	 to	theorising,	 from	concepts	 to	conceptual	practices;	and	even	when	the	
discussion	 is	 restricted	 to	 scientific	 knowledge,	 there	 is	 a	 shift	 from	 theoretical	
knowledge	 (know-that)	 to	 practical	 knowledge	 (know-how).	 In	 short,	 for	 many	
philosophers	 (for	 example,	 Chang,	 2014,	 p.	 67;	 Giere,	 2011,	 p.	 61;	 Soler,	 Zwart,	
Lynch,	&	 Israel-Jost,	2014,	pp.	21–22;	Waters,	2014,	p.	121),	 the	central	 issue	has	
shifted	from	what	scientists	find	out	to	how	scientists	find	out.	This	is	the	so-called	
practical	turn	in	the	philosophy	of	science.	
Correspondingly	 several	 philosophical	 accounts	 of	 the	 history	 of	 science	 with	 a	
more	 rigorous	 practice-based	 approach	 were	 proposed.	 Philip	 Kitcher	 (1984)	
characterises	 the	 history	 of	 science	 in	 terms	 of	 practices,	 while	 Hacking	 (1992,	
1994),	 building	on	 the	work	of	 the	historian	A.C.	Crombie	 (1994,	 1996),	 develops	
the	 notion	 of	 styles	 of	 scientific	 thinking	 to	 understand	 the	 history	 of	 science.	
Another	 two	 more	 recent	 contributions	 are	 Lindley	 Darden’s	 mechanism-based	
account	of	the	history	of	biology	(Craver	&	Darden,	2013;	Darden	&	Craver,	2002;	
Darden,	2005),	 and	Hasok	Chang’s	analysis	of	 the	history	of	 chemistry	 in	 the	18th	
and	19th	century	in	terms	of	systems	of	practice	(Chang,	2012).	
The	Context	of	Discovery,	Theory-Construction,	and	the	Origin	of	a	Science	
If	 the	 focus	of	 the	old	 philosophical	 examinations	of	 the	history	 of	 science	 is	 the	
history	 of	 scientific	 knowledge	 before	 the	 practical	 turn,	 then	 that	 of	 current	
philosophical	 analysis	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 the	 history	 of	 scientific	 practice.																																																									9	 It	is	worth	noting	that	Kuhn,	though	well	realising	this	problem	and	advocating	paradigm	as	an	alternative	to	theory	to	analyse	the	history	and	practice	of	science,	still	said	little	on	the	establishment	of	a	paradigm.	See	the	discussion	in	Chapter	2.	10	 In	fact,	the	shift	can	already	be	found	in	many	pre-1980	works.	There	are	some	non-theoretical	elements	in	the	elucidation	of	paradigms,	research	programmes	and	research	traditions.	However,	the	significance	of	the	shift	was	not	universally	recognised	until	1980s.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	the	distinction	between	scientific	knowledge	and	practice	is	not	sharp.	Scientific	knowledge	includes	practical	know-how,	while	scientific	practice	relies	on	some	theoretical	knowledge.	
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Nevertheless,	I	still	find	that	these	philosophical	analyses	pay	insufficient	attention	
to	 a	 very	 important	 question,	 the	 origin	 of	 an	 established	 school	 of	 scientific	
practices.11	 How	 is	a	school	of	 scientific	practice	 first	established?	What	 is	a	best	
way	to	analyse	and	characterise	the	origin	of	a	school	of	scientific	practice?	This	is	
an	 area,	 traditionally	 conflated	 with	 “the	 context	 of	 discovery”12,	 despised	 by	
philosophers.	Discovery	was	contrasted	with	justification	as	the	two	main	activities	
of	 scientists.	 Philosophers	 of	 science	 once	 widely	 accepted	 that	 there	 is	 a	 sharp	
distinction	between	the	process	of	how	scientists	propose	a	theory	and	the	method	
of	 justifying	 it.	 Moreover,	 they	 claimed	 that	 the	 former	 is	 not	 a	 topic	 for	
philosophers.	
The	 initial	 stage,	 the	act	of	 conceiving	or	 inventing	a	 theory,	 seems	 to	me	
neither	to	call	for	a	logical	analysis	nor	to	be	susceptible	of	it.	(Popper,	1959,	
p.	7)	
The	solution	of	these	historical	problems	involves	the	individual	psychology	
of	thinking	and	the	sociology	of	thought.	None	of	these	questions	are	our	
business	here.	(Braithwaite,	1953,	pp.	20–21)	
In	fact,	how	a	theory	is	constructed	is	much	more	important	and	complicated	
than	philosophers	used	to	think.	Theory	construction	involves	an	intertwined	
practice	of	conceptualisation,	modeling,	testing,	modification,	confirmation,	
and	so	on.	So	it	cannot	be	simply	identified	with	a	process	of	how	an	idea	
occurs	to	a	scientist.	As	Darden	points	out,	“A	theory	rarely,	if	ever,	arises	all	at	
once	in	a	complete	form.	Vague	ideas	about	postulated	explanatory	factors	may	
take	on	more	form	as	new	data	are	found	and	new	theoretical	components	
added.	A	negative	result	may	produce	a	change	in	only	one	part	of	a	theory,	
with	subsequent	modification	incorporating	new	ideas,	which	fit	the	data	better.	
Connections	to	empirically	confirmed	items	in	another	field	may	be	important																																																									11	 Craver	and	Darden’s	work	(Craver	&	Darden,	2001,	2013;	Darden	&	Craver,	2002;	Darden,	2002,	2006a)	is	definitely	an	exception.	12	 There	is	a	difference	between	the	origin	of	a	school	of	scientific	practice	and	the	context	of	disocovery.	The	process	of	discovery	is	construed	as	an	intellectual	act,	while	the	origin	of	a	school	of	scientific	practice	is	a	more	complex	multi-faceted	development.	However,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	philosophical	understanding	of	the	development	of	a	science	is	conflated	with	the	history	of	a	theory.	Thus,	strictly	speaking,	there	is	very	few	serious	philosophical	articulation	of	the	origin	of	a	science	until	Darden’s	paper	(1980).	
	 17	
in	constructing	part	of	a	theory	and	at	the	same	time	bring	a	measure	of	
justification.”	(Darden,	1980,	p.	152)	The	neglect	of	theory-construction	in	
philosophy	of	science	is	particularly	well	reflected	in	the	case	of	the	early	
development	of	genetics.	Although	since	the	1980s	historians	have	done	much	
important	work	on	the	early	period	of	the	history	of	genetics	(for	example,	
Bowler,	1989;	Kohler,	1994;	Olby,	1985),	philosophers	of	science	were	yet	to	
draw	on	the	fruitful	wealth	of	historical	work	which	has	been	done.	On	the	one	
hand,	few	philosophers	took	serious	attempts	to	study	the	development	of	
early	genetics.	On	the	other	hand,	as	I	shall	show	in	Chapter	1,	most	of	
philosophical	works	on	the	history	of	genetics	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	relied	on	
a	superficial	understanding	of	the	history.	
In	response,	Darden	(1980,	1991,	2006a)	made	a	substantial	contribution	to	this	
neglected	topic	by	articulating	the	development	of	the	theory	of	genetics	from	
1900	to	1926.	Despite	this,	the	philosophical	examination	of	the	origin	of	
genetics	remains	largely	overlooked	by	philosophers.	Moreover,	given	the	
practical	turn,	as	I	shall	show	in	the	section	1.2,	Darden’s	analysis	of	
theory-construction	in	genetics	is	insufficient	to	reflect	the	multifaceted	
development	of	early	genetics.	In	particular,	Darden’s	analysis	is	still	mainly	on	
the	theoretical	aspect	of	the	development	of	the	early	period	of	genetics.	
However,	as	I	shall	show,	the	construction	of	the	non-theoretical	aspect	(e.g.	
how	to	set	up	an	experiment	and	how	to	define	a	research	problem)	is	also	
worth	articulating.	In	other	words,	a	more	comprehensive	articulation	of	the	
origin	of	genetics	is	necessary.	This	is	the	primary	motivation	of	this	thesis.	
In	addition,	many	of	the	philosopher’s	analyses	of	the	history	of	scientific	practice13	
oversimplify	or	distort	the	actual	history	and	overlook	the	historical	context.	This	is	
why	Leslie	Pearce	Williams	once	strongly	opposed	the	philosophical	reconstruction	
of	the	history	of	science:	
It	 is	 time,	 now,	 to	 comment	 on	 the	 title	 of	 this	 essay	 review.	 [i.e.	 Should	
philosophers	 be	 allowed	 to	 write	 history?]	 I	 mean	 the	 question	 quite	
																																																								13	 However,	some	works,	like	Chang’s	works	(2004,	2012),	are	definitely	exempt	from	this	charge.	
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seriously	 and	 I	 shall	 now	 answer	 it	 with	 a	 resounding	 ‘NO!’	 Let	 me	
generalise	at	my	own	peril.	Philosophers	tend	to	be	interested	in	ideas,	their	
logical	connections	and	their	logical	consequences.	They	do	not	seem	to	find	
it	very	interesting	to	ask	where	ideas	came	from,	how	they	developed,	and	
how	they	were	interpreted	by	others	who	claim	to	have	been	influenced	by	
them.	(Williams,	1975,	p.	252)	
Although	Williams’s	 hostility	 aimed	at	 the	works	of	 logical	 empiricists	 and	 critical	
rationalists	 in	the	1960s	and	1970s,	his	objection	is	still	applicable	to	many	recent	
philosophical	 examinations	 of	 the	 history	 of	 science.	 Quite	 a	 few	 philosophical	
accounts	 of	 the	 history	 of	 science	 still	 rely	 on	 a	 very	 superficial	 and	 incomplete	
understanding	of	the	actual	history.	As	I	shall	show	in	1.2	and	1.3,	the	philosophical	
examinations	 of	 the	 history	 of	 genetics	 are	 good	 examples.	 Philosophers	 have	
different	foci	from	historians,	but	philosophers	have	to	pay	serious	attention	to	the	
problems	of	the	formation,	development,	and	representation	of	scientific	practice	
in	 its	historical	 context.	 It	 is	a	 fair	point	 that	many	contemporary	philosophers	of	
science	 still	 fail	 to	 sufficiently	 follow	 and	 benefit	 from	 cutting-edge	 research	 by	
historians	of	 science,	 especially	 in	 the	 case	of	 the	history	of	 genetics.	My	 second	
motivation	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 provide	 a	 philosophical	 analysis	 of	 the	 history	 of	
genetics	with	a	more	solid	understanding	of	the	history.	
Thus,	my	 ultimate	 concern	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 explore	 a	 new	way	 to	 analyse	 and	
understand	the	origin	of	a	particular	school	of	scientific	practice,	namely,	genetics.	
Methodologically	 speaking,	 my	 thesis	 will	 be	 located	 in	 an	 ongoing	 movement	
called	integrated	history	and	philosophy	of	science14,	which	encourages	a	plurality	
of	 approaches	 to	 understanding	 science	 by	 blending	 philosophical	 analysis	 and	
historical	 interpretation	 (Arabatzis	&	Howard,	2015,	pp.	1–2).	 In	Chapter	1,	 I	 shall	
review	a	number	of	philosophical	analyses	of	the	history	of	genetics,	and	show	in	
what	 sense	 the	 approach	 underlying	 these	 analyses	 is	 theory-driven.	 I	 will	 then	
diagnose	 its	 problems	 and	 weaknesses.	 In	 Chapter	 2,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	
examination	of	Kuhn’s	novel	notion	“exemplar”,	I	shall	provide	a	new	interpretation	
of	exemplar	and	propose	an	exemplar-based	approach	to	understand	and	analyse																																																									14	 For	the	contemporary	state	of	integrated	history	and	philosophy	of	science,	see	Schickore	(2011),	Arabatzis	and	Schickore	(2012),	 	
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the	 history	 (especially	 the	 origin)	 of	 a	 science.	 Before	 introducing	 an	
exemplar-based	analysis,	I	shall	begin	with	a	historical	re-examination	of	the	origin	
of	 genetics.	 In	 Chapter	 3,	 I	 shall	 carefully	 revisit	 Mendel’s	 research	 within	 its	
historical	 context	 (especially	 the	 influence	 of	 Gärtner’s	 work)	 to	 strengthen	 the	
view	that	Mendel’s	concern	and	research	 is	about	developmental	series	of	hybrid	
progeny.	Based	on	my	new	analyse	of	Mendel’s	work	on	Pisum,	in	Chapter	4,	I	shall	
further	delve	into	the	historical	analysis	of	the	rediscoverers’	work,	and	attempt	to	
reveal	the	actual	development	and	incorporation	of	Mendel’s	work	with	the	study	
of	heredity	at	the	turn	of	the	twentieth	century	by	examining	the	differences	of	the	
conceptual	 framework	 of	 the	 rediscoverers.	 In	 Chapter	 5,	 given	 my	 historical	
interpretations	of	early	Mendelian	genetics,	 I	 shall	 show	how	my	exemplar-based	
approach	 can	 be	 used	 to	 analyse	 the	 origin	 of	 genetics,	 and	 argue	 that	 my	
exemplar-based	one	is	better	fit	than	the	old	theory-driven	one.	In	Chapter	6,	I	shall	
examine	some	potential	responses	and	challenges	from	the	theory-driven	approach,	
critically	 examine	 a	potential	mechanism-based	 account	of	 the	origin	of	 genetics,	
and	make	some	further	notes	on	the	exemplar-based	approach.	
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CHAPTER                                                                       	
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1.	The	Theory-Driven	Approach,	the	
Theory-Centric	View,	and	the	Philosophical	
Analyses	of	the	History	of	Mendelian	
Genetics	
In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 aim	 to	 critically	 examine	 the	 problems	 of	 the	 traditional	
philosophical	 accounts	 of	 Mendelian	 Genetics.	 Firstly,	 I	 shall	 provide	 a	 brief	
summary	 of	 the	 history	 of	 Mendlian	 genetics.	 Secondly,	 after	 reviewing	 some	
typical	 theory-driven	 accounts	 of	 Mendelian	 genetics,	 I	 shall	 articulate	 the	
problems	 of	 the	 theory-driven	 approach	 to	 analysing	 the	 history	 of	 Mendelian	
genetics.	Thirdly,	by	developing	Waters’	criticisms	of	the	theory-driven	approach,	I	
shall	make	a	detailed	 critical	 examination	of	 the	assumption	of	 the	 theory-driven	
approach,	namely,	the	theory-centric	view.	
1.1	Philosophy	and	the	History	of	Genetics	
In	 Introduction,	 I	 have	 briefly	 argued	 that	 the	 theory-driven	 approach	 was	
influential	 in	 the	 philosophical	 examination	 of	 the	 history	 of	 science.	 A	 good	
example	is	the	debate	on	theory	reduction	in	genetics,	one	of	central	topics	in	the	
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philosophy	 of	 biology	 in	 the	 period	 1970s-1990s.	 With	 the	 great	 impact	 of	 the	
discovery	of	the	structure	of	DNA	in	1953,	it	seems	natural	for	many	philosophers	
(for	example,	Goosens,	1978;	Hull,	1979;	Ruse,	1976;	Schaffner,	1976)	to	distinguish	
the	history	of	genetics	chronologically	with	two	episodes:	Mendelian	genetics	and	
molecular	genetics.	Thus,	the	philosophers	began	exploring	the	nature	of	the	shift	
from	Mendelian	genetics	to	molecular	genetics.	Since	the	late	1960s15,	the	question	
of	whether	the	theory	of	Mendelian	genetics	is	reducible	to	the	theory	of	molecular	
genetics	has	been	one	of	the	most	persistent	debates	in	the	philosophy	of	biology.	
Mendelian	 genetics	 is	 an	 ambiguous	 term,	 especially	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	
philosophy	 of	 science.	 In	 most	 philosophical	 discussions,	 the	 term	 "Mendelian	
genetics"	 is	used	 interchangeably	with	"classical	genetics",	or	"classical	Mendelian	
genetics".	 David	 Hull	 (1972,	 1974,	 1979),	 William	 Goosens	 (1978),	 Michael	 Ruse	
(1973,	 1976)	 and	William	Wimsatt	 (1976)	 talked	 of	 "Mendelian	 genetics".	 Philip	
Kitcher	(1984),	Kenneth	Schaffner	(1974,	1976)	and	Russell	Vance	(1996)	spoke	of	
"classical	 genetics".	 Darden	 (2005)	 and	 Waters	 (1990)	 employed	 "classical	
Mendelian	 genetics".	 However,	 more	 precisely	 speaking,	 all	 these	 terms	 do	 not	
refer	 to	 the	 same	 thing	 exactly.	 Ruse	 (1973)	 regards	 Mendelian	 genetics	 as	
Mendel's	 law	of	segregation	and	of	 independent	assortment,	whereas	Hull	 (1974)	
takes	 the	 chromosome	 theory	 of	 inheritance	 to	 be	 Mendelian	 genetics.	 Darden	
(2005)	 thinks	 that	 classical	 Mendelian	 genetics	 emerged	 in	 1900,	 while	 Kitcher	
(1984)	believes	 that	 classical	 genetics	 stemmed	 from	 the	 studies	of	 T.	H.	Morgan	
and	his	fellows	in	1910s.	
I	 shall	 argue	 that	all	 these	different	 interpretations	are	 just	efforts	 to	understand	
the	same	period	in	the	history	of	genetics.	It	is	evident	that	in	the	debate	regarding	
theory	 reduction	 in	 genetics,	 all	 discussants	 well	 realised	 that	 the	 subject	 is	 the	
same,	although	there	was	no	agreement	on	how	to	characterise	it.	In	other	words,	
despite	 the	 different	 understandings,	 all	 these	 terms	 "classical	 genetics",	
"Mendelian	genetics"	and	"classical	Mendelian	genetics"	refer	to	an	early	period	in	
the	 history	 of	 genetics,	 roughly	 from	 its	 beginning	 to	 the	 introduction	 to	 the	
																																																								
15	 Schaffner’s	paper	“The	Watson-Crick	Model	and	Reductionism”	(1969)	might	be	the	first	paper	on	theory	reduction	in	genetics.	
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molecular	approach.16	 For	the	sake	of	consistency,	I	shall	call	it	Mendelian	genetics	
in	the	rest	of	the	thesis.	
It	 is	 conventionally	 agreed	 that	 the	 history	 of	 Mendelian	 genetics	 (or	 genetics)	
started	 with	 Gregor	 Mendel’s	 study	 of	 Pisum	 Sativum	 (pea).	 Gavin	 de	 Beer’s	
following	statement	is	a	representative	account	of	the	origin	of	genetics17.	
It	 is	 not	 often	 possible	 to	 pinpoint	 the	 origin	 of	 a	 whole	 new	 branch	 of	
science	accurately	 in	 time	and	place	 ...	 But	 genetics	 is	 an	exception,	 for	 it	
owes	 its	 origin	 to	 one	 man,	 Gregor	 Mendel,	 who	 expounded	 its	 basic	
principles	at	Brno	on	8	February	and	8	March	1865.	(de	Beer,	1965,	p.	154)	
In	other	words,	Mendel,	 an	Austrian	monk	 in	Brünn,	 is	 generally	 regarded	as	 the	
founder	 of	 genetics.	 In	 the	 1850s,	Mendel	 began	 his	 experiments	 on	 hybridising	
peas.	From	his	experiments,	Mendel	observed	some	impressive	statistical	regularity	
in	 the	 successive	 generations	of	 pea	hybrids.	 For	 example,	when	purely	 breeding	
round	 peas	 and	 purely	 breeding	 wrinkled	 ones	 are	 crossed,	 all	 of	 the	 seeds	
obtained	 in	the	first	generation	were	round.	More	surprisingly,	when	these	round	
hybrids	were	self-fertilised,	both	round	and	wrinkled	seeds	were	gained	in	the	next	
generation,	and	the	ratio	of	round	seeds	to	wrinkled	ones	was	close	to	3	:	1.	These	
interesting	regularities	were	also	observed	 in	different	pairs	of	antagonistic	 traits.	
(See	Table	1)	
Table	1	
The	Result	of	the	First	Generation	from	the	Hybrid	Acquired	by	Mendel	
(1865)	
Experiment	
Amount	(of	
seeds	with	one	trait)	
Amount	(of	seeds	with	
the	other	trait)	
Ratio	
1	 5474	(round)	 1850	(wrinkled)	 2.96	:	1																																																									16	 It	should	be	clarified	that	my	usage	of	the	term	“Mendelian	genetic”	does	not	suggest	that	I	accept	that	there	are	two	genuinely	distinct	episodes	of	the	history	of	genetics:	Mendelian	genetics	and	molecular	genetics.	Nor	does	it	suggest	that	I	accept	that	there	is	a	clear-cut	between	these	two.	Since	my	concern	is	about	the	origin	of	genetics,	there	is	no	substantial	difference	between	the	expressions	“the	origin	of	Mendelian	genetics”	and	“the	origin	of	genetics”,	given	that	Mendelian	genetics	refers	to	an	early	period	in	the	history	of	genetics.	17	 Other	similar	accounts	include	Dodson	(1955,	p.	187)	and	Ravin	(1965,	p.	1).	
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2	 6022	(yellow)	 2001	(green)	 3.01	:	1	
3	
705	
(grey-brown)	
224	(white)	 3.15	:	1	
4	 882	(inflated)	 299	(constricted)	 2.95	:	1	
5	 428	(green)	 152	(yellow)	 2.82	:	1	
6	 651	(axial)	 207	(terminal)	 3.14	:	1	
7	 787	(long)	 277	(short)	 2.84	:	1	
	
In	 addition,	Mendel	 also	 observed	 that	when	 two	 pairs	 of	 antagonistic	 traits	 are	
united	in	the	hybrid	by	crossing,	the	ratio	is	roughly	9	:	3	:	3	:	1.	For	example,	when	
the	yellow	and	round	hybrid	peas	are	crossed,	in	the	next	generation	there	are	315	
round	and	yellow	peas,	101	wrinkled	and	yellow	peas,	108	round	and	green	peas	
and	32	wrinkled	and	green	peas.	These	observations	led	to	Mendel’s	formulation	of	
the	laws	to	describe	and	explain	the	phenomena.18	 Mendel	presented	his	work	on	
Pisum	 at	 two	 meetings	 of	 the	 Natural	 History	 Society	 of	 Brünn	 in	 1865	 and	
published	it	entitled	Versuche	über	Pflanzenhybriden	shortly	after.	
It	 is	 traditionally	 (for	 example,	 Iltis,	 1932;	 Posner	 &	 Skutil,	 1968;	 Roberts,	 1929;	
Stubbe,	 1972;	 Sturtevant,	 1965)	 said	 that	 the	 significance	 of	 Mendel’s	 work	 on	
Pisum	was	not	generally	 recognised	until	1900	when	Hugo	de	Vries,	Carl	Correns,	
and	 Erich	 von	 Tschermak	 all	 claimed	 that	 they	 independently	 rediscovered	
Mendel’s	 work.	 This	 “rediscovery”19	 marks	 a	 beginning	 of	 the	 examination	 and	
development	of	Mendel’s	work	and	its	application	in	the	science	of	heredity.	There	
were	many	attempts	to	apply,	develop	and	test	the	Mendelian	principles	on	various	
organisms	in	the	first	decade	of	the	twentieth	century.	(For	example,	Castle	&	Allen,	
1903;	 Hurst,	 1906;	 Nettleship,	 1909;	 Raynor	 &	 Doncaster,	 1905)	 However,	 the	
Mendelian	principles	of	heredity	were	still	 controversial	 in	 the	1900s.	On	the	one	
hand,	 there	was	 a	 substantial	 development	 of	 the	 conceptualisation	 of	 the	 basic	
unit	of	heredity	and	reformulations	of	Mendelian	laws.	(For	example,	Bateson,	1902,	
1909;	R.	C.	Punnett,	1905)	On	 the	other	hand,	although	 the	Mendelian	principles	
were	 confirmed	 by	 experiments	 on	 a	 variety	 of	 organisms,	many	 still	 refused	 to																																																									18	 See	in-depth	analysis	of	Mendel’s	work	in	Chapter	3	and	Chapter	5.	19	 I	shall	argue	in	Chapter	4	that	it	is	not	a	rediscovery	at	all!	
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accept	them	because	they	were	not	applied	universally.	A	breakthrough	occurred	in	
the	 1910s	 and	 1920s.	 By	 their	 highly	 sophisticated	 studies	 on	 Drosophila	
melanogaster	 (fruit	 fly),	 Thomas	 Hunt	 Morgan	 and	 his	 colleagues	 successfully	
integrated	 the	 Mendelian	 ideas	 in	 the	 1900s	 with	 the	 chromosome	 theory	 of	
inheritance,	 in	 which	 the	 chromosomes	 were	 regarded	 as	 the	 bearers	 of	 the	
hereditary	material.	Since	then,	Mendelian	genetics,	as	an	established	school	of	the	
study	of	inheritance,	has	been	developed	in	a	great	depth	and	at	a	rapid	speed.20	
Now,	 the	 question	 that	 interests	 me	 is:	 what	 is	 a	 best	 philosophical	 way	 to	
understand	 and	 analyse	 the	 origin	 of	 genetics?	 Before	 reviewing	 the	 traditional	
philosophical	 characterisations	 of	 the	 history	 of	 Mendelian	 genetics,	 I	 find	 it	
necessary	 to	 ward	 off	 some	 potential	 worries	 here.	 Some	 may	 question	 the	
legitimacy	of	my	chronological	demarcation	of	the	origin	of	genetics:	Am	I	justified	
in	claiming	that	genetics	originates	from	Mendel’s	work?	I	well	realise	that	there	is	
definitely	 more	 than	 one	 way	 to	 determine	 the	 beginning	 of	 genetics.	 Many	
historians	(for	example,	Carlson,	2004,	p.	1;	Roberts,	1929,	p.	286;	Wallace,	1992,	p.	
46)	maintain	that	the	rediscovery	of	Mendel’s	work	in	1900	marks	the	beginning	of	
the	history	of	genetics.	Personally	I	am	not	very	interested	in	the	task	of	identifying	
the	 beginning	 of	 genetics	 with	 respect	 to	 an	 exact	 time.	 However,	 I	 have	 some	
reasons	 for	 including	Mendel’s	 research	on	peas	 in	my	discussion.	 It	 is	a	 fact	 that	
Mendel’s	 work	 is	 crucial	 to	 the	 history	 of	 genetics.	 The	 emergence	 and	
development	 of	 Mendelism	 in	 the	 first	 decade	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 is	
fundamentally	based	on	Mendel’s	legacy.	It	is	also	a	fact	that	all	the	debates	on	the	
Mendelian	 theory	 of	 heredity	 arose	 from	 the	 “rediscovery”	 of	Mendel’s	 work	 in	
1900.	Therefore,	even	if	the	science	of	genetics	is	“officially”	established	in	1900	or	
later,	I	still	find	it	reasonable	to	begin	my	examination	of	the	origin	of	genetics	with	
Mendel’s	work.	
In	 addition,	 I	 have	 to	 emphasise	 that	 my	 aim	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 not	 to	 provide	 a	
complete	and	comprehensive	examination	of	the	origin	of	genetics.	As	the	title	of	
Olby’s	book	Origins	of	Mendelism	 (1985)	has	suggested,	there	are	multiple	origins	
of	 genetics.	 I	 also	 recognise	 that	 there	 is	 no	 reason	 to	 ignore	 the	 significance	 of																																																									20	 For	a	fuller	account	of	the	history	of	Mendelian	genetics,	see	Carlson	(2004)	and	Dunn	(1965).	
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non-Mendelian	elements	(e.g.	the	development	of	cytology	 in	the	19th	century)	 in	
the	origin	of	genetics.	However,	what	I	focus	on	here	is	only	one	path	to	genetics,	
as	the	subtitle	of	my	thesis	indicates.	More	precisely	speaking,	my	task	is	to	explore	
a	best	philosophical	way	to	analyse	and	understand	the	development	of	scientific	
practice	 from	Mendel’s	 (1865),	 de	 Vries’	 (1900a,	 1900c,	 1900d),	 Correns’	 (1900),	
Tschermak’s	(1900a,	1900b)	to	Bateson’s	work	(1902).	
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	 1.2	Traditional	Philosophical	Understandings	of	Mendelian	genetics:	
From	Laws	to	Patterns	of	Reasoning	
Before	 the	 1980s,	 most	 philosophical	 discussions	 on	 the	 history	 of	 genetics	 are	
around	the	debate	regarding	inter-theoretic	reduction.	In	this	context,	it	was	widely	
discussed	 whether	 Mendelian	 genetics	 is	 reducible	 to	 molecular	 genetics.	 (For	
example,	 Goosens,	 1978;	 Hull,	 1972,	 1979;	 Ruse,	 1973,	 1976;	 Schaffner,	 1974;	
Wimsatt,	 1976)	 In	addition,	 a	 related	discussion	was	about	how	 to	 formulate	 the	
theory	of	Mendelian	genetics.	(For	example,	Lindenmayer	&	Simon,	1980;	Woodger,	
1937)	 In	 most	 of	 these	 debates,	 Mendelian	 genetics	 is	 construed	 as	 a	 theory	
without	argument.	
Mendelian	genetics,	a	purely	biological	scientific	theory	is	being	reduced	to	
molecular	genetics,	a	physico-chemical	theory.	(Hull,	1972,	p.	491)	
I	shall	call	this	theory	'Mendelian	genetics'	in	order	to	distinguish	it	from	the	
very	modern	'molecular	genetics'.	(Ruse,	1973,	p.	12)	
Immediately	 the	 question	 arises	 of	 what	 classical	 or	 Mendelian	 genetics	
includes.	Both	terms	suggest	that	we	are	dealing	with	a	fixed	and	historically	
dated	theory.	(Goosens,	1978,	p.	76)	
The	“theory”	of	Mendelian	genetics	 in	most	of	 these	contexts	 is	 identified	with	a	
corpus	 of	 statements	 to	 describe	 and	 explain	 the	 phenomena	of	 inheritance.	 For	
example,	Ruse	(1973,	pp.	12–15)	identifies	the	theory	“Mendelian	genetics”	with	a	
set	 of	 statments	 centred	on	 the	 concept	 “gene”,	 the	 law	of	 segregation,	 and	 the	
law	 of	 independent	 assortment.	 In	 other	 words,	 before	 the	 1980s	 Mendelian	
genetics	was	generally	understood	as	a	single	theory.	
This	 theory-based	 understanding	 of	 Mendelian	 genetics	 construes	 Mendelian	
genetics	as	a	single	consistent	theory	universally	accepted	in	the	history.	However,	
this	 implication	 is	 historically	 flawed.	 There	 are	 many	 significant	 theoretical	
variations	in	the	history	of	Mendelian	genetics,	especially	between	1900	and	1926.	
A	good	case	is	the	evolution	of	the	conception	of	the	unit	of	hereditary	material.	In	
Morgan's	 theory	 of	 the	 gene	 (1926),	 the	 gene	 is	 a	 cause	 of	morphological	 traits,	
which	 differentiate	 the	 varieties	 of	 organisms.	 For	 example,	 a	 pair	 of	 genes	
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determines	 the	 different	 colours	 of	 peas.	 There	 is,	 however,	 no	 concept	 “gene”	
found	in	the	work	of	Mendel’s	work	(1865).	Nor	was	it	found	in	any	early	works	of	
Mendelian	genetics	during	the	period	1900-1908.	The	term	“gene”	was	coined	by	
Wilhelm	 Johannsen	 in	 1909.	 Nevertheless,	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 there	 are	 some	
seemingly	 similar	 concepts	 (for	 example,	 “anlage”,	 “unit”,	 “allelomorph”,	 etc)	
employed	in	early	Mendelian	works	in	that	period.	
[P]rior	 to	 the	 definitive	 formation	 of	 the	 reproductive	 nuclei	 a	 complete	
separation	of	the	two	anlagen	occurs,	so	that	one	half	of	the	reproductive	
nuclei	receive	the	anlage	for	[one	trait],	the	other	half	the	[other].	(Correns,	
1966,	p.	126)	(Correns,	1966,	p.	121)	
According	to	the	principles	which	I	have	expressed	elsewhere	(Intracelluläre	
Pangenesis,	 1889),	 the	 specific	 characters	 of	 organisms	 are	 composed	 of	
separate	units.	(de	Vries,	1966)	
Each	 such	 character,	 …,	 must	 henceforth	 be	 conceived	 of	 as	 a	 distinct	
unit-character…	we	may	recognize	this	fact	by	naming	such	unit-characters	
allelomorphs.	(Bateson,	1902,	p.	27)	
Some	(for	example,	Sturtevant,	1965,	p.	32)	may	argue	that,	despite	the	different	
names,	 the	 term	 "gene"	 and	 those	 terms	 quoted	 above	 are	 in	 fact	 the	 same	
concept,	and	both	 refer	 to	 the	unit	of	heredity.	However,	 these	 terms	are	clearly	
different	 concepts.	 Firstly,	 though	 the	 terms	 “anlage”,	 “unit”,	 “allelomorph”,	 and	
“gene”	 all	 refer	 to	 the	 hereditary	material,	 their	 physical	 referents	 are	 different.	
Genes,	 for	Morgan,	 refer	 to	 the	 different	 loci	 on	 the	 chromosomes	 in	 the	 nuclei	
explicitly.	 It	 was	 uncontroversial	 that	 "the	 chromosomes	 are	 the	 bearers	 of	 the	
hereditary	 elements	or	 genes"	 (Morgan,	 1926,	 p.	 45),	 though	 the	physical	 nature	
and	structure	of	the	“gene”	was	still	unclear.21	 However,	units,	for	de	Vries	(1889),	
exist	both	 inside	and	outside	the	nuclei	 in	the	cell,	while	Correns’	“anlage”	(1900)	
and	Bateson’s	“allelomorph”	(1902),	both	quite	hypothetical,	just	vaguely	designate																																																									21	 Morgan	was	very	explicit	on	this	point	in	his	Nobel	Prize	Lecture:	“Now	that	we	locate	[the	genes]	in	the	chromosomes	are	we	justified	in	regarding	them	as	material	units;	as	chemical	bodies	of	a	higher	order	than	molecules?	Frankly,	these	are	questions	with	which	the	working	geneticists	has	not	much	concerned	himself,	except	now	and	then	to	speculate	as	to	the	nature	of	postulated	elements.	There	is	not	consensus	of	opinion	amongst	geneticists	as	to	what	genes	are…”	(Morgan,	1965,	p.	315)	
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the	 hereditary	material	 in	 the	 nuclei.	 Secondly,	 the	 explanation	 of	 how	 the	 gene	
affects	 the	morphological	 trait	 is	much	more	 sophisticated	 than	 that	 of	 how	 the	
unit/anlage/allelomorph	 influences	 the	 morphological	 trait.	 In	 Morgan's	 theory	
(1926),	 genes	may	 cause	 phenotypic	 characters	 in	 three	ways:	 1)	 One	 gene	may	
cause	one	phenotypic	 character;	 2)	Genes	 at	 different	 loci	 in	 linkage	 groups	may	
interact	 in	 causing	 one	 phenotypic	 character;	 3)	 One	 gene	 may	 affect	 many	
phenotypic	 characters.	 But	 in	 the	 period	 1900-1903,	 the	 relation	 of	 the	
unit/anlage/allelomorph	 and	 the	 morphological	 trait	 is	 never	 explicitly	 stated.	
Hence,	 it	 is	 not	evident	 that	 the	 terms	 "gene"	and	 the	 concepts	 "unit”,	 “anlage”,	
and	“allelomorph"	are	the	same	concept.	
Table	2	
The	Conceptions	of	the	Unit	of	Hereditary	Material	
Source	 Concept	 Physical	Loci	
Mendel	(1865)	 Kind	of	cells	 Anther	or	Ovary	
De	 Vries	 (1889,	 1900a,	
1900c,	1900d)	
Unit	 Cell	
Correns	(1900)	 Anlage	 Nuclei	
Bateson	(1902,	1909)	 Allelomorph	(or	unit-character)	 Nuclei	
Morgan	(1915;	1926)	 Gene	 Chromosome	
	
Another	 case	 is	 the	 development	 of	 Mendel's	 laws	 of	 heredity,	 which	 were	
consistently	 regarded	 as	 a	 core	 theoretical	 component	 of	 Mendelian	 genetics	
between	 1900	 and	 1926.	 In	 1926,	 Morgan	 regards	 Mendel’s	 laws	 as	 two	
“fundamental	laws	of	heredity	on	which	the	modern	theory	of	heredity	was	based”.	
Mendel’s	two	laws,	namely	Mendel’s	first	law	of	segregation	and	Mendel’s	second	
law	of	independent	assortment,	are	explicitly	stated	and	articulated.	(Morgan,	1926,	
pp.	1–10)	These	laws	are	quite	different	from	the	so-called	Mendel’s	 law(s)	 in	the	
first	decade	of	the	twentieth	century.	Firstly,	the	law(s)	discovered	by	Mendel	was	
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named	very	differently:	 “the	 law	of	 segregation”	 (de	Vries,	1900a,	1900c,	1900d),	
“Mendel’s	 rule”22	 (Correns,	1900),	 “the	principle”	 (Tschermak,	1900b),	 “Mendel’s	
law”	 (Bateson,	 1902;	 Davenport,	 1901),	 “Mendel’s	 laws”	 (Weldon,	 1902),	 etc.	
Secondly,	 all	 these	 different	 phrases	 in	 fact	 also	 reflect	 a	 substantial	 conceptual	
difference.	Some	(for	example,	Morgan,	1926;	Weldon,	1902)	carefully	distinguish	
Mendel’s	teaching	into	two	laws,	while	others	(for	example,	Correns,	1900;	de	Vries,	
1900a,	1900c,	1900d)	do	not.	Thirdly,	the	formulations	of	these	“Mendel’s	 law(s)”	
are	 conceptually	 distinct	 in	 several	 substantial	 ways.	 For	 example,	 though	 both	
Weldon	and	Morgan	identified	two	laws,	Weldon	(1902)	referred	them	to	the	law	
of	dominance	and	of	 segregation,	whereas	Morgan	 (1926)	 the	 law	of	 segregation	
and	of	independent	assortment.	Moreover,	even	if	both	Weldon	and	Morgan	have	
the	 law	 of	 segregation,	 they	 are	 conceptually	 differently.	 The	 law	 of	 segregation	
formulated	by	Weldon	is	about	the	statistical	interrelations	of	morphological	traits,	
while	the	one	by	Morgan	is	about	the	behaviour	of	genes	during	the	process	of	the	
division	 of	 germ	 cells.	 What	 is	 more,	 neither	 Weldon’s	 nor	 Morgan’s	 “law	 of	
segregation”	is	identical	with	de	Vries’	“law	of	segregation”,	which	is	formulated	in	
terms	of	antagonistic	characteristics.	
Table	3	
Mendel’s	“Law(s)”	between	1900	and	1926	
Source	 Name	
De	Vries	(1900a,	1900c,	1900d)	 The	law	of	segregation	
Correns	(1900)	 Mendel’s	rule	
Tschermak	(1900b)	 The	principle	
Davenport	(1901)	 Mendel’s	law	of	alternative	inheritance	
Weldon	(1902)	 Mendel’s	law	of	alternative	 The	law	of	dominance	
																																																								22	 As	I	shall	show,	Piternick’s	translation	(1966)	of	the	title	of	Correns’	paper	as	“G.	Mendel’s	Law	Concerning	the	Behaviour	of	Progeny	of	Varietal	Hybrid”	is	not	accurate.	Correns	(1900)	in	fact	used	the	German	word	Regel,	which	is	better	translated	as	rule.	See	more	detailed	discussion	in	Chapter	4.	
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inheritance	 The	law	of	segregation	
Bateson	(1902,	1909)	 Mendel’s	law	
Morgan	(1915;	1926)	 Mendel’s	first	law	(or	the	law	of	segregation)	
Mendel’s	 second	 law	 (or	 the	 law	 of	 independent	
assortment)	
	
Although,	 apparently,	 these	 differences	 do	 not	 exhaust	 the	 theoretical	 variations	
between	1900	and	1926,	 it	 is	sufficient	to	conclude	that	it	 is	extremely	difficult	to	
formulate	a	single	theory	of	Mendelian	genetics	throughout	the	history,	especially	
in	the	period	between	1900	and	1926.	
Hence,	a	serious	problem	arises	for	the	theory-based	understanding	of	Mendelian	
genetics.	 Given	 these	 theoretical	 variations,	 how	 can	 one	 identify	 “a	 theory”	 of	
Mendelian	 genetics?	Of	 course	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 these	 theoretical	 variations	
just	 reflect	 the	 differences	 between	 various	 versions	 of	 the	 theory	 of	Mendelian	
genetics.	 Darden	 (1991)	makes	 a	 detailed	 analysis	 to	 characterise	 the	 conceptual	
changes	 by	 identifying	 and	 comparing	 the	 essential	 theoretical	 components	 of	
Mendelism	in	1900-1903	with	those	in	1926.	Darden’s	approach	is	a	perfect	case	of	
the	 theory-driven	approach23:	 She	analyses	 the	knowledge	of	Mendelian	genetics	
by	identifying	the	theory	of	the	gene	as	a	central	explanatory	theory.	Then	for	the	
theory	of	gene,	she	analyses	its	central	concepts	and	principles	(or	laws)	in	different	
periods	 (see	Table	 4),	 details	 how	 it	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 explain	 the	 phenomena,	
reconstructs	 how	 it	 develops	 and	 is	 justified,	 and	 explores	 the	 strategies	 for	
conceptual	changes	of	the	theory	of	the	gene.	
Darden’s	 comparative	 analysis	 begins	 with	 the	 summary	 of	 the	 core	 theoretical	
components	 of	 the	 theory	of	Mendelism	 (1900-1903)	 and	of	 the	 gene	 (1926).	 By	
carefully	analysing	early	Mendelians’	publication	(Bateson,	1900,	1902;	Castle,	1903;	
Correns,	1900;	Cuénot,	1902;	Davenport,	1901;	de	Vries,	1900a),	she	 identifies	six																																																									23	 Coincidently,	Darden	(1991,	p.	7)	even	used	the	very	term	“theory-driven	approach”	to	describe	her	approach	in	analysing	the	strategies	for	the	theoretical	changes	for	the	theory	of	Mendelian	genetics.	 	
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core	 theoretical	 components:	 unit-characters,	 differentiating	 pairs	 of	 characters,	
interfiled	 connection	 to	 cytology,	 dominance-recessiveness,	 segregation,	
explanation	of	dihybrid	crosses.	Based	on	Morgan’s	summary	of	the	theory	of	the	
gene	 (1926,	 p.	 25),	 she	 also	 identifies	 seven	 theoretical	 components:	 genes	 and	
characters,	paired	genes	and	multiple	allelomorphs,	 interfield	connection,	 laws	of	
segregation,	 assortment,	 linkage	 and	 crossing-over,	 and	 mutation.	 By	 comparing	
these	 theoretical	 components,	 Darden	 articulates	 the	 strategy	 of	 theory	 change	
between	1900	and	1926.	
Table	4	
Darden’s	Summary	(1991)	of	the	Theoretical	Changes	in	Mendelian	genetics	between	
1900	and	1926	
Theoretical	
Knowledge	
1900-1903	 1926	
The	 Unit	 of	
Inheritance	
	
Units-Characters	 Genes	
An	organism	is	to	be	regarded	as	
composed	of	separable	
units/characters.	(Darden,	1991,	
pp.	52–54)	
Genes	cause	characters.	(Darden,	
1991,	pp.	169–188)	
One	gene	may	cause	one	one	
character.	(Darden,	1991,	pp.	
169–188)	
Multiple	factors	may	interact	in	
the	production	of	one	character.	
(Darden,	1991,	pp.	169–188)	
One	gene	may	affect	many	
characters.	(Darden,	1991,	pp.	
169–188)	
Multiple	Alleles	
In	varieties	of	organisms,	the	
traits	by	which	they	differ	are	
antagonistic	or	differentiating	
pairs	of	characters.	(Darden,	
1991,	pp.	54–55)	
In	any	one	organism,	genes	occur	
in	pairs.	(Darden,	1991,	p.	229)	
In	a	population,	multiple	
allelomorphs	for	a	character	
occasionally	occur.	(Darden,	
1991,	p.	229)	
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Connection	 with	
Cytology	
The	connections	between	
generations	are	the	germ	cells.	
(Darden,	1991,	pp.	55–56)	
Genes	are	transmitted	from	
parents	to	offspring	in	the	germ	
cells.	(Darden,	1991,	pp.	229–
230)	
Dominance-Recess
iveness	
In	a	hybrid	formed	by	crossing	
parents	that	differ	in	a	single	pair	
of	characters,	there	is	some	
difference	such	that	one	
character	dominates	over	the	
over;	thus,	the	character	in	the	
hybrid	resembles	one	but	not	the	
other	of	the	parents.	(Darden,	
1991,	pp.	56–57)	
The	distinction	between	
dominance	and	recessiveness	
was	deleted.	(Darden,	1991,	p.	
72)	
Mendel's	 Law	 of	
Segregation	
In	the	formation	of	germ	cells	in	
a	hybrid	produced	by	crossing	
parents	that	differed	in	a	single	
pair	of	characters,	the	parental	
characters	segregate	or	separate,	
so	that	the	germ	cells	are	of	one	
or	other	of	the	pure	parental	
types.	(Darden,	1991,	pp.	57–60)	
Parental	genes	are	not	modified	
as	a	result	of	being	together	in	a	
hybrid;	no	new	kinds	of	hybrid	
genes	form.	(Darden,	1991,	p.	
232)	
In	the	formation	of	germ	cells	of	a	
hybrid,	paired	parental	genes	
segregate	so	that	the	germ	cells	
have	one	or	the	other	of	a	given	
pair.	(Darden,	1991,	p.	232)	
The	two	different	types	of	germ	
cells	form	in	approximately	equal	
numbers.	(Darden,	1991,	pp.	57–
60)	
The	two	different	types	of	germ	
cells	are	formed	in	equal	
numbers.	(Darden,	1991,	p.	232)	
When	two	hybrids	are	fertilised,	
the	differing	types	of	germ	cells	
combine	randomly.	(Darden,	
1991,	pp.	57–60)	
When	two	similar	hybrids	are	
cross-fertilised,	the	differing	
types	of	germ	cells	combine	
randomly.	(Darden,	1991,	p.	232)	
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Mendel's	 Law	 of	
Independent	
Assortment	
In	the	formation	of	germ	cells	in	
a	hybrid	produced	by	crossing	
parents	that	differed	in	two	or	
more	traits,	the	parental	factors	
segregate	or	separate	so	that	the	
germ	cells	are	of	all	possible	pure	
parental	combinations.	(Darden,	
1991,	pp.	126–132)	
Genes	are	found	in	linkage	
groups;	groups	occur	in	
corresponding	pairs.	(Darden,	
1991,	p.	149)	
The	different	types	of	germ	cells	
are	formed	in	equal	numbers.	
(Darden,	1991,	pp.	126–132)	
Genes	of	different	linkage	group	
assort	independently.	(Darden,	
1991,	p.	149)	
When	two	hybrids	are	fertilised,	
the	differing	types	of	germ	cells	
combine	randomly.	(Darden,	
1991,	pp.	126–132)	
Usually	genes	in	the	same	linkage	
group	are	inherited	together;	at	
times,	however,	an	orderly	
interchange,	called	
"crossing-over",	takes	place	
between	allelomorphs	in	
corresponding	linkage	groups.	
(Darden,	1991,	pp.	149–150)	
	
Genes	in	a	linkage	group	are	
arranged	linearly	with	respect	to	
each	other.	(Darden,	1991,	p.	
150)	
	
The	frequency	of	crossing-over	
can	be	used	to	calculate	the	order	
and	relative	positions	of	the	
respective	genes	in	linkage	
groups	if	such	disturbing	factors	
as	double	cross-overs	and	
interference	of	one	cross-over	
with	another	are	taken	into	
account.	(Darden,	1991,	p.	150)	
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Mutation	
No	concept	"mutation".	(Darden,	
1991,	pp.	158–160)	
Genes	occasionally	mutate	and	
then	cause	a	different	character.	
(Darden,	1991,	p.	161)	
Mutation	does	not	alter	their	
linear	relation	to	other	genes	in	
the	linkage	group.	(Darden,	1991,	
p.	161)	
Darden’s	 detailed	 analysis	 pioneers	 the	 philosophical	 examination	 of	 the	 early	
theoretical	 development	 of	 genetics,	 and,	 in	 particular,	 makes	 a	 valuable	
complement	to	the	theory-driven	analysis	of	the	history	of	genetics.	However,	such	
a	 revised	 theory-driven	 analysis	 is	 still	 unsatisfactory,	 from	 a	 historian’s	 point	 of	
view.	 Darden’s	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 theoretical	 components	 of	 the	 theory	 of	
Mendelism	 (1900-1903)	 and	 of	 the	 gene	 (1926)	 is	 still	 oversimplified.	 It	 is	 clear	
there	 is	 no	 such	 a	 theoretical	 consensus	 among	 the	 so-called	Mendelians	 in	 the	
period	 1900-1903	 summarised	 by	 Darden.	 Thus,	 as	 Staffan	 Müller-Wille	 and	
Vitezslav	 Orel	 correctly	 point	 out,	 “Mendelians	 did	 not	 share	 one	 particular,	 and	
certainly	not	a	particular	[…]	theory	of	inheritance.”	(Müller-Wille	&	Orel,	2007,	p.	
212)	For	example,	as	I	have	shown,	there	was	no	consensus	on	the	formulation	of	
Mendel’s	 law	 in	the	1900s.	Nor	was	the	concept	“unit/character”	commonly	used	
among	 early	Mendelians.	 Thus,	 Darden’s	 summary	 fails	 to	 reflect	 the	 theoretical	
difference	among	Mendelians	in	the	period	1900-1903.	
Nevertheless,	Darden’s	work	still	seems	to	provide	a	defence	of	the	theory-driven	
approach	in	analysing	the	history	of	genetics.	The	difficulty	of	identifying	the	theory	
of	 Mendelian	 genetics	 is	 no	 longer	 a	 serious	 objection	 to	 the	 theory-driven	
approach	if	one	argues	that	the	theoretical	variations	between	1900	and	1926	well	
reflect	 the	 different	 versions	 of	 a	 single	 theory	 rather	 than	 different	 theories.	
Unfortunately,	 Darden	 implicitly	 accepts	 this	 assumption	 without	 any	 sustained	
defence.	 In	 other	words,	 such	 an	 assumption	 is	 yet	 to	 be	 justified	 and	 thus,	 the	
defence	 is	 ill	 grounded.	Even	 if	 there	 is	one	 single	 theory	with	different	 versions,	
called	the	theory	of	Mendelian	genetics,	the	problem	is	still	not	solved	thoroughly.	I	
can	 press	 the	 question	 further:	What	makes	 us	 convinced	 that	 these	 theoretical	
variations	 genuinely	 reflect	 the	 different	 versions	 of	 a	 single	 theory	 rather	 than	
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different	 theories?	 Even	 if	 these	 are	 different	 versions,	 what	 underlies	 the	
interrelation	between	these	versions	of	the	theory?	As	Kitcher	points	out,	"[If]	we	
think	of	genetic	theory	as	something	that	persisted	through	various	versions:	what	
is	the	relation	among	the	versions	of	classical	genetic	theory	accepted	at	different	
times	(the	versions	of	1910,	1930,	and	1950,	for	example)	which	makes	us	want	to	
count	 them	 as	 versions	 of	 the	 same	 theory?"	 (Kitcher,	 1984,	 p.	 352)	 If	 we	
understand	Mendelian	genetics	as	a	 theory,	 there	 is	 a	difficulty	of	 identifying	 the	
theory	of	Mendelian	genetics,	or	the	essence	of	the	theory	of	Mendelian	genetics.	
This	 is	the	first	main	problem	of	the	theory-driven	analysis	of	Mendelian	genetics,	
namely,	the	problem	of	theory-identification.	
In	addition,	despite	assuming	the	centrality	of	theory	in	the	history	of	genetics,	the	
theory-driven	analysis	neglects	an	 important	aspect	of	 the	 theory.	Even	 if	we	can	
identify	a	theory	of	Mendelian	genetics,	which	has	been	modified	extensively	in	the	
history,	how	is	this	theory	 initially	constructed	and	established?	Once	established,	
how	 is	 it	 further	 articulated	 and	 improved	 as	 it	 develops?	 As	 Darden	 observes,	
"Philosophers	of	science	have	had	little	to	say	about	theory	construction.	Theories	
were	treated	by	Popper	(1965)	and	the	logical	empiricists	(e.g.	Hempel	1966)	as	if	
they	arose	all	at	once	by	a	creative	leap	of	the	imagination	of	a	scientist."	(Darden,	
1980,	 p.	 151)	 This	 is	 the	 second	main	problem	of	 the	 theory-driven	 analysis:	The	
problem	 of	 theory-construction.	 As	 I	 have	 shown	 in	 Introduction,	 the	 problem	 of	
theory-construction	is	important	and	should	be	taken	seriously	by	philosophers.	
Furthermore,	the	theory-driven	understanding	of	Mendelian	genetics	says	little	on	
the	 non-theoretical	 aspect	 of	 geneticists’	 practice.	 It	 is	 apparent	 that	 early	
geneticists’	 activities	 were	 much	 more	 than	 constructing	 theories.	 For	 example,	
Morgan	 and	 his	 colleagues	 took	 efforts	 to	 make	 Drosophila,	 this	 wild,	 highly	
variable	 creature,	 constructed	 into	 a	 standard	 instrument	 to	 be	 used	 for	 precise,	
quantitative	 genetic	 study.	 These	 non-theoretical	 activities	 are	 also	 important	 to	
the	 establishment	 and	 construction	 of	 the	 theory	 of	 the	 gene.	 Thus,	 the	
non-theoretical	aspect	of	Mendelian	genetics	should	not	be	simply	ignored.	This	is	
the	third	main	problem:	The	problem	of	practice.	
These	three	problems	were	seldom	examined	before	the	1980s.	In	order	to	respond	
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to	the	problem	of	theory-identification	and	of	practice,	Kitcher	(1984)	argues	that	
Mendelian	genetics	is	more	than	a	single	theory	as	a	corpus	of	statements.	Rather	
Mendelian	 genetics	 should	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 continuous	 series	 of	 scientific	
practices.	The	components	of	the	practice	of	Mendelian	genetics	at	a	time	include	
"a	 common	 language	 used	 to	 talk	 about	 heredity	 phenomena,	 a	 set	 of	 accepted	
statements	 in	 that	 language	 (the	 corpus	 of	 beliefs	 about	 inheritance...),	 a	 set	 of	
questions	 taken	 to	 be	 the	 appropriate	 questions	 to	 ask	 about	 hereditary	
phenomena,	and	a	set	of	patterns	of	reasoning	which	are	instantiated	in	answering	
some	 of	 the	 accepted	 questions;	 (also:	 sets	 of	 experimental	 procedures	 and	
methodological	rules...	)."	(Kitcher,	1984,	p.	352)	
Nonetheless,	Kitcher	still	contends	that	there	is	a	theory	of	Mendelian	genetics,	and	
emphasises	 the	 central	 and	 essential	 role	 of	 this	 theory	 in	 the	 practice	 of	
Mendelian	genetics.	In	his	words,	“Mendelian	genetics	persists	as	a	single	theory…”	
(Kitcher,	 1984,	 p.	 353)	 But,	 unlike	 the	pre-1980	 interpretations,	 he	 construes	 the	
theory	of	Mendelian	genetics	as	a	family	of	related	patterns	of	reasoning	for	solving	
the	“pedigree	problems”	(that	is,	identifying	and	explaining	patterns	of	inheritance).	
A	pattern	of	reasoning	here	is	defined	as	a	sequence	of	schematic	sentences	(or,	a	
schematic	 argument),	 that	 is,	 sentences	 in	 which	 certain	 items	 of	 non-logical	
vocabulary	 have	 been	 replaced	 by	 dummy	 letters,	 together	 with	 a	 set	 of	 fillings	
instructions	 which	 specify	 how	 substitutions	 are	 to	 be	made	 in	 the	 schemata	 to	
produce	 reasoning	 which	 instantiates	 the	 pattern.	 For	 example,	 the	 theory	 of	
Mendelian	 genetics	 in	 1900	 can	 be	 formulated	 in	 the	 following	 schematic	
argument:	
(1) There	are	two	alleles	A,	a.	A	is	dominant,	a	recessive.	
(2) AA	and	Aa	individuals	have	trait	P,	aa	individuals	have	trait	P’.	
(3) The	genotypes	of	the	individuals	in	the	pedigree	are	as	follows:	i1	is	G1,	i2	is	
G2,	…,iN	is	GN.	
(4) For	any	individual	x	and	any	alleles	y,	z	if	x	has	yz	then	the	probability	that	x	
will	transmit	y	to	any	one	of	its	offspring	is	1/2.	
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(5) The	expected	distribution	of	progeny	genotypes	in	a	cross	between	ij	and	ik	
is	D;	the	expected	distribution	of	progeny	genotypes	in	a	cross	…	
(6) The	expected	distribution	of	progeny	phenotypes	in	a	cross	between	ij	and	ik	
is	E;	the	expected	distribution	of	progeny	phenotypes	in	a	cross	…	(Kitcher,	
1989,	p.	439)	
Note	that	(1),	(2),	(3),	and	(4)	are	premises;	(5)	is	obtained	from	(3)	and	(4)	by	using	
the	principles	of	probability;	(6)	is	derived	from	(2)	and	(5).	
Similarly,	 the	 theory	 of	 Mendelian	 genetics	 in	 the	 period	 1902-1910	 can	 be	
formulated	as	follows:	
(1') There	are	n	pertinent	loci	L1,	.	.	.	,	Ln.	At	locus	Li,	there	are	mi	alleles	
ai1,	…,aimi.	
(2') Individuals	who	are	a11a11a21a21…	an1an1	have	trait	P1;	individuals	who	are	
a11a12a21a21…	an1an1	have	trait	P2;	.	.	.	{Continue	through	all	possible	
combinations.}	
(3') The	genotypes	of	the	individuals	in	the	pedigree	are	as	follows:	i1	is	G1,	i2	is	
G2,	.	.	.	,	in	is	GN.	{Appended	to	(3)	is	a	demonstration	that	(2)	and	(3)	are	
consistent	with	the	phenotypic	ascriptions	given	in	the	pedigree.}	
(4') For	any	individual	x	and	for	any	alleles	y,	z,	if	x	has	vz	then	the	probability	
that	a	particular	one	of	x’s	offspring	will	have	y	is	1/2.	
(5') The	linkage	relations	among	the	loci	are	given	by	the	equations	Prob(Li,	Lj)	=	
pij.	Prob(Li,	Lj)	is	the	probability	that	the	alleles	at	Li,	Lj	on	the	same	
chromosome	will	be	transmitted	together	(if	Li,	Li,	are	loci	on	the	same	
chromosome	pair)	and	is	the	probability	that	arbitrarily	selected	alleles	at	Li,	
Lj	will	be	transmitted	together	(otherwise).	If	Li,	Lj	are	loci	on	the	same	
chromosome	pair,	then	pij	is	0.5	≤	Pij	≤	1.	If	Li,	Lj	are	on	different	
chromosome	pairs,	then	pij	is	0.5.	
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(6') The	expected	distribution	of	progeny	genotypes	in	a	cross	between	ij	and	ik	
is	D;	the	expected	distribution	of	progeny	genotypes	in	a	cross	.	.	.	
(continued	for	all	pairs	in	the	pedigree	for	which	crosses	occur).	
(7') The	expected	distribution	of	progeny	phenotypes	in	a	cross	between	ij	and	ik	
is	E;	the	expected	distribution	of	progeny	phenotypes	in	a	cross	.	.	.	
(continued	for	all	pairs	in	the	pedigree	for	which	crosses	occur).	(Kitcher,	
1989,	p.	440)	
In	 this	 schematic	argument,	 (1’),	 (2’),	 (3’),	 (4’)	and	 (5’)	are	premises,	whereas	 (6’)	
and	(7’)	are	derived	from	the	premises.	
Correspondingly,	Morgan’s	theory	of	the	gene	in	1926	can	be	reformulated	as	
follows.	
(1'') There	are	n	pertinent	loci	L1,	.	.	.	,	Ln.	At	locus	Li,	there	are	mi	alleles	
ai1,	…,aimi.	
(2'') Individuals	who	are	a11a11a21a21…	an1an1	have	trait	P1;	individuals	who	are	
a11a12a21a21…	an1an1	have	trait	P2;	.	.	.	{Continue	through	all	possible	
combinations.}	
(3'') The	genotypes	of	the	individuals	in	the	pedigree	are	as	follows:	i1	is	G1,	i2	is	
G2,	.	.	.	,	in	is	GN.	{Appended	to	(3)	is	a	demonstration	that	(2)	and	(3)	are	
consistent	with	the	phenotypic	ascriptions	given	in	the	pedigree.}	
(4'') For	any	individual	x	and	for	any	alleles	y,	z,	if	x	has	vz	then	the	probability	
that	a	particular	one	of	x’s	offspring	will	have	y	is	1/2.	
(5'') The	linkage	relations	among	the	loci	are	given	by	the	equations	Prob(Li,	Lj)	
=	pij.	Prob(Li,	Lj)	is	the	probability	that	the	alleles	at	Li,	Lj	on	the	same	
chromosome	will	be	transmitted	together	(if	Li,	Lj,	are	loci	on	the	same	
chromosome	pair)	and	is	the	probability	that	arbitrarily	selected	alleles	at	Li,	
Lj	will	be	transmitted	together	(otherwise).	If	Li,	Lj	are	loci	on	the	same	
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chromosome	pair,	then	0.5	≤	Pij	≤	1.	If	Li,	Lj	are	on	different	chromosome	
pairs,	then	pij	is	0.5.	
(6'') The	expected	distribution	of	progeny	genotypes	in	a	cross	between	ij	and	ik	
is	D;	the	expected	distribution	of	progeny	genotypes	in	a	cross	.	.	.	
(continued	for	all	pairs	in	the	pedigree	for	which	crosses	occur).	
(7'') The	expected	distribution	of	progeny	phenotypes	in	a	cross	between	ij	and	
ik	is	E;	the	expected	distribution	of	progeny	phenotypes	in	a	cross	.	.	.	
(continued	for	all	pairs	in	the	pedigree	for	which	crosses	occur).	(Kitcher,	
1989,	pp.	440–441)	
Although	these	three	schematic	arguments	have	different	premises,	they	both	are	
applied	to	answer	the	pedigree	problems	like:	What	is	the	expected	distribution	of	
phenotypes	 in	 a	 certain	 generation?	 What	 is	 the	 probability	 that	 a	 particular	
phenotype	will	 result	 from	a	 certain	mating?	…	Thus,	 for	 Kitcher,	 the	problem	of	
theory-identification	 is	 resolved.	 Despite	 the	 theoretical	 variations	 between	 1900	
and	1926,	 these	 seemingly	different	 theories	are	 in	 fact	different	 versions	of	one	
theory	at	different	times.	
There	 are	 certain	 connections	 between	 these	 versions.	 In	 his	 words,	 "Mendelian	
genetics	persists	as	a	single	theory	with	different	versions	at	different	times	in	the	
sense	that	different	practices	are	 linked	by	a	chain	of	practices	along	which	there	
are	 relatively	 small	 modifications	 in	 language,	 in	 accepted	 questions,	 and	 in	 the	
patterns	 for	 answering	 questions.	 In	 addition	 to	 this	 condition	 of	 historical	
connections,	versions	of	classical	genetic	theory	are	bound	by	a	common	structure:	
each	version	uses	certain	expressions	to	characterise	heredity	phenomena,	accepts	
as	important	questions	of	a	particular	form,	and	offers	a	general	style	of	reasoning	
for	 answering	 those	 questions.	 Specifically,	 throughout	 the	 career	 of	 Mendelian	
genetics,	the	theory	is	directed	towards	answering	questions	about	the	distribution	
of	 characteristics	 in	 successive	 generations	 of	 a	 genealogy,	 and	 it	 proposes	 to	
answer	 those	 questions	 by	 using	 the	 probabilities	 of	 chromosome	distribution	 to	
compute	the	probabilities	of	descendant	genotypes."	(Kitcher,	1984,	pp.	353–354)	
In	short,	Mendelian	genetics	primarily	aimed	to	solve	"pedigree	problems"	(that	is,	
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identifying	and	explaining	patterns	of	inheritance);	different	versions	of	the	theory	
of	Mendelian	 genetics	 at	 different	 times	 contain	 some	 problem-solving	 patterns;	
and	 these	 patterns	 of	 reasoning	 were	 improved	 throughout	 the	 history.	 The	
changes	of	the	premises	in	these	schematic	arguments	well	reflect	the	theoretical	
variations	throughout	the	history.	
Kitcher's	 account	 shows	 a	 more	 sophisticated	 understanding	 of	 the	 history	 of	
Mendelian	genetics	than	those	pre-1980	accounts.	Firstly,	it	correctly	suggests	that	
the	 corpus	 of	 statements	 about	 the	 inheritance	 of	 characteristics	 is	 only	 one	
component	 of	 the	 practice	 of	 Mendelian	 genetics,	 and	 thus	 provides	 a	 fuller	
understanding	of	the	history	and	practice	of	Mendelian	genetics.	Secondly,	 it	well	
realises	 and	 explains	 away	 the	 problem	 of	 theory-identification	 by	 identifying	
theoretical	 statements	 about	 the	 patterns	 of	 inheritance	 as	 the	 premises	 of	
different	 but	 related	 reasoning	 schematic	 arguments.	 Thirdly,	 the	 problem	 of	
practice	 is	 also	 resolved.	 The	 experimental	 procedures	 and	methodological	 rules	
are	included	as	constituents	of	the	practice.	
Unfortunately,	 Kitcher’s	 account	 is	 still	 problematic	 in	 several	 ways.	 Firstly,	 it	
oversimplifies	 the	 history	 of	 genetics.	 The	 theoretical	 variations	 of	 Mendelian	
genetics	 cannot	 be	 exhaustively	 characterised	 by	 the	 premises	 of	 Kitcher’s	
schematic	 arguments.	 Nor	 do	 any	 of	 Kitcher’s	 schematic	 arguments	 capture	 the	
theoretical	 consensus	 at	 the	 time	 suggested.	 Secondly,	 Kitcher’s	 schematic	
arguments	 are	 formulated	ahistorically.	As	 I	 have	 shown,	 the	 terms	 like	 “alleles”,	
“genotype”,	 “phenotype”	 were	 not	 available	 in	 1900.	 Kitcher’s	 reformulations	 in	
terms	 of	 “alleles”,	 “genotype”	 and	 “phenotype”	 fail	 to	 reflect	 the	 substantial	
conceptual	 changes	 from	 1900	 to	 1920.	 Thirdly,	 Kitcher	 still	 fails	 to	 provide	 a	
sufficient	description	of	 the	process	of	 theory-construction.	 For	 instance,	 it	 is	 still	
unclear	 how	 the	 first	 version	 of	 the	 theory	 of	 Mendelian	 genetics	 (1900)	 is	
established.	 It	 is	 also	 unclear	 why	 there	 is	 a	 shift	 from	 the	 first	 to	 the	 second	
version	of	the	theory	of	Mendelian	genetics	and	how	it	happens.	Although	Kitcher’s	
analysis	 highlights	 the	 shift	 of	 schematic	 arguments,	 the	 problem	 of	
theory-construction	 is	 yet	 to	 be	 articulated	 adequately.	 Fourthly,	 the	 problem	 of	
identification	 is	 not	 satisfactorily	 solved.	 Kitcher’s	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	 of	
identification	 is	 to	 identify	 the	 pedigree	 problem	 as	 the	 underlying	 relation	
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connecting	 the	 different	 versions	 of	 the	 theory	 of	Mendelian	 genetics.	 However,	
there	 is	 a	 “second-order”	 problem	 of	 identification:	 It	 is	 difficult	 to	 identify	 a	
version	 of	 the	 pedigree	 problem	 that	 persists	 throughout	 the	 history.	 How	 can	
Kitcher	 identify	 the	 problems	 investigated	 with	 the	 different	 versions	 of	 the	
pedigree	 problem?	 Finally,	 as	 I	 shall	 show	 in	 the	 next	 section,	 like	 the	 pre-1980	
accounts,	 Kitcher’s	 understanding	 of	 Mendelian	 genetics	 is	 still	 fundamentally	
theory-driven	in	some	sense.	
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1.3	Criticisms	of	the	Theory-Driven	Approach	and	Theory-Centric	View	
Waters	(2004)	challenges	those	traditional	understandings.	 In	the	beginning	of	his	
paper	"what	was	Mendelian	genetics?",	he	compares	the	traditional	philosophical	
accounts	with	a	recent	historical	account	by	Robert	Kohler	(1994).	According	to	this	
account,	Mendelian	genetics	is	organised	around	the	efforts	to	investigate	a	broad	
range	of	basic	biological	phenomena,	not	just	transmission	phenomena.	Moreover,	
Kohler	provides	an	account	of	the	central	research	agendas	of	Mendelian	genetics	
without	 mentioning	 the	 central	 theory	 that	 explained	 inheritance	 patterns.	
Although,	 as	 Waters	 realises,	 it	 does	 not	 necessarily	 show	 that	 the	 theory	 was	
irrelevant	 to	Mendelian	 genetics,	 it	 does	 suggest	 that	 the	 research	 of	Mendelian	
genetics	 was	 not	 merely	 organised	 around	 efforts	 to	 improve	 theoretical	
explanations	 of	 gene	 transmission	 and	 expand	 upon	 the	 range	 of	 inheritance	
phenomena	explicable	in	terms	of	the	theory.	A	theory-based	picture	of	the	history	
of	Mendelian	genetics	 is	not	a	complete	presentation	of	the	history	of	Mendelian	
genetics.	
Hence,	Waters	believe	that	there	is	a	puzzle	for	philosophers.	On	the	one	hand,	the	
research	 of	 Mendelian	 genetics	 entailed	 many	 theoretical	 explanations	 of	
inheritance	 patterns.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 many	 research	 agendas	 of	 Mendelian	
genetics	can	be	described	without	mentioning	these	theoretical	explanations.	
Waters's	solution	to	this	puzzle	 is	 to	criticise	the	traditional	account	 for	mistaking	
the	means	for	the	ends:	"[E]xplanations	of	inheritance	patterns	are	an	essential	part	
of	 the	 means	 for	 advancing	 the	 research	 agendas	 of	 classical	 genetics,	 but	 that	
research	 agendas	 are	 not	 ultimately	 aimed	 at	 explaining	 inheritance	 patterns."	
(Waters,	2004,	p.	786)	For	Waters,	explaining	inheritance	patterns	does	not	exhaust	
practices	 of	 classical	 geneticists.	 He	 shows	 this	 by	 scrutinising	 Alfred	 Sturtevant’s	
investigation	of	a	crossover	modifier	CIIIB	(1926).	
In	the	1910s,	Morgan	and	his	collaborators	proposed	the	theory	of	the	gene,	which	
states	that	the	morphological	traits	of	an	individual	are	referable	to	paired	genes	in	
the	chromosomes	that	are	held	together	in	a	definite	number	of	linkage	groups.	
Each	pair	of	genes	separates	when	the	germ	cells	mature	and	recombines	with	the	
pair	of	genes	from	the	other	parent	to	form	a	new	pair	of	genes.	However,	the	
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Figure	1	Crossing	Over	
paired	genes	may	not	always	be	linked	completely.	The	genes	in	one	chromosome	
may	 be	 interchanged	 for	 the	 genes	 in	 the	 other	 chromosome.	 (See	 Figure	 1	
Crossing	Over)	This	phenomenon	of	interchange	is	called	crossing	over.	
In	the	1920s,	it	was	observed	that	the	frequency	of	crossing	over	between	any	two	
loci	varies	with	temperature,	age	of	parents,	chromosomal	context	of	the	segment	
containing	 the	 loci,	 and	 the	 presence	 of	 crosser	 modifiers	 on	 the	 same	
chromosome.	The	first	crossover	modifier	found	in	Drosophila,	CIIIA24,	reduced	the	
frequency	of	 crossing	over	 in	 the	 region	around	ebony	 in	 the	 third	 chromosome.	
This	 modifier	 did	 not	 reduce	 the	 frequency	 of	 crossing	 over	 when	 present	 in	
homozygous	 form.	 Shortly	 thereafter	 some	 other	 crossover	 modifiers	 were	
discovered.	At	first,	it	was	thought	that	the	crossover	modifiers	were	mutant	genes	
and	 geneticists	mapped	 their	 locations	 in	 the	 chromosome.	 However,	 Sturtevant	
pointed	out	that	the	cause	of	the	decrease	in	the	frequency	of	crossing	over	is	an	
inverted	section	of	the	chromosome	rather	than	a	mutation	of	a	single	gene.	(See	Figure	 2	 (Sturtevant,	 1926,	 p.	 699)25)	 He	 mapped	 the	 region	 around	 CIIIB	 and	
showed	that	the	order	the	genes	in	the	affected	region	was	reversed.	According	to																																																									24	 C	designates	a	crossover	modifier,	and	the	capitalization	means	that	it	is	a	dominant.	The	Roman	III	designates	its	locus	as	in	the	third-chromosome.	25	 I	acknowledge	the	permission	to	reprint	this	figure	from	Elsevier.	
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Sturtevant,	 the	 frequency	of	 crossing	over	was	 reduced	 in	 the	 third	 chromosome	
where	CIIIB	was	present	in	heterozygous	form	because	genes	in	the	inverted	region	
around	CIIIB	were	not	 positioned	 across	 from	 the	 corresponding	 genes	 in	 the	wild	
type	 chromosome	 during	meiosis.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 frequency	 of	 crossing	
over	was	not	reduced	in	flies	homozygous	for	CIIIB	because	the	order	of	the	genes	
was	the	same	in	the	two	third-chromosomes	of	these	flies.	
	
Figure	2	(Sturtevant,	1926,	p.	699)	
In	 addition	 to	explaining	 the	patterns	of	 inheritance,	 Sturtevant’s	 investigation	of	
the	 CIIIB	 also	 explains	 the	 synaptic	 attraction	 between	 chromosomes	 during	 the	
process	 of	 meiosis.	 As	 Waters	 neatly	 summarises,	 “Sturtevant’s	 finding	 that	
chromosomal	inversions	reduced	crossover	was	important	because	it	favoured	the	
idea	 the	 mutual	 attraction	 between	 genes	 was	 responsible	 for	 the	 mutual	
attraction	 between	 homologous	 chromosomes	 during	 meiosis	 and	 because	 it	
suggested	 that	 the	 process	 of	 crossing	 over	 depended	 on	 the	 close	 affinity	
homologous	genes.”	(Waters,	2004,	pp.	791–792)	In	other	words,	the	investigation	
of	 the	crossover	modifier	 is	not	only	 to	explain	some	patterns	of	 inheritance,	but	
also	 to	 reveal	 some	 information	 about	 basic	 biological	 processes	 (i.e.	 meiosis).	
Moreover,	Waters	emphasises	that	Sturtevant’s	research	on	the	crossover	modifier	
illustrated	 was	 central	 to	 the	 practice	 of	 Mendelian	 genetics	 in	 the	 later	 1920s,	
1930s	and	1940s.	
Therefore,	 Waters	 counters	 the	 unexamined	 assumption	 behind	 the	 traditional	
theory-driven	approach	in	analysing	the	history	of	Mendelian	genetics:	The	history	
of	 Mendelian	 genetics	 was	 centred	 on	 the	 development	 of	 a	 theory	 of	 gene	
transmission,	and	the	practice	of	Mendelian	genetics	is	organised	around	efforts	to	
improve	 the	 theory’s	 explanations	 of	 heredity	 and	 to	 expand	 the	 range	 of	
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inheritance	phenomena	that	it	could	explain.	
As	Waters	has	shown	 in	the	Sturtevant’s	case,	 the	practice	of	Mendelian	genetics	
was	 not	 ultimately	 theory-driven.	 There	 are	 many	 investigative	 practices	 (e.g.	
Sturtevant’s	 study	 of	 CIIIB)	 in	 Mendelian	 genetics	 without	 such	 purposes.	 These	
investigative	 practices	 should	 not	 be	 overlooked	 in	 analysing	 the	 history	 of	
Mendelian	 genetics.	 As	 Waters	 pointed	 out,	 "[T]he	 methods	 associated	 with	
genetic	analysis	and	the	genetic	approach	to	studying	biological	processes	were	as	
integral	 a	 part	 of	 classical	 genetics	 as	 were	 the	 principles	 of	 independent	
assortment	 and	 segregation."	 (Waters,	 2004,	 p.	 800)	 In	 other	 words,	 Waters	
suggest	s	that	philosophers	should	not	simply	take	a	monistic	understanding	of	the	
aim	of	Mendelian	genetics.	Focusing	on	explanations	of	inheritance	only	provides	a	
superficial	understanding	of	the	history	of	Mendelian	genetics.	Not	all	practices	of	
Mendelian	 genetics	 were	 centred	 on	 a	 central	 explanatory	 theory.	 Thus,	Waters	
contends	 that	 taking	 the	 theory-driven	 approach	 to	 analysing	 the	 history	 of	
Mendelian	 genetics	 relies	 on	 a	 problematic	 assumption	 that	 the	 practice	 of	
Mendlian	 genetics	 is	 centred	 on	 an	 explanatory	 theory.	 (The	 Problem	 of	
Theory-Centrality)	
Thus,	 given	 the	 problem	 of	 theory-centrality,	 Waters	 argues	 that	 the	 pre-1980	
traditional	 accounts	 are	 inadequate	 for	 understanding	 the	 actual	 practice	 of	
Mendelian	 genetics.	 Furthermore,	 Waters’s	 criticism	 is	 also	 applied	 to	 Kitcher’s	
account	of	Mendelian	genetics	in	terms	of	practices.	Although	Kitcher	realised	that	
experimental	procedures	and	methodological	rules	are	components	of	the	practice	
of	 Mendelian	 genetics,	 he	 still	 contended	 that	 these	 practical	 elements	 are	
designed	for	use	 in	evaluating	the	theoretical	consequences.	He	explicitly	claimed	
that	“these	[practical	elements]	may	be	ignored	for	[the	purpose	of	understanding	
the	state	of	a	science	at	a	time].”	(Kitcher,	1984,	p.	352)	 In	other	words,	Kitcher’s	
account	of	Mendelian	genetics	is	still	theory-driven.	
Along	 with	 Waters,	 I	 contend	 that	 that	 the	 theory-driven	 understanding	 of	
Mendelian	 genetics	 is	 inadequate.	 Moreover,	 based	 on	 Waters’	 objection	 on	
theory-driven	 approach,	 I	 wish	 to	 articulate	 the	 problems	 of	 the	 traditional	
theory-driven	 analyses	 of	 Mendelian	 genetics	 more	 explicitly.	 The	 theory-driven	
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approach	 is	 deeply	 rooted	 in	 an	 unexamined	 assumption,	 that	 is,	 the	 history	 of	
Mendelian	 genetics	 should	 be	 characterised	 and	 structured	 by	 a	 central	
explanatory	 theory.	 This	 assumption	 well	 reflects	 a	 view	 widely	 accepted	 by	
philosophers	that	there	is	a	theory	T,	which	is	essential	and	central	to	the	practice	
of	 Mendelian	 genetics	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 practice	 of	 Mendelian	 genetics	 is	
ultimately	driven	by	T.	To	say	that	the	practice	of	Mendelian	genetics	is	ultimately	
driven	 by	 T	 not	 only	means	 that	 T	 is	 accepted	 for	 all	 the	 practices	 of	Mendelian	
genetics,	but	also	that	the	practice	of	Mendelian	genetics	 is	organised	around	the	
efforts	 to	 apply,	 articulate,	 extend	 and	 improve	 T.	 This	 is	 what	 I	 call	 the	
theory-centric	view.	
Note	 that	 this	 theory-centric	 view	 (or,	 theory-centrism)	 is	 more	 than	 an	
unexamined	 assumption	 of	 the	 philosophical	 examination	 of	 the	 history	 of	
Mendelian	 genetics.	 It	 also	 reflects	 a	 widespread	 philosophical	 assumption	 that	
scientific	practice	 is	ultimately	 is	organised	around	efforts	to	fill	out	a	theory,	and	
thus	a	school	of	scientific	practice	or	an	episode	of	the	history	of	a	science	should	
be	characterised	and	structured	by	a	theory.	
Three	 further	 points	 have	 to	 be	 clarified.	 Firstly,	 the	 theory-centric	 view	 is	 not	 a	
view	about	the	nature	of	the	theory,	but	about	the	role	of	the	theory	in	(the	history	
and	 practice	 of)	 science.	 The	 theory-centric	 view	 of	 science	 only	 makes	 a	
commitment	to	the	importance	of	theory	in	science,	whether	a	theory	is	construed	
in	 terms	of	 statements,	models,	or	patterns	of	 reasoning.	The	question	 regarding	
the	nature	of	theory	given	the	acceptance	of	the	theory-centric	view	of	science	still	
remains.	For	example,	though	Kitcher	(1984,	1989)	and	Balzer	(1986;	2000)	clearly	
disagree	on	what	a	 theory	 is,	 both	of	 their	 characterisions	of	Mendelian	genetics	
are	theory-driven.	
Secondly,	 the	 theory-centric	view	of	 science	 is	not	 just	 the	view	that	 theories	are	
indispensable	 for	 scientific	 practice.	 In	 fact	 the	 theory-centric	 view	 of	 science	 is	
stronger	 than	the	claim	that	 theories	are	 indispensable	 for	scientific	practice.	The	
theory-centric	view	of	science	entails	 that	 theories	are	 indispensable	 for	scientific	
practice,	 but	not	vice	 versa.	 It	 should	be	noted	 that	when	 I	 say	 that	 theories	 are	
indispensable	for	scientific	practice,	it	only	means	that	for	any	scientific	practice	P,	
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there	must	 be	 some	 theories	 that	 play	 an	 important	 role.	 It	 does	not	warrant	 or	
imply	that	there	must	be	some	theories,	which	are	essential	and	central	to	P.	
Thirdly,	 the	 theory-centric	view	 is	different	 from	the	 theory-driven	approach.	The	
theory-driven	 approach	 is	 an	 approach	 adopted	 by	 philosophers	 to	 analysing	 the	
history	 and	 practice	 of	 science,	 while	 the	 theory-centric	 view	 is	 an	 assumption	
underlying	and	justifying	the	theory-driven	approach.	 	
Unfortunately,	this	theory-centric	view	is	highly	problematic,	especially	in	the	case	
of	Mendelian	genetics.	Firstly,	given	the	significance	of	a	central	explanatory	theory	
in	 the	 practice	 of	 genetics,	 it	 seems	 necessary	 to	 identify	 what	 that	 theory	 is.	
However,	 as	 I	 have	 shown	 in	 the	 section	 1.2,	 it	 is	 extremely	 difficulty	 to	 identify	
such	a	theory.	Thus,	it	is	doubtful	that	there	is	a	central	explanatory	theory	as	the	
driving	 force	 of	 the	 practice	 of	 genetics.	 This	 is	 the	 source	 of	 the	 problem	 of	
theory-identification.	
Secondly,	when	analysing	the	history	of	Mendelian	genetics,	the	philosophers	with	
the	theory-centric	view	in	mind	keeps	asking	perplexing	questions	as	follows:	
(1) What	is	the	theory	of	Mendelian	genetics?	(For	example,	Goosens,	1978;	
Kitcher,	1984;	Ruse,	1973)	
(2) How	should	the	theory	of	Mendelian	genetics	be	formulated?	(For	example,	
Balzer	and	Dawe	1986;	Balzer	and	Lorenzano	2000;	Lindenmayer	and	Simon	
1980;	Woodger	1937)	
(3) What	is	the	relation	between	the	theory	of	Mendelian	genetics	and	that	of	
molecular	genetics?	(For	example,	Hull,	1972;	Kitcher,	1984;	Schaffner,	1969;	
Waters,	1990)	
(4) What	is	a	“gene”?	(For	example,	Beurton,	Falk,	&	Rheinberger,	2000;	
Malisoff,	1939)	
It	should	be	noted	that	these	questions	are	not	bad	questions	themselves.	However,	
the	theory-centric	view	pushes	one	to	look	for	a	unitary	answer	to	questions	like	(1),	
(2)	and	(4).	Since	the	theory-centric	account	of	Mendelian	genetics	emphasises	the	
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essentiality	and	centrality	of	a	theory,	it	seems	implausible	that	such	a	theory	might	
be	understood	pluralistically.	Even	if	as	Kitcher	admits	that	the	theory	of	Mendelian	
genetics	 is	 a	 theory	 with	 different	 versions,	 he	 still	 has	 to	 show	 that	 there	 is	
something	common	and	unchanged	underlying	these	versions.	Thereafter,	a	further	
unitary	 answer	 is	 required	 to	 the	 question	 that	 what	 makes	 the	 different	
theoretical	knowledge	to	be	different	versions	of	one	single	theory.	Unfortunately,	
as	I	have	shown	in	the	section	1.2,	it	is	extremely	difficult	to	formulate	the	so-called	
theory	of	Mendelian	genetics,	so	it	is	likely	that	there	is	no	such	a	monist	account	of	
the	 theory	 of	 Mendelian	 genetics	 at	 all.	 If	 so,	 questions	 like	 (3)	 are	 no	 longer	
philosophically	 significant,	 since	 the	 problem	 of	 theory	 reduction	 relies	 on	 the	
assumption	that	there	are	two	unitarily	formulated	theories.	Hence,	questions	like	
(1),	(2),	(3)	and	(4)	are	misleading.	
Thirdly,	 the	 theory-centric	 view	 pushes	 philosophers	 to	 hold	 an	 oversimplified	
understanding	 of	 the	 development	 of	Mendelian	 genetics.	 A	 consequence	 of	 the	
theory-centric	Mendelian	genetics	 is	 that	 the	practice	of	Mendelian	genetics	aims	
to	look	for	a	theory	with	a	great	explanatory	power.	It	is	definitely	misleading	and	
ahistorical.	It	is	a	fact	that	neither	Mendel’s	study	on	Pisum26	 or	Morgan’s	study	on	
Drosophila	 initially	 aimed	 to	 look	 for	 a	 theory	 to	 explain	 the	 phenomena	 of	
inheritance.	 It	 is	 also	 evident,	 as	 Waters	 shows,	 that	 there	 are	 many	 significant	
contributions	(e.g.	investigation	of	a	crossover	modifier	CIIIB)	by	classical	geneticists,	
which	are	not	aimed	at	applying,	extending	or	 improving	the	theory	of	Mendelian	
genetics.	
Now	 I	 conclude	 that	 the	 theory-driven	 analyses	 of	 the	 history	 of	 genetics	 are	
problematic	 in	 the	sense	 that	both	 the	 theory-driven	approach	and	 its	underlying	
assumption	 are	 problematic.	 Thus,	 it	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 good	 time	 to	 explore	 a	 new	
approach	to	analysing	and	interpreting	the	history	of	genetics,	especially	the	origin	
of	genetics.	
Summary	
In	 this	 Chapter,	 I	 have	 briefly	 introduced	 the	 history	 of	 Mendelian	 genetics	 and	
shown	that	most	of	the	traditional	philosophical	analyses	of	it	are	theory-driven.	In																																																									26	 For	more	discussion,	see	Chapter	3.	
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addition,	 I	 have	 also	 articulated	 the	 four	 main	 problems	 of	 the	 theory-driven	
analyses:	The	problem	of	theory-identification,	the	problem	of	theory-construction,	
the	 problem	 of	 practice,	 and	 the	 problem	 of	 theory-centrality.	Moreover,	 I	 have	
articulated	 and	 critically	 examined	 the	 assumption	 underlying	 the	 theory-driven	
approach.	
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4.	An	Introduction	to	the	Exemplar-Based	
Approach	
Despite	 its	 dominance	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century's	 philosophy	 of	 science,	 the	
theory-driven	 approach	was	not	without	 enemies.	 Thomas	Kuhn,	 in	 his	 book	The	
Structure	 of	 Scientific	 Revolutions	 (1962),	 strongly	 opposes	 the	 unexamined	
assumption	among	philosophers	 that	 the	 theory	 should	be	 the	unit	of	 analysis	 in	
the	philosophical	examination	of	history	of	 science.	 In	particular,	Kuhn	 (1970b,	p.	
182)	 argues	 that	 the	 received	 understanding	 of	 theory	 “connotes	 a	 structure	 far	
more	 limited	 in	 nature	 and	 scope”	 to	 reflect	 the	 multifaceted	 practice	 of	 a	
community	 of	 scientists.	 In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 shall	 critically	 review	 and	 articulate	
Kuhn’s	 paradigm-based	 methodology.	 Then,	 inspired	 by	 Kuhn’s	 notion	 of	
“exemplar”,	 I	 shall	 propose	 a	 new	 definition	 of	 exemplar,	 and	 outline	 an	
exemplar-based	approach	as	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	 theory-driven	one	 to	 analysing	
the	history	of	scientific	practice.	
2.1	The	Kuhnian	Analyses	of	Mendel’s	Contribution	
For	Kuhn,	 the	 typical	 unit	 of	 analysis	 should	be	 a	paradigm	 rather	 than	a	 theory.	
Accordingly,	 Kuhn	 suggests	 that	 the	 history	 of	 a	 science	 is	 a	 cyclic	 process	
alternating	the	period	of	normal	science,	 in	which	most	scientists	work	under	one	
dominating	 paradigm,	with	 the	 period	 of	 scientific	 revolution,	 in	which	 there	 are	
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multiple	 competing	 paradigms.	 In	 the	 period	 of	 normal	 science,	 scientists’	 main	
task	 is	 to	 solve	 puzzles	 or	 problems	 of	 the	 accepted	 paradigm.	 Sometimes	 a	
paradigm	falls	into	a	state	of	crisis	due	to	some	internal	and	external	factors	when	
the	scientists	begin	to	 lose	their	confidence	 in	the	ability	and	effectiveness	of	 the	
paradigm’s	puzzle-solving	machinery.	For	Kuhn,	a	crisis	 is	"the	usual	prelude"	to	a	
scientific	revolution,	or	paradigm-shift.	In	the	period	of	scientific	revolution,	there	is	
no	 universally	 accepted	 paradigm	 in	 the	 community	 of	 scientists.	 Multiple	
paradigms	 compete	 with	 each	 other	 until	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 new	 period	 of	
normal	 science	 (i.e.	 one	 of	 the	 competing	 paradigms	 wins	 the	 support	 of	 the	
majority	and	most	scientists	again	work	together	to	solve	its	puzzles).	
This	Kuhnian	account	of	the	history	of	science	provides	an	alternative	way	to	
analyse	the	history	of	science,	including	the	history	of	genetics.	On	the	basis	of	his	
reinterpretation	of	Mendel’s	work,	Augustine	Brannigan	(1979)	adopts	Kuhn’s	
conceptual	framework	to	reassess	Mendel’s	contribution:	
[I]n	1866	Mendel’s	work	figured	as	normal	science	in	the	hybridist	tradition,	
while	in	1900	the	revival	of	Mendel’s	discovery	of	segregation	constituted	a	
relatively	revolutionary	achievement.	(Brannigan,	1979,	p.	424)	
According	to	Brannigan,	Mendel’s	work	on	Pisum	plays	a	dual	role	in	the	history	of	
science.	On	the	one	hand,	it	is	well	within	the	paradigm	of	hybridism27.	The	main	
problem	that	Mendel	aimed	to	solve	is	“the	role	of	hybridization	in	the	evolutionary	
history	of	organic	forms”,	which	was	an	unsolved	puzzle	left	by	early	hybridists.	On	
the	other	hand,	Mendel’s	work	was	adopted	by	the	rediscoverers	to	constitute	a	
scientific	revolution	in	the	history	of	the	science	of	heredity.	Thus,	from	his	
contemporaries’	point	of	view,	Mendel’s	work	was	part	of	the	paradigm	of	
hybridism,	while	from	the	rediscoverers’	point	of	view,	some	of	Mendel’s	work	
played	a	key	role	in	the	a	revolution	in	the	science	of	heredity	in	1900.	
Müller-Wille	and	Orel	(2007)	recently	provide	a	similar	Kuhnian	interpretation.	 	
Mendel’s	achievement	was	a	product	of	normal	science,	and	yet	a	
revolutionary	step	forward.	(Müller-Wille	&	Orel,	2007,	p.	171)																																																									27	 For	a	brief	history	of	hybridism,	see	the	section	3.1.	
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Along	with	Brannigan,	Müller-Wille	and	Orel	argue	that	Mendel’s	work	was	an	
extension	of	early	hybridists’	(especially	Gärtner’s)	work.	They	convincingly	show	
that	there	is	a	continuity	of	works	by	Linnaeus,	Kölreuter,	and	Gärtner,	linked	with	
anomalies	and	puzzles	under	an	accepted	paradigm.	However,	there	is	one	
substantial	difference	between	Brannigan’s	and	Müller-Wille’s	and	Orel’s	
interpretations.	Müller-Wille	and	Orel	contend	that	Mendel’s	work	itself	was	
revolutionary.	 	
As	we	shall	see	in	Chapter	3	and	4,	from	a	historical	point	of	view,	both	
interpretations	are	more	sophisticated	than	the	theory-based	ones	discussed	in	
Chapter	1.	Unlike	the	theory-driven	analyses,	Mendel’s	theory	is	not	simply	
construed	as	a	theory	of	heredity	without	argument.	Mendel’s	work	is	examined	in	
its	historical	context.	For	example,	the	hybridist	influence	on	Mendel	is	well	
characterised	and	highlighted	in	these	Kuhnian	interpretations.	However,	the	role	
of	Mendel’s	work	in	1900	has	yet	been	articulated	adequately.	Brannigan	is	unclear	
on	how	and	to	what	extent	Mendel’s	work	was	adopted	and	constituted	the	
Mendelian	revolution	in	1900,	while	Müller-Wille’s	and	Orel’s	philosophical	
interpretation	that	Mendel’s	work	was	revolutionary	is	based	on	their	
controversial28	 historical	argument	that	Mendel’s	work	can	be	understood	as	a	
work	of	heredity.	
Nevertheless,	these	Kuhnian	analyses	suggest	a	promising	way	to	analyse	and	
characterise	the	origin	of	genetics	from	Mendel	to	Bateson.	In	order	to	explore	a	
more	sophisticated	paradigm-based	approach,	I	shall	first	review	Kuhn’s	conception	
of	paradigm	in	detail.	
	 	
																																																								28	 For	in-depth	discussions,	see	the	section	3.3.	
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2.2	Revisiting	Kuhn’s	Paradigm	
Kuhn	(1962)	proposes	that	the	practice	of	a	scientific	community	should	be	better	
analysed	and	characterised	in	terms	of	paradigms	than	of	theories.	Kuhn’s	proposal	
can	be	understood	 in	 two	ways,	 given	his	 elaboration	of	 two	 senses	of	paradigm	
(Kuhn,	 1970b,	 1974):	 paradigm-as-disciplinary	 matrix	 and	 paradigm-as-exemplar.	
One	 interpretation	 of	 Kuhn’s	 proposal	 is	 that	 a	 paradigm	 (-as-disciplinary	matrix)	
should	 be	 a	 better	 candidate	 to	 represent	 and	 reflect	 the	 practice	 of	 a	 scientific	
community	than	a	theory.	The	disciplinary	matrix	(the	broad	sense	of	“paradigm”)	
is	defined	as	a	consensus	around	a	variety	of	components	of	activities	shared	by	the	
members	 of	 a	 given	 scientific	 community. 29 	 Kuhn’s	 favourite	 examples	 of	
disciplinary	 matrices	 include	 Aristotelian	 physics,	 Ptolemaic	 astronomy	 and	
Newtonian	mechanics.	(Kuhn,	1970b,	p.	10)	
There	are	 four	main	constituents	of	a	disciplinary	matrix:	 symbolic	generalisation,	
model,	 value,	 and	 exemplar	 (the	 narrow	 sense	 of	 “paradigm”).	 Symbolic	
generalisations	 are	 symbolic	 expressions	 of	 scientific	 hypotheses,	 which	 can	 be	
manipulated	mathematically.	Models,	for	Kuhn,	designate	two	different	classes.	On	
the	 one	 hand,	 models	 include	 “the	 metaphysical	 commitments”	 or	 “ontological	
models”30	 like	 the	 belief	 that	 the	 heat	 of	 a	 body	 is	 the	 kinetic	 energy	 of	 its	
constituent	 particles.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 models	 also	 encompass	 the	 “heuristic	
models	 and	 analogies”	 in	 accordance	 with	 which	 phenomena	 from	 a	 given	 class																																																									29	 Kuhn	defines	a	disciplinary	matrix	as	what	the	members	of	a	scientific	community	share.	This	definition	emphasises	the	importance	of	scientific	communities	in	the	understanding	of	the	history	of	science.	Scientific	communities	can	be	isolated	without	prior	recourse	to	theoretical	agreements,	while	disciplinary	matrices	have	to	be	determined	by	scrutinising	the	behaviours	and	practice	of	a	given	community’s	members.	This	definition	highlights	Kuhn’s	belief	that	all	scientific	practices	are	community-based	activities.	As	Kuhn	put	it,	“[a]	paradigm	governs,	in	the	first	instance,	not	a	subject	matter	but	rather	a	group	of	practitioners.	Any	study	of	paradigm-directed	or	of	paradigm-shattering	research	must	begin	by	locating	the	responsible	group	or	groups.”	(Kuhn,	1970b,	p.	180)	Here	Kuhn,	unlike	his	most	contemporaries	(perhaps	I	shall	say	philosophers),	took	a	very	different	perspective	of	the	history	of	science.	From	his	point	of	view,	the	subject	is	not	theories	but	what	the	community	of	scientists	share.	As	to	how	to	isolate	a	scientific	community	without	prior	recourse	to	theoretical	agreements,	Kuhn	provides	a	rough	methodology	by	examining	attendance	at	special	conferences,	the	distribution	of	draft	manuscripts	prior	to	publication,	and	all	formal	and	informal	communication	networks	including	those	in	correspondence	and	in	the	linages	of	citations.	And	he	also	assumes	that	a	“more	systematic	means”	for	the	identification	of	a	scientific	community	will	be	forthcoming.	(Kuhn,	1970b,	pp.	177–178,	1974,	pp.	461–462)	30	 Kuhn	did	not	explicitly	define	the	so	called	“metaphysical	commitments”	in	addition	to	giving	two	examples.	As	to	the	heat	example,	it	seems	more	proper	to	call	it	the	definition	of	heat	than	the	metaphysical	commitment	of	heat.	
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may	 be	 treated	 as	 if	 they	 were	 something	 else	 entirely.	 Take	 an	 example	 from	
Mendelian	genetics:	Genes	 carried	on	 chromosomes	 can	be	understood	as	beads	
strung	 on	 a	 wire.31	 The	 values	 of	 a	 disciplinary	matrix,	 which	 are	 shared	 by	 the	
members	under	it	(Kuhn,	1970b,	p.	185,	1977a,	pp.	321–322)32,	include	accuracy33,	
consistency34,	scope35,	simplicity36,	fruitfulness37	 and	so	on38.	The	exemplar,	which	
Kuhn	claimed	"the	most	novel	and	 least	understood	aspect	of	 [SSR]",	 is	originally	
defined	as	"a	set	of	recurrent	and	quasi-standard	illustrations	of	various	theories	in	
their	 conceptual,	 observational	 and	 instrumental	 applications.	 These	 are	 the	
community's	 paradigms,	 revealed	 in	 its	 textbooks,	 lectures	 and	 laboratory	
exercises.”	 (Kuhn,	 1970b,	 p.	 43)	 According	 to	 a	 later	 definition	 (Kuhn,	 1974),	 the	
exemplars	 are	 the	 “concrete	 problem-solutions”39.	 Thus,	 accordingly,	 a	 paradigm	
(-as-disciplinary	 matrix)	 shift	 involves	 the	 change	 of	 symbolic	 generalisations,	
models,	values,	and	exemplars.	
Traditionally,	 most	 philosophers	 including	 Kuhn	 himself	 used	 to	 take	 disciplinary	
matrix	 as	 an	 alternative	 to	 theory	 to	 analyse	 the	 history	 of	 science,	 since	 a																																																									31	 It	is	not	difficult	to	see	that	Kuhn’s	definition	of	“model”	is	not	well	developed.	For	example,	the	 nature	 of	model	 is	 not	 discussed.	 Scientific	model	 has	 been	 becoming	 one	 of	 the	 central	topics	 in	 the	 philosophy	 of	 science	 since	 1970s,	 but	 unfortunately	 Kuhn	 did	 not	 further	articulate	a	refined	account	of	“models”	in	his	later	academic	career.	32	 Kuhn	(1977a)	uses	"theory"	and	"paradigm"	interchangeably.	For	the	sake	of	consistency,	I	re-formulate	these	values	in	terms	of	disciplinary	matrix.	33	 A	disciplinary	matrix	should	be	both	qualitatively	and	quantitatively	accurate,	that	is,	the	consequences	(or	predictions)	of	the	disciplinary	matrix	should	be	in	demonstrated	agreement	with	the	results	of	existing	observations	and	experiments.	And	to	what	extent	the	qualitative	and	quantitative	accuracy	is	enough	is	shared	by	the	members	under	that	disciplinary	matrix.	34	 The	components	of	a	disciplinary	matrix	should	be	consistent	and	compatible	with	other	well-established	disciplinary	matrices.	The	members	of	the	scientific	community	share	a	commitment	to	the	standard	of	consistency.	35	 A	disciplinary	matrix	should	have	a	broad	scope	in	the	sense	that	the	consequences	of	a	disciplinary	matrix	should	extend	far	beyond	the	particular	observations	it	was	initially	designed	to	account	for.	36	 A	disciplinary	matrix	should	provide	unifying	explanations	for	the	ordering	of	unrelated	groups	of	phenomena	and	have	the	simplest	conceptual	and	technical	apparatus	and	procedures	for	application.	The	standard	of	simplicity	is	universally	accepted	within	the	scientific	community.	37	 A	disciplinary	matrix	should	disclose	new	phenomena	or	new	relations	between	previously	known	phenomena.	38	 In	addition,	Kuhn	(1970a)	occasionally	regards	the	unity	of	science,	explanatory	power	and	plausibility	as	values	of	a	disciplinary	matrix.	39	 Kuhn	does	not	explicitly	define	what	a	“concrete”	problem	means.	By	the	examples	he	gives,	the	concrete	problems	seem	to	be	the	problems	in	the	actual	practice.	But	are	there	any	problems	not	problems	in	the	actual	practice?	Thus,	the	predicate	“concrete”	seems	unnecessary	and	redundent,	and	I	shall	use	the	term	“problem-solution”	instead	in	the	following.	
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disciplinary	matrix	 encompasses	 a	more	dimensions	of	 the	practice	of	 a	 scientific	
community	 than	 a	 theory	 does.	 For	 example,	 Kuhn	 (1970b,	 pp.	 55–56,	 107)	
contends	 that	 the	 chemical	 revolution	 is	 better	 characterised	 as	 a	 shift	 between	
two	 disciplinary	matrices	 rather	 than	 one	 between	 two	 theories.	 This	 plan	 looks	
appealing,	but	the	disciplinary	matrix-based	approach	encounters	a	similar	problem	
that	 threats	 the	 theory-driven	 approach:	 the	 problem	 of	 paradigm-identification.	
When	 looking	 at	 a	 historical	 case,	 it	 is	 very	 difficult	 to	 identify	 a	 set	 of	 symbolic	
generalisations,	models,	values,	and	exemplars,	which	is	invariantly	and	universally	
accepted	by	the	community	throughout	the	period	of	normal	science.	 In	addition,	
the	 constituents	 of	 a	 disciplinary	 matrix,	 especially	 models	 and	 exemplars,	 are	
insufficiently	articulated	in	Kuhn’s	work.	 	
The	other	way	to	understand	Kuhn’s	proposal	that	the	practice	of	a	scientific	
community	should	be	better	analysed	and	characterised	in	terms	of	paradigms	
rather	than	theories	is	that	an	exemplar	is	a	better	candidate	to	characterise	the	
most	fundamental	unit	shared	by	a	scientific	community	than	a	theory	is.	
	
Figure	3	
An	exemplar,	 as	 I	mentioned,	 is	defined	by	Kuhn	as	a	 concrete	problem-solution.	
Ptolemy’s	 solution	 by	 applying	 epicycles	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 accounting	 for	 the	
retrograde	motion	 of	 Saturn	 is	 a	 good	 example	 of	 an	 exemplar.	 Ptolemy	 used	 a	
geometric	 model	 to	 explain	 the	 variations	 in	 speed	 and	 orbit	 of	 the	 motion	 of	
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Saturn.40	 In	the	simplest	form,	Saturn	moves	on	a	small	circle	(an	epicycle),	whose	
centre	moves	on	the	large	circle	(a	deferent).	(See	Figure	3)	At	his	time,	Ptolemy's	
application	of	epicycles	was	a	great	scientific	achievement	as	a	tool	to	describe	and	
predict	the	motion	of	Saturn.	
For	 Kuhn,	 exemplars	 are	more	 than	 concrete	 problem-solutions.	 The	 example	 of	
Ptolemy's	application	of	epicycle	highlights	four	normative	functions	of	exemplar41.	
Firstly,	exemplars	have	a	semantic	function.	Some	concepts	are	not	only	employed	
in	exemplars,	but	also	acquire	their	meanings	with	the	articulation	of	exemplars.	In	
the	 above	 example,	 the	 concept	 "epicycle"	 can	 be	 better	 understood	 by	 an	
exemplary	application	of	it.	And	it	is	not	an	isolated	case.	As	Kuhn	puts	it,	"Without	
exemplars	 [one]	 would	 never	 learn	 much	 of	 what	 the	 group	 knows	 about	 such	
fundamental	 concepts	as	 force	and	 field,	element	and	compound,	or	nucleus	and	
cell."	(Kuhn,	1974,	p.	471)	
Secondly,	exemplars	have	an	 investigative	 function	by	 suggesting	new	puzzles	 for	
the	paradigm.	(Kuhn,	1970b,	p.	x)	For	example,	applying	one	epicycle	to	the	circular	
orbit	 of	 Saturn	 is	 a	 great	 improvement	 in	 explaining	 the	 retrograde	 motion	 of	
Saturn,	but	it	does	not	perfectly	fit	the	actual	observation	of	the	motion	of	Saturn.	
Hence	a	new	puzzle	occurs:	How	can	it	be	resolved?	Of	course,	this	is	just	one	kind	
of	puzzle	suggested	by	exemplars.	There	are	many	other	kinds.	In	some	cases,	the	
symbolic	generalisations	employed	by	an	exemplar	may	 involve	a	constant	whose	
value	is	not	known	with	precision	(e.g.	the	articulation	of	the	gravitational	constant	
in	 the	 law	of	gravitation);	an	exemplar	may	employ	approximations	 that	could	be	
improved;	 it	may	 suggest	 other	 puzzles	 of	 the	 same	 kind	 (e.g.	 whether	 a	 similar	
solution	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 a	 similar	 problem);	 it	 may	 suggest	 new	 areas	 for	
investigation	(e.g.	what	is	the	physical	referent	for	a	concept	used	in	an	exemplar).	
Thirdly,	exemplars	have	an	explanatory	function	by	providing	approaches	to	other	
problems.	 (Kuhn,	 1970b,	 p.	 x)	 The	 application	 of	 epicycle	 in	 formulating	 Saturn's	
orbit	to	account	for	its	retrograde	motion	indicates	a	similar	and	potential	solution																																																									40	 Ptolemy	was	not	the	first	to	develop	this	model.	It	is	believed	that	the	application	of	epicycle	can	be	traced	back	to	Apollonius	of	Perga	and	Hipparchus	of	Rhodes.	41	 Hoyningen-Huene	(1993)	summarised	three	functions	for	exemplars,	and	Bird	(2000)	identified	four.	My	interpretation	of	the	functions	of	exemplars	is	slightly	different	from	theirs.	
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to	the	puzzle	of	describing	Saturn's	retrograde	motion.	
Fourthly,	 exemplars	 have	 an	 evaluative	 function	by	providing	 standards	 to	 assess	
potential	 problem-solutions.	 (Kuhn,	 1970b,	 p.	 103)	 The	 concepts,	 models,	 and	
values	 employed	 in	 different	 exemplars	 in	 a	 disciplinary	 matrix	 have	 to	 be	
consistent.	And	the	solutions	to	the	similar	problems	are	assessed	with	respect	to	
the	 similarity	 of	 the	 exemplary	 solution.	 For	 example,	 the	 explanation	 of	 the	
retrograde	 motion	 of	 Mercury	 by	 applying	 epicycles	 is	 acceptable	 for	 Ptolemaic	
astronomers	 since	 it	 is	 consistent	 and	 similar	 to	 Ptolemy’s	 solution	 by	 applying	
epicycles	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 accounting	 for	 the	 retrograde	 motion	 of	 Saturn.	 In	
contrast,	 Priestley,	 as	 a	 practitioner	 of	 the	 phlogiston	 paradigm	 (as	 a	 disciplinary	
matrix)	 of	 combustion,	 refused	 to	 accept	 Lavoisier’s	 solution	 by	 employing	 the	
concept	 “oxygen”	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 accounting	 for	 combustion,	 since	 it	
contradicted	 the	 fundamental	 exemplar	 of	 the	 phlogiston	 paradigm	 (as	 a	
disciplinary	matrix).	Moreover,	exemplars	contribute	to	establish	standards	as	well	
as	 other	 sorts	 of	 components	 of	 a	 disciplinary	matrix.	 As	 Paul	 Hoyningen-Huene	
summarises,	 "For	a	 judgement	 regarding	 the	acceptability	of	a	proposed	problem	
solution	is	an	evaluation	of	this	proposal	undertaken	relative	to	accepted	symbolic	
generalizations,	 ontological	 commitments,	 the	 heuristic	 models	 current	 in	 the	
community,	 and	 accepted	 standards	 of	 accuracy,	 simplicity,	 and	 the	 like."	
(Hoyningen-Huene,	1993,	p.	162)	
The	 normative	 functions	 highlight	 the	 significance	 of	 exemplar	 in	 the	 scientific	
practice.	Moreover,	Kuhn	has	three	reasons42	 for	his	preference	of	exemplars.	
Firstly,	 when	 investigating	 the	 history	 and	 practice	 of	 a	 particular	 scientific	
community,	it	is	much	easier	to	find	shared	exemplars	than	to	find	shared	theories	
as	a	guide	to	the	practice	of	this	scientific	community.	(Kuhn,	1970b,	pp.	43–44)	The	
scientists	of	a	particular	community	can	agree	that	an	exemplar	provides	a	solution	
to	a	research	problem	but	disagree	about	some	of	the	concepts,	laws	and	theories	
postulated	by	that	exemplar.	For	example,	Stahl,	Priestley	and	Cavendish	accept	the	
explanation	of	the	phenomenon	of	combustion	by	appeal	to	the	phlogiston	model,																																																									42	 In	fact,	Kuhn	(1970b)	identified	four	reasons	for	the	priority	of	exemplars.	But	the	fourth	reason	is	implausible,	and	he	later	(1974,	p.	471	n.17)	also	admitted	this,	so	I	decide	not	to	state	it	here.	
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but	they	differ	in	the	identification	of	the	properties	of	phlogiston.	As	a	result,	the	
search	 for	 a	 set	 of	 shared	 theories,	 the	 so-called	 theory	 of	 phlogiston,	 between	
Stahl,	Priestley	and	Cavendish	 is	more	difficult	and	 less	 satisfying	 than	 the	search	
for	 a	 shared	 exemplar.	 As	 Hoyningen-Huene	 remarks,	 "The	 coherence	 of	 the	
research	tradition	associated	with	[a	core	of	common,	concrete	problem	solutions]	
is	a	consequence	of	the	fact	that	scientists	find	and	process	their	research	problems	
by	 forming	 analogies	 to	 these	 exemplary	 problem	 solutions...	 the	 attempt	 to	
reconstruct	a	set	of	rules	assumed	to	underlie	research	practice	implicitly	generally	
misses	its	mark."	(Hoyningen-Huene,	1993,	p.	137)	
Secondly,	 scientists	 cannot	 learn	 concepts,	 laws	 and	 theories	without	 exemplars.	
(Kuhn,	1970b,	pp.	46–47)	In	Kuhn’s	words,	"Scientists...	never	learn	concepts,	laws	
and	theories	in	the	abstract	and	by	themselves...	A	new	theory	is	always	announced	
together	with	applications	to	some	concrete	range	of	natural	phenomena;	without	
them	it	would	not	be	even	a	candidate	for	acceptance."	(Kuhn,	1970b,	p.	46)	In	the	
example	of	 Ptolemy’s	 solution	 to	 the	problem	of	 retrograde	motion,	 the	 concept	
“epicycle”	 is	 articulated	 by	 the	 exemplar.	 It	 is	 evident	 that	 concepts,	 laws	 and	
theories	 are	 directly	 learned	 through	 repeated	 exposure	 of	 exemplars,	 not	 vice	
versa.	As	Kuhn	emphasises,	“[i]n	absence	of	…	exemplars,	the	laws	and	theories	[a	
student]	has	previously	learned	would	have	little	empirical	content.”	(Kuhn,	1970b,	
p.	188)	In	this	sense,	exemplars	play	a	more	fundamental	role	than	theories	do	in	
the	scientific	practice.	
Thirdly,	the	history	of	science	shows	that	the	practice	of	a	scientific	community	can	
develop	 without	 shared	 theories	 as	 long	 as	 there	 are	 shared	 exemplars.	 (Kuhn,	
1970b,	 pp.	 47–48)	 Consider	 the	 history	 of	 the	 phlogiston	 theory43.	 Despite	 the	
disagreement	 on	 the	 properties	 of	 phlogiston,	 there	 is	 a	 continuous	 series	 of	
practices	 of	 a	 community	 including	 Priestley	 and	 Cavendish	 who	 worked	 on	 the	
basis	 of	 the	 exemplary	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 accounting	 for	 combustion	 in	
terms	of	phlogiston.	Therefore,	Kuhn	argues	that	the	exemplar	is	a	better	candidate	
to	reflect	and	represent	the	practice	and	history	of	science.																																																									43	 When	I	say	"the	history	of	the	phlogiston	theory",	I	do	not	mean	a	history	of	a	theory,	namely	the	phlogiston	theory.	Rather	I	mean	a	school	of	scientific	practice	in	the	18th	century.	The	reason	I	call	it	"the	phlogiston	theory"	is	just	to	follow	the	convention.	
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To	sum	up,	 there	are	two	ways	of	understanding	Kuhn’s	proposal	 that	a	scientific	
achievement	should	be	better	understood	in	terms	of	paradigms	than	of	theories.	
In	the	broad	sense,	a	paradigm-as-disciplianry	matrix	should	be	a	better	candidate	
to	represent	and	reflect	a	school	of	scientific	practice	 in	 the	history	of	science.	 In	
the	 narrow	 sense,	 a	 paradigm-as-exemplar	 should	 be	 a	 better	 candidate	 to	
characterise	 the	 fundamental	 unit	 shared	 by	 a	 scientific	 community.	
Correspondingly,	 we	 can	 learn	 two	 paradigm-based	 approaches	 from	 Kuhn.	
According	to	the	disciplinary	matrix-based	approach,	when	analysing	the	history	of	
science,	 one	 should	 first	 identify	 a	 disciplinary	 matrix	 by	 articulating	 the	 shared	
symbolic	generalisations,	models,	values,	and	exemplars.	Then	one	should	 further	
analyse	these	constituents	of	the	disciplinary	matrix,	detail	how	they	can	be	applied	
to	solve	puzzles,	reconstruct	how	they	develop	and	explore	the	development	of	the	
disciplinary	matrix	 as	 a	 puzzle-solving	machinery.	 However,	 given	 the	 inadequate	
explication	 of	 “model”,	 “value”,	 and	 “exemplar”	 and	 their	 significance	 to	 the	
determination	 of	 a	 disciplinary	 matrix,	 there	 is	 too	 much	 work	 to	 be	 done	 to	
explore	 and	 defend	 the	 disciplinary	matrix-based	 approach.	 Thus,	 this	 is	 not	 the	
approach	 I	 aim	 to	 explore	 and	 defend	 in	 this	 thesis.	 Rather,	 I	 shall	 focus	 on	 the	
notion	of	exemplar	and	 its	application	as	a	 tool	 to	analyse	 the	history	of	 science.	
Before	delving	into	my	articulation	of	exemplar,	I	shall	carefully	re-examine	Kuhn’s	
characterisation	of	exemplar.	
Prospects	of	an	Exemplar-based	Approach	
Exemplar	is	a	key	concept	in	Kuhn’s	early	philosophy	of	science	(1962,	1970b,	1974).	
Puzzle-solving	 is	 the	 most	 common	 and	 characteristic	 activity	 in	 the	 period	 of	
normal	science,	and	even	symbolises	the	scientific	character	to	some	extent44.	 	 As	
I	have	reviewed,	exemplars	as	problem-solutions	play	an	indispensable	role	 in	the	
practice	 of	 puzzle-solving.	 It	 is	 Kuhn’s	 novel	 contribution	 to	 the	 significance	 of	
puzzle-solving	 in	 the	scientific	practice	 into	 the	philosophy	of	 science	community.	
However,	Kuhn's	conception	of	"exemplar"	still	lacks	of	a	full	articulation.	Nor	has	a	
Kuhnian	 exemplar-based	 approach	 ever	 been	 explored	 seriously	 to	 analyse	 the	
																																																								44	 Kuhn	(1970a)	once	argues	that	it	is	puzzle-solvability	rather	than	falsifiability	that	is	the	criterion	of	scientific	character.	
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history	 or	 practice	 of	 science.45 	 One	 reason	 might	 be	 that	 Kuhn	 no	 longer	
continued	to	develop	his	account	of	 the	history	of	 science	 in	 terms	of	exemplars,	
neither	 by	 presenting	 a	 detailed	 historical	 case-study,	 nor	 providing	 a	 more	
sophisticated	 conceptual	 analysis	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 exemplar.	 In	 particular,	 Kuhn’s	
own	definition	of	exemplar	 is	 too	 thin	and	premature.	Many	 significant	problems	
concerning	 exemplars	 are	 yet	 to	 be	 explored.	 Firstly,	 Kuhn	 says	 little	 on	 how	 an	
exemplar	 is	 first	established	or	constructed	further.	Although	he	 is	 famous	for	his	
rejection	 of	 the	 sharp	 distinction	 between	 the	 context	 of	 discovery	 and	 of	
justification	and	accusing	philosophers	of	ignoring	the	“temporal	development	of	a	
theory”,	 Kuhn	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 sophisticated	 account	 of	 the	 construction	 and	
temporal	 development	 of	 an	 exemplar.	 Secondly,	 in	 his	 elaboration,	 Kuhn’s	
“exemplar”	 is	 simply	 exemplified	by	 the	examples	 in	 the	 textbooks,	 lectures,	 and	
laboratory	exercises.	The	constituents	of	an	exemplar	are	never	explicitly	explicated.	
Nor	 is	 a	 historical	 example	 of	 an	 exemplar	 articulated	 in	 an	 explicit	way.	 Thirdly,	
Kuhn’s	 “exemplar”	 (as	 a	 problem-solution)	 implicitly	 assumes	 some	 pre-existing	
problems.	But	where	are	 these	pre-existing	problems	 from?	Although	contending	
that	 the	 shift	 of	 accepted	 exemplars	 in	 a	 scientific	 revolution	 necessitates	 the	
redefinition	of	research	problems	(Kuhn,	1970b,	p.	103),	he	says	 little	on	how	the	
research	 problems	 are	 defined.	 Nor	 is	 clear	 if	 problem-defining	 is	 a	 task	 for	 the	
construction	 of	 an	 exemplar.	 The	 significance	 of	 problem-defining	 seems	 to	 be	
neglected	 by	 Kuhn.	 Fourthly,	 Kuhn	 fails	 to	 explore	 the	 characteristics	 of	 a	 good	
exemplar.	 It	 is	 unclear	 what	makes	 some	 exemplars	 successfully	 accepted,	 while	
others	neglected	or	abandoned.46	
Therefore,	it	seems	clear	that	a	promising	exemplar-based	approach	has	to	rely	on	
a	more	sophisticated	articulation	of	exemplar	and	overcome	all	the	problems	of	
Kuhn’s	conception	of	exemplar.	In	the	next	section,	I	shall	articulate	and	explore	a	
new	interpretation	of	exemplar	and	thereof	an	outline	of	the	exemplar-based																																																									45	 There	are	a	few	attempts	to	employ	the	notion	of	exemplar	to	analyse	some	history	cases.	For	example,	Darden	(1991)	analyses	the	explanatory	virtue	of	the	hybrid	crossing	in	terms	of	exemplar,	while	Skopek	(2011)	explores	the	pedagogical	virtue	of	Mendel’s	work	on	peas	in	terms	of	exemplar.	Unfortunately,	the	exemplar,	for	both	Darden	and	Skopek,	is	simply	construed	as	the	example	in	the	textbook.	46	 As	I	have	mentioned,	Kuhn	listed	five	main	characteristics	of	a	good	theory	(or	a	paradigm).	(Kuhn,	1977a,	pp.	321–322)	However	the	theory	(or	the	paradigm)	here	refers	obviously	to	a	disciplinary	matrix	rather	than	an	exemplar.	
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approach.	
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2.3	 The	 New	 Definition	 of	 Exemplar	 and	 the	 Exemplar-based	
Approach	
As	 I	 have	 argued	 in	 the	 last	 section,	 Kuhn’s	 definition	 of	 exemplar	 is	 not	 well	
articulated	mainly	in	four	ways:	
1) The	constituents	of	an	exemplar	are	unclear;	
2) The	construction	of	an	exemplar	is	unclear;	
3) No	detailed	example	of	an	exemplar	is	given.	
4) What	makes	an	exemplar	successfully	received	is	unclear.	
Correspondingly,	a	good	reinterpretation	of	exemplar	has	to	
1') analyse	the	constituents	of	an	exemplar;	
2') explicate	how	an	exemplar	is	constructed;	
3') be	instantiated	by	a	detailed	historical	case-study.	
4') explore	the	characteristics	of	a	successfully	accepted	exemplar	
In	other	words,	I	not	only	have	to	tell	what	an	exemplar	is,	what	the	components	of	
an	 exemplar	 are,	 but	 also	 to	 explore	 how	 an	 exemplar	 is	 constructed,	 how	 an	
episode	of	the	history	of	science	is	best	characterised	in	terms	of	exemplars	by	my	
case	study	of	the	origin	of	Mendelian	genetics.	Moreover,	 I	shall	discuss	what	the	
characteristics	of	a	good	exemplar	are,	which	make	it	successfully	accepted.	
I	 have	 argued	 that	 one	 advantage	 of	 a	 Kuhnian	 exemplar-based	 account	 of	 the	
history	of	science	is	that	the	significance	of	the	problem-solution	in	the	history	and	
practice	of	science	is	well	articulated	and	highlighted.	Many	of	scientific	practices	in	
history	are	oriented	or	inspired	by	some	past	successful	problem-solutions.	Kuhn’s	
account	 of	 “puzzle-solving”	 does	 capture	 the	 “essence”	 of	many,	 though	 not	 all,	
scientific	practices	 in	history.	 Therefore,	 I	would	 reserve	 this	 fundamental	part	of	
Kuhn’s	 idea	 that	 a	 key	 constituent	 of	 an	 exemplar	 is	 a	 problem-solution.	
Furthermore,	 I	 argue	 that	 an	 exemplar	 as	 the	 fundamental	 unit	 shared	 by	 a	
scientific	 community	 should	 be	 more	 than	 a	 problem-solution.	 A	 well-defined	
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problem	itself	is	at	least	as	important	as	its	solution	in	the	scientific	practice.	It	also	
has	 as	 many	 normative	 functions	 as	 its	 solution	 does.	 In	 many	 historical	 cases,	
puzzle-solving	and	problem-defining	are	two	intertwined	activities.	As	I	shall	show	
in	 Chapter	 5,	 an	 exemplary	 practice	 involves	 the	 mutually	 related	 activities	 of	
puzzle-solving	 and	 problem-defining.	 Moreover,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	
problem-defining	is	much	more	than	proposing	a	problem.	In	fact	it	usually	consists	
of	 activities	 of	 problem-proposing	 (i.e.	 propose	 an	 initial	 problem),	
problem-refining	 (i.e.	 refine	 an	 initial	 problem),	 and	 problem-specification	 (i.e.	
make	an	initial	problem	into	some	more	specific	and	practical	problems).	
Thus,	my	definition	of	exemplar	is	as	follows:	 	
An	 exemplar	 is	 a	 set	 of	 contextually	 well-defined	 research	 problems	 and	 the	
corresponding	solutions.	 	
First	 of	 all,	 I	 follow	 Kuhn	 in	 maintaining	 that	 one	 of	 the	 characteristics	 of	 an	
exemplar	 is	 to	 provide	 a	 problem-solution.	 However,	 one	 crucial	 difference	
between	 Kuhn’s	 and	 my	 definition	 is	 that	 Kuhn	 implicitly	 assumes	 that	 a	
well-defined	problem	is	already	posed	before	an	exemplar	is	constructed,	whereas	I	
contend	 that	 the	 contribution	 of	 an	 exemplar	 to	 the	 practice	 of	 science	 is	more	
than	a	successful	problem-solution.	The	well-defined	research	problems	should	be	
an	essential	constituent	of	an	exemplar.	 In	many	historical	cases,	the	introduction	
to	the	new	research	problem	itself	is	a	great	scientific	achievement.	For	instance,	in	
The	 Origins	 of	 Species,	 Charles	 Darwin	 introduced	many	 new	 research	 problems,	
which	were	never	thought	of	or	formulated	before,	 like	“How	will	the	struggle	for	
existence…	act	in	regard	to	variation?	Can	the	principle	of	selection,	which	we	have	
seen	 is	 so	potent	 in	 the	hands	of	man,	apply	 in	nature?”	 (Darwin,	1999,	p.	68)	 In	
history	 of	 science,	 new	 research	 problems	 usually	 play	 a	 vital	 role	 to	 guide	 the	
further	practice.	
Secondly,	 I	 take	 an	 exemplar	 as	 a	 set	 of	 research	 problems	 and	 their	 solutions	
rather	than	a	single	problem	and	its	solution.	The	reason	is	that	a	set	of	problems	
and	 their	 solutions	 can	 better	 reflect	 the	 complex	 aspects	 of	 an	 exemplar	 as	 a	
scientific	 achievement.	 For	 example,	 we	 may	 argue	 that	 the	 Morgan	 school’s	
research	 on	 Drosophila	 provides	 a	 problem	 of	 the	 patterns	 of	 inheritance	 of	
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Drosophila	and	its	solution.	However	it	is	a	fuller	analysis	that	the	Morgan	school’s	
research	on	Drosophila	provides	a	set	of	well-defined	research	problems	(e.g.	what	
is	 the	 expected	 distribution	 of	 phenotypes	 in	 a	 certain	 generation?	What	 is	 the	
probability	 that	a	particular	phenotype	will	 result	 from	a	certain	mating?	What	 is	
the	frequency	of	crossing	over	between	two	given	 loci	 in	the	chromosomes?)	and	
their	solutions.	
Thirdly,	the	reason	why	I	define	an	exemplar	as	a	set	of	“contextually”	well-defined	
research	 problems	 and	 the	 corresponding	 successful	 solutions	 is	 that	 these	
research	problems	can	only	be	well	defined	and	understood	in	the	context	of	their	
solutions.	 In	 the	 process	 of	 constructing	 an	 exemplar,	 problem-defining	 and	
solution-searching	 are	 not	 two	 independent	 activities.	 Rather	 these	 are	 two	
intertwined	 activities.	 Solution-searching	 is	 obviously	 dependent	 on	 the	 research	
problem,	while	the	research	problem,	as	I	shall	show	in	Chapter	5,	can	be	redefined	
with	 the	 process	 of	 solution-searching	 such	 as	 conceptualisation	 and	
hypothesisation.	 	
Fourthly,	an	exemplar	should	not	be	understood	 in	a	purely	theoretical	sense.	No	
exemplar	 can	 be	 constructed	 in	 an	 armchair.	 Any	 exemplar	 must	 have	 some	
non-theoretical	components.	
Thus,	 a	 naïve	 version	 of	 the	 exemplar-based	 approach	 can	 be	 formulated	
accordingly	as	follows.	
One	 should	 first	 analyse	 the	 history	 of	 a	 science	 by	 identifying	 the	 research	
problems.	 Then,	 one	 needs	 to	 analyse	 the	 solutions	 and	 practical	 efforts	 to	 seek	
solutions,	 and	 then	 provide	 details	 about	 how	 they	 were	 applied	 to	 solve	 the	
problems.	
It	 is	obvious	that	such	an	exemplar-based	approach	is	still	too	vague	to	be	helpful	
or	 instructive	 in	 analysing	 the	history	of	 science.	 In	 response,	 I	 have	 to	articulate	
the	 components	 of	 the	 solutions	 of	 an	 exemplar	 in	 greater	 detail.	 However,	 it	
should	 be	 noted	 that	 I	 do	 not	 think	 that	 the	 constituents	 of	 the	 solutions	 of	 an	
exemplar	can	be	characterised	 in	a	monistic	way.	Scientists	solve	the	problems	 in	
different	 ways,	 so	 it	 would	 be	 unwise	 for	 anyone	 to	 try	 to	 summarise	 some	
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universally	fundamental	parts	in	their	solutions.	Therefore,	what	I	would	provide	is	
rather	 a	 common	 recipe	 of	 an	 exemplar	 rather	 than	 a	 definition.	 By	 “a	 common	
recipe”	I	mean	that	an	exemplar	usually	consists	in	such	and	such	components,	but	
definitely	not	exclusive.	Here	is	my	common	recipe.	
An	 exemplar	 has	 five	 main	 components:	 a	 vocabulary,	 which	 includes	 all	 the	
concepts	 employed	 in	 the	 problems	 and	 solutions;	 a	 set	 of	 well-defined	 research	
problems;	 a	 set	 of	 practical	 guides,	 which	 specify	 all	 the	 procedures	 and	
methodology	as	means	to	solve	the	problems;	a	set	of	hypotheses	or	models,	which	
are	 proposed	 to	 solve	 the	 problems;	 and	 a	 set	 of	 patterns	 of	 reasoning,	 which	
indicate	how	to	use	other	components	to	solve	the	problems.	
Three	points	have	to	be	added	here.	Firstly,	these	five	components	are	intertwined.	
For	instance,	the	hypotheses	are	often	formulated	on	the	basis	of	the	results	of	the	
experiments	 by	 employing	 the	 concepts	 in	 the	 vocabulary;	 the	 experiments	 are	
usually	designed	and	undertaken	with	the	purpose	of	solving	the	research	problems	
(e.g.	 by	 testing	 the	 hypotheses);	 the	 concepts	 in	 the	 vocabulary	 are	 understood	
with	the	help	of	undertaking	the	experiments	and	applying	the	hypotheses,	and	so	
on.	Secondly,	the	vocabulary	of	an	exemplar	does	not	suggest	the	all	the	concepts	
in	 the	 vocabulary	 are	 first	 introduced	by	 the	 exemplar.	 It	 is	 not	 unusual	 that	 the	
vocabulary	of	an	exemplar	has	some	pre-defined	concepts.	Thirdly,	the	hypotheses	
in	 the	exemplar	 should	not	be	narrowly	construed	as	 statements	or	propositions.	
Rather	 I	 refer	 to	 “hypotheses”	 as	 all	 kinds	 of	 theoretical	 constructions	 made	 by	
scientists.	In	the	history,	scientist	use	different	terms	to	name	this	kind	of	work	like	
“hypotheses”,	 “assumptions”,	 “principles”,	 “laws”,	 “theories”,	 “models”,	
“mechanisms”,	etc.	
Thus,	 correspondingly,	 the	 construction	 of	 an	 exemplary	 practice	 is	 a	 series	 of	
intertwined	 practices	 of	 experimentation,	 problem-defining,	 conceptualisation,	
hypothesisation,	 and	 reasoning.	 The	 experimentation	 is	 the	 practice	 of	 designing	
and	undertaking	the	experiments.	The	problem-defining	is	the	practice	of	defining	
and	 redefining	 the	 research	 problems.	 The	 conceptualisation	 is	 the	 practice	 of	
introducing	 a	 new	 conceptual	 scheme.	 The	 hypothesisation	 is	 the	 practice	 of	
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theoretical	construction	to	make	an	explanatory	and	predictive	machinery.47	 Again,	
all	 these	practices	are	 intertwined	and	cannot	be	understood	as	 the	 independent	
activities	of	an	exemplary	practice.	
Therefore,	a	common	recipe	for	the	exemplar-based	approach	can	be	summarised	
as	follows.	
In	order	to	analyse	the	history	of	the	practice	of	a	scientific	school,	we	first	should	
identify	the	initial	problem	as	the	starting	point	of	the	research48,	and	then	trace	the	
way	 of	 solving	 the	 initial	 problem	 by	 identifying	 the	 actual	 problems	 to	 be	
investigated	and	 the	way	 they	occur	 in	 the	practice,	and	analysing	 the	process	of	
problem-defining,	 conceptualisation,	 experimentation,	 hypothesisation,	 and	
reasoning	 involved.	 Then,	 we	 should	 detail	 the	 development	 of	 the	 intertwined	
practices	in	history	to	explore	the	development	of	a	school	of	scientific	practice.	
Before	ending	 this	 chapter,	 I	 find	one	more	problem,	namely	 the	problem	of	 the	
reception	 of	 an	 exemplary	 practice,	 to	 be	 articulated.	 Why	 are	 some	 exemplars	
successfully	 received,	 while	 others	 totally	 neglected	 or	 abandoned	 after	 the	
acceptance	 in	 a	 period?	 What	 makes	 those	 exemplar	 so	 successfully	 accepted?	
What	are	the	characteristics	shared	by	those	successfully	accepted	exemplars?	
It	 is	 obvious	 that	 philosophy	 alone	 cannot	 provide	 the	 complete	 and	
comprehensive	answers	to	these	questions.	Why	and	when	an	exemplary	practice	
is	 recognised	 and	 well	 received	 by	 a	 community	 of	 scientists	 are	 determined	 by	
intellectual,	social,	political,	religious	factors.	My	interest	here	is	not	to	attempt	to	
look	for	universal	and	comprehensive	answers	to	these	questions.	Rather,	I	aim	to	
identify	 some	 intellectual	 characteristics	 shared	 by	 all	 well	 received	 exemplary																																																									47	 Note	that	I	have	to	emphasise	here	that	there	is	no	universal	account	of	theoretical	construction.	We	have	to	delve	into	the	historical	context	to	study	the	process	of	hypothesisation.	For	example,	some	hypothesisaitons	are	better	characterised	as	modelling,	while	others	are	better	as	the	discovery	of	mechanism.	 	48	 Although	 I	 emphasised	 many	 times	 that	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 contributions	 of	 an	exemplary	practice	 is	the	definition	of	research	problems,	 it	 is	unlikely	for	a	scientist	to	begin	his	studies	without	an	initial	problem,	which	was	a	well-defined	research	problem.	These	kind	of	initial	problems	might	not	be	interesting	at	all	for	the	subsequent	development	of	the	studies.	A	classical	example	is	that	the	initial	problem	that	inspired	Morgan	to	conduct	experiments	on	
Drosophila	was	in	search	for	an	experimental	approach	to	evolution,	but	he	finally	made	a	great	achievement	 on	 solving	 the	 problems	 of	Drosophila’s	 heredity.	 It	 is	 also	 likely	 that	 an	 initial	problem	is	re-formulated	in	new	terms.	
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practices	 in	 the	 history	 of	 science	 if	 there	 is	 any.	 I	 propose	 that	 all	 successfully	
accepted	exemplar	 share	 (at	 least)	 two	 “intellectual”	 characteristics:	 repeatability	
and	usefulness.	A	successfully	accepted	exemplary	practice	must	be	repeatable	 in	
the	 sense	 that	 all	 the	 practice	 of	 problem-defining,	 experimentation,	
conceptualization,	hypothesisation,	and	reasoning	can	be	repeatedly	manipulated.	
On	 the	other	 hand,	 a	 successfully	 accepted	 exemplary	 practice	must	 be	useful	 in	
the	sense	that	some	concepts	in	the	vocabulary,	some	hypotheses,	some	research	
problems,	 some	practical	guides,	or	 some	patterns	of	 reasoning	of	 the	exemplary	
practice	 can	 be	 used	 as	 tools	 to	 solve	 other	 existing	 problems	 or	 establish	 new	
exemplary	 practices.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 repeatability	 and	 usefulness	 are	
minimally	 necessary,	 rather	 than	 sufficient	 conditions	 of	 a	 successfully	 received	
exemplary	practice.	
Before	taking	an	exemplar-based	approach	to	analysing	the	origin	of	genetics	and	
showing	how	the	exemplar-based	approach	is	helpful	to	understand	the	questions	
like	Mendel’s	 contribution	 and	 the	 actual	 development	of	 early	 genetics,	 I	would	
revisit	the	history	of	genetics	from	Mendel	to	Bateson	in	the	next	two	chapters.	
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CHAPTER                                                                       	
	
3 
	
2.	Mendel’s	Versuche	Revisited	
Conventionally	Mendel’s	paper	Versuche	über	Pflanzen-Hybriden	(1865)	is	regarded	
as	the	starting	point	of	modern	genetics.	However,	there	are	many	disagreements	
on	the	interpretation	of	Mendel’s	paper.	In	particular,	the	objective	of	Mendel’s	
paper	and	his	contribution	to	the	history	of	genetics	are	highly	controversial.	In	this	
chapter,	I	aim	to	reinterpret	Mendel’	work	on	Pisum.	Considering	many	discussions	
on	Mendel’s	paper	conflate	Mendel’s	concern	with	his	contribution,	I	shall	break	
down	the	question	concerning	how	to	understand	Mendel’s	work	into	three	
questions:	What	is	Mendel’s	real	concern	in	his	paper?	What	did	Mendel	believe	
that	he	achieved	in	the	paper?	Can	Mendel’s	paper	be	understood	as	a	study	on	
heredity?49	 Firstly,	I	shall	argue	that,	under	the	influence	of	hybridism	(especially	
Gärtner),	Mendel’s	real	concern	in	his	1866	paper	is	about	development	of	hybrids	
in	their	progeny	(die	Entwicklung	der	Hybriden	in	ihren	Nachkommen),	rather	than	
heredity	(Verebung)	in	general.	Secondly,	I	shall	show	that	Mendel	himself	well	
recognised	that	his	contribution	is	the	discovery	of	the	statistical	regularity	in	the	
progeny	of	hybrids	and	the	corresponding	laws	of	development	of	hybrids	as	the	
explanans.	Thirdly,	I	shall	argue	that	Mendel’s	work	cannot	be	construed	as	a	study	
on	heredity,	no	matter	how	heredity	is	interpreted.	
																																																								49	 These	three	questions	are	not	independent	of	each	other.	However,	I	believe	that	exploring	these	questions	is	helpful	to	understand	Mendel’s	contribution	to	the	history	of	genetics.	
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3.1	Gärtner’s	Legacy	and	Mendel’s	Real	Concern	
The	 once	 received	 understanding	 of	Mendel’s	 studies	 on	Pisum	 is	 I	 believe	 quite	
familiar	 to	most.	Mendel,	 a	 nineteenth-century	monk	 living	 in	 Brünn,	 now	 in	 the	
Czech	Republic,	 spent	eight	 years	doing	experiments	on	Pisum	 in	his	 garden,	 and	
finally	discovered	the	laws	(or	facts)	of	heredity,	which	lay	down	the	foundation	of	
the	 theory	 of	 Mendelian	 genetics.	 Correspondingly,	 Mendel’s	 motivation	 of	 his	
studies	 on	 Pisum	 is	 implicitly	 assumed	 to	 be	 an	 attempt	 to	 investigate	 the	
hereditary	 patterns	 of	 Pisum.	 This	 traditional	 interpretation	 has	 been	 very	
influential	among	historians,	geneticists,	and	philosophers	(even	today).	
The	 story	 of	 Gregor	 Mendel	 is	 well-known.	 Between	 1856	 and	 1863,	 he	
conducted	 extensive	 trials	 with	 pea	 plants,	 growing	 over	 twenty-eight	
thousand	of	them,	which	led	him	to	draw	up	his	famous	Laws	of	inheritance.	
(Kingsbury,	2009,	p.	142)	
As	a	result	of	his	research	with	pea	plants,	Mendel	proposed	…	a	theory	of	
particulate	 inheritance.	 A	 genetic	 determinant	 of	 a	 specific	 character	 is	
passed	on	from	one	generation	to	the	next	as	a	unit,	without	any	blending	
of	 the	 units.	 This	 model	 explained	 many	 observations	 that	 could	 not	 be	
explained	by	blending	 inheritance.	 It	also	proved	a	very	 fruitful	 framework	
of	 further	 progress	 in	 understanding	 the	 mechanism	 of	 heredity.	 (Suzuki,	
Griffiths,	Miller,	&	Lewontin,	1981,	p.	100)	
Gregor	Mendel’s	(1822-1884)	work	in	the	1860s	on	patterns	of	inheritance,	
rediscovered	around	1900,	provided	evidence	for	unobservable	differences	
among	 germ	 cells	 that	might	 explain	 the	 preservation	 of	 traits.	 (Craver	&	
Darden,	2013,	p.	70)	
The	Central	Terms:	Hybriden	and	Entwicklung	
However,	 it	 is	 not	 obvious	 to	 see	 this	 point	 given	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 Mendel’s	
introductory	remarks	(Einleitende	Bemerkungen).	
Artificial	 fertilization	undertaken	on	ornamental	plants	to	obtain	new	color	
variants	 initiated	 the	 experiments	 to	 be	 discussed	 here.	 The	 striking	
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regularity	with	which	 the	same	hybrid	 forms	always	 reappeared	whenever	
fertilization	between	like	species	took	place	suggested	further	experiments	
whose	task	it	was	to	follow	the	development	of	hybrids	in	their	progeny.	
….	 That	 no	 generally	 applicable	 law	of	 the	 formation	 and	 development	 of	
hybrids	 has	 yet	 been	 successfully	 formulated	 can	 hardly	 astonish	 anyone	
who	 is	acquainted	with	the	extent	of	the	task	and	who	can	appreciate	the	
difficulties	 with	 which	 experiments	 of	 this	 kind	 have	 to	 contend.	 A	 final	
decision	can	be	reached	only	when	the	results	of	detailed	experiments	from	
the	most	diverse	plant	families	are	available.	Whoever	surveys	the	work	in	
this	field	will	come	to	the	conviction	that	among	the	numerous	experiments	
not	one	has	been	carried	out	to	an	extent	or	in	a	manner	that	would	make	it	
possible	 to	 determine	 the	 number	 of	 different	 forms	 in	 which	 hybrid	
progeny	appear,	permit	classification	of	these	forms	in	each	generation	with	
certainty,	and	ascertain	their	numerical	interrelationships.	It	requires	a	good	
deal	of	courage	indeed	to	undertake	such	a	far-reaching	task;	however,	this	
seems	 to	 be	 the	 one	 correct	 way	 of	 finally	 reaching	 the	 solution	 to	 a	
question	 whose	 significance	 for	 the	 [developmental]50	 history	 of	 organic	
forms	must	not	be	underestimated.	
The	paper	discusses	 the	attempt	at	such	a	detailed	experiment…	(Mendel,	
1865,	pp.	3–4,	1966a,	pp.	1–2)	
From	 the	quoted	passage,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 inheritance	of	 characters	of	Pisum	 is	
not	Mendel’s	main	 concern.	 Neither	 the	 German	word	 for	 “inheritance”,	 nor	 for	
“heredity”	appears	in	the	introductory	remarks.	More	surprisingly,	they	are	absent	
in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 paper,	 except	 that	Mendel	 uses	 the	 verb	 “vererbt	 (inherited)”	
once51.	 In	 contrast,	 there	 are	 two	 other	 key	 words	 I	 found.	 The	 German	 word	
Hybriden	 (hybrids)	 remarkably	 appears	 101	 times.	 The	 title	 of	 the	 paper	
“Experiment	 on	 Plant	 Hybrids”	 (Versuche	 über	 Pflanzen-Hybriden)	 also	 suggests	
that	 Mendel’s	 primary	 concern	 is	 about	 hybridisation	 rather	 than	 heredity.	 In																																																									50	 In	Sherwood’s	original	translation,	Entwicklungs-Geschichte	is	translated	as	“evolutionary	history”.	However,	I	prefer	to	my	translation	as	“developmental	history”,	given	the	contemporary	usage	of	“evolution”.	See	my	discussion	in	the	section	3.1,	for	my	reasons.	51	 The	original	German	text	is	“auch	beschränkt	sich	diese	Eigentümlichkeit	nur	auf	das	Individuum	und	vererbt	sich	niche	auf	die	Nachkommen”.	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	14)	(Sherwood’s	translation	(1966a,	p.	12):	“furthermore,	this	peculiarity	is	restricted	to	the	individual	and	not	inherited	by	the	offspring.”)	
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addition,	 Entwicklung	 is	 another	 key	 word,	 appearing	 45	 times	 in	 the	 paper.	 (In	
most	 cases,	 Entwicklung	 is	 translated	 as	 development,	 though	 occasionally	 as	
formation	or	evolution	by	Sherwood.52)	 In	particular,	Mendel	explicitly	states	that	
the	purpose	of	his	experiments	reported	in	the	paper	is	to	study	“the	development	
of	hybrids	in	their	progeny”.	In	his	own	words,	the	objective	can	be	summarised	as	
an	attempt	to	formulate	a	generally	applicable	law	of	the	development	of	hybrids	in	
their	 progeny	 by	 a	 detailed	 experiment.	 Moreover,	 this	 can	 be	 confirmed	 in	
Mendel’s	 later	 letters	 to	Nägeli,	 in	which	Entwicklung	 is	 still	a	central	word53.	For	
example,	in	the	first	letter,	Mendel	introduces	his	work	as	a	discovery	of	the	laws	of	
development.	
The	results	which	Gärtner	obtained	in	his	experiments	are	known	to	me;	I	
have	repeated	his	work	and	have	re-examined	it	carefully	to	find,	if	possible,	
an	agreement	with	those	laws	of	development	which	I	found	to	be	true	for	
my	experimental	plant.	(Mendel,	1966b,	p.	57)	
Hence,	 if	 one	 makes	 a	 careful	 reading	 of	 Mendel’s	 paper	 (1865),	 it	 is	 beyond	
dispute	 that,	 literally	 speaking,	 Mendel’s	 concern	 is	 about	 the	 development	 of	
hybrids	 in	 their	 progeny,	 rather	 than	 the	 problem	 of	 heredity.	 However,	 it	 still	
remains	controversial	on	how	to	interpret	this	objective:	What	did	Mendel	mean	by	
“the	 development	 of	 hybrids	 in	 their	 progeny”?	What	 is	 the	 underlying	 concern	
behind	Mendel’s	study	of	“the	development	of	hybrids	in	their	progeny”?	Can	“the	
development	of	hybrids	in	their	progeny”	be	construed	as	patterns	of	inheritance?	
Some	(for	example,	Brannigan,	1979,	pp.	424,	449;	Callender,	1988,	p.	41;	Corcos	&	
Monaghan,	 1993,	 p.	 95;	 Monaghan	 &	 Corcos,	 1990,	 p.	 289;	 Olby,	 1979,	 p.	 67)	
strongly	oppose	the	view	that	Mendel’s	concern	can	be	identified	with	the	problem	
of	 heredity,	 since	 Mendel	 seems	 to	 make	 his	 motivation	 quite	 explicitly	 in	 the	
introductory	 remarks.	 He	 claimed	 that	 the	 problem	 he	 was	 trying	 to	 solve	 was	
significant	“for	the	[developmental]	history	of	organic	forms.”	(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	2)	
Thus,	 based	 on	 this	 passage,	 there	 are	 some	 reinterpretations	 of	 Mendel’s	
motivation	or	objectivity	since	the	late	1970s	(for	example,	Brannigan,	1979;	Olby,																																																									52	 See	Appendix	1.	53	 See	Appendix	2	for	an	exhaustive	list	of	the	usage	of	Entwicklung	in	Mendel’s	letters	to	Nägeli.	
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1979).	 Robert	 Olby	 (1979)	 famously	 argues	 that	 Mendel’s	 study	 on	 patterns	 of	
inheritance	 of	 the	 characters	 of	 Pisum	 is	 just	 the	 means	 to	 study	 “the	 role	 of	
hybrids	in	the	genesis	of	new	species”.	
Mendel’s	overriding	concern	was	with	the	role	of	hybrids	 in	the	genesis	of	
new	species.	Are	hybrids	variable	or	constant?	–	for	 if	constant	they	might	
mark	 the	 first	 stage	 in	 the	 genesis	 of	 new	 species.	 He	 approached	 the	
subject	 with	 his	 conception	 of	 constant	 and	 independently	 transmitted	
characters.	The	laws	of	inheritance	were	only	of	concern	to	him	in	so	far	as	
they	bore	on	his	analysis	of	the	evolutionary	role	of	hybrids.	(Olby,	1979,	p.	
67)	
L.	A.	Callender	(1988)	considerably	reinforces	this	bold	view54	 by	arguing	that	
Mendel	was	in	fact	a	proponent	of	the	doctrine	of	Special	Creation	(i.e.	the	
hybrids	of	two	species	are	a	third	species),	and	his	research	on	Pisum	was	an	
attempt	to	confirm	it.	
Mendel	was	 an	opponent	 of	 the	 fundamental	 principle	 of	 evolution	 itself,	
that	is	to	say,	of	descent	with	modification,	…	[remaining	attached]	to	that	
modified	form	of	the	doctrine	of	Special	Creation	first	proposed	by	Linnaeus	
in	the	proceeding	century.	(Callender,	1988,	p.	41)	
In	 comparison,	 Floyd	 Monaghan	 and	 Alain	 Corcos	 are	 more	 modest	 on	
interpreting	 Mendel’s	 objective	 by	 avoiding	 making	 bold	 conjectures	 on	
Mendel’s	motivation.	
[T]he	real	objectivity	of	Mendel’s	work	was	the	creation	of	a	mathematically	
precise	 science	 of	 hybridization	 modeled	 upon	 the	 physical	 sciences.	
(Monaghan	&	Corcos,	1990,	p.	289)	
In	 order	 to	 answer	 the	 questions	 and	 assess	 these	 interpretations,	 I	 find	 it	
necessary	to	delve	 into	the	historical	research	context	of	Mendel’s	study	first	and	
foremost.	
Mendel,	Hybrids,	and	Hybridism																																																									54	 In	fact,	as	Olby	admits,	this	view	is	originally	proposed	by	Callender	in	1974	in	his	unpublished	M.Phil	dissertation.	(Olby,	1979,	pp.	57,	69n28)	
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Mendel’s	primary	concern	on	hybridisation	is	also	well	reflected	by	the	references	
he	 made	 in	 the	 paper.	 In	 the	 paper,	 there	 are	 five	 scholars	 and	 their	 works	
mentioned	in	total:	Kölreuter,	Gärtner,	Herbert,	Lecoq,	Wichura,	all	of	whom	were	
important	figures	of	hybridism55,	a	research	school	in	the	late	eighteenth-	and	early	
nineteenth-century.	In	Mendel’s	words,	they	all	had	“devoted	a	part	of	their	lives	to”	
the	 problem	 of	 the	 development	 of	 hybrids	 in	 their	 progeny.	 In	 particular,	 Carl	
Friedrich	 von	 Gärtner	 is	 mentioned	 18	 times,	 while	 Joseph	 Joseph	 Gottlieb	
Kölreuter	 6	 times. 56 	 What	 is	 more,	 in	 his	 Conclusion	 Remarks	
(Schluss-Bemerkungen),	Mendel	himself	clearly	identifies	that	his	work	on	Pisum	is	
within	the	“field”	of	the	hybridist	tradition,	led	by	“two	authorities”	Kölreuter	and	
Gärtner57,	 and	makes	 a	 lengthy	 comparison	 of	 his	 work	with	 theirs.	 Therefore,	 I	
argue	 that	 the	 significance	 of	 hybridists’	 (especially	 Kölreuter’s	 and	 Gärtner’s)	
influence	on	Mendel	should	not	be	overlooked	or	underestimated.	
Table	5	
Cited	Scholars	in	Mendel’s	paper	(1866)	
Cited	scholar	 The	number	of	occurrence	
Kölreuter	 6	
Gärtner	 18	
Herbert	 1	
Lecocq	 1	
Wichura	 3	
	
The	hybridists’	legacy	in	Mendel’s	work	on	Pisum	has	been	well	recognised	among	
historians.																																																									55	 For	a	detailed	study	of	the	history	of	hybridism,	see	Roberts	(1929).	56	 Herbert	and	Lecoq	are	only	mentioned	once	in	the	Introductory	Remarks	as	two	of	“numerous	careful	observers”,	while	Wichura	is	mentioned	two	more	times	elsewhere	with	his	work	on	willow.	Gärtner	is	the	most	mentioned	scholar	in	the	paper	and	the	only	one	mentioned	with	his	titled	book	Die	Bastarderzeugung	im	Pflanzenreiche.	It	should	be	noted	that	though	Kölreuter	is	second	most	mentioned,	he	is	only	mentioned	in	accordance	with	Gärtner.	This	is	partly	why	some	historians	suespect	that	Mendel	did	not	read	Kölreuter	directly,	but	learnt	his	work	via	Gärtner’s	work.	Nevertheless,	it	is	obvious	that	Kölreuter	and	Gärtner	have	more	important	influence	on	Mendel.	57	 “A	comparison	of	the	observations	made	on	Pisum	with	the	experimental	results	obtained	by	Kölreuter	and	Gärtner,	the	two	authorities	in	this	field,	cannot	fail	to	be	of	interest.”	(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	39)	
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Mendel	was	seen	within	the	continuing	tradition	of	plant	hybridization	from	
Koelreuter	to	Gaertner	to	Mendel.	(Olby,	1979,	p.	57)	
[Mendel’s]	 work	 was	 well	 within	 the	 tradition	 of	 the	 hybridists	 whose	
experiments	he	discussed.	(Brannigan,	1979,	p.	447)	
However,	there	is	still	no	consensus	on	in	what	sense	and	to	what	extent	Mendel’s	
work	is	framed	by	the	hybridist	tradition.	Now	it	seems	worth	reviewing	the	history	
of	hybridism	briefly.	
The	 study	 on	 plant	 hybrids	 originates	 from	 Carl	 Linnaeus.	 In	 1751,	 Linnaeus	
published	 a	 short	 essay	 Plantae	 hybridae,	 which	 is	 regarded	 as	 “the	 founding	
document	of	the	hybridist	tradition.”	(Müller-Wille	&	Orel,	2007,	p.	177)	In	Plantae	
hybridae,	Linnaeus	tries	to	distinguish	species	from	accidental	varieties	by	analysing	
differences	 in	 characters	 of	 plants	 with	 their	 reproduction	 and	 distribution	 over	
various	habitats.	According	to	him,	accidental	varieties	are	the	plants	with	different	
characters	 “produced	 by	 soil,	 locality,	 climate.”	 (Linnaeus,	 1751,	 pp.	 32–33;	
Müller-Wille	 &	 Orel,	 2007,	 p.	 179)	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 species	 display	 different	
characters,	which	do	not	depend	on	those	local	conditions,	but	“on	that	natural	law”	
that	 is,	 plants	 “celebrate	 their	marriages	 and	 propagate	 their	 families,	 such	 that	
they	 rarely	deflect	 to	other	 species.”	 (Linnaeus,	 1751,	 p.	 30;	Müller-Wille	&	Orel,	
2007,	 p.	 179)	 In	 other	 words,	 if	 some	 plants	 differ	 in	 characters	 due	 to	 local	
conditions	 (e.g.	 soil	 and	 climate),	 these	 are	 different	 varieties,	while	 if	 the	 set	 of	
characters	 of	 some	 plants	 still	 vary	 under	 the	 same	 local	 conditions;	 then	 these	
plants	are	different	species.	Therefore,	for	Linnaeus,	the	hybrids	of	two	species	are	
a	third	species	(i.e.	a	truly	breeding	new	species).	(The	Special	Doctrine	of	Creation)	
Moreover,	 hybrids,	 Linnaeus	 contends,	 show	 a	 combination	 of	 paternal	 and	
maternal	 characters.	 However,	 Linnaeus’s	 theory	 of	 hybridisation	 is	 highly	
speculative.	 He	 never	 conducted	 a	 number	 of	 carefully	 designed	 experiments	 to	
confirm	his	theory,	though	he	did	perform	one	(and	the	only	one)	experiment	on	a	
hybrid	 goatsbeard	 (Tragopogan	 pratensis	 X	 T.	 porrifolius)	 in	 preparation	 of	 the	
essay	for	competing	a	prize	offered	by	the	Academy	of	Sciences	in	St	Petersburg.	
In	 1759,	 the	 same	 year	 when	 Linnaeus	 submitted	 the	 essay	 to	 the	 Academy	 of	
Sciences	in	St	Petersburg,	Kölreuter	conducted	his	first	hybridisation	experiment	in	
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the	botanical	garden	of	St	Petersburg.	The	results	of	this	experiment	and	the	three	
further	 experiments	 in	 1763,	 1764,	 and	 1766	 made	 Kölreuter	 draw	 different	
conclusions	 from	 Linnaeus’.	 He	 doubted	 the	 possibility	 of	 the	 creation	 of	 new	
species	 by	 hybridisation.	 More	 specifically,	 Kölreuter	 mainly	 disagrees	 with	
Linnaeus	 on	 two	 points.	 Firstly,	 he	 argues	 that	 hybrids	 do	 not	 always	 display	 a	
combination	of	paternal	and	maternal	characters,	as	Linnaeus	believed.	There	are	
many	blended	characters	 found	 in	his	experiments.	Secondly,	he	argues	 that	 true	
species	 hybrids	 are	 always	 sterile,	 which	 is	 neglected	 by	 Linnaeus.	 Based	 on	 the	
results,	Kölreuter	divides	hybrid	plants	into	three	classes.	
Since	all	the	hybrids,	which	I	was	fortunate	enough	to	produce	and	educate,	
have	now	been	indicated,	I	want	to	divide	them	according	to	their	different	
nature	into	the	following	classes,	orders,	genera,	and	species.	Firstly,	I	divide	
them	into	three	classes.	To	the	first	class	belong	the	perfect	hybrids,	which	
originate	from	two	or	three	different	natural	species,	and	from	whose	
production	own	male	seed	was	completely	excluded.	To	the	second	class,	
on	the	other	hand,	belong	the	imperfect	plants,	which	also	result	from	two	
different	natural	species,	whose	production,	however,	involved	a	little	bit	of	
own	male	seed,	aside	from	the	alien	one.	The	third	class	comprises	hybrid	
varieties,	which	arise	from	two	varieties	of	the	same	natural	species,	and	
from	whose	production	own	male	seed	was	completely	excluded.	(Kölreuter,	
1763,	pp.	47–48;	Müller-Wille	&	Orel,	2007,	p.	183)	
Two	 important	 things	 we	 can	 learn	 from	 this	 passage	 is	 that,	 firstly,	 the	
classification	 of	 hybrids	 relies	 on	 Kölreuter’s	 distinction	 between	 species	 and	
varieties;	secondly,	unlike	Linnaeus,	Kölreuter’s	distinction	is	experiment-based.	As	
Müller-Wille	 and	 Orel	 summarise,	 “For	 Koelreuter,	 it	 was	 the	 ‘combination	
experiment’	 (Verbindungsversuch)	 itself	 that	 provided	 the	 ‘true,	 certain,	 and	
infallible	 touchstone	 (Probierstein)	 of	 each	 particular	 species	 and	 variety’.”	
(Müller-Wille	&	Orel,	2007,	p.	183)	In	addition	to	Linnaeus’s	criterion	of	defining	a	
species	 solely	 by	 descent,	 Kölreuter	 proposes	 another	 criterion,	 “fertility”.	 He	
believes	 that	 hybrid	 species	 either	 produces	 no	 offspring	 or	 shows	 a	 significant	
reduction	 in	 fertility,	while	 hybrid	 varieties	 are	 fertile.	However,	 Kölreuter	 (1766)	
encountered	some	unexpected	results	in	his	hybridisation	experiments	of	varieties	
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of	garden	carnation	(Dianthus	hortensis).	Hybrid	varieties,	as	assumed	to	display	a	
blended	 form	 of	 parents,	 surprisingly	 exhibit	 a	 combination	 of	 their	 parental	
characters	in	various	ways.	
After	almost	ninety	years,	another	important	figure	in	hybridism,	Gärtner	adopted	a	
new	approach	to	investigate	the	problem	of	species/variety.	For	him,	
The	question	of	what	distinguishes	species	from	varieties	is	therefore	[…]	a	
purely	biological	one:	a	secure	foundation	for	determining	species	cannot	
be	found	solely	in	abstraction,	neither	in	the	characters,	nor	in	the	
intermediate	forms,	but	has	to	be	sought	in	reflection,	that	is	in	the	
individual	history	(individuellen	Geschichte)	of	each	species,	its	whole	
development	(Entwickelung),	and	not	in	a	particular	aspect	only.	(Gärtner,	
1849,	p.	151;	Müller-Wille	&	Orel,	2007,	p.	187)	
Note	 that	 this	 is	 the	 first	 time	 in	 the	 history	 to	 study	 the	 problem	 of	
species/varieties	 by	 examining	 “the	 development	 of	 various	 forms	 of	 plants	 (die	
Entwickelung	der	verschiedenen	Pflanzenformen)”.	(Gärtner,	1849,	p.	293)	Gärtner’s	
proposal	 was	 echoed	 by	 the	 objective	 of	 Mendel’s	 work	 seven	 years	 later.	 In	
addition,	considering	all	of	Mendel’s	comparative	analysis	 is	made	between	these	
hybridist’s	 and	 his	 own	 work,	 I	 readily	 agree	 with	 Brannigan	 (1979),	 Callender	
(1988),	and	Olby	(1979,	1985)	on	the	point	that	Mendel’s	objective	was	well	within	
the	hybridist	tradition.	
Though	my	 brief	 account	 of	 the	 history	 of	 hybridism	 definitely	 fails	 to	 provide	 a	
complete	 and	 comprehensive	 characterization,	 it	 is	 still	 sufficient	 to	 suggest	 the	
central	 problems	 of	 hybridism:	What	 distinguishes	 a	 species	 from	 a	 variety?	 Is	 it	
possible	 to	 have	 a	 new	 species	 by	 hybridisation?	 Given	 the	 central	 problems	 of	
hybridism,	both	Olby	and	Callender	confidently	argue	that	Mendel’s	motivation	of	
his	research	on	Pisum	is	about	the	doctrine	of	special	creation.	
It	 is	 true	 that	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 doctrine	 of	 special	 creation	 is	 discussed	 in	
Mendel’s	paper,	especially	in	the	final	part	of	the	concluding	remarks.	
Finally,	the	experiments	performed	by	Kölreuter	and	Gärtner,	and	others	on	
transformation	of	one	species	 into	another	by	artificial	fertilization	deserve	
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special	mention.	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	43,	1966a,	p.	44)	
In	particular,	Callender	(1988,	pp.	54–55)	is	right	that	Mendel	seems	to	express	his	
position	on	the	doctrine	of	special	creation.	
The	 success	 of	 transformation	 experiments	 led	 Gärtner	 to	 disagree	 with	
those	 scientists	 who	 contest	 the	 stability	 of	 plant	 species	 and	 assume	
continuous	evolution	of	plant	forms.	In	the	complete	transformation	of	one	
species	 into	 another	 he	 finds	 unequivocal	 proof	 that	 a	 species	 has	 fixed	
limits	 beyond	 which	 it	 cannot	 change.	 Although	 this	 opinion	 cannot	 be	
adjudged	 unconditionally	 valid,	 considerable	 confirmation	 of	 the	 earlier	
expressed	 conjecture	 on	 the	 variability	 of	 cultivated	 is	 to	 be	 found	 in	 the	
experiments	performed	by	Gärtner.	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	46,	1966a,	p.	47)	
The	 paragraph,	 according	 to	 Callender,	 shows	 that	Mendel	 conditionally	 accepts	
Gärtner’s	view	that	a	species	has	fixed	limits	beyond	which	it	cannot	change.	
Olby	and	Callender	are	also	correct	that	Mendel	believes	that	his	work	on	Pisum	is	
helpful	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 transformation	 of	 one	 species	 into	 another	 by	
artificial	fertilization.	
If	 one	 may	 assume	 that	 the	 development	 of	 forms	 proceeded	 in	 these	
experiments	in	a	manner	similar	to	that	in	Pisum,	then	the	entire	process	of	
transformation	would	have	a	rather	simple	explanation.	(Mendel,	1865,	pp.	
43–44,	1966a,	p.	44)	
This	 corresponds	 well	 to	 Mendel’s	 promise	 in	 the	 introductory	 remarks	 that	 his	
study	on	Pisum	“seems	to	be	the	one	correct	way	of	finally	reaching	the	solution	to	
a	 question	whose	 significance	 for	 the	 [developmental]	 history	 of	 organic	 forms.”	
However,	these	still	 insufficiently	show	that	“the	developmental	history	of	organic	
forms”	 can	 only	 be	 construed	 as	 the	 problem	 concerning	 the	 doctrine	 of	 special	
creation.	 Nor	 is	 it	 clear	 that	 the	 doctrine	 of	 special	 creation	 is	Mendel’s	 primary	
motivation.	 It	 should	 be	 highlighted	 that	 Mendel’s	 comparative	 analysis	 in	 the	
concluding	 remarks	 is	 about	more	 than	 the	doctrine	of	 special	 creation.	 The	 first	
half	 of	 the	 concluding	 remarks	 focuses	 on	 a	 comparison	 between	 Mendel’s	
observation	and	prediction	on	the	development	of	pea	hybrids	and	Kölreuter’s	and	
	 78	
Gärtner’s	observations.	
In	 addition,	 Mendel	 himself	 explicitly	 mentioned	 the	 motivation	 of	 his	 study	 of	
Pisum	nowhere	in	the	paper,	except	the	statement	that	“this	seems	to	be	the	one	
correct	way	of	finally	reaching	the	solution	to	a	question	whose	significance	for	the	
[developmental]	 history	 of	 organic	 forms	 must	 not	 be	 underestimated.”	 In	 this	
statement,	 the	 indexical	 term	 “this”	 refers	 to	 a	 detailed	 experiment,	 which	 is	
sufficient	 to	 “determine	 the	 number	 of	 different	 forms	 in	 which	 hybrid	 progeny	
appear,	permit	classification	of	these	forms	in	each	generation	with	certainty,	and	
ascertain	their	numerical	 interrelationships”.	However,	this	statement	is	not	really	
helpful	for	us	to	figure	out	Mendel’s	motivation,	because	it	is	just	trivial	if	we	read	it	
with	Mendel’s	objective	in	mind.	As	I	have	indicated,	Mendel’s	objective	is	to	study	
the	development	of	hybrids	in	their	progeny,	so	it	seems	trivial	that	his	study	would	
be	significant	for	the	developmental	history	of	organic	forms.	Thus,	on	the	evidence	
available	it	is	not	very	likely	that	we	can	identify	Mendel’s	initial	motivation	in	1856	
precisely.	 	
Furthermore,	 I	 do	 not	 think	 that	 what	 Mendel’s	 initial	 motivation	 is,	 is	 a	 key	
question	regarding	the	origin	of	genetics.	Instead	the	objective	of	Mendel’s	paper	is	
more	 important	 and	 interesting.	What	 in	 fact	 influenced	 the	 three	 rediscoverers	
and	other	successors	in	the	1900s	is	what	is	explicit	in	Mendel’s	paper	rather	than	
the	motivation	behind	it.	Since	it	 is	beyond	dispute	that	Mendel’s	real	objective	is	
about	the	development	of	hybrids	in	their	progeny,	I	suggest	that	the	next	task	is	to	
figure	out	what	Mendel	meant	by	“the	development	of	hybrids	 in	their	progeny”,	
especially	the	meaning	of	“development”.	
Mendel	and	Gärtner	on	Entwicklung	
Recently,	 some	 historians,	 realising	 the	 significance	 of	 Entwicklung	 in	 Mendel’s	
paper,	 make	 great	 efforts	 to	 reconstruct	 Mendel’s	 usage.	 Sander	 Gliboff	 (1999)	
argues	that	Mendel,	under	the	influence	of	Franz	Unger58,	refers	“Entwicklung”	to	
both	“the	individual	ontogeny	and	the	evolution	of	the	lineage”.	
																																																								58	 Franz	Unger	was	the	chair	of	Botany	at	University	of	Vienna	when	Mendel	was	a	student	there	from	October	1851	to	August	1853.	Mendel	attended	two	courses	(Anatomy	and	physiology	of	plants	in	October	1852,	and	Use	of	the	microscope	in	April	1853)	taught	by	Unger.	
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Unger	 used	 Entwicklung	 both	 for	 the	 growth	 and	 development	 of	 the	
individual	plant	and	for	changes	in	the	flora	through	geological	time.	Indeed,	
he	 did	 not	 even	 consider	 the	 two	 processes	 distinct,	 since	 he	 viewed	 the	
plant	 kingdom	 as	 a	 developing	 super-organism	 with	 fossil	 florae	 as	 its	
embryonic	 stages.	 It	 is	 a	 mistake	 to	 assume	 that	 Mendel	 always	 meant	
Entwicklung	in	the	sense	of	individual	development.	
In	 the	 introduction	 to	 his	 paper,	 Mendel	 found	 fault	 with	 previous	
hybridization	work	because	it	had	failed	to	formulate	“a	generally	applicable	
law	of	 the	development	and	evolution	hybrids”	 (“allgemein	giltiges	Gesetz	
für	Bildung	und	Entwicklung	der	Hybriden”)…	The	passage	reveals	Mendel’s	
Ungerian	orientation,	for	he	was	seeking	a	law	that	governed	development	
and	evolution	together.	(Gliboff,	1999,	p.	226)	
On	 the	basis	 of	 her	 textual	 analysis,	 Iris	 Sandler	 (2000)	makes	 a	more	bold	 claim	
that	 though	 his	 usage	 of	 “Entwicklung”	 was	 influenced	 by	 its	 historical	 context,	
especially	 Schlediden’s	 definition	 and	 the	 nineteenth-century	 popular	 usage,	
Mendel’s	 phrase	 “the	 development	 of	 hybrid	 in	 their	 progeny”	 refers	 to	 the	
phenomena	of	transmission	from	generations	to	generations.	
There	is	no	doubt	that	Mendel’s	focus	is	on	the	events	of	transmission,	but	
he	 continues	 to	 think	and	 speak	and	write	about	 transmission	 in	 terms	of	
nineteenth	 century	 development…	 Mendel’s	 intention	 –	 “to	 follow	 the	
development	of	hybrids	in	their	progeny”	–	is	a	step-by-step	description	of	
the	 transmission	 and	 distribution	 of	 hybrid	 traits	 between	 parent	 and	
progeny.	(Sandler,	2000,	p.	11)	
In	 contrast	 to	what	Campbell	 (1982)	and	Olby	 (1979)	did,	Gliboff	and	Sandler	are	
correct	 to	 show	 that	 Entwicklung	 cannot	 be	 simply	 construed	 or	 translated	 as	
evolution	without	argument.	They	also	insightfully	suggest	that	Mendel’s	usage	of	
Entwicklung	 should	 have	 been	 influenced	 by	 his	 contemporaries	 and	 his	 time.	
However,	something	really	important	is	missing	from	their	analysis.	Nobody	has	yet	
attempted	to	study	the	meaning	of	Entwickelung	in	Gärtner’s	book,	despite	the	fact	
that	Gärtner	was	 the	most	 cited	 scholar	 in	Mendel’s	 paper	 (1866).	 As	 the	 earlier	
quotation	 shows,	 Gärtner	 regards	 the	 development	 of	 a	 species	 as	 “a	 secure	
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foundation”	to	answer	“the	question	of	what	distinguishes	species	from	varieties”.	
Remember	that	Gärtner	was	the	first	proponent	in	the	history	of	hybridism	to	study	
the	problem	of	species/varieties	by	examining	“the	development	of	various	forms	
of	 plants”	 (die	 Entwickelung	 der	 verschiedenen	 Pflanzenformen).	 What	 is	 more,	
Entwickelung	really	is	one	of	the	central	terms	in	Gärtner’s	1849	book	Versuche	und	
Beobachtungen	 über	 die	 Bastarderzeugung	 im	 Pflanzenreich.	 (The	 term	 Entwicke	
appears	 332	 times	 in	 the	 book.)	 Therefore,	 considering	 the	 significance	 of	
Entwick(e)lung	in	both	Gärtner	and	Mendel’s	work	and	Gärtner’s	great	influence	on	
Mendel,	 I	 contend	 that	 it	 is	 worth	 studying	 Gärtner’s	 usage	 of	 Entewickelung	
carefully	for	the	purpose	of	making	clear	Mendel’s	real	concern.	
In	 Gärtner’s	 book,	 Entwickelung	 is	 definitely	 nothing	 to	 do	 with	 evolution	 (or	
according	 to	 the	 19th	 century	 terminology,	 transformation).	 Rather,	 it	 is	 closer	 to	
what	we	now	refer	to	as	 individual	ontogeny.	 In	most	cases59,	Gärtner	designates	
Entwickelung	to	be	the	growth,	or	maturation	of	the	plant,	or	of	a	specific	part	of	
the	plant	(e.g.	ovary,	embryo,	and	flower).	Here	are	examples60.	
[O]n	the	contrary	in	the	natural	fertilization,	although	all	parts	of	the	female	
organs	have	not	yet	reached	their	complete	development,	the	pollination	of	
the	stigma	with	their	own	pollen	has	rarely	been	unsuccessful.61	 (Gärtner,	
1849,	p.	9)	
If	 such	 a	 hybrid	 caused	 by	 procreation,	 its	 fruit	 is	 examined	 in	 the	 first	
period	of	their	development	in	the	interior,	so	no	one	can	find	the	fertilised	
oaks	in	the	same	degree	of	development	and	the	size.62	 (Gärtner,	1849,	p.	
29)	
These	experiments	seem	to	show	once	again	that	in	addition	to	the	various	
sight	unseen	the	developmental	state	of	the	female	organs	of	plants,	both																																																									59	 For	an	exhaustive	list	of	Gärtner’s	usage	of	Entwickelung	in	his	book	(1849),	see	Appendix	5.	60	 Gärtner’s	book	(1849)	is	not	yet	translated	into	English.	If	not	indicated	otherwise,	all	the	translations	of	Gärtner’s	text	are	mine.	61	 “…,	da	im	Gegentheil	bei	der	natürlichen	Befruchtung,	wenn	auch	alle	Theile	der	weiblichen	Organe	ihre	vollstandige	Entwickelung	noch	nicht	erlangt	haben,	eine	Bestäubung	der	Narbe	mit	dem	eigenen	Pollen	sehr	selten	erfolglos	bleibt,	…”	(Gärtner,	1849,	p.	9)	62	 “Wenn	eine	solche	durch	Bastardzeugung	entstandene	Frucht	in	der	ersten	Periode	ihrer	Entwickelung	im	Innern	untersucht	wird,	so	findet	man	die	befruchteten	Eichen	nicht	in	gleichem	Grade	der	Entwickelung	und	der	Grösse.”	(Gärtner,	1849,	p.	29)	
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agents,	 the	 sunlight	 and	 the	 heat,	 (see	 Fig.	 Above,	 p	 10)	 have	 a	 great	
influence	on	the	course	of	fertilisation	of	plants.63	 (Gärtner,	1849,	p.	49)	
This	 occurs	 especially	 in	 the	 hybrids	 of	 a	 doubt	 whether	 even	 the	 deaf	
pollen	 possess	 the	 power	 to	 bring	 about	 the	 development	 of	 the	 outer	
envelopes	of	the	fruit	and	the	seed.64	 (Gärtner,	1849,	p.	98)	
At	four	plants	of	this	species,	which	had	gone	up	from	the	same	seed	from	
one	 and	 the	 same	 pod,	 all	 flowers	 buttons	 were	 castrated	 before	 their	
development	 and	 maturity	 of	 the	 anthers	 occurred	 at	 the	 same	 time.65	
(Gärtner,	1849,	p.	566)	
In	many	cases,	Mendel	uses	the	term	Entwicklung	in	a	similar	way.	For	example,	
A	defective	development	of	the	keel	has	also	been	observed.	(Mendel,	1865,	
p.	5,	1966a,	p.	8)	
In	 the	 pods	 first	 formed	 by	 a	 small	 number	 of	 plants	 only	 a	 few	 seeds	
developed,	…	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	13,	1966a,	p.	11)	
In	addition,	by	reading	Gärtner’s	book	carefully,	I	have	surprisingly	found	that	some	
phrases	used	by	Mendel	are	really	similar	to,	and	even	closely	related	to	those	of	
Gärtner.	 What	 is	 more,	 Mendel’s	 view	 on	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 law	 of	 hybrid	
development	 is	 very	 similar	 to	 Gärtner’s.	 For	 instance,	 Gärtner	 strongly	 believes	
that	 the	 formation	 and	 development	 of	 hybrids	 are	 based	 on	 certain	 laws	 (die	
Entwickelung	und	Bildung	einer	jeden	Pflanze	beruhe	auf	gewissen	Gesetzen),	while	
those	laws	are	still	not	yet	known.	
Given	 this	 original,	 full	 development,	 so	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 species	
conditional,	 relationship	repealed,	 the	deviation	of	a	plant	 from	its	normal																																																									63	 “Diese	Versuche	scheinen	abermals	zu	zeigen,	dass	neben	den	verschiedenen,	dem	Auge	unsichtbaren	Entwickelungsgraden	der	weiblichen	Organe	der	Gewächse,	die	beide	Agentien,	das	Sonnenlicht	und	die	Wärme,	(s.	oben	S.	10)	einen	grossen	Einfluss	auf	den	Gang	der	Befruchtung	der	Pflanzen	haben.”	(Gärtner,	1849,	p.	49)	64	 “Hier	tritt	namentlich	bei	den	Hybriden	der	Zweifel	ein:	ob	nicht	auch	der	taube	Pollen	die	Kraft	besitze,	die	Entwickelung	der	äusseren	Umhüllungen	der	Frucht	und	der	Samen	zu	bewirken.”	(Gärtner,	1849,	p.	98)	65	 “An	vier	Pflanzen	dieser	Art,	welche	aus	dem	gleichen	Samen	aus	einer	und	derselben	Schote	aufgegangen	waren,	wurden	alle	Blumenknöpfe	vor	ihrer	Entwickelung	und	eingetretenen	Reife	der	Antheren	zu	gleicher	Zeit	castrirt.”	(Gärtner,	1849,	p.	566)	
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type	are	the	necessary	consequences	of	the	development	and	formation	of	
each	plant	which	are	based	on	certain	 laws,	and	these	 laws	are	 in	favor	of	
the,	 needful	 to	 the	 perfect	 development	 of	 a	 plant,	 different	 ratios	 of	
exposure	 to	 the	outer	moments,	 light,	moisture,	 soil,	 air	 quality,	 heat	etc.	
Yet	 we	 certainly	 do	 not	 know	 these	 laws;	 but	 their	 existence	 are	 by	 no	
means	 questioned,	 especially	 since	 they	 are	 confirmed	 rather	 by	 a	 set	 of	
phenomena.66	 (Gärtner,	1849,	p.	494)	
This	view	is	also	reflected	by	Mendel	in	his	introductory	remarks,	and	strengthened	
in	several	places	later.	
That	 no	 generally	 applicable	 law	 of	 the	 formation	 and	 development	 of	
hybrids	has	yet	been	successfully	formulated.67	 (Mendel,	1865,	p.	3,	1966a,	
p.	2)	
Anyone	surveying	the	shades	of	color	that	appear	in	ornamental	plants	as	a	
result	 of	 like	 fertilization	 cannot	 easily	 escape	 the	 conviction	 that	 …	
development	proceeds	according	to	 [certain	 laws]68	 [die	Entwicklung	nach	
einem	bestimmten	Gesetze	erfolgt].	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	38,	1966a,	p.	38)	
…	 unity	 in	 the	 plan	 of	 development	 of	 organic	 life	 is	 beyond	 doubt.69	
(Mendel,	1865,	p.	43,	1966a,	p.	43)	
Thirdly,	 I	 find	 that	 there	 are	 some	 implicit	 connections	 between	 Mendel’s	 and	
Gärtner’s	work.	For	instance,	the	objective	of	Mendel’s	paper	as	searching	for	the	
law	 of	 the	 development	 of	 hybrids	 in	 their	 progeny	 seems	 to	 follow	 a	 question																																																									66	 “Werde	 dieses	 ursprüngliche,	 die	 vollständige	 Entwickelung,	 ja	 die	 Existenz	 der	 Art	bedingende,	 Verhältniss	 aufgehoben,	 so	 sei	 die	 Abweichung	 einer	 Pflanze	 von	 ihrem	Normaltypus	 die	 nothwendige	 Folge	 davon	 ,	 d.	 i.	 die	 Entwickelung	 und	Bildung	 einer	 jeden	Pflanze	 beruhe	 auf	 gewissen	 Gesetzen,	 und	 werde	 durch	 diese	 bedingt,	 und	 diese	 Gesetze	sprechen	 sich	 aus	 in	 den,	 zur	 vollkommenen	 Entwickelung	 einer	 Pflanze	 nothigen,	verschiedenen	 Verhaltnissen	 der	 Einwirkung	 der	 ausseren	 Momente,	 Licht,	 Feuchtigkeit,	Boden,	Luftbeschaffenheit,	Wärme	u.	s.	w.	Noch	kennen	wir	freilich	diese	Gesetze	so	gut	als	gar	nicht;	 ihr	Vorhandensein	lasse	sich	aber	durchaus	nicht	mehr	verkennen,	wir	seien	vielmehr	durch	eine	Menge	von	Erscheinungen	gezwungen,	sie	als	vorhanden	anzunehmen.”	(Gärtner,	1849,	p.	494)	67	 “Wenn	es	noch	nicht	gelungen	ist,	ein	allgemein	giltiges	Gesetz	für	die	Bildung	und	Entwicklung	der	Hybriden	aufzustellen.”	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	3)	68	 Sherwood’s	original	translation	is	that	“according	to	a	certain	law”,	but	it	is	in	fact	a	mistranslation,	because	in	Mendel’s	German	text	the	plural	term	Gesetze	(laws)	is	used.	69	 “…	die	Einheit	 im	Entwicklungsplane	des	organischen	Lebens	ausser	Frage	steht.”	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	43)	
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asked	by	Gärtner	at	the	end	of	the	book.	
How	do	these	different	seeds	behave	in	their	further	development	(in	1849)	
with	respect	to	the	type	of	plants	and	their	seed	production?70	
Moreover,	“the	[developmental]	history	of	organic	forms”	(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	2)	to	
which	Mendel	contends	that	his	research	on	peas	seems	highly	relevant	is	also	an	
unsolved	problem	for	Gärtner.	
Because	there	we	still	lack	of	means,	to	declare	in	its	various	phases	and	to	
follow	 in	 the	 organism	 or	 to	 construct	 the	 origin	 and	development	 of	 the	
various	forms	of	plants	from	simple	cell	to	at	completed	development	of	the	
perfect	crop:	we	are	not	even	able	to	determine	the	band,	bringing	the	law	
of	 hybrid	 formation	 with	 the	 vegetable	 metamorphosis	 at	 all	 related.71	
(Gärtner,	1849,	p.	293)	
Considering	the	similarity	of	the	usage	of	Entwick(e)lung	and	the	view	on	the	law	of	
hybrid	 development,	 and	 the	 inner	 connections	 between	Mendel’s	 and	Gärtner’s	
work,	I	wish	that	it	is	sufficient	to	show	that	Mendel’s	usage	of	Entwicklung	might	
have	been	 inherited	from	(or	at	 least	 largely	 influenced	by)	Gärtner’s.	For	anyone	
who	 is	 still	 unconvinced,	 there	 is	 another	piece	of	evidence	 in	Mendel’s	paper	 to	
show	that	Mendel’s	concern	on	Entwicklung	is	inherited	from	Gärtner’s	work.	
Gärtner	 mentions	 that	 in	 cases	 where	 development	 was	 regular	 the	 two	
parental	types	themselves	were	not	represented	among	the	offspring	of	the	
hybrids,	only	occasional	 individual	closely	approximating	 them.72	 (Mendel,	
1865,	p.	40,	1966a,	pp.	40	–	41)	
																																																								70	 “Wie	 sich	 diese	 verschiedenen	 Samen	 in	 ihrer	 weiteren	 Entwickelung	 (im	 Jahr	 1849)	 in	Absicht	 auf	 den	 Typus	 der	 Pflanzen	 und	 ihrer	 Samenerzeugung	 verhalten	werden.”	 (Gärtner,	1849,	p.	680)	71	 “Da	 es	 uns	 noch	 an	 Mitteln	 fehlt,	 die	 Entstehung	 und	 Entwickelung	 der	 verschiedenen	Pflanzenformen	 von	 der	 einfachen	 Zelle	 an	 bis	 zur	 vollendeten	 Entwickelung	 des	vollkommenen	Gewächses	 in	 ihren	 verschiedenen	Phasen	 zu	 erklären	und	 im	Organismus	 zu	verfolgen	oder	zu	construiren:	so	sind	wir	auch	noch	nicht	im	Stande,	die	Bande	zu	bestimmen,	womit	 der	 Metaschematismus	 der	 hybriden	 Bildung	 mit	 der	 vegetabilischen	 Metamorphose	überhaupt	zusammenhängt.”	(Gärtner,	1849,	p.	293)	72	 “Gärtner	erwähnt,	dass	in	jenen	Fällen,	wo	die	Entwicklung	eine	regelmässige	war,	unter	den	Nachkommen	der	Hybriden	nicht	die	beiden	Stammarten	selbst	erhalten	wurden,	sondern	nur	einzelne	ihnen	näher	verwandte	Individuen.”	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	40)	
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It	 is	 very	 clear	 that	 in	 this	 paragraph	Mendel	 shares	 the	 usage	 of	Entwick(e)lung	
with	Gärtner.	Therefore,	contra	Gliboff	(1999),	I	argue	that	Mendel	did	not	refer	the	
term	Enwticklung	to	both	individual	ontogeny	and	evolution.	No	evidence	available	
in	 Mendel’s	 publication	 suggests	 that	 his	 usage	 of	 Entwicklung	 is	 influenced	 by	
Unger.	 Even	 if	 in	 the	 introductory	 remarks	 Mendel	 uses	 the	 phrase	 “law	 of	 the	
formation	and	development	of	hybrids	(Gesetz	für	die	Bildung	und	Entwicklung	der	
Hybriden)”,	 it	 does	 not	 clearly	 suggest	 that	 Bildung	 means	 development	 while	
Entwicklung	evolution.	Gärtner	uses	Bildung	to	designate	the	process	of	formation	
in	 his	 book	 where	 he	 also	 frequently	 uses	 the	 phrase	 like	 Samebildung	
(seed-formation),	Fruchtbildung	(fruit-formation),	die	Bildung	des	Embryo	aus	dem	
Pollen	(the	formation	of	the	embryo	from	the	pollen).	Gliboff	is	correct	to	point	out	
that	Bildung	and	Entwicklung	have	distinct	meanings,	but	he	mistranslates	Bildung	
as	individual	ontogeny	and	Entwicklung	as	evolution	of	genealogy.	
The	 Development	 of	 Hybrids	 in	 their	 Progeny	 and	 the	 Developmental	 Series	
(Entwicklungsreihe)	
However,	 it	 should	 be	 emphasised	 that	 though	 following	 Gärtner’s	 usage	 of	
Entwicklung,	 Mendel’s	 work	 on	 Pisum	 is	 not	 about	 the	 development	 of	 hybrids.	
Rather	 it	 is	 in	 fact	 an	extension	of	Gärtner’s	work.	While	Gärtner	 focused	on	 the	
development	 of	 hybrids	 in	 one	 generation,	Mendel	was	 particularly	 interested	 in	
comparing	 the	 development	 of	 hybrids	 in	 different	 generations.	 More	 precisely	
speaking,	Mendel	particularly	refers	“the	development	of	hybrids	in	their	progeny”	
to	 “the	 developmental	 series”	 (Entwicklungsreihe)	 of	 hybrid	 forms	 in	 different	
generations	 (i.e.	 the	 distribution	 of	 different	 morphological	 forms).	 Remember	
Mendel’s	 conviction	 that	 the	 law	 of	 development	 of	 hybrid	 in	 their	 progeny	 can	
only	 be	 discovered	 by	 determining	 the	 “numerical	 relationships	 of	 different	 of	
hybrids”.	 He	 also	 explicitly	 mentions	 that	 the	 numerical	 relationships	 of	 hybrid	
forms	are	determined	by	observing	the	developmental	series	of	offspring.	
To	 discover	 the	 relationships	 of	 hybrid	 forms	 to	 each	 other	 and	 to	 their	
parental	types	it	seems	necessary	to	observe	without	exception	all	members	
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of	the	series73	 (Entwicklungsreihe)	of	offspring	in	each	generation.	(Mendel,	
1865,	p.	5,	1966a,	p.	4)	
Thus,	Mendel’s	concern	can	also	be	summarised	as	a	study	on	the	developmental	
series	of	hybrid	in	different	generations,	where	the	development	series	means	the	
numerical	 relationships	of	 the	 forms	of	hybrids.	 It	 is	evident	 that	Mendel’s	major	
discussions	in	the	paper	are	centred	on	the	developmental	series.	
If	A	denotes	one	of	the	two	constant	traits,	for	example,	the	dominating	one,	
a	the	recessive,	the	Aa	the	hybrid	form	in	which	both	are	united,	then	the	
expression	
A	+	2Aa	+a	
gives	the	[developmental	series]	for	the	progeny	of	plants	hybrid	in	a	pair	of	
differing	traits.	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	17,	1966a,	p.	16)	
When,	therefore,	two	kinds	of	differing	traits	are	combined	 in	hybrids,	the	
progeny	develop	according	to	the	expression:	
AB	+	Ab	+	aB	+	ab	+	2ABb	+	2aBb	+	2	AaB	+	2Aab	+	4AaBb	
Indisputably	this	[developmental	series]	is	a	combination	series	in	which	the	
two	 [developmental	 series]	 for	 the	 traits	 A	 and	 a,	 B	 and	 b	 are	 combined	
term	by	term.	(Mendel,	1865,	pp.	20–21,	1966a,	p.	20)	
The	difference	of	forms	among	the	progeny	of	hybrids,	as	well	as	the	ratios	
in	which	 they	 are	 observed,	 find	 an	 adequate	 explanation	 in	 the	 principle	
just	deduced.	The	 simplest	 case	 is	 given	by	 the	 [developmental	 series]	 for	
one	pair	of	differing	traits.	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	29,	1966a,	p.	29)	
Moreover,	as	we	shall	see	in	the	section	2.2,	all	Mendel’s	laws	are	in	fact	about	the	
developmental	 series.	 Therefore,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 developmental	 series	 for	 the	
progeny	of	hybrid	is	Mendel’s	real	concern.74																																																									73	 This	is	a	major	error	in	Sherwood’s	translation	(Mendel,	1966a),	in	which	Entwicklungsreihe	is	translated	as	series	rather	than	developmental	series	in	all	of	its	17	occurrances.	(See	Appendix	1)	However,	such	a	translation	fails	to	reflect	the	significance	of	Entwicklungsreihe	(or	even	Entwicklung)	in	Mendel’s	paper	(1865).	74	 Unfortunately,	partly	because	of	the	traditional	mistranslation	of	Entwicklungsreihe	(for	example,	Bateson,	1902;	Mendel,	1966a),	historians	used	to	overlook	the	relation	of	“developmental	series	(Entwicklungsreihe)”	and	“the	development	of	hybrids	in	their	progeny	(die	Entwicklung	der	Hybriden	in	ihren	Nachkommen)”.	
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Furthermore,	this	 is	why	Mendel	explicitly	 identifies	that	his	task	 is	“to	follow	the	
development	of	hybrids	 in	their	progeny”	rather	than	“to	follow	the	development	
of	 hybrids	 themselves”	 in	 the	 introductory	 remarks.	 Thus,	Mendel’s	 objective	 as	
looking	for	the	law	of	the	development	(Entwicklung)	of	hybrids	in	their	progeny	is	
an	 extension	 of	 Gärtner’s	 research.	 As	Müller-Wille	 and	Orel	 correctly	 point	 out,	
“Mendel,	 in	 stating	his	aims,	was	 simply	 taking	 the	programme	of	Gärtner	a	 step	
forward.”	(Müller-Wille	&	Orel,	2007,	p.	192)	Therefore,	 it	 is	confirmed	again	that	
Mendel’s	 work	 does	 not	 aim	 to	 investigate	 the	 hereditary	 patterns	 of	 peas,	 in	
contrast	to	what	has	been	traditionally	interpreted.	His	real	concern	is	to	follow	and	
develop	 Gärtner’s	 interest	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	 plant,	 where	 “the	
[developmental]	history	of	organic	forms”	has	been	explicitly	defined	by	Gärtner	as	
a	process	from	the	single	cell	to	a	perfectly	mature	form	of	a	plant.	(Gärtner,	1849,	
p.	293)	
Nevertheless,	 rejecting	 the	 traditional	 interpretation	 that	 Mendel’s	 concern	 is	
about	heredity	does	not	suggest	that	I	would	embrace	the	revisionist	interpretation,	
mainly	developed	by	Olby	(1979),	Callender	(1988),	and	Di	Trocchio	(1991),	which	
states	 that	 Mendel’s	 initial	 motivation	 or	 objective	 is	 about	 the	 genesis	 of	 new	
species	 by	 hybridisation75 .	 As	 I	 have	 argued,	 Mendel’s	 initial	 motiviation	 is	
extremely	 difficult	 to	 identify	 while	 his	 objective	 should	 not	 be	 simply	 conflated	
with	the	problem	of	transformation	of	species	by	hybridisation.	
Summary	
In	this	section,	I	have	shown	that	Mendel’s	concern	of	his	study	on	Pisum	is	not	
about	heredity.	Rather,	by	carefully	analysing	Mendel’s	paper	and	its	historical	
research	context,	I	can	now	conclude	that	under	Gärtner’s	influence,	Mendel’s	
objective	is	to	study	the	development	of	hybrids	in	their	progeny	(or	the	
developmental	series	for	the	progeny	of	hybrids).	Gärtner’s	influence	on	Mendel	is	
reflected	in	both	the	terminological	and	methodological	sense:	Mendel	followed																																																									75	 In	fact	there	are	some	differences	between	Olby,	Callender,	and	Di	Trocchio’s	reinterpretations.	For	Olby,	Mendel’s	concern	is	“the	role	of	hybrids	in	the	genesis	of	new	species.”	(1979,	p.	67)	Di	Trocchio	goes	further	and	more	explicitly:	“the	original	aim	of	Mendel’s	experiments	was	to	check	whether	or	not	new	species	could	be	produced	by	hybridization.”	(1991,	p.	507)	Callender	is	the	most	bold:	“Mendel	was	an	opponent	of	the	fundamental	principle	of	evolution	itself.”	(1988,	p.	41)	
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Gärtner’s	usage	of	Entwicklung	and	developed	his	study	of	the	development	of	
hybrids	(die	Entwicklung	der	Hybriden).	
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3.2	Mendel	on	his	Achievement:	The	Ratios	and	Laws	
In	this	section,	I	aim	to	reexamine	what	Mendel	himself	believed	he	achieved	in	his	
study	 of	 Pisum.	 More	 precisely	 speaking,	 I	 shall	 examine	 whether	 there	 is	 any	
achievements	 he	 believed	 that	 he	 made	 eventually	 on	 the	 study	 of	 hybrid	
development	in	their	progeny.	
The	Conceptualisation	of	the	Mendelian	Ratios	
Some	historians	argue	that	most	of	Mendel’s	work	was	nothing	astonishingly	new.	
Most	 of	 his	 work	 on	 Pisum	 was	merely	 a	 confirmation	 of	 observations	 reported	
before.	
Before	Mendel,	 the	 component	 parts	 of	Mendelism	 had	 been	 discovered	
separately,	 some	 by	 the	 plant	 hybridizers	 and	 some	 by	 the	 bee	 breeders.	
(Zirkle,	1951,	p.	103)	
[Mendel’s]	observations	on	segregation	and	 independent	assortment	were	
recorded	 by	 his	 predecessors	 and	 the	 focus	 on	 inheritance	 ratios	 was	
pioneered	by	his	contemporary.	(Brannigan,	1979,	p.	440)	
However,	this	is	definitely	not	what	Mendel	himself	thought	of	his	work	on	Pisum.	
In	a	letter	to	Nägeli	(18	April	1867),	Mendel	was	clear	on	the	point	that	he	believed	
that	he	did	discover	something	novel.	
I	 knew	 that	 the	 results	 I	 obtained	 were	 not	 easily	 compatible	 with	 our	
contemporary	scientific	knowledge.	(Correns,	1906,	p.	199;	Mendel,	1966b,	
p.	60)	
In	fact,	not	only	did	Mendel	aim	to	study	the	development	of	plant	hybrids	in	their	
progeny,	but	also	he	believed	that	his	work	on	Pisum	eventually	turns	out	to	be	an	
important	 contribution	 to	 the	 study	 of	 hybrid.	 Mendel	 recognised	 the	 “striking	
regularity”	of	the	development	of	hybrids	in	their	progeny	from	his	experiments	on	
Pisum.	 As	 I	 mentioned	 in	 section	 1.1,	 when	 the	 peas	 differing	 in	 a	 pair	 of	
antagonistic	traits	are	crossed,	all	the	seeds	obtained	resemble	one	of	the	parental	
traits.	For	example,	Mendel	recognised	that	the	hybrid	seeds	of	purely	bred	yellow	
peas	 and	 green	 ones	 are	 all	 yellow.	 It	 must	 be	 emphasised	 that	 Mendel’s	
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recognition	that	all	the	hybrids	are	yellow	is	more	than	a	mere	observation.	Rather	
it	also	involves	a	conceptual	reconstruction.	Mendel	denotes	that	yellowness	in	the	
parental	 peas	 as	 the	 dominating	 parental	 trait,	which	 refers	 to	 the	 parental	 trait	
passing	unchanged	to	all	of	the	offspring,	while	greenness	as	the	recessive	parental	
trait,	which	refers	to	the	parental	trait	absent	in	the	offspring.	
Moreover,	when	these	hybrid	seeds	are	self-fertilised,	both	yellow	and	green	seeds	
are	obtained	in	the	offspring.	And	the	ratio	of	the	yellow	seeds	to	the	green	ones	is	
close	 to	 3	 :	 1.	 Thus,	 it	 seems	 to	 Mendel	 that	 the	 ratio	 of	 the	 seeds	 with	 the	
dominating	 trait	 to	 the	 ones	 with	 the	 recessive	 trait	 is	 3	 :	 1.	 It	 must	 be	 also	
emphasised	that	it	is	not	obvious	for	Mendel	to	recognise	those	Mendelian	ratios.	
As	we	can	see	from	Table	1,	though	all	the	ratios	are	close	to	3	:	1,	it	is	still	a	novel	
move	for	Mendel	to	classify	the	morphological	traits	statistically.	As	we	shall	see	in	
the	 section	 3.1,	 de	 Vries,	 when	 undertaking	 the	 similar	 crossing	 experiments,	
initially	failed	to	recognise	the	3	:	1	ratio.	In	addition,	Mendel’s	recognition	of	the	3	:	
1	 ratio	 is	 more	 than	 a	 simple	 approximation	 of	 the	 raw	 data.	 Rather	 it	 is	 a	
conceptual	 analysis	 in	 terms	 of	 dominance	 and	 recessiveness.	 Without	 the	
definition	of	dominating	and	recessive	traits,	the	3	:	1	ratio	is	unrecognisable.	It	is	a	
substantial	conceptual	construction	by	Mendel	 to	classify	the	morphological	 traits	
in	 terms	 of	 dominance	 and	 recessiveness.	 What	 is	 more,	 Mendel	 further	
reconceptualised	 the	 3	 :	 1	 ratio	 into	 the	 1	 :	 2	 :	 1	 ratio,	 which	 represents	 the	
distribution	of	dominating	(parental),	dominating	(hybrid),	and	recessive	(parental)	
traits.	
[T]he	average	ratio	between	the	number	of	forms	with	the	dominating	trait	
and	those	with	the	recessive	one	is	…	3	:	1.	
The	dominating	trait	can	have	double	significance	here	–	namely	that	of	the	
parental	 characteristic	 or	 that	 of	 the	 hybrid	 trait.	 In	 which	 of	 the	 two	
meanings	 it	 appears	 in	 each	 individual	 case	 only	 the	 following	 generation	
can	decide.	As	parental	trait	it	would	pass	unchanged	to	all	of	the	offspring;	
as	hybrid	trait,	on	the	other	hand,	 it	would	exhibit	the	same	behavior	as	 it	
did	in	the	first	generation.	(Mendel,	1865,	pp.	14–15,	1966a,	p.	13)	
The	ratio	of	3:1	in	which	the	distribution	the	distribution	of	the	dominating	
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and	 recessive	 traits	 take	 place	 in	 the	 first	 generation	 therefore	 resolves	
itself	into	the	ratio	of	2:1:1	in	all	experiments	if	one	differentiates	between	
the	meaning	of	the	dominating	trait	as	a	hybrid	trait	and	as	a	parental	trait.	
(Mendel,	1865,	pp.	16–17,	1966a,	p.	15)	
In	 these	 paragraphs,	 the	 dominating	 trait	 is	 redefined.	Mendel	 distinguishes	 two	
senses	 of	 the	 dominating	 trait.	 The	 dominating	 parental	 trait	 is	 the	 trait	 which	
passes	unchanged	 to	all	 of	 the	offspring,	while	 the	dominating	hybrid	 trait	which	
would	exhibit	the	same	behaviour	with	the	3	:	1	ratio	in	its	offspring,	as	illustrated	
in	 Figure	 4,	 where	 A	 denotes	 the	 dominating	 parental	 trait,	 while	 Aa	 the	
dominating	hybrid	trait.	
	
Figure	4	
This	redefinition	is	really	important	for	Mendel.	It	suggests	that	he	recognised	that	
there	is	a	distinction	between	the	yellow	seeds	in	the	first	generation.	Some	yellow	
seeds	 only	 produce	 yellow	 seeds,	 while	 others	 produce	 both	 yellow	 and	 green	
seeds.	The	former	is	redefined	as	the	dominating	parental	trait,	whereas	the	latter	
as	 the	 dominating	 hybrid	 trait.	 This	 distinction	 leads	 Mendel	 and	 his	 reader	 to	
recognise	 another	 “striking”	 regularity.	Among	 the	offspring	of	 the	peas	with	 the	
dominating	 hybrid	 trait,	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	 dominating	 parental	 trait,	
dominating	 hybrid	 trait,	 and	 the	 recessive	 trait	 is	 1	 :	 2	 :	 1	 again.	 Based	 on	 this,	
Mendel	 formulated	 the	 law	 of	 development	 of	 hybrid	 that	 “apply	 to	 a	 pair	 of	
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differing	 traits”.	 Thus,	 one	 significant	 achievement	 that	Mendel	 believed	 that	 he	
had	made	was	 the	 recognition	 of	 those	Mendelian	 ratios	 among	 the	 progeny	 of	
hybrids.	
Mendel’s	Got	Laws	
Mendel’s	 other	 achievement	 that	 he	was	 very	 proud	 of	was	 his	 discovery	 of	 the	
laws	of	hybrid	development.	He	(1865)	repeatedly	emphasised	that	he	discovered	
the	laws	of	development,	though	he	was	still	cautious	on	the	universal	applicability	
of	the	laws.	As	we	can	see	from	the	following	quotations:	
The	 next	 task	 consisted	 in	 investigating	 whether	 the	 law	 of	 development	
[Entwicklungs-Gesetz]	 thus	 found	 would	 also	 apply	 to	 a	 pair	 of	 differing	
traits	when	several	different	characteristics	are	united	in	the	hybrid	through	
fertilization.	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	18,	1966a,	p.	17)	
The	 law	of	combination	of	differing	traits	[Das	Gesetz	der	Combinirung	der	
differirenden	Merkmale]	 according	 to	which	hybrid	development	proceeds	
thus	finds	its	basis	and	explanation…	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	32,	1966a,	p.	32)	
The	object	of	further	experiments	will	be	to	determine	whether	the	law	of	
development	 [Entwicklungsgesetz]	 discovered	 for	 Pisum	 is	 also	 valid	 for	
hybrids	of	other	plants.	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	32,	1966a,	p.	32)	
Despite	 the	many	 obstacles	 with	which	 the	 observations	 had	 to	 contend,	
this	experiment	 still	 establishes	 that	development	 follows	 the	 same	 law[s]	76	 [Gesetze]	as	in	Pisum…	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	34,	1966a,	p.	35)	
But	 these	 puzzling	 phenomena,	 too,	 could	 probably	 be	 explained	 by	 the	
law[s]77	 [Gesetze]	valid	for	Pisum…	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	35,	1966a,	p.	35)	
If	 it	 is	assumed	that	development	of	hybrids	 follows	 the	 law[s]	 [Gesetze]78	
valid	for	Pisum…	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	39,	1966a,	p.	40)	
Yet	 even	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 laws	 [Sätze]	 proposed	 for	 Pisum	 needs																																																									76	 This	is	a	mistranslation	of	Sherwood’s	translation,	since	in	the	German	text,	the	plural	term	
Gesetze	rather	than	the	singular	term	Gesetz	was	used.	77	 Another	mistranslation,	see	footnote	76.	78	 Another	mistranslation,	see	footnote	76.	
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confirmation,	and	a	repetition	of	at	least	the	more	important	experiments	is	
therefore	desirable…	Whether	variable	hybrids	of	other	plant	species	show	
complete	agreement	in	behavior	also	remains	to	be	decided	experimentally;	
one	 might	 assume,	 however,	 that	 no	 basic	 difference	 could	 exist	 in	
important	matters	since	unity	 in	 the	plan	of	development	of	organic	 life	 is	
beyond	doubt.	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	42,	1966a,	p.	43)	
It	 has	 been	 debated	 how	 many	 laws	 Mendel	 discovered	 among	 historians.	
Müller-Wile	 and	Orel	 (2007)	 argue	 that	Mendel	 only	 had	 one	 law	 in	mind,	while	
Callender	 (1988)	 maintains	 that	 Mendel	 identified	 two	 laws.	 However,	 Mendel	
enunciates	 that	 he	 discovers	 more	 than	 one	 law	 of	 development	 in	 the	 paper	
(1865).	As	we	have	seen,	in	most	places	Mendel	uses	the	plural	form	Gesetze	(laws)	
rather	 than	 the	 singular	 form	Gesetz	 (law).79	 In	 particular,	Mendel	 also	 explicitly	
identified	what	he	found	in	his	experiments	on	Pisum	is	the	laws	of	development	in	
his	letter	(31	December	1866)	to	Nägeli.	
I	have	repeated	[Gärtner’s]	work	and	have	reexamined	it	carefully	to	find,	if	
possible,	 an	 agreement	 with	 those	 laws	 of	 development	
[Entwicklungsgesetze]	which	 I	 found	to	be	 true	 for	my	experimental	plant.	
(Correns,	1906,	p.	195;	Mendel,	1966b,	p.	57)	
Precisely	speaking,	 in	his	paper	Mendel	formulates	three	laws	of	“development	of	
hybrid”:	 the	 law	 of	 development	 (Entwicklungs-Gesetz)	 that	 “apply	 to	 a	 pair	 of	
differing	 traits	 (welche	 nur	 in	 einem	wesentlichen	Merkmale	 verschieden	waren)”	
(Mendel,	 1865,	 p.	 18),	 the	 “law	 of	 combination	 of	 differing	 traits	 (Gesetz	 der	
Combinirung	der	 	 differierenden	Merkmale)”	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	32),	and	the	law	of	
“the	 composition	 of	 hybrid	 fertilizing	 cells	 (die	 Beschaffenheit	 der	
hybriden-Befruchtungszellen)”	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	45).	
Müller-Wile	 and	 Orel	 (2007)	 believe	 that	 Mendel	 formulates	 the	 law	 of	
development	concerning	a	pair	of	differing	traits	as	follows:	
…	[O]f	the	seeds	formed	by	the	hybrids	with	one	pair	of	differing	traits,	one	
half	 again	 develop	 the	 hybrid	 form	 while	 the	 other	 half	 yield	 plants	 that																																																									79	 Now	we	can	see	that	Sherwood’s	translation	fails	to	reflect	this	subtle	difference	in	some	sentences.	
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remain	constant	and	receive	the	dominating	and	the	recessive	character	in	
equal	shares.	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	17,	1966a,	p.	15)	
This	 statement	 is	 italicised	 in	 Mendel’s	 original	 paper	 (1865),	 in	 which	 italicised	
terms	 and	 sentences	 are	 what	 Mendel	 attempts	 to	 emphasise.	 So,	 Mendel	 did	
seem	 to	 take	 it	 as	 the	 formulation	 of	 law	 of	 development	 concerning	 a	 pair	 of	
differing	traits.	However,	from	a	philosopher’s	point	of	view,	I	regard	it	only	as	the	
statement	 of	 an	 instance	 of	 the	 law	 in	 the	 first	 generation	 of	 hybrids.	 A	 more	
general	form	of	the	law	should	be	that	the	ratio	of	the	dominating	constant	form,	
the	hybrid	form,	and	the	recessive	constant	form	in	the	nth	generation	is	2n	–	1	:	2	:	
2n	–	1	under	the	assumption	that	“on	the	average,	equal	fertility	for	all	plants	in	all	
generations,	 and	 if	 one	 considers,	 furthermore,	 that	 half	 of	 the	 seeds	 that	 each	
hybrid	produces	yield	hybrids	again	while	 in	 the	other	half	 the	two	traits	become	
constant	in	equal	proportions.”	(Mendel,	1865,	pp.	17–18,	1966a,	p.	16)	This	law	of	
development	 concerning	 a	 pair	 of	 differing	 traits	 is	 really	 important	 for	Mendel,	
since	the	two	other	laws	are	formulated	on	the	basis	of	it.	For	example,	the	law	of	
combination	of	differing	traits	is	about	its	applicability	to	multiple	pairs	of	differing	
pairs,	which	is	stated	as	follows:	
The	 progeny	 of	 hybrids	 in	 which	 several	 essentially	 different	 traits	 are	
united	 represent	 the	 terms	 of	 a	 combination	 series	 in	 which	 the	
[developmental	series]	for	each	pair	of	differing	are	combined…	at	the	same	
time	that	the	behavior	of	each	pair	of	differing	traits	in	a	hybrid	association	
is	independent	of	all	other	differences	in	the	two	parental	plants.	(Mendel,	
1865,	p.	22,	1966a,	p.	22)	
In	addition,	the	law	of	composition	of	hybrid	fertilising	cells	provides	the	“basis	and	
explanation”	 of	 the	 law	 of	 combination	 of	 differing	 traits,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 law	 of	
development	concerning	a	pair	of	differing	traits.	This	law	is	formulated	as	follows.	
…	 [P]ea	 hybrids	 form	 germinal	 and	 pollen	 cells	 that	 in	 their	 composition	
correspond	 in	 equal	 numbers	 to	 all	 the	 constant	 forms	 resulting	 from	 the	
combination	 of	 traits	 united	 through	 fertilization.	 (Mendel,	 1865,	 p.	 29,	
1966a,	p.	29)	
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Although	Mendel	does	not	explicitly	use	the	term	Gesetz	to	name	“the	assumption”	
about	 the	 composition	 of	 hybrid	 fertilising	 cells,	 there	 is	 another	 passage	where	
Mendel	clearly	identifies	his	discovery	of	the	law	on	the	composition	of	cells,	where	
he	refer	Sätze	to	all	his	laws.	
Yet	 even	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 laws	 [Sätze]	 proposed	 for	 Pisum	 needs	
confirmation,	and	a	repetition	of	at	least	the	more	important	experiments	is	
therefore	 desirable:	 for	 instance,	 the	 one	 on	 the	 composition	 of	 hybrid	
fertilizing	cells.	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	42,	1966a,	p.	43)	
Though	in	the	case	Mendel	used	the	term	Sätze	rather	than	Gesetze,	the	key	point	
is	 that	Mendel	 again	 used	 the	 plural	 term	 to	 identify	 his	 discovery.	 Therefore,	 in	
contrast	 to	 what	 Müller-Wille	 and	 Orel	 maintained,	 Mendel	 believed	 that	 he	
discovered	the	laws	of	development	rather	than	the	law	of	development.	
Table	6	
Mendel’s	Laws	in	Versuche	(1865)	
Traits	Level	 The	 law	 of	
development	 that	
applies	 to	 a	 pair	 of	
differing	traits	(LDT)	
The	law	of	combination	of	
differing	traits	(LCT)	
	
Cell	Level	 	 	 The	 law	 of	
composition	 of	
hybrid	 fertilising	
cells	(LCC)	
Thirdly,	Mendel	believes	that	his	law	on	the	composition	of	cells	underlies	the	law	
of	 development	 of	 one	 pair	 of	 differing	 traits	 and	 the	 law	 of	 combination	 of	
differing	 traits	 by	 providing	 a	 reductionist	 explanation	 of	 the	 numerical	
interrelationships	of	the	morphological	traits	of	hybrids	in	their	progeny.	
The	 law	 of	 combination	 of	 differing	 traits	 according	 to	 which	 hybrid	
development	 proceeds	 thus	 finds	 its	 basis	 and	 explanation	 in	 the	 proven	
statement	 that	 hybrids	 produce	 germinal	 pollen	 cells	 that	 correspond	 in	
equal	numbers	to	all	the	constant	forms	resulting	from	the	combination	of	
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traits	united	through	fertilization.	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	32,	1966a,	p.	32)	
The	 distinguishing	 traits	 of	 two	 plants	 can,	 after	 all,	 be	 caused	 only	 by	
differences	 in	 the	 composition	 and	 grouping	 of	 the	 elements	 existing	 in	
dynamic	interaction	in	their	primordial	cells.	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	42,	1966a,	p.	
43)	
Fourthly,	 it	 is	clear	that	Mendel’s	 laws	are	all	about	the	developmental	series.	For	
example,	 LDT	 is	 about	 the	 developmental	 series	 of	 dominating	 constant,	 hybrid,	
and	 recessive	constant	 forms	of	hybrids,	which	 is	also	 symbolically	 formulated	by	
Mendel	 as	 A	 +	 2Aa	 +	 a	 where	 A	 denotes	 the	 dominating	 constant	 form,	 Aa	 the	
hybrid	 form,	 and	 a	 the	 recessive	 constant	 form.	 Mendel’s	 LCT	 is	 about	 the	
developmental	 series	 of	 the	 progeny	 hybrids	 which	 differ	 more	 than	 a	 pair	 of	
differing	traits,	while	Mendel’s	LCC	provides	a	reductive	explanation	of	LCT	and	LCD.	
Thus,	 it	 seems	 to	 be	 more	 appropriate	 to	 call	 Mendel’s	 laws	 “the	 laws	 of	
developmental	series”.	This,	again,	confirms	my	conclusion	 in	 the	section	2.1	that	
Mendel’s	concern	is	about	developmental	series	of	the	progeny	of	hybrids.	
Finally,	Mendel	 believes	 that	 his	 laws	 of	 development,	 especially	 the	 law	 on	 the	
composition	of	cells,	are	useful	to	analyse	and	explain	some	unsolved	problems	in	
plant	hybridism.	For	example,	 in	the	concluding	remarks,	he	contends	that	one	of	
“most	 difficult	 [problems]	 in	 hybrid	 production”,	 that	 is,	 “transformation	 of	 one	
species	 into	 another	 by	 artificial	 fertilization”,	 can	 be	 analysed	 and	 explained	 by	
applying	his	laws	of	hybrid	development.	
If	 one	 may	 assume	 that	 the	 development	 of	 forms	 proceeded	 in	 these	
experiments	in	a	manner	similar	to	that	in	Pisum,	then	the	entire	process	of	
transformation	would	have	a	rather	simple	explanation.	(Mendel,	1865,	pp.	
43–44,	1966a,	p.	44)	
In	 his	 first	 letter	 to	 Nägeli,	 Mendel	 explicates	 this	 project	 in	 greater	 detail	 by	
studying	 the	 law	 underlying	 the	 transformation	 of	G.	urbanum	 into	 rivale	 on	 the	
basis	of	his	laws	of	developmental	series	of	hybrids.	
In	order	to	determine	the	agreement,	if	any,	with	Pisum,	a	study	of	those	
forms	which	occur	in	the	first	generation	should	be	sufficient…	 	
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Hieracium,	Cirsium,	and	Geum	I	have	selected	for	further	experiments…	
The	hybrid	Geum	urbanum	+	rivale	deserves	special	attention.	This	plant,	
according	to	Gärtner,	belongs	to	the	few	known	hybrids	which	produce	
nonvariable	progeny	as	long	as	they	remain	self-pollinated.	To	me	it	does	
not	seem	quite	certain	that	the	hybrid	which	Gärtner	obtained	was	actually	
G.	intermedium	Ehrh.	Gärtner	calls	his	plant	an	intermediate	type;	this	
designation	can	not	be	applied	without	qualification	to	G.	intermedium.	In	
the	transformation	of	G.	urbanum	into	rivale,	Gärtner	states	explicitly	that,	
by	fertilization	of	the	hybrid	with	the	pollen	of	rivale,	only	homogeneous	
offspring,	which	definitely	resemble	the	paternal	type,	were	obtained.	
However,	we	are	not	informed	as	to	where	this	resemblance	lies,	and	to	
what	degree	characters	of	G.	urbanum	were	suppressed	by	each	successive	
fertilization,	until	finally	the	pure	rivale	type	emerged.	It	can	hardly	be	
doubted	that	this	gradual	transformation	obeys	a	definite	law,	which,	if	it	
could	be	discovered,	would	also	give	clues	to	the	behavior	of	other	hybrids	
of	this	type.	I	hope	to	be	able	to	get	this	artificial	hybrid	to	flower	next	
summer.	(Correns,	1906,	pp.	195–197;	Mendel,	1966b,	pp.	57–59)	
This	application	of	the	laws	of	hybrid	development	echoes	Mendel’s	promise	in	the	
introductory	 remarks	 that	 the	 discovery	 of	 the	 law	 of	 development	 of	 hybrids	 is	
significant	for	“the	[developmental]	history	of	organic	forms.”80	
In	summary,	it	can	be	concluded	that	Mendel	himself	well	recognises	that	his	work	
on	Pisum	is	about	the	development	of	hybrids	in	their	progeny.	For	those	who	have	
not	 yet	 been	 convinced	 by	my	 arguments	 and	 are	 still	 inclined	 to	maintain	 that	
Mendel’s	concern	is	about	heredity,	one	important	question	remains.	
If	Mendel’s	real	concern	would	have	been	about	heredity	rather	than	development	
of	hybrids	in	their	progeny,	why	didn’t	Mendel	emphasise	this	literally	in	the	paper																																																									80	 Olby	(1991)	provides	an	alternative	reading	of	Mendel’s	promise.	He	takes	the	“developmental	history	of	organic	forms”	as	the	ultimate	question	Mendel	aims	to	answer	in	his	1866	paper.	In	the	concluding	remarks,	Mendel’s	purpose,	as	explicitly	stated	in	the	opening	sentence,	is	to	compare	his	observations	on	peas	with	Kölreuter	and	Gärtner’s	experimental	results.	The	problem	of	transformation	is	just	one	and	the	final	one	of	the	several	comparative	studies	in	the	concluding	remarks.	In	addition,	though	Mendel	is	explicit	that	the	significance	of	his	studies	on	peas	for	the	developmental	history	of	organic	forms	must	not	be	underestimated,	it	does	not	imply	that	the	developmental	history	of	organic	forms	is	Mendel’s	ultimate	concern	in	the	paper.	
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and	his	correspondence	with	Nägeli	instead?	In	short,	it	seems	to	me	really	difficult	
to	insist	that	Mendel’s	concern	is	about	heredity	until	this	puzzle	is	well	solved.	 	
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3.3	Understanding	Mendel	on	Pisum:	It	isn’t	about	Heredity	at	all!	
Even	if	many	admit	that	Mendel’s	objective	is	not	about	heredity,	some	still	try	to	
argue	that	Mendel’s	work	can	be	read	as	a	work	of	heredity.	Müller-Wille	and	Orel	
maintain	that	though	Mendel’s	motivation	cannot	simply	be	read	as	an	attempt	to	
study	 patterns	 of	 inheritance	 of	 peas,	 Mendel’s	 work	 is	 definitely	Mendelian.	 In	
their	 words,	 “What	Mendel	 achieved	 by	 his	 experimental	 analysis	 was	 a	 kind	 of	
anatomy	 of	 inheritance.”	 (Müller-Wille	&	Orel,	 2007,	 p.	 212)	One	 of	 their	 crucial	
arguments	 is	 that	 Mendel’s	 approach	 is	 totally	 different	 from	 his	 predecessors	
Linnaeus,	Kölreuter,	and	Gärtner.	In	particular,	they	argue	that	the	real	objective	of	
Mendel’s	experiments	 is	not	about	hybrids	as	 stated	 in	 the	 introductory	 remarks.	
Müller-Wille	and	Orel	claim	that	they	find	a	“reformulation	of	the	aim	of	Mendel’s	
experiment”.	Here	is	the	passage.	
The	object	of	the	experiment	was	to	observe	[the]	variations	[in	the	progeny	
of	the	hybrid]	in	the	case	of	each	pair	of	differentiating	characters,	and	to	
establish	the	law	according	to	which	they	appear	in	successive	generations.	
The	experiment	resolves	itself	therefore	into	just	as	many	separate	
experiments	as	there	are	constantly	differentiating	characters	presented	in	
the	experimental	plants’.	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	7,	1966a,	p.	5)	
For	Müller-Wille	and	Orel,	this	passage	shows	a	shift	of	the	aim	of	Mendel’s	work	
from	a	study	of	hybrids	to	a	study	of	the	characters	of	hybrids.	However,	 I	do	not	
see	this	as	a	shift	of	the	aim	of	Mendel’s	research.	Rather,	as	I	shall	argue	in	detail	
in	the	section	5.2,	it	is	just	a	problem-specification.	Müller-Wille	and	Orel	are	right	
to	point	out	that	the	subject	of	Mendel’s	research	on	Pisum	is	paired	morphological	
traits	of	pea	hybrids,	but	 the	study	on	the	paired	characters	of	pea	hybrids	 is	 the	
means	rather	than	the	ends.	Mendel’s	careful	discussions	on	the	paired	characters	
of	 pea	 hybrids	 are	 merely	 the	 means	 to	 study	 the	 general	 problem	 of	 the	
developmental	 series	 of	 hybrids	 in	 their	 progeny.81	 His	 ultimate	 concern	 is	 still	
about	the	developmental	series	of	hybrids	in	their	progeny.	As	I	have	cited	earlier,	
in	his	first	letter	to	Nägeli,	Mendel	clearly	describes	his	achievement	as	finding	the	
“laws	 of	 development”.	 (Mendel,	 1966b,	 p.	 57)	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 shall	 argue	 that																																																									81	 See	more	in-depth	discussion	in	Chapter	5.	
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Mendel’s	work	on	Pisum	cannot	be	understood	as	a	work	of	heredity,	whether	 in	
the	19th	century	or	20th	century	sense.	
Mendel:	A	Geneticist	in	the	20th	Century	sense?	
There	are	two	other	lines	of	argument	for	the	view	that	Mendel’s	research	can	be	
understood	as	a	work	of	heredity.	 Firstly,	 some	 (for	example,	Hartl	&	Orel,	1992;	
Sandler	&	 Sandler,	 1985)	 argue	 that	 there	 are	 premature	 versions	 of	 the	 laws	 of	
segregation	and	of	 independent	assortment	 in	Mendel’s	paper.	The	problem	that	
Mendel	was	 studying	 is	 in	 fact	 the	 patterns	 of	 inheritance,	 from	a	 contemporary	
point	of	view.	So	Mendel	 is	a	geneticist	 in	the	20th	century	sense.	The	first	 line	of	
argument	 has	 been	widely	 discussed.	 Olby	makes	 a	 systematic	 argument	 against	
this	 view	 by	 rejecting	 that	 there	 is	 any	 explicit	 formulation	 of	 the	 laws	 of	
segregation	and	of	independent	assortment.	
Mendel	 did	 not	 have	 the	 conception	 of	 pairs	 of	 factors	 or	 elements	
determining	 his	 pairs	 of	 contrasted	 characters…	 There	 is	 no	 case	 for	 the	
view	that	Mendel	conceived	of	paired	hereditary	particles	equivalent	to	the	
alleles	in	classical	genetics.	He	went	no	further	than	postulating	one	kind	of	
element	in	the	germ	cell	for	any	one	trait.	
…	The	cell	theory	of	fertilization…	in	Mendel’s	Versuche…	did	not	serve	as	a	
basis	 for	 cytological	 theory	about	hereditary	determinants.	 (Olby,	1979,	p.	
67)	
Though	Olby	 is	 right	 that	Mendel’s	 laws	 of	 hybrid	 development	 are	 conceptually	
different	 from	the	so-called	Mendel’s	 laws	of	 inheritance	 in	 the	20th	 century,	 it	 is	
hardly	a	serious	challenge	to	the	view	that	Mendel’s	work	can	be	read	as	a	work	of	
heredity	 in	 the	20th	 century	 sense.	Olby’s	 argument	 can	be	 countered	by	 arguing	
that	 Mendel’s	 laws	 of	 hybrid	 development	 are	 just	 a	 premature	 version	 of	 the	
theory	of	Mendelian	genetics.	Thus,	it	seems	still	plausible	to	understand	Mendel’s	
work	as	a	study	of	heredity.	
Nevertheless,	 this	 defence	 is	 not	 conclusive.	 I	 wonder	 to	 what	 extent	 Mendel’s	
work	can	be	understood	as	a	work	of	heredity.	As	I	have	asked	in	the	section	1.2,	if	
Mendel’s	laws	can	be	understood	as	a	version	of	the	theory	of	Mendelian	genetics,	
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what	underlies	the	relation	between	Mendel’s	version	and	the	later	versions?	Why	
should	 we	 believe,	 say,	 that	Mendel’s	 laws	 and	 de	 Vries’	 law	 of	 segregation	 are	
different	versions	of	a	single	theory	rather	than	different	theories?	 	
As	 a	 response,	 Raphael	 Falk	 and	 Sahotra	 Sarkar	 (1991),	 accepting	 that	 there	 are	
substantially	 conceptual	 differences	 between	 Mendel’s	 laws	 and	 the	 laws	 of	
inheritance,	argue	 that	Mendel	was	 studying	 the	problem	of	heredity	 in	 terms	of	
development.	
Indeed,	 as	Olby	…	has	observed,	Mendel	 phrased	his	 problem	 in	 terms	of	
the	 formulation	 of	 hybrids	 and	 their	 progeny.	 The	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 the	
historical	context:	in	the	first	half	of	the	nineteenth	century,	Moravia	was	a	
center	of	intensive	breeding	activity	which	provoked	considerable	interest	in	
intellectual	 circles	 ...	The	breeding	methods	of	Robert	Blakewell	 that	were	
imported	from	England	and	promoted	by	Geisslern	(known	as	the	“Morvian	
Blakewell”)	 were	 those	 of	 the	 production	 of	 hybrids	 between	 divergent	
strains	showing	desired	traits	and	transmit	them	to	the	progeny	over	several	
generations.	A	difficulty	 that	 arose	was	 that	 the	 traits	 did	 not	 breed	 true.	
When	 Mendel	 addressed	 such	 problems	 he	 was,	 therefore,	 directly	
addressing	a	problem	of	heredity.	Conceptually,	moreover,	it	could	not	have	
been	otherwise.	If	hybrids	are	formed	through	reproduction,	and	pass	traits	
on	 (with	whatever	 success)	 through	 reproduction,	and	 these	are	 the	 traits	
being	studied,	what	is	being	studied,	 ipso	facto,	 is	the	inheritance	of	traits.	
The	 problem	 of	 inheritance	 is,	 in	 some	 sense,	 more	 general	 than	 the	
problem	of	hybridization.	But	that	hardly	means	that	studying	hybridization	
is	not	studying	inheritance.	(Falk	&	Sarkar,	1991,	p.	448)	
At	first	glance,	Falk	and	Sarkar’s	argument	seems	to	be	quite	promising.	It	not	only	
defends	 that	 Mendel’s	 work	 is	 about	 heredity	 by	 identifying	 the	 problem	 of	
heredity,	but	also	answers	a	question	I	asked	at	the	end	of	last	section:	why	didn’t	
Mendel	mentioned	heredity	in	his	paper?	Unfortunately,	the	argument	is	flawed	in	
many	ways.	 The	biggest	 problem	 is	 the	 circularity.	 Falk	 and	 Sarkar	 are	 looking	 at	
Mendel’s	problem	with	a	20th	century	prejudice.	In	other	words,	Mendel’s	problem	
was	construed	with	a	contemporary	understanding	of	the	problem	of	 inheritance.	
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Falk	and	Sarkar’s	argument	can	be	reformulated	as	follows:	 	
P1.	 Transmission	 of	 morphological	 traits	 is	 a	 central	 problem	 in	 the	 science	 of	
heredity.	
P2.	Mendel	was	studying	transmission	of	the	morphological	trait	of	Pisum	in	terms	
of	development.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
C.	Therefore,	Mendel’s	work	can	be	understood	as	a	work	of	heredity.	 	
However,	 I	have	 to	warn	 that	our	understanding	of	 the	problem	of	 inheritance	 is	
heavily	influenced	by	Mendel’s	work.	The	definition	of	the	problem	of	inheritance	is	
indebted	to	Mendel’s	work.	Under	the	influence	of	Mendel’s	focus	on	transmission	
of	 morphological	 traits,	 geneticists	 in	 the	 early	 20th	 century	 began	 taking	
transmission	as	a	central	research	problem	in	the	study	of	heredity,	which	consists	
in	our	current	understanding	of	the	science	of	heredity.	Therefore,	 it	 is	circular	to	
show	 that	Mendel’s	work	 is	 about	 heredity	 by	 arguing	 that	Mendel’s	 problem	 is	
similar	to	the	problem	of	transmission	inheritance	today!	
In	addition,	there	are	two	minor	problems.	Firstly,	Falk	and	Sarkar’s	argument	relies	
on	a	vague	claim	that	Mendel’s	work	was	provoked	by	 the	studies	of	breeding	 in	
Moravia.	 Though	 I	 have	 no	 objection	 to	 the	 view	 that	Mendel	 was	more	 or	 less	
influenced	 by	 the	 breeding	 research	 in	 Moravia,	 it	 is	 unclear	 to	 what	 extent	
Mendel’s	problem	was	framed	by	it.	There	is	so	little	written	evidence	to	show	that	
Mendel’s	 study	on	Pisum	was	motivated	by	 the	studies	of	breeding	 in	Moravia	 in	
the	 first	half	of	 the	19th	 century.82	 Secondly,	 I	have	no	 idea	of	 in	what	 sense	 the	
problem	 of	 inheritance	 is	 more	 general	 than	 the	 problem	 of	 hybridisation.	 If	 it	
means,	as	implicitly	suggested	by	Falk	and	Sarkar,	that	the	problem	of	hybridisation	
is	part	of	the	problem	of	inheritance.	It	is	definitely	not	the	case	in	the	19th	century.	
There	 is	 little	 evidence	 to	 show	 that	 there	 is	 correspondence	 between	 plant	
hybridists	 (e.g.	 Kölreuter	 and	Gärtner)	 and	 sheep	breeders	 in	Moravia	 (e.g.	Napp	
and	Nestler).	As	Orel	 (1996,	p.	34)	points	out,	Rudolf	Wagner	(1853,	p.	1018)	was	
the	first	19th	century	naturalist	who	explicitly	suggested	that	plant	hybridisation	can	
be	 useful	 to	 study	 heredity.	 However,	 I	 am	 really	 sceptical	 on	 whether	 Mendel																																																									82	 This	point	will	be	discussed	in	greater	detail	later.	
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might	have	ever	been	influenced	by	Wagner’s	suggestion.	Thus,	I	conclude	that	it	is	
too	arbitrary	to	argue	that,	for	Mendel,	the	problem	of	hybridization	is	part	of	the	
problem	of	inheritance.	
To	sum	up,	I	argue	that	Mendel’s	work	cannot	be	understood	as	a	work	of	heredity	
in	the	20th	century	sense.	
Mendel:	A	Geneticist	in	the	19th	Century	sense?	
Another	line	of	argument	(for	example,	Orel	&	Wood,	1998;	Orel,	1998)	for	the	
view	that	Mendel’s	research	can	be	understood	as	a	work	of	heredity	is	as	follows:	
In	the	first	half	of	nineteenth-century	there	are	lively	discussions	on	heredity	in	
Brünn,	Moravia,	where	Mendel	was	living.	The	interest	of	heredity	arose	from	the	
study	of	sheep	breeding.	The	notion	of	genetische	Gesetze	(genetic	laws)	was	first	
introduced	in	1818	to	describe	the	patterns	of	inheritance	in	animals	by	Count	E.	
Festetics.	Since	1827,	the	word	Vererbung	(heredity)	had	been	widely	used	to	
describe	the	transmission	of	different	traits.	J.	K.	Nestler	(1783-1841),	Professor	of	
Agriculture,	Science	and	Natural	History	at	the	Moravian	University	of	Olomouc,	
and	F.	C.	Napp	(1792-1867),	abbot	of	the	Augustinian	monastery	in	Brünn,	were	
two	leading	figures	in	the	study	of	heredity	at	that	time.	Soon	F.	Diebl,	professor	of	
the	Philosophical	Institute,	introduced	Nestler’s	teaching	on	breeding	and	heredity	
into	Brünn.	It	is	argued	that	Mendel	must	have	known	the	context,	given	the	
evidence	that	Napp	was	Mendel’s	mentor,	and	Mendel	attended	Diebl’s	lectures.	
So	Mendel	was	studying	heredity	in	the	19th	century	sense.	
Orel,	a	strong	proponent	of	this	view,	reinforces	this	view	by	arguing	that	a	key	
term	in	Mendel’s	paper	Entwicklungsgeschichte	(the	developmental	history)	should	
be	identical	with	Verebungsgeschichte	(the	history	of	heredity).	
At	 that	time	prominent	sheep	breeders	 in	Moravia	had	kept	 forty	years	of	
stock	registers	with	wool	sample	cards.	Nestler	called	on	them	to	take	part	
in	 the	elaboration	of	 the	principles	of	 rational	breeding	 to	answer	 the	key	
question:	“What	noticeable	success	in	heredity	can	be	achieved	when	rams	
and	ewes	with	equal	or	unequal	traits	are	paired?”	The	breeders	were	asked	
to	examine	these	old	 family	registers	 to	 investigate	the	history	of	heredity	
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(Verebungsgeschichte)	of	the	best	stock	animals	 in	their	offspring	from	the	
top	 downward	 or	 their	 developmental	 history	 (Entwicklungsgeschichte)	 in	
their	 ancestors	 from	 bottom	 upward.	 From	 this	 investigation	 Nestler	
expected	 valuable	 material	 for	 the	 theory	 of	 breeding.	 The	 term	
Entwicklungsgeschichte	 was	 for	 him	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 same	 coin,	 of	
Verebungsgeschichte.	(Orel,	1998,	p.	297)	
Emphasising	 the	significance	of	his	 research	approach	 from	the	view	point	
of	 “Entwicklungsgeschichte	 of	 organic	 forms”,	 Mendel	 could	 have	 had	 in	
mind	Nestler’s	understanding	of	the	history	of	heredity.	(Orel,	1998,	p.	299)	
I	 agree	 with	 Orel	 that	 the	 problem	 of	 heredity	 was	 important	 in	 the	 context	 of	
animal	breeding	in	Moravia.	As	Wood	and	Orel	point	out,	 	
The	 big	 problem	 facing	 [breeders	 in	 Moravia],	 …	 was	 the	 absence	 of	 a	
theory	 of	 inheritance.	 In	 1836	 Napp	 stated	 his	 opinion	 that	 the	 problem	
could	be	explained	only	by	seeking	its	physiological	basis,	i.e.	by	discovering	
the	 nature	 and	 behaviour	 of	 whatever	 it	 was	 that	 was	 transmitted	 at	
fertilisation.	When	discussion	on	this	topic	continued	in	the	following	year,	
he	 formulated	 the	 key	 research	 question	 ‘what	 is	 inherited	 and	 how?’	
(Wood	&	Orel,	2005,	p.	268)	
There	 are	 many	 discussions	 on	 Vererbung	 (heredity)	 in	 the	 literature	 of	 animal	
breeding	in	Moravia	in	the	first	half	of	the	19th	century	(for	example,	Nestler,	1837).	
It	 is	 also	 plausible	 to	 postulate	 that	 Mendel	 might	 have	 known	 the	 work	 of	
Vererbung	 (heredity)	 by	 Nestler,	 Napp,	 Diebl,	 etc,	 through	 either	 his	 personal	
acquiescence	with	Napp	or	his	study	under	Diebl.	
However,	it	is	still	unknown	to	what	extent	Mendel	was	influenced	by	these	studies	
on	heredity:	Did	Mendel	regard	the	problem	of	heredity	as	an	interesting	problem	
to	study?	Given	the	evidence	we	have	so	 far,	 it	 is	 too	bold	to	 infer	 that	Mendel’s	
research	on	the	development	of	plant	hybrids	is	a	means	to	studying	the	problem	
of	heredity.	No	direct	evidence	shows	that	Mendel’s	paper	is	related	to	the	problem	
of	 heredity	 studied	 by	Nestler	 and	Napp.	Otherwise,	why	 didn’t	Mendel	mention	
their	 works	 in	 the	 paper?	 Why	 didn’t	 Mendel	 even	 suggest	 the	 potential	
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contribution	made	by	his	experiments	on	Pisum	 to	 the	problem	of	heredity?	Why	
didn’t	 Mendel	 make	 a	 comparison	 between	 his	 observation	 on	 peas	 and	 the	
experimental	 results	 obtained	 by	 Nestler	 or	 other	 breeders	 in	 the	 concluding	
remarks,	as	he	did	with	Kölreuter	and	Gärtner?	
In	addition,	Nestler’s	belief	that	(Verebungsgeschichte)	the	history	of	heredity	can	
be	 studied	 by	 means	 of	 studying	 Entwicklungsgeschichte	 (the	 developmental	
history)	 confirms	 a	 fact	 that	 Entwicklung	 (development)	 is	 an	 independent	 and	
important	 research	 problem	 in	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 19th	 century.	 Given	 the	
significance	of	Entwickelung	in	Gärtner’s	research	as	I	have	pointed	earlier,	we	can	
see	that	the	study	of	Entwicklung	has	many	potential	utilities	in	Mendel’s	time.	And	
this	further	confirms	my	conclusion	that	Mendel’s	ultimate	concern	was	about	the	
problem	of	development	(Entwicklung).	
Therefore,	 I	 contend	 that	 no	 matter	 how	 genetics	 or	 the	 study	 of	 heredity	 is	
understood	 in	 the	 historical	 context,	 Mendel	 is	 definitely	 not	 a	 geneticist	 in	 the	
sense	that	he	aims	to	study	heredity,	or	his	work	is	about	heredity.	We	should	not	
overestimate	nor	underestimate	Mendel’s	contribution	to	the	history	of	genetics.	
Summary	
In	summary,	as	I	have	shown,	the	traditional	understanding	of	Mendel's	
contribution	as	the	discovery	of	the	laws	of	heredity	was	seriously	challenged	in	the	
late	1970s.	Some	(for	example,	Callender,	1988;	Olby,	1979)	develop	the	revisionist	
interpretation	by	postulating	that	Mendel's	real	concern	is	about	the	genesis	of	
new	species	by	hybridisation.	Recently	Müller-Wille	and	Orel	(2007)	try	to	reconcile	
the	two	views	by	arguing	that	though	Mendel's	work	on	Pisum	is	oversimplified	by	
the	traditional	interpretation,	it	is	right	to	maintain	that	Mendel's	work	is	about	
inheritance.	However,	the	debate	is	murky	especially	because	it	fails	to	distinguish	
how	to	understand	Mendel’s	contribution	from	what	Mendel’s	objective	is,	or	what	
Mendel’s	understanding	of	his	own	work	was.	I	revisit	Mendel’	work	on	Pisum	by	
focusing	on	three	questions:	What	is	Mendel’s	real	concern	in	his	paper	Versuche	
über	Pflanzen-Hybriden	(1866)?	What	did	Mendel	believe	that	he	achieved	in	the	
paper?	Can	Mendel’s	paper	be	understood	as	a	study	on	heredity?	And	my	answers	
are	
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1. Mendel’s	real	concern	in	his	paper	Versuche	is	not	about	heredity.	Rather,	
under	Gärtner’s	influence,	it	is	about	the	developmental	series	of	hybrids	in	
their	progeny.	
2. Mendel	himself	confirmed	in	the	1866	paper	and	his	correspondence	with	
Nägeli	that	his	key	contribution	is	to	recognise	the	striking	ratios	among	the	
progeny	of	hybrids	and	to	discover	the	laws	of	development	of	hybrids.	
3. Mendel’s	work	on	Pisum	cannot	be	understood	as	a	study	on	heredity,	whether	
is	interpreted	in	the	19th	century	or	20th	century	sense.	
Although	not	all	of	these	answers	are	completely	new,	I	have	tried	to	provide	new	
arguments	to	support	these.	In	particular,	I	strengthened	the	view	that	Mendel’s	
concern	was	about	the	developmental	series	of	hybrids	in	their	progeny	by	showing	
Gärtner’s	influence	on	Mendel’s	work	both	methodologically	and	terminologically.	 	
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3.	Demystifying	the	Rediscovery	Story	
As	I	have	argued	in	the	last	chapter,	Mendel’s	work	on	Pisum	is	not	about	heredity	
and	cannot	be	understood	as	a	study	on	heredity,	then	how	should	we	reassess	the	
significance	of	Mendel’s	work?	What	 role	did	Mendel’s	work	play	 in	 the	origin	of	
Mendelism	 at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 20th	 century?	 In	 order	 to	 find	 answers	 to	 these	
questions,	I	find	it	necessary	to	reexamine	the	fate	of	Mendel’s	work	from	1866	to	
1900	at	first.	In	this	chapter,	I	aim	to	reshape	the	history	of	the	“rediscovery”	story	
by	examining	the	literature	and	material	critically.	Firstly,	I	shall	show	that	none	of	
the	 three	 rediscoverers’	work	 is	 an	 independent	 activity	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 all	 the	
rediscoverers,	 namely,	 de	 Vries,	 Correns,	 and	 Tschermak,	 were	 led	 to	 the	
rediscovery	by	reading	Mendel’	paper	(1865).	Secondly,	I	shall	argue	that	due	to	the	
substantial	differences	of	their	conceptual	framework,	there	is	no	“rediscovery”	at	
all.	 The	 traditional	 “rediscovery”	 characterisation	oversimplifies	 the	history	of	 the	
birth	of	genetics	around	1900	and	fails	to	capture	the	practice	of	de	Vries,	Correns,	
and	Tschermak	accurately.	
4.1	The	Problem	of	Independence	
We	may	all	hear	the	famous	story	that	Mendel’s	study	on	Pisum	was	hardly	noticed	
until	1900	when	de	Vries,	Correns	and	Tschermak	independently	re-discovered	it.	
Ernst	Mayr’s	neat	summary	is	such	a	typical	account:	
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[I]n	the	spring	of	1900	…	[t]hree	botanists	–	de	Vries,	Correns,	and	
Tschermak	–	within	a	period	of	a	few	months	published	statements	that	
they	had	independently	discovered	certain	laws	of	inheritance,	only	to	find,	
when	checking	the	literature,	that	Mendel	had	anticipated	them	by	
thirty-five	years.	(Mayr,	1982,	p.	727)	
The	rediscovery	story	consists	of	two	theses:	Mendel’s	work	was	neglected	until	
1900	(the	long-neglect	thesis);	and	in	1900	de	Vries,	Correns	and	Tschermak	
rediscovered	Mendel’s	“laws”	independently	in	the	sense	that	they	all	happened	to	
read	Mendel’s	paper	after	the	completion	of	(at	least	the	majority	of)	their	research	
(the	rediscovery	thesis).	The	rediscovery	thesis	was	originally	kept	by	all	three	
rediscoverers’	advocacy	in	their	papers	published	in	a	German	journal	Berichte	der	
deutschen	botanischen	Gesellschaft	in	1900.	
This	important	treatise	[i.e.	Mendel’s	paper	(1866)]	is	so	seldom	cited,	that	I	
myself	for	the	first	time	came	to	know	about	it	after	I	had	closed	the	
majority	of	my	experiments,	and	had	derived	therefrom	the	principles	
contributed	in	the	text.	(de	Vries,	1900a,	p.	85	n1,	1966,	p.	110	n6)	
When	I	discovered	the	regularity	of	the	phenomena,	and	the	explanation	
thereof…	the	same	thing	happened	to	me	which	now	seems	to	be	
happening	to	de	Vries:	I	thought	that	I	had	found	something	new.	But	then	I	
convinced	myself	that	the	Abbot	Gregor	Mendel	in	Brünn,	had,	during	the	
sixties,	not	only	obtained	the	same	result	through	extensive	experiments	
with	peas,	which	lasted	for	many	years,	as	did	de	Vries	and	I,	but	had	also	
given	exactly	the	same	explanation,	as	far	as	that	was	possible	in	1866.	
(Correns,	1900,	p.	158,	1966,	pp.	119–120)	
Correns	has	just	published	experiments,	which	also	deal	with	artificial	
hybridization	of	different	varieties	of	Pisum	sativum	and	observations	of	the	
hybrids	left	to	self-fertilization	through	several	generations.	They	confirm,	
just	as	my	own,	Mendel’s	teachings.	The	simultaneously	“discovery”	of	
Mendel	by	Correns,	de	Vries,	and	myself	appears	to	me	especially	gratifying.	
Even	in	the	second	year	of	experimentation,	I	too	still	believed	that	I	had	
found	something	new.	(Tschermak,	1900b,	p.	239,	1950,	p.	47)	
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However,	both	of	the	long-neglect	and	rediscovery	theses	have	been	heavily	
criticised	by	historians.	Some	studies	(for	example,	Olby,	1985,	pp.	219–234;	Orel,	
1996,	pp.	275–279;	Weiling,	1991,	pp.	10–11)	have	shown	that	there	are	at	least	a	
dozen	references	to	Mendel’s	work	before	1900.	In	particular,	Mendel’s	work	was	
carefully	studied	and	discussed	by	C.	A.	Blomberg	(1872)	and	I.	F.	Schmalhausen	
(1874)	in	their	theses.	So,	it	is	clearly	not	the	case	that	Mendel’s	work	was	
completely	neglected	or	unknown	in	academia.	The	long-neglect	thesis	is	not	well	
established.	On	the	other	hand,	the	rediscovery	thesis	was	also	seriously	challenged.	
The	major	line	of	criticism	is	to	question	the	independence	of	the	rediscovery.	
During	the	months	of	March	and	July,	in	1900,	de	Vries,	Correns,	and	Tschermak	
published	five	articles	on	the	rediscovery	of	Mendel’s	work	on	Pisum.	However,	I	
shall	show	conclusively	in	this	section	that	none	of	these	publications	can	be	
legitimately	regarded	as	an	“independent”	rediscovery	of	Mendel’s	work.	In	other	
words,	I	shall	argue	that	all	the	three	rediscoverers	had	already	read	Mendel’s	
paper	(1865)	before	the	completion	of	(at	least	the	majority	of)	their	research,	and	
Mendel’s	paper	played	a	vital	role	in	the	research	published	in	the	“rediscovery”	
papers.	
Table	7	
The	Rediscoverers’	Publications	on	“Rediscovery”	in	1900	
Author	 Paper	
Hugo	de	Vries	 Sur	la	loi	de	disjonction	des	hybrids,	Comptes	Rendus	
de	I'Academie	des	Sciences	(Paris),	130,	pp.	845-847.	
(Published	on	March	26,	1900.)	
Das	Spaltungsgesetz	der	Bastarde	(Vorläufige	
Mittheilung),	Berichte	der	deutschen	botanischen	
Gesellschaft,	18(3),	pp.	83-90.	(Received	for	
publication,	on	March	14,	1900;	Published	on	March	
30,	1900.)	
Sur	les	unités	des	caractères	spécifiques	et	leur	
application	à	l'étude	des	hybrids,	Revue	générate	de	
botanique,	12,	pp.257-271.	(Dated	on	March	19,	1900;	
Published	on	July	15,	1900)	
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Über	erbungleiche	Kreuzungen	(Vorläufige	
Mittheilung),	Berichte	der	deutschen	botanischen	
Gesellschaft,	18(9),	pp.	435-443.	(Published	on	
November	30,	1900;	Received	for	publication	
November	21,	1900.)	
Carl	Correns	 G.	Mendels	Regel	über	das	Verhalten	der	
Nachkommenschaft	der	Rassenbastarde,	Berichte	der	
deutschen	botanischen	Gesellschaft,	18(4),	pp.158-168.	
(Dated	April	22,	1900;	Received	for	publication,	on	
April	24,	1900;	Published	on	April	27,	1900.)	
Erich	von	Tschermak	 Über	künstliche	Kreuzung	bei	Pisum	sativum,	Berichte	
der	deutschen	botanischen	Gesellschaft,	18(6),	
pp.232-239.	(Received	for	publication,	on	June	2,	1900;	
Published	on	June	29,	1900.)	
Über	künstliche	Kreuzung	bei	Pisum	sativum,	Zeitschrift	
für	das	landwirtschaftliche	Versuchswesen	in	
Oesterreich,	3,	pp.	465-555.	(Submitted	on	January	1,	
1900)	
De	Vries’	Rediscovery	and	Bailey’s	work	
As	shown	in	the	Table	7,	de	Vries’	“Sur	la	loi	de	disjonction	des	hybrides”	(1900c)	
was	the	earliest	published	“rediscovery”	paper.	Surprisingly,	de	Vries	did	not	give	
Mendel	any	credit	for	the	law	of	segregation	of	hybrids.	Nor	did	he	even	mention	
Mendel	in	this	French	paper.	In	contrast,	four	days	later,	de	Vries’	another	paper	
“Das	Spaltungsgesetz	der	Bastarde”	(de	Vries,	1900a)	was	published	in	German,	in	
which	he	acknowledged	Mendel’s	priority	as	the	discoverer	of	the	law	of	
segregation	of	hybrids.	
These	two	statements	[i.e.	the	law	of	segregation	of	hybrids],	in	their	most	
essential	points,	were	drawn	up	long	ago	by	Mendel	for	a	special	case	(peas).	
(de	Vries,	1900a,	p.	85,	1966,	p.	110)	
From	these	and	numerous	other	experiments	I	draw	the	conclusion	that	the	
law	of	segregation	of	hybrids	as	discovered	by	Mendel	for	peas	finds	very	
	 110	
general	application	in	the	plant	kingdom…	(de	Vries,	1900a,	p.	90,	1966,	p.	
117)	
It	is	a	bit	confusing	that	in	two	papers	on	the	law	of	segregation	both	published	
in	March,	1900,	de	Vries	treated	Mendel	so	differently.	Why	did	he	make	no	
mention	of	Mendel	in	the	French	paper	at	all?	One	suspicion	is	that	de	Vries	
intended	to	supress	Mendel’s	priority	at	first,	but	had	to	make	a	reference	after	
he	realised	that	Correns	also	knew	and	appreciated	Mendel’s	work.	Despite	a	
lack	of	direct	evidence,	it	was	once	widespread	and	persistent.	Perhaps,	as	
Sturtevant	comments,	“[this	suspicion]	cannot	be	accepted	as	established	but	
seems	to	be	the	simplest	interpretation	of	the	puzzling	facts.”	(Sturtevant,	1965,	
p.	28)	On	the	other	hand,	it	can	also	be	argued	that	de	Vries	came	to	know	
Mendel’s	paper	after	the	submission	of	the	first	paper	(de	Vries,	1900c),	and	
then	added	the	reference	to	Mendel	in	the	German	paper.83	
Though	never	giving	an	explanation	of	this	puzzling	fact,	de	Vries	was	very	
explicit	on	his	independence	of	the	rediscovery	of	the	law	of	segregation	in	the	
German	paper.	
…	I	first	learned	of	[the	existence	of	Mendel’s	paper]	after	I	had	completed	
the	majority	of	my	experiments	and	had	deduced	from	them	the	statements	
communicated	in	the	text.	(de	Vries,	1900a,	p.	85	n1,	1966,	pp.	110,	n6)	
Unfortunately,	such	a	statement	is	too	brief	to	be	informative.	Except	for	the	
confirmation	that	he	read	Mendel’s	paper	after	his	proposal	of	the	laws,	de	Vries	
fails	to	explicitly	indicate	the	date	of	his	first	reading	of	Mendel’s	paper	or	the																																																									83	 This	explanation	is	consistent	with	Stomps’	memoir	(1954),	which	I	shall	discuss	in	detail	later.	However,	it	is	not	very	convincing.	Firstly,	though	it	is	not	clear	how	long	there	was	between	de	Vries’	submission	of	the	first	French	paper	(de	Vries,	1900c)	and	the	German	paper	(de	Vries,	1900a),	given	the	fact	that	the	French	paper	was	published	only	five	days	earlier	than	the	German	paper,	it	is	not	very	likely	that	de	Vries	first	read	Mendel’s	paper	in	the	interval	between	his	two	submissions.	Secondly,	in	1900	some	realised	that	de	Vries	must	have	known	Mendel’s	paper	by	reading	his	French	paper.	Correns	and	Tschermak	are	among	them.	Tschermak	wrote	in	his	letter	to	Roberts	in	1925:	“In	the	beginning	of	April	1900,	I	received	from	Hugo	de	Vries,	whom	I	visited	from	Ghent	in	the	year	1898,	the	article	'Sur	la	loo	de	disjunction	des	hybrides'	(March	26,	1900),	in	which	De	Vries,	on	pages	1-2	says:	'In	the	hybrid	the	simple	differential	character	of	one	of	the	parents	is	then	visible	or	dominant,	while	the	antagonistic	character	is	in	the	latent	or	excessive	state.'	I	read	this	sentence	with	the	greatest	interest,	but	also,	frankly	stated,	with	consternation,	for	it	was	now	quite	clear	to	me	that	De	Vries	must	also	know	the	work	of	Mendel,	although	it	was	not	cited	in	this	paper.”	(Roberts,	1929,	p.	346)	
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source	that	led	him	to	it.	Twenty-four	years	later,	in	a	letter	to	H.	F.	Roberts,	de	
Vries	made	a	more	detailed	memoir	by	suggesting	that	his	first	reading	happened	
sometime	after	1895.	
In	1893,	I	crossed	Oenothera	lamarckiana	with	O.	lam.	brevistylis,	and	found	
their	progeny	to	be	uniform,	and	true	to	the	specific	parent	in	1894,	but	
splitting	in	the	second	generation	1895,	giving	17-26	individuals	with	the	
recessive	character	(Mut.	The.	II,	p.157).	Many	other	species	were	tried	with	
the	same	result,	and	dihybrid	crosses	showed	the	laws	of	chance	to	be	valid	
for	them	also.	After	finishing	most	of	these	experiments,	I	happened	to	read	
L.	H.	Bailey's	'Plant	Breeding'	of	1895.	In	the	list	of	literature	of	this	book,	I	
found	the	first	mention	of	Mendel's	now	celebrated	paper,	and	accordingly	
looked	it	up	and	studied	it.	(Roberts,	1929,	p.	323)	
However,	this	account	is	somehow	inconsistent	with	what	de	Vries	wrote	in	an	
earlier	letter	to	Bailey	in	1905	or	1906,	in	which	he	claimed	that	he	was	led	to	
Mendel’s	work	by	Bailey’s	paper	(1892).	
Many	years	ago	you	had	the	kindness	to	send	me	your	article	on	
'Cross-breeding	and	Hybridizing'	of	1892;	and	I	hope	it	will	interest	you	to	
know	that	it	was	by	means	of	your	bibliography	therein	that	I	learnt	some	
years	afterwards	of	the	existence	of	Mendel's	papers,	which	now	are	
coming	to	so	high	credit.	Without	your	aid	I	fear	I	should	not	have	found	
them	at	all.	(Bailey,	1915,	pp.	155,	n1)	
By	checking	Bailey’s	book	(1895),	I	find	it	clear	that	de	Vries	could	not	have	learnt	
Mendel	from	that	book,	since	there	is	no	bibliography	in	that	edition	of	the	book.	
As	Bailey	himself	correctly	pointed	out,	
The	essay,	"Cross-breeding	and	Hybridizing,"	formed	Chapter	II	of	the	old	
"Plant-Breeding"	[the	1895	version];	but	the	bibliography	that	accompanied	
it	was	not	reprinted	until	the	second	edition	of	the	book.	(Bailey,	1915,	pp.	
155,	n1)	
Bailey’	book	Plant-Breeding	was	first	published	in	December	1895,	and	then	
reprinted	three	times	before	1900:	in	April	1896,	in	August	1897,	and	in	October	
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1897	respectively.	My	examination	confirms	that	none	of	these	versions	include	a	
bibliography,	though	Mendel	was	mentioned	once	in	each	version.	The	earliest	
reprint,	which	included	the	reference	to	Mendel’s	paper	(1865),	was	the	one	
published	in	March	190284.	Therefore,	I	can	conclude	for	sure,	along	with	Zirkle’s	
observation	(1968),	that	de	Vries	could	not	have	first	learned	of	Mendel’s	paper	
from	Bailey’s	book	Plant	Breeding.	 	
However,	I	still	have	to	emphasise	that	the	possibility	that	de	Vries	first	knew	
Mendel’s	paper	from	Bailey’s	paper	Cross-Breeding	and	Hybridizing	(1892)	is	not	
excluded.	In	addition	to	the	version	of	Bailey’s	1902	paper	published	by	the	rural	
library	dated	April	1892,	which	I	found	from	archive.org,	there	is	the	other	version85,	
which	was	published	by	Wright	&	Potter	Printing	Co.,	State	Printers	dated	January	
1902.	(See	Appendix	3)	There	are	some	minor	differences	on	the	content	between	
these	two	printings.	The	most	significant	difference	is	that	in	the	rural	library	
printing,	Mendel’s	paper	(1865)	was	in	the	bibliography	on	the	page	32,	while	in	the	
Wright	&	Potter	printing,	there	is	no	bibliography	included.	Thus,	there	was	no	
mention	of	Mendel’s	paper	in	the	Wright	&	Potter	printing.	So,	if	de	Vries	had	had	a	
copy	of	the	rural	library	printing,	it	remains	the	possibility	that	de	Vries’	first	
learning	of	Mendel’s	paper	was	from	Bailey’s	1902	paper.	
Table	8	
de	Vries’	claims	on	his	“Rediscovery”	story	
Source	 Year/Source	of	First	
Reading	
Year	of	Proposing	
the	Law	
Notes	
“Das	
Spaltungsgesetz	der	
Bastarde”	(de	Vries,	
1900a)	
After	1896	 1896	(after	the	
experiment	on	
Papaver	
somniferum)	
	
“Sur	les	unités	des	
caractères	
spécifiques	et	leur	
After	1896	 1896	(after	the	
experiment	on	
Papaver	
	
																																																								84	 Mendel’s	paper	(1865)	was	included	in	the	bibliography	of	Bailey’s	book	(1902)	on	page	297.	This	is	also	what	Bailey	refers	the	second	edition	to.	(Bailey,	1915,	p.	vi)	85	 I	would	like	to	thank	Michael	Buttolph	for	pointing	out	the	existence	of	Wright	&	Potter	printing	and	sending	me	an	electronic	copy	of	it.	
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application	à	l'étude	
des	hybrids”	(1900d)	
somniferum)	
de	Vries’	letter	to	
Bailey	in	1905	or	
1906	
Some	years	after	
1892	/	Bailey’s	paper	
(1892)	
	 There	are	two	
printings	of	Bailey’s	
1892	paper,	only	
one	of	which	
included	Mendel’s	
paper	in	the	
bibliography.	
“The	Origin	of	the	
Mutation	Theory”	
(1917)	
	 After	the	experiment	
on	Papaver	
somniferum	
	
de	Vries’	letter	to	
Roberts	on	
December	18,	1924	
After	1895	/	Bailey’s	
book	(1895)	
After	the	
experiments,	
especially	including	
the	one	on	
Oenothera	
lamarckiana	
No	reference	to	
Mendel	in	Bailey’s	
book	(1895)	
Stomps	on	De	Vries’	Rediscovery	
Interestingly,	Theodoor	Stomps	(1954),	a	student	and	assistant	of	de	Vries,	tells	us	a	
different	story.	
Thereupon	de	Vries	undertook	his	experimental	work	in	the	garden,	with	
the	result	that	a	long	series	of	genetical	papers	already	appeared	before	
1900.	He	made	numerous	crosses	between	species	and	varieties	and,	being	
unaware	of	the	existence	of	Mendel's	paper,	"Versuche	über	
Pflanzenhybriden,"	quite	independently	discovered	the	formula,	which	we	
now	know	as	Mendel's	law.	In	1900,	at	just	the	time	he	was	about	to	publish	
the	results	of	his	experiments	he	received	a	letter	from	his	friend	Professor	
Beyerinck	at	Delft,	reading	thus:	"I	know	that	you	are	studying	hybrids,	so	
perhaps	the	enclosed	reprint	of	the	year	1865	by	a	certain	Mendel	which	I	
happen	to	possess,	is	still	of	some	interest	to	you."	De	Vries	read	the	paper	
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and	found	that	the	results	of	his	experiments,	which	he	had	believed	to	be	
quite	new,	had	already	been	reported	35	years	before.	And	it	goes	without	
saying	that	in	his	first	article	referring	to	the	subject	under	discussion,	"Das	
Spaltungsgesetz	der	Bastarde,"	received	by	the	editorial	staff	of	the	
Deittsche	Botanische	Gesellschaft	on	the	14th	of	March	and	published	on	
the	25th	of	April	1900,	the	work	of	Gregor	Mendel	was	accurately	
mentioned.	This	then	is	the	true	story	of	the	rediscovery	of	Mendel.	I	once	
asked	De	Vries	whether	he	could	remember	the	precise	moment	at	which	
he	discovered	Mendel's	now	famous	paper,	and	he	personally	related	the	
story	to	me.	(Stomps,	1954,	p.	294)	
Stomps’	account	is	different	from	de	Vries’	own	in	two	important	places.	Firstly,	
Stomps	explicitly	indicates	that	de	Vries’	first	reading	happened	in	early	1900,	just	
before	the	submission	of	his	German	paper	(de	Vries,	1900a).	Secondly,	de	Vries	
was	led	to	Mendel’s	paper	by	Beijerinck’s	letter	rather	than	by	Bailey’s	work.	
Stomps’	account	is	quite	favourable	among	historians	(for	example,	Campbell,	1980;	
Corcos	&	Monaghan,	1985;	Meijer,	1985;	Zirkle,	1968),	though	some	of	them	did	
not	exclude	the	possibility	that	de	Vries	read	Mendel’s	paper	without	
understanding	it	before	1900.	However,	I	have	three	main	doubts	about	Stomps’	
account.	
Firstly,	what	makes	Stomps	convinced	that	his	account	is	"the	true	story"	is	that	this	
was	what	de	Vries	told	him	personally.	Unfortunately,	as	seen	from	de	Vries’	own	
inconsistent	accounts,	de	Vries’	memory	was	not	very	reliable.	Even	if	Stomps	tells	
the	truth,	it	is	exactly	what	de	Vries	told	him	on	“the	precise	moment	at	which	he	
discovered	Mendel's	now	famous	paper”,	why	should	we	give	the	privilege	to	this	
account?	Furthermore,	I	do	not	see	why	Stomps’	memory	of	de	Vries’	memory	of	
his	first	reading	of	Mendel’s	paper	is	more	reliable	than	de	Vries’	own	memory.	
Secondly,	Stomps	said	little	on	the	Beijerinck’s	letter.	As	Onno	Meijer	insightfully	
points	out,	“Stomps	seems	to	have	quoted	[Beijerinck’s	letter]	literally,	and	one	
wonders	why	he	did	not	give	the	date	of	the	letter.”	(Meijer,	1985,	p.	194	n35)	
What	is	worse,	according	to	Meijer’s	investigation,	Beijerinck’s	letter	to	de	Vries,	
mentioned	by	Stomps,	was	not	found	in	the	Stomps	archives	at	the	Hugo	de	Vries	
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Laboratorium.	In	addition,	if	de	Vries	did	have	such	a	letter	from	Beijerinck,	and	did	
first	learn	of	Mendel’s	paper	from	this	letter,	why	did	he	not	say	anything	about	
this	in	these	paper	(for	example	de	Vries,	1900a,	1900d)	in	1900	when	the	memory	
should	be	still	refresh?86	 Stomps’	account	seems	even	more	dubious,	given	the	fact	
that	de	Vries	never	mentioned	Beijerinck	in	his	own	accounts.	What	is	more,	had	de	
Vries	first	known	Mendel’s	paper	from	Beijerinck’s	letter,	it	would	be	better	for	him	
to	admit	it.	Given	his	account	that	he	discovered	the	law	of	segregation	
independently	in	189687,	it	would	be	a	much	better	way	to	show	his	independence	
of	the	rediscovery	than	to	vaguely	suggest	his	learning	was	from	Bailey’s	work.	
Thirdly,	Stomps	did	not	provide	more	detailed	information	on	when	and	where	the	
conversation	took	place.	I	find	it	reasonable	to	doubt	the	accuracy	of	Stomps’	
account.	Therefore,	I	argue	that	Stomps’	account	cannot	be	more	reliable	than	de	
Vries’	ones,	though	I	would	not	dismiss	all	of	Stomps’	account88.	
De	Vries’	Rediscovery	and	the	Experiment	on	Papaver	somniferum	
As	far	as	I	examined	these	accounts,	all	I	can	conclude	at	this	moment	is,	though	
not	very	interesting	to	many	who	are	familiar	with	the	literature,	that	de	Vries’	first	
reading	of	Mendel’s	paper	was	between	April	1892	and	March	1900.	In	order	to	
further	investigate	de	Vries’	independence	of	the	rediscovery,	I	shall	then	examine	
whether	de	Vries’	first	reading	of	Mendel’s	paper	happened	after	his	completion	of	
the	majority	of	the	experiment	and	the	proposal	of	the	law.	First	of	all,	it	seems	
necessary	to	figure	out	when	de	Vries	first	independently	observed	the	important	3	:	
1	ratio	and	formulated	a	Mendelian	explanation.	
In	the	end	of	his	other	1900	French	paper	“Sur	les	unités	des	caractères	spécifiques	
et	leur	application	à	l'étude	des	hybrids”	(1900d),	de	Vries	also	asserts	his	
																																																								86	 Meijer’s	explantion	of	this	puzzling	fact	is	that	“there	is	some	evidence	of	animosity	between	Beijerinck	and	De	Vries	at	the	time.”	(Meijer,	1985,	p.	194)	However	I	find	this	explanation	implausible.	Meijer	is	vague	on	when	there	is	animosity	between	Beijerinck	and	de	Vries.	If	Beijerinck	had	sent	de	Vries	a	reprint	of	Mendel’s	paper	in	1900,	it	seems	obvious	that	they	were	in	a	good	friendship	at	that	time.	It	is	puzzling	why	de	Vries	did	not	mention	this	in	any	of	the	1900	papers,	especially	given	that	admitting	Beijerinck’s	letter	would	not	undermine	his	independence	claim.	87	 See	Table	8	and	the	quotation	in	the	following	pages.	88	 I	shall	argue	later	in	this	section	that	de	Vries’	first	good	reading	of	Mendel’s	paper	happened	around	1900,	which	is	closer	to	the	time	provided	by	Stomps	than	by	de	Vries.	
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independence	of	the	rediscovery	by	indicating	that	his	proposal	of	the	law	of	
segregation	was	based	on	the	experiment	on	Papaver	somniferum	(opium	poppy).	
This	law	[i.e.	the	law	of	segregation	of	hybrids]	is	not	new.	It	was	stated,	for	
a	particular	case	(peas),	thirty	years	ago.	This	is	Gregor	Mendel	who	
formulated	it	in	a	paper	entitled	"Versuche	uber	Pflanzen-Hybrids"	in	the	
journal	Verhandlungen	des	naturforschenden	Vereins	Brünn	(T	IV,	p.	1),	1865.	
Mendel	deduced	the	consequences	not	only	for	monohybrid,	but	also	for	
di-polyhybrid.	
This	memoir,	too	good	for	its	time,	was	disregarded	and	forgotten.	We	find	
rare	citation,	and	then	only	for	accessories	observations.	Also	do	I	read	my	
meme	after	having	completed	the	most	essential	part	of	the	experiments	
cited	in	this	article,	especially	after	finding	the	proof	of	principle	by	the	
fourth	year	of	cultivation	(1896)	of	my	cross	of	poppy.	
However,	I	wish	that	I	had	shown	that	Mendel's	law	not	only	is	applied	to	
peas,	but	also	it	is	applicable	to	all	true	hybrids.89	 (de	Vries,	1900d,	p.	271)	
As	we	can	see,	this	account	is	consistent	with	his	other	accounts	on	the	time	of	his	
first	reading,	that	is,	some	years	after	1892.	In	addition,	in	regarding	when	and	how	
he	derived	the	law,	this	account	is	also	consistent	with	de	Vries’	statements	in	
German	paper	(de	Vries,	1900a)	and	his	book	Die	Mutationstheorie	(1903).	
I	carried	out	this	experiment	in	1896	with	Papaver	somniferum	Mephisto	×	
Danebrog	and	obtained	the	first	generation	of	1895	the	following:	
Dominating	(Mephisto)	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	24%	
Hybrids	(with	±25%	Danebrog)	.	51%																																																									89	 This	is	my	translation	of	de	Vries’	text:	“Cette	loi	n'est	pas	nouvelle.	Elle	a	été	énoncée,	pour	un	cas	particulier	(les	pois),	il	y	a	plus	de	trente	années.	C'est	Gregor	Mendel	qui	l'a	formulé	dans	un	mémoire	intitule	«	Versuche	über	Pflanzen-Hybriden	»,	inséré	dans	le	journal	Verhandlunyen	d.	nat.	Vereins	in	Brünn	(T	IV,	p.	1),	1865.	Mendel	en	a	déduit	les	conséquences	non	seulement	pour	les	monohybrides,	mais	aussi	pour	les	di-polyhybrides.	Ce	mémoire,	trop	beau	pour	son	temps,	a	été	méconnu	et	oublié.	On	ne	le	trouve	cité	que	rarement,	et	alors	seulement	pour	des	observations	accessoires.	Aussi	n'en	ai-je	pris	connaissance	moi-mème	qu'après	avoir	achevé	la	partie	la	plus	essentielle	des	expériences	citées	dans	cet	article,	et	notamment,	après	avoir	trouvé	la	démonstration	du	principe	par	la	quatrième	année	de	culture	(1896)	de	mes	pavots	croisés.	J'espère	cependant	avoir	démontré	que	la	loi	de	Mendel	ne	vaut	pas	seulement	pour	les	pois,	mais	qu'elle	s'apphque	d'une	manière	très	générate	à	tous	les	vrais	hybrides.”	(de	Vries,	1900d,	p.	271)	
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Recessive	(Danebrog)	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	25%	
This	result	is	concordant	with	the	formula	cited	above	[(d+r)(d+r)=d2+2dr+r2],	
or	more	correctly	expressed,	it	was	from	these	numberical	relations	that	I	
first	deduced	the	formula.	(de	Vries,	1966,	p.	114)	
From	these	numbers	[25%	(Const.	Dom.)	50%(Hybrid)	25%	(Const.	Rec.)],	I	
then	first	derived	the	law	of	segregation,	while	I	did	not	yet	know	at	that	
time	the	work	of	Mendel.	(Kottler,	1979,	p.	530)	
According	to	de	Vries’	own	accounts	(de	Vries,	1900a,	1900d,	1903),	the	experiment	
on	Papaver	somniferum	began	in	1893,	and	recongised	3	:	1	ratio	and	proposed	the	
law	of	segregation	in	1896.	Thus,	another	puzzle	occurs:	why	did	de	Vries	not	
publish	this	discover	immediately?	As	Malcolm	Kottler	asks,	“[W]hy	did	de	Vries	
wait	until	1900	to	publish,	if	he	had	obtained	all	the	data	and	discovered	their	
explanation	(the	laws)	by	1896?	"	(Kottler,	1979,	p.	530)	Moreover,	none	of	de	Vries’	
pre-1900	papers	even	mentions	such	an	interesting	ratio	in	the	hybrids	of	opium	
poppy.	Nor	is	the	3	:	1	ratio	of	other	hybrids	mentioned.	
According	to	his	personal	conversation	to	Ralph	E.	Cleland90,	de	Vries’	own	
explanation	is	that	he	was	unsure	about	the	universality	of	his	explanation	of	the	3	:	
1	ratio	in	1896.	Since	he	published	the	law	of	segregation	in	1900,	it	is	natural	to	
infer	that	he	was	happy	with	the	universality	at	that	time.	This	inference	seems	to	
have	been	confirmed	by	de	Vries’	own	statements.	In	his	1900	papers,	de	Vries	
emphasised	that	one	major	difference	between	his	and	Mendel’s	work	is	that	
Mendel	only	confirmed	the	law	in	pea	hybrids,	while	he	confirmed	it	in	different	
plant	hybrids.	
These	two	statements	[i.e.	the	law	of	segregation	of	hybrids],	in	their	most	
essential	points,	were	drawn	up	long	ago	by	Mendel	for	a	special	case	(peas).	
(de	Vries,	1966,	p.	110)	
																																																								90	 	"In	a	private	conversation	in	1928,	de	Vries	told	me	that	his	failure	to	publish	his	findings	prior	to	1900	was	because	he	obtained	discordant	results,	Oenothera	contrasting	with	the	other	plants	he	had	studied;	and	he	was	endeavoring	to	understand	more	fully	the	reason	for	this	discrepancy	before	publishing.	His	discovery	in	1900	of	Mendel's	paper,	however,	stimulated	him	to	begin	the	presentation	of	his	results,	and	six	papers	appeared	in	that	year."	(Cleland,	1972,	p.	10)	
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However,	I	wish	that	I	had	shown	that	Mendel's	law	not	only	is	applied	to	
peas,	but	also	it	is	applicable	to	all	true	hybrids.	(de	Vries,	1900d,	p.	271)	
In	two	1900	French	papers,	de	Vries	listed	the	results	of	the	experiments	on	
twelve	different	species	to	confirm	the	law	of	segregation.	In	the	1900	German	
paper,	de	Vries	listed	the	data	on	sixteen	species	and	the	corresponding	year	of	
cross.91	 All	these	data	were	also	included92	 in	his	book	(1903).	
Table	9	
De	Vries’	important	ratio	published	between	1897	and	1903	
	 1897	 1899	 	 1900	
German	
1900m	
French	
1903	
Lychnis	
vespertina	
glabra	×	
Lynchnis	diurna	
(began	in	1892)	
2/3	
(hairy)	:	
1/3	
(smooth)	
99	
(hairy)	:	
54	
(smooth)	
3/4	:	1/4	
	 	 	 392	
(hairy)	:	
144	
(smooth)	
Lychnis	
vespertina	×	
Lychnis	glabra	
(began	in	1892)	
	 	 72%	
(hairy)	:	
28%	
(smooth)	
72%	
(hairy)	:	
28%	
(smooth)	
72%	
(hairy)	:	
28%	
(smooth)	
73%	:	27%	
Lynchnis	diurna	
×	Lychnis	
vespertina	
(began	in	1892)	
	 	 73%	
(red)	:	
27%	
(white)	
73%	
(red)	:	
27%	
(white)	
73%	
(red)	:	
27%	
(white)	
	
Papaver	somnif.	
Mephisto	×	
Danebrog	
(began	in	1893)	
	 	 75%	
(black):	
25%	
(white)	
72%	:	
28%	
75%	:	
25%	
77.5%	:	
22.5%	
158	
(black)	:	
43	(white)	
Chrysanthemum	 	 	 	 77%	:	 	 80%	:	20%																																																									91	 It	is	interesting	to	see	the	discrepancy	between	the	German	paper	(de	Vries,	1900a)	and	French	papers	(de	Vries,	1900c,	1900d).	I	shall	discuss	it	later.	92	 Some	were	modified,	see	Table	9.
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Roxburghi	×	
album	(began	in	
1896)	
23%	
Solanum	nigrum	
×	chlorocarpum	
(began	in	1894)	
	 	 	 76%	:	
24%	
	 77%	:	73%	
Astertripolium	×	
album	(began	in	
1897)	
	 	 	 73%	:	
27%	
	 75%	:	25%	
By	analysing	these	data,	I	can	summarise	that	by	1897	de	Vries	already	had	the	
results	of	nearly	half	of	the	crossing	experiments	(i.e.	experiments	on	seven	
different	species).	In	other	words,	as	Kottler	points	out,	it	seems	that	de	Vries	
“had	established	considerable	generality.”	(Kottler,	1979,	p.	531)	Again,	it	is	
puzzling	why	de	Vries	did	not	publish	anything	in	1897.	
It	is	worth	noting	that	in	1897,	de	Vries	published	a	paper	entitled	“Erfelijke	
Monstrositeiten”	in	a	Dutch	journal,	in	which	he	recorded	the	result	of	an	F2	
generation	of	the	cross	of	Lychnis	vespertina	glabra	×	Lynchnis	diurna:	“the	
seedlings	of	1894	were	2/3	pubescent	[hairy]	and	1/3	deprived	of	hair.”	(Kottler,	
1979,	p.	519)	Such	a	result	was	obviously	not	included	in	any	of	de	Vries’	1900	
papers,	since	it	is	a	2	:	1	ratio	rather	than	3	:	1.	But	two	years	later,	in	a	paper	
read	the	conference	in	London	in	July,	1899	de	Vries	seemed	to	modify	the	
result	into	3	:	1	implicitly.	
If	the	white-flowering	plants	be	isolated,	it	is	found	that	they	are	fully	
constant.	I	fertilised	them	in	1893	in	the	first	hybrid	generation,	when	they	
were	all	hairy.	The	hairiness	was	inherited,	as	in	the	redflowered	plants,	in	
three-fourths	of	the	individuals,	but	the	white	colour	in	nearly	every	
individual.	(de	Vries,	1900b,	p.	75)	
Nevertheless,	de	Vries	did	not	provide	any	explanation	of	the	3	:	1	ratio	in	that	
paper.	What	is	more	surprising,	de	Vries	took	this	modified	result	as	a	piece	of	
evidence	for	the	law	of	segregation	in	his	book	(1903).	If	de	Vries	had	
established	evidence	for	the	law	of	segregation	in	1897,	he	must	have	been	
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sensitive	to	the	result	of	the	cross	of	Lychnis.	If	so,	why	did	he	fail	to	see	it	as	a	
piece	of	potential	evidence?	Thus,	I	suspect	that	it	is	likely	that	by	1897	de	Vries	
had	not	recognised	the	3	:	1	ratio.	Even	if	he	did,	he	still	had	not	discovered	the	
law,	as	Kottler	(1979)	argues.	Furthermore,	I	am	inclined	to	think	that	even	in	
July	1899,	de	Vries	still	did	not	come	to	a	“Mendelian”	explanation.	
De	Vries’	Rediscovery	and	the	1896	Notes	
However,	in	1999	new	evidence93	 was	claimed	to	be	found	to	support	that	de	Vries	
knew	the	law	of	segregation	independently	in	1896.	Stamhuis,	Meijer	and	
Zevenhuizen	found	notes	dated	1896	in	the	Hugo	de	Vries	Archive,	in	which	
contains	the	evidence	of	de	Vries’	recognition	of	the	3	:	1	ratio	and	the	law	of	
segregation.	In	one	of	the	sheets	containing	information	on	Aster	tripolium,	dated	
August	10,	1896,	de	Vries	wrote:	
Discussion.	According	to	the	law	of	pangene	hybridization	(p.	187),	the	
purple	specimens	from	white	mother	must	have	purple	fathers	and	be	
central	hybrids.	They	show	therefore	that	the	white	specimens	at	Huizen	
(preferably	almost	entirely,	partially?	[inserted:	95%])	have	been	fertilized	
by	purple	ones.	Just	as	my	Trifol.	pat.	alb.	have	been	fertilized	by	my	
7-leaved	race	at	16b	VI.	 	
Therefore	gain	seed	and	sow	it.	If	there	are	no	white	flowers	this	year	and	
therefore	all	specimens	are	central	hybrids,	the	seed	must	give	75%	purples	
and	25%	whites.	This	to	be	investigated.	 	
At	the	same	time	this	is	a	new	principle	in	the	transfer	of	varieties	from	the	
wild	into	the	garden.	If	this	happens	after	fertilization	in	the	field,	then	all	
specimens	from	the	seed	can	be	look	like	old-types;	then	the	variant	will	still	
emerge	from	their	seed	(namely	in	25%	of	the	specimens).94	 (Stamhuis,	
Meijer,	&	Zevenhuizen,	1999,	pp.	249–250)	
																																																								93	 This	“new”	evidence	is	in	contrast	to	the	Poppy	Plate.	Peter	van	der	Pas	(1976)	and	Jacob	Heimans	(1978)	once	accept	that	one	of	the	lecture	plates	in	the	collection	of	the	Museum	of	the	University	of	Amsterdam	on	the	cross	of	Papaver	somniferum	was	used	by	de	Vries	in	the	lectures	in	1895	and	1896.	However,	the	belief	that	the	Poppy	Plate	is	a	piece	of	evidence	for	that	de	Vries	had	discovered	the	law	of	segregation	in	1896	was	convincingly	dismissed	by	Darden	(1985)	and	Zevenhuizen	(2000).	94	 The	English	translation	quoted	is	from	Stamhuis,	Meijer	and	Zevenhuizen’s	paper	(1999).	
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In	another	note,	dealing	with	Veronica	longifolia,	dated	August	18,	1896,	de	Vries	
wrote:	
According	to	the	1.2.1	law	the	old-types,	no	matter	how	they	are	pollinated,	
always	give	have	to	give	100%	blue	ones,	while	the	central	bastards	in	the	
case	of	free	pollination	(with	the	exception	of	whites),	therefore	by	central	
bastards	and	by	old-types,	would	have	to	give	between	0	and	25%	whites.	
(Stamhuis	et	al.,	1999,	p.	250)	
At	first	glance,	this	discovery	seems	to	be	well	consistent	with	de	Vries’	own	claim	
that	he	first	obtained	the	3	:	1	ratio	and	the	explanation	in	1896.	Both	“the	law	of	
pangene	hybridization”	and	“the	1.2.1	law”	look	so	similar	to	the	law	of	segregation,	
and	easily	make	one	to	suspect	them	as	the	premature	versions	of	the	law	of	
segregation.	Based	on	these	two	notes,	Stamhuis,	Meijer	and	Zevenhuizen	conclude	
that	in	1896	de	Vries	already	discovered	the	3	:	1	ratio	and	the	Mendelian	
explanation.	 	
However,	I	find	this	conclusion	unconvincing	for	the	following	reasons.	Firstly,	two	
species	in	the	experiments	noted	are	not	included	in	de	Vries’	two	French	papers.	If	
in	1896	de	Vries	had	already	recognised	that	the	results	from	the	crosses	of	Aster	
tripolium	and	Veronica	longifolia	are	important	to	his	law	of	segregation,	why	did	
not	he	include	these	results	in	his	two	1900	French	papers,	especially	the	first	one	
(de	Vries,	1900c)?	It	seems	that	de	Vries	should	not	have	forgotten	these	two	
important	pieces	of	evidence.	Secondly,	the	results	of	the	crosses	with	these	two	
species	were	included	in	de	Vries’	1900	German	paper	and	1903	book.	However	
there	are	discrepancies	of	the	results,	as	shown	in	the	Table	9.	It	is	puzzling	why	de	
Vries	made	these	changes.	Thirdly,	according	to	de	Vries’	1900	German	paper,	Aster	
tripolium	was	crossed	in	1897.	So,	de	Vries	should	not	have	discussed	the	expected	
distribution	of	traits	in	the	F2	generation	when	the	experiment	was	not	undertaken.	
Fourthly,	the	terms	“the	law	of	pangene	hybridisation”	and	“the	1.2.1	law”	are	so	
peculiar	in	de	Vries’	publications.	It	is	still	unclear	what	these	laws	exactly	mean.	
Nor	are	these	terms	found	in	any	of	de	Vries’	publication.	Therefore,	I	seriously	
doubt	the	originality	of	these	two	notes,	and	cannot	regard	them	as	evidence	to	
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support	that	de	Vries	already	noticed	3	:	1	ratio	and	formulated	the	law	of	
segregation	in	1896.	
In	addition,	if	one	still	remembers	what	was	written	in	the	letter	to	Roberts,	it	
seems	obvious	that	once	again	de	Vries	provides	an	inconsistent	account.	In	the	
letter,	de	Vries	implicitly	reported	that	the	3	:	1	ratio	was	first	recognised	in	1895,	
one	year	earlier	than	the	ratio	was	observed	from	the	cross	of	Papaver	somniferum.	
Whether	this	was	accurate	or	not,	I	contend	that	this	is	another	piece	of	evidence	
against	de	Vries’	claim	that	he	discovered	the	law	of	segregation	from	the	cross	of	
Papaver	somniferum	in	1896.	
There	is	another	conflict	between	de	Vries’	letter	to	Roberts	and	de	Vries’	1900	
German	paper.	According	to	the	letter,	de	Vries	began	crossing	Oenothera	
lamarckiana	with	O.	lam.	brevistylis	in	1893.	In	contrast,	in	the	German	paper,	de	
Vries	recorded	the	year	of	crossing	as	1898.	(de	Vries,	1966,	p.	113)	Hence,	I	believe	
that	it	is	not	hasty	to	conclude,	at	this	moment,	that	most	of	de	Vries’	own	accounts	
are	inaccurate.	In	particular,	as	I	have	argued,	de	Vries’	claim	that	he	discovered	the	
law	of	segregation	from	the	cross	of	Papaver	somniferum	in	1896	is	not	well	
established.	
Final	Remarks	on	De	Vries’	Rediscovery	
By	carefully	reading	de	Vries’	publication	from	1890s	to	1903,	I	find	that	there	are	
several	substantial	conceptual	changes	in	1900.	Firstly,	before	1900,	no	3:	1	ratio	
nor	1:	2	:	1	ratio	explicitly	appeared	in	his	publication.	Secondly,	in	all	his	1900	
rediscovery	papers,	de	Vries	suddenly	began	using	Mendel’s	term	“dominant”	and	
“recessive”	to	describe	the	morphological	traits	of	the	plant	hybrids.	It	was	de	Vries’	
first	1900	paper	(de	Vries,	1900c),	by	using	Mendel’s	terms,	that	made	Correns	to	
realise	that	de	Vries	also	well	knew	Mendel’s	work,	though	without	a	reference	to	
Mendel.	Thirdly,	before	1900,	it	seems	that	de	Vries	did	not	have	the	idea	that	the	
pair	of	characteristics	can	be	separated	and	brought	together	again	in	new	paired	
combination.	All	these	conceptual	changes	indicate	that	there	is	some	influence	of	
Mendel’s	work	on	de	Vries.	Therefore,	I	now	can	conclude	that	de	Vries’	claim	as	to	
the	independence	of	his	rediscovery	is	ill	grounded.	
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Correns’	Rediscovery	and	the	1896	Protocol	
The	claim	of	Correns’	independent	rediscovery	is	not	well	established,	either.	
Correns,	according	to	his	own	narration,	began	conducting	the	experiment	on	
Pisum	in	1896.	
I	began	(1894)	with	Phaseolus	vulgaris	nanus	(with	which,	however,	
cross-fertilization	did	not	succeed	at	all	for	me),	then	with	Zea,	Pisum,	Lilium	
and	Matthiola.	(Roberts,	1929,	p.	337)	
In	his	letter	to	H.	F.	Roberts	on	January	23,	1925,	Correns	gives	a	detailed	account	
of	how	he	realised	Mendel’s	priority.	 	
The	date	of	the	day	upon	which	in	the	autumn	(October)	of	1899,	I	found	
the	explanation,	I	no	longer	know;	I	do	not	make	note	of	such	matters.	I	only	
know	that	it	came	to	me	at	once	‘like	a	flash,’	as	I	lay	toward	morning	awake	
in	bed,	and	let	the	results	again	run	through	my	head.	Even	as	little	do	I	
know	now	the	date	upon	which	I	read	Mendel’s	memoir	for	the	first	time;	it	
was	at	all	events	a	few	weeks	later.	(Roberts,	1929,	p.	335)	
The	explanation	mentioned	in	the	letter	was	named	“Mendel’s	rule95	 (Mendel’sche	
Regel)”	in	Correns’	paper	(1900).	However,	this	independence	claim	is	dubious.	
According	to	Correns’	other	letter	(on	30	January	1925)	to	Roberts,	his	original	
interest	is	the	xenia	question,	and	the	experiments	on	Pisum	are	undertaken	to	
investigate	a	similar	question.	
Originally	I	started	out	to	solve	the	xenia	question.	To	this	end	I	wished	to	
test	experimentally	all	the	assertions	known	in	the	literature.	I	began	(1894)	
with	Phaseolus	vulgaris	nanus	(with	which,	however,	cross-fertilization	did	
not	succeed	at	all	for	me),	then	with	Zea,	Pisum,	Lilium	and	Matthiola…	For	
Pisum	there	are	different	pertinent	assumptions	…	I	had	carried	on	
cross-fertilizations	with	Pisum	likewise	on	account	of	the	xenia	question	
(there	exist,	indeed,	assumptions	on	the	influence	of	the	seed-coat)…	
(Roberts,	1929,	p.	337)																																																									95	 Mendel’sche	Regel	was	translated	by	Piternick	as	“Mendel’s	law”.	However,	Regel	is	better	translated	as	“rule”.	
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The	xenia	question,	namely,	whether	foreign	pollen	has	a	direct	influence	on	the	
characteristics	of	the	fruit	and	seed,	had	puzzled	many	19th	century	naturalists	
including	Darwin	for	a	long	time.	In	order	to	study	the	xenia	question,	Correns	
planned	to	test	all	the	known	assertions	in	the	literature.	Conceivably,	in	order	to	
study	the	problem	in	the	case	of	Pisum,	Correns	must	have	also	tried	his	best	to	
survey	the	relevant	literature.	It	would	be	a	bit	surprising	if	Correns,	especially	as	a	
student	of	Nägeli,	missed	Mendel’s	paper.	Hence,	I	am	inclined	to	suspect	that	
Correns	must	have	known	Mendel’s	paper	before	his	experiment	on	Pisum,	and	the	
objective	of	his	experiment	on	Pisum	is	to	test	Mendel’s	work.	
This	suspicion	is	not	unfair.	Correns’	paper	(1900)	is	easily	seen	as	an	attempt	to	
examine	Mendel’s	work	on	Pisum.	This	is	well	reflected	from	the	title	“G.	Mendel’s	
Law	Concerning	the	Behaviour	of	Progeny	of	Varietal	Hybrids”	to	the	conclusion	on	
the	universality	of	“Mendel’s	rule”.	In	particular,	the	paper	contains	the	statements	
like:	
The	facts,	which	Mendel	found,	I	can	fully	confirm.	(Correns,	1900,	p.	160,	
1966,	p.	122)	
In	order	to	explain	the	facts,	one	must	assume	(as	did	Mendel)	that	…	
(Correns,	1900,	p.	163,	1966,	p.	125)	
…	[T]hat	Mendel’s	Law	of	segregation	cannot	be	applied	universally…	
(Correns,	1900,	p.	168,	1966,	p.	132)	
Correns’	paper	reads	really	like	a	report	of	the	examination	of	Mendel’s	work	on	
Pisum.	This	observation	was	also	implicitly	suggested	by	William	Bateson	(1902),	
who	regarded	Correns’	paper	as	a	report	of	a	repetition	of	“Mendel’s	original	
experiment	with	Peas	having	seeds	of	different	colours.”	If	Correns	had	studied	
Pisum	for	a	different	purpose,	or	found	a	Mendelian	explanation	by	himself	
independently,	there	may	have	alternative	ways	of	writing	his	1900	paper.	However,	
it	can	be	argued	that	by	the	time	Correns	wrote	the	paper,	he	had	already	known	
about	Mendel’s	paper.	My	argument	seems	not	to	undermine	Correns’	
independence	claim	in	the	sense	that	Correns	did	not	know	about	Mendel’s	paper	
before	his	proposal	of	the	Mendelian	explanation.	
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Unfortunately,	Correns’	independence	claim	was	falsified	when	Hans-Jörg	
Rheiberger	(1995;	2000)	found	an	entry	written	by	Correns	in	his	protocols	of	the	
experiment	on	peas	(1896-1899)	preserved	in	the	Archive	for	the	History	of	the	
History	of	the	Max-Planck	Society	in	Berlin.	In	this	page	carrying	the	date	16	August	
1896,	Correns	clearly	notes	Mendel’s	analysis	of	the	characters	of	peas	with	the	
reference	to	Mendel’s	paper	(1865).	(See	Figure	596)	Two	conclusions	can	be	
drawn	now.	Firstly,	my	suspicion	is	confirmed.	It	is	clear	from	this	entry	in	1896	that	
Correns	was	already	attempting	to	analyse	his	experiment	by	following	Mendel’s	
approach.	In	particular,	Correns	noticeably	adopted	Mendel’	terminology	
(“dominant”/	“recessive”)	to	categorise	the	morphological	traits,	and	thereof	made	
a	further	analysis.	
	
Figure	5	
16.	IV.	96	
Mendel	(66)	distinguishes:																																																									96	 I	acknowledge	the	permission	to	reprint	this	figure	from	the	University	of	Chicago	Press.	
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	 dominant	and	recessive	characters.	For	our	
	 cases	is	 dominant:	 recessive:	
–	 form	of	seed	 round	 wrinkled	
–	 seed	coat:	
("Albumen")	
grey	to	brown	 white	
–	 cotyledons:	 yellow	 pale-yellow,	green	 	
–	 Pod:	 inflated	 constricted	
–	 	 	 	 	 	 	 :	 green	(unripe)	 yellow	(unripe)	
The	dominant	and	recessive	characters	are	expressed	already	in	the	first	generation	
in	such	a	way	that	the	former	are	present	in	3,	the	latter	in	1	individual,	
respectively.	
The	hybrid	form	of	seed	shape	and	cotyledons	develops	immediately	and	directly	
through	fertilization	
Cot.	(therefore)	yellow?	+	greene	=	yellows	+	green?	=	3/4	yellow	+	1/4	green	Form.	
round?	+	wrinkled	=	wrinkled?	+	rounds	=	3/4	round	+	1/4	wrinkled	
The	seed	coat,	the	form	and	the	colour	of	the	pods	 	
are	not	changed.	
But	later	Mendel	notes,	e	.g.,	that	A	(seed	round,	Cot.	(p.	19)	yellow)	pollinated	
with	B	(seed	wrinkled	Cot.	green),	exclusively	yielded	yellows	seeds	which	were	
round.	
(Hans-Jörg	Rheinberger,	1995,	pp.	613–614)	
Secondly,	if	Correns,	as	stated	in	his	letter	to	Roberts,	did	find	a	Mendelian	
explanation	of	the	numerical	relation	in	the	progeny	of	pea	hybrids	in	1899,	then	he	
definitely	had	already	read	Mendel’s	paper.	Therefore,	it	is	sufficient	to	be	
concluded,	as	Rheiberger	has	suggested,	that	Correns	must	“have	read	Mendel’s	
paper	at	the	outset	of	his	crossing	experiments	with	peas,	rather	than	after	their	
completion.”	(Hans-Jorg	Rheinberger,	1995,	p.	614)	
Tschermak’s	Rediscovery	of	the	3	:	1	Ratio?	
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The	claim	of	Tschermak	to	have	discovered	Mendel’s	work	independently	is	of	the	
most	dubious,	and	seems	never	to	be	well	accepted97.	According	to	his	own	
narration	in	a	letter	to	Roberts	in	1925,	it	was	in	the	fall	of	1899	that	Tschermak	
first	knew	and	read	Mendel’s	paper	(1865).	
In	the	autumn	of	1899,	I	received	from	Prof.	A.	v.	Liebenberg	the	permission	
to	volunteer	in	his	department,	and	to	make	use	of	the	library.	The	first	
work	I	seized	upon	was	the	well-known	book	of	Focke:	'Pflanzenmischlinge,'	
of	1881.	There	I	found,	in	the	chapter	on	'Peas,'	the	familiar	obscure	
expression	of	Focke's	concerning	Mendel's	treatise,	as	well	as	the	views	on	
Mendel's	experiments	with	beans	and	Hieraceae.	Since	Mendel's	work	was	
not	on	hand	in	the	library	of	the	Hochschule	für	Bodenkultur,	I	had	on	the	
same	day	of	this	'discovery'	the	'Transactions	of	the	Natural	History	Society	
of	Brünn,'	hunted	out	of	the	University	library,	which	now	gave	me	the	
information,	to	my	greatest	surprise,	that	the	regular	relationships	
discovered	by	me,	had	already	been	discovered	by	Mendel	much	earlier.	
Still,	I	believed	myself	to	be	at	this	time	the	only	one	who	had	made	this	
discovery	anew.	(Roberts,	1929,	p.	346)	
In	the	same	letter,	Tschermak	also	confirms	that	his	first	reading	of	Mendel	
happened	just	shortly	after	his	discovery	of	the	3:1	ratio	from	the	results	of	his	
experiment	on	peas,	which	began	in	the	spring	of	1898.	(Roberts,	1929,	pp.	343–
345)	This	account	is	consistent	with	his	retrospective	view	in	a	lecture	in	1950.	
In	studying	the	results	of	my	pea	crosses	in	the	fall	of	1899	I	discovered	the	
3:1	segregation	ratio	for	yellow	and	green	cotyledons	and	smooth	and	
wrinkled	seeds,	as	well	as	the	1:1	ratio	in	backcrossing	the	green	cotyledon	
peas	with	hybrid	pollen,	in	the	second	seed	generation	of	all	of	my	
experimental	groups.	
While	recording	these	results	I	saw	the	citation	of	Mendel	in	Focke's	book	
and	obtained	from	the	University	library	the	volume	of	the	
Naturjorschender	Verein	in	Brünn	containing	Mendel's	paper.	There	I	read	to																																																									
97	 Stern	and	Sherwood	did	not	even	include	von	Tschermak’s	paper	in	their	anthology	The	
Origins	of	Genetics,	A	Mendel	Source	Book	for	the	reason	that	his	study	“had	fallen	short	of	the	essential	discovery.”	(C.	Stern	&	Sherwood,	1966,	pp.	xi–xii)	
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my	great	surprise	that	Mendel	had	already	carried	out	such	experiments	
much	more	extensive	than	mine,	had	noted	the	same	regularities,	and	had	
already	given	the	explanation	for	the	3:1	segregation	ratio.	This	was	the	first	
surprise	I	encountered	in	the	preparation	of	my	Habilitationsschrift	which	I	
hurried	to	completion	in	order	to	hand	it	to	the	editors	of	our	Institute	on	
January	17th,	1900.	(Tschermak,	1951,	p.	169)	
To	sum	up,	Tschermak	claims	that	he	learnt	of	Mendel	and	his	paper	from	Focke’s	
book	and	his	first	reading	of	Mendel’s	paper	happened	after	his	discovery	of	the	
regularity	found	in	the	results	of	the	experiment	on	peas.	However,	two	points	
should	be	noted.	Firstly,	in	both	accounts,	what	really	surprised	Tschermak	when	he	
first	read	Mendel’s	paper	is	that	Mendel	already	discovered	“the	regular	
relationships”	he	discovered.	In	contrast,	he	did	not	emphasise	that	Mendel’s	
explanation	of	3:1	ratio	is	the	same	as	his	if	he	really	had	one	mind	at	that	time.	It	
would	be	really	surprising	if	Tschermak	forgot	to	mention	such	a	coincidence.	As	we	
have	seen	from	de	Vries’	and	Correns’	statements,	both	of	them	emphasised	that	
their	first	reading	of	Mendel’s	paper	(1865)	was	after	their	proposal	of	the	
Mendelian	law.	Thus,	I	suggest	that	Tschermak	did	not	have	a	Mendelian	
explanation	before	his	first	reading	of	Mendel’s	paper.98	
Secondly,	Tschermak’s	claim	that	he	recognised	the	1	:	1	ratio	in	the	results	of	
backcrossing	in	1899	is	not	supported	by	his	paper	(1900b).	Though	he	recorded	
the	results	of	back-crossing,	the	1	:	1	ratio	was	not	explicitly	stated.	
When	fertilized	by	the	parental	type	with	the	recessive	character,	the	
number	of	bearers	of	the	recessive	character	are	increased	over	that	of	
self-fertilization	of	the	hybrid.	The	influence	of	the	character	“yellow”	in	the	
seeds	in	the	hybrid	was	in	this	case	reduced	by	57	per	cent,	while	that	of	the	
character	“green”	was	reduced	by	43.5	percent.	(Tschermak,	1900b,	p.	237,	
1950,	p.	46)	
																																																								98	 In	fact	Tschermak	did	not	provide	any	explanation	of	the	3	:	1	ratio	in	his	papers	(1900a,	1900b)	at	all!	Nor	is	any	lawlike	statement	explicitly	made.	See	more	discussion	on	this	in	the	section	4.2.	
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It	is	far	from	clear	that	57%	:	43.5%	is	identical	with	the	1	:	1	ratio.	Hence,	I	argue	
that	Tschermak	could	not	have	recognised	the	1	:	1	ratio	in	the	results	of	
backcrossing	in	1900.	
As	shown	in	Table	7,	in	1900	Tschermak	published	two	“rediscovery”	papers	with	
the	same	title	“Über	künstliche	Kreuzung	bei	Pisum	sativum”.	The	short	one	
(Tschermak,	1900b)	was	published	in	June	29th	in	the	same	Journal	where	de	Vries’	
and	Correns’	papers	were	published	in	March	and	April	respectively,	while	the	
longer	one	(Tschermak,	1900a)	was	published	in	Zeitschrift	für	das	landwirtscha	
ftliche	Versuchswesen	in	Oesterreich	a	few	months	later.	According	to	Tschermak’s	
own	accounts	(Roberts,	1929;	Tschermak,	1951),	the	long	version	was	prepared	
much	earlier	and	was	submitted	on	January	17th,	1900,	though	he	also	made	some	
corrections	by	checking	de	Vries’	paper	(de	Vries,	1900c)	and	Correns’	paper	(1900).	
By	Christmas,	my	paper	was	finished,	ready	for	publication,	and	on	the	17th	
of	January…	In	the	meantime	there	appeared	soon	thereafter	the	extensive	
work	of	De	Vries	in	the	Reports	of	the	German	Botanical	Society	(Heft	3).	I	
was	able	to	utilize	it	already	as	early	as	during	the	correction	of	my	proofs.	
On	the	reading	of	the	second	proof	I	was	surprised	anew	by	the	work	of	
Correns	(Ber.	d.	d.	Bot.	Gesell.	Heft	4,	April	24).	I	was	therefore	able	to	take	
it	into	consideration	only	in	the	footnote	to	my	first	paper.	As	may	readily	
be	conceived,	I	now	made	every	effort	to	induce	the	publisher	of	the	journal	
before-mentioned,	as	well	as	the	printing	office,	to	publish	the	separates	of	
my	work	before	the	appearance	of	the	number	in	question,	which,	
fortunately,	likewise	succeeded	(May,	1900).	In	the	meantime,	I	wrote	
quickly	an	abstract	of	my	paper,	for	the	Berichte	der	deutschen	botanischen	
Gesellschaft	(received	for	publication	June	2,	Heft	6),	which,	however,	
appeared	somewhat	later	than	the	separates	of	my	complete	paper,	which	I	
immediately	sent	out.	(Roberts,	1929,	p.	346)	
As	seen	in	the	quote	above,	Tschermak’s	short	paper	(1900b),	or	“abstract”	in	his	
word,	was	written	after	the	publication	of	Correns’	paper.	So	it	can	be	inferred	that	
the	abstract	was	written	in	May	1900.	Thus,	it	is	quite	certain	that	Tschermak’s	first	
reading	of	Mendel’s	paper	happened	earlier	than	his	completion	of	the	paper,	and	
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much	earlier	than	the	beginning	of	his	writing	of	the	abstract.	This	conclusion	is	
further	confirmed	by	new	evidence	uncovered	recently.	Michal	Smunek,	Uwe	
Hoßfeld,	and	Olaf	Breidbach	found	in	a	letter	dated	April	4th,	1900,	Tschermak	had	
been	commented	that	he	well	understood	Mendel	at	that	time	by	his	brother,	
Armin	von	Tschermak.	
But	[de	Vries]	doesn’t	know	the	teaching	of	Mendel!	Ha!	Ha!	But	please	
don’t	offend	him:	He	will	need	to	learn	it	from	you!	(Simunek,	Hoßfeld,	&	
Breidbach,	2011,	p.	838)	
Twelve	days	later,	Armin	Tschermak	suggested	his	brother	to	write	an	abstract	of	
the	long	paper	(Tschermak,	1900a)	for	publication.	So	it	can	be	inferred	that	
Tschermak’s	abstract	(1900b)	was	written	after	16	May	1900.	If	so,	the	
correspondence	between	Tschermak	brothers,	though	indirectly,	shows	that	before	
writing	the	abstract,	Tschermak	had	made	a	careful	reading	of	Mendel’s	paper,	as	
well	as	de	Vries’	(de	Vries,	1900a)	and	Correns’	(1900).	
Moreover,	it	is	dubious	if	Tschermak	independently	recognized	the	3	:	1	ratio.	It	is	
not	obvious	for	a	reader	by	reading	Tschermak’s	long	paper	(1900a)	to	see	that	he	
had	recognised	the	3	:	1	ratio	before	his	first	reading	of	Mendel	and	regarded	it	as	a	
new	discovery.	In	order	to	show	his	independence	of	the	discovery	of	the	3	:	1	ratio,	
Tschermak,	in	his	letter	to	Roberts	(1929),	claims	that	he	initially	conceptualized	the	
3	:	1	ratio	in	a	different	way	as	Mendel	did.	
[In	the	paper	(Tschermak,	1900a)]	I	emphasized	besides	that	instead	of	
'dominieren’	[dominate],	one	should	say	rather	‘prävalieren'	[predominate],	
at	least	in	certain	cases…	(Roberts,	1929,	p.	345)	
If	this	were	the	case,	Tschermak’s	initial	formulation	of	the	3	:	1	ratio	in	terms	of	
predominance	(prävalieren)	was	a	good	piece	of	evidence	to	support	the	
independence.	Unfortunately,	as	I	shall	show	in	the	next	section,	Tschermak’s	
non-Mendelian	conceptualization	of	the	3	:	1	ratio	was	not	very	sophisticated	until	
his	1901	papers.	In	particular,	Tschermak	(1900a,	1900b)	did	not	have	a	
counterpart	concept	compared	to	Mendel’s	“recessiveness”.	It	is	not	convincing	
that	Tschermak	recognised	the	3	:	1	ratio	in	terms	of	predominance	initially	before	
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reading	Mendel’s	paper.	Therefore,	Tschermak’s	independence	of	the	rediscovery	
is	undermined.	
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4.2	“Rediscovery”:	A	Misleading	Characterisation	
Another	line	of	criticism	on	the	rediscovery	thesis	is	to	challenge	the	conventional	
usage	of	the	term	“rediscovery”	to	designate	the	publication	of	de	Vries,	Correns,	
and	Tschermak’s	papers	in	1900	and	its	impact.99	 When	talking	of	“the	
rediscovery”,	one	may	easily	have	the	impression	that	de	Vries,	Correns,	and	
Tschermak’s	contribution	is	merely	a	re-introduction	of	Mendel’s	work.	However,	
the	real	story	is	much	more	complicated.	As	we	shall	see,	de	Vries,	Correns,	and	
Tschermak	were	studying	different	problems,	all	of	which	are	different	from	
Mendel’s	concern.	In	the	rediscovery	papers,	they	painstakingly	conceptualised	the	
results	of	their	experiments	by	adopting	Mendel’s	approach	within	their	own	
theoretical	frameworks.	As	Orel	points	out,	“there	was	a	process	of	incorporation	
of	Mendel’s	innovative	[work]100.”	(Orel,	1996,	p.	289)	So	it	is	not	legitimate	to	call	
what	de	Vries,	Correns,	and	von	Tschermak	did	around	1900	the	rediscovery.	In	this	
section	I	shall	develop	and	strengthen	Orel’s	view	to	show	the	incorporation	is	a	
better	term	to	characterise	and	reflect	the	contribution	of	de	Vries,	Correns,	and	
Tschermak	in	1900	by	making	an	in-depth	analysis	of	their	conceptual	frameworks.	
Tschermak’s	“Rediscovery”:	The	3	:	1	Ratio	and	the	Valency	of	the	Trait	
In	order	to	evaluate	whether	the	term	“rediscovery”	correctly	captures	de	Vries’,	
Correns’	and	Tschermak’s	contribution	to	the	history	of	genetics,	I	find	it	necessary	
to	clarify	what	the	“rediscovery”	means.	There	are	various	phrases	of	the	
rediscovery	story:	“the	rediscovery	of	Mendel’s	work”	(for	example,	Corcos	&	
Monaghan,	1985;	Iltis,	1932;	Orel,	1996;	R.	G.	Punnett,	1919),	“the	rediscovery	of	
Mendelism”	(for	example,	Harwood,	2000;	C.	Stern	&	Sherwood,	1966;	Zirkle,	1968),																																																									99	 It	should	not	be	confused	with	the	criticism	on	the	long-neglect	thesis.	The	long-neglect	thesis	is	sufficiently	countered	by	the	evidence	of	the	references	to	Mendel	in	pre-1900	publications.	However,	the	criticism	I	shall	discuss	and	develop	in	this	section	is	to	argue	that	the	actual	practice	of	de	Vries,	Correns,	and	Tschermak	is	too	complicated	to	be	summarised	by	the	term	“rediscovery”.	In	other	words,	the	term	“rediscovery”	oversimplifies	the	actual	practice	of	de	Vries,	and	Correns,	and	Tschermak	in	1900.	100	 Orel’s	original	term	used	here	is	“ideas”.	However	I	find	that	the	term	“ideas”	connotes	a	limited	aspect	of	Mendel’s	contribution.	In	fact,	as	I	shall	show	later,	Mendel’s	influence	on	de	Vries,	Correns,	and	Tschermak	is	in	many	ways.	As	Orel	himself	well	recognizes,	“After	reading	Mendel’s	paper	[de	Vries,	Correns,	and	Tschermak]	definitely	revised	the	methods	used	in	their	further	experiments,	and	above	all	interpreted	the	results	taking	into	account	Mendel’s	approach	to	research	in	plant	hybridization	so	far	as	they	had	perceived	it.”	(Orel,	1996,	p.	289)	Hence,	I	employ	the	term	“work”	to	embrace	Mendel’s	theoretical	and	practical	contribution.	
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and	“the	rediscovery	of	Mendel’s	law(s)”	(for	example,	Bateson,	1902;	Bowler,	1989;	
Kottler,	1979;	Simunek	et	al.,	2011;	Stubbe,	1972).	In	fact	all	these	phrases	are	used	
interchangeably	(for	example,	Corcos	&	Monaghan,	1985,	1987a,	1987b;	Monaghan	
&	Corcos,	1986,	1987;	Tschermak,	1951).	Conventionally,	both	Mendel’s	work	and	
Mendelism	are	identical	with	Mendel’s	law	of	inheritance.	However,	as	I	have	
argued	in	Chapter	3,	Mendel’s	laws	are	in	fact	not	about	inheritance	and	cannot	be	
understood	as	laws	of	inheritance,	so	it	is	obviously	illegitimate	to	name	the	
rediscoverers’	publications	in	1900	the	rediscovery	of	Mendel’s	laws.	Nevertheless,	
it	is	still	worth	investigating	what	de	Vries,	Correns,	and	Tschermak	in	fact	
“rediscovered”	respectively,	and	what	is	a	best	way	to	understand	these	activities.	
Let	me	begin	with	Tschermak.	As	I	have	mentioned,	Tschermak,	according	to	his	
narration	in	the	first	1900	paper	(1900b),	began	his	hybridisation	experiment	on	
Pisum	sativum	in	1898.	He	focused	on	observing	the	inheritance	patterns	of	two	
pair	of	morphological	traits,	namely,	yellow/green	storage	tissues	and	
round/wrinkled	seeds.	In	order	to	analyse	the	results,	Tschermak	followed	Mendel	
to	designate	“dominant”	characters	to	yellowness	and	roundness	and	“recessive”	
to	greenness	and	wrinkleness.	In	the	F2	generation,	Tschermak	recognised	the	3	:	1	
ratio	between	dominant	and	recessive	characters.	
The	ratio	of	seeds	carrying	the	dominant,	prevailing	character	to	those	
carrying	the	recessive	is	about	3	:	1.	(Tschermak,	1900b,	p.	236,	1950,	p.	45)	
In	the	long	paper	(Tschermak,	1900a,	p.	536),	Tschermak	reports	the	ratio	in	
greater	details	as	follows.	
Yellow-seeded	 Green-seeded	 	
1854	 660	 =	2.8	:	1	
Smooth-seeded	 Wrinkled-seeded	 	
884	 288	 =	3.1	:	1	
However,	Tschermak	did	not	provide	any	“deeper”	explanation	of	the	3	:	1	ratio	at	
all!	Nor	does	he	deduce	any	“Mendel’s	rule”	or	“the	law	of	segregation”	explicitly,	
unlike	de	Vries	and	Correns	did.	In	the	postscript	of	his	papers	(Tschermak,	1900a,	
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1900b),	Tschermak	enunciates	that	he	believed	that	he	“had	found	something	new”,	
and	his	hybridisation	experiment	and	observation	“confirm	Mendel’s	teaching”,	but	
he	nowhere	explicitly	tells	us	what	Mendel’s	teaching	is	in	the	paper.	All	I	can	
justifiably	infer	from	Tschermak’s	paper	(1900b)	is	that	if	there	is	a	new	thing	he	
believed	that	he	found,	it	only	can	be	the	3	:	1	ratio.	It	is	also	confirmed	by	
Tschermak’s	own	retrospect	fifty	years	later.	
In	studying	the	results	of	my	pea	crosses	in	the	fall	of	1899	I	discovered	the	
3:1	segregation	ratio	for	yellow	and	green	cotyledons	and	smooth	and	
wrinkled	seeds,	as	well	as	the	1:1	ratio	in	backcrossing	the	green	cotyledon	
peas	with	hybrid	pollen,	in	the	second	seed	generation	of	all	of	my	
experimental	groups.	
While	recording	these	results	I	saw	the	citation	of	Mendel	in	Focke's	book	
and	obtained	from	the	University	library	the	volume	of	the	
Naturjorschender	Verein	in	Brünn	containing	Mendel's	paper.	There	I	read	to	
my	great	surprise	that	Mendel	had	already	carried	out	such	experiments	
much	more	extensive	than	mine,	had	noted	the	same	regularities,	and	had	
already	given	the	explanation	for	the	3:1	segregation	ratio.	(Tschermak,	
1951,	p.	169)	
It	is	quite	clear	that	even	Tschermak	himself	identified	what	he	rediscovered	is	the	
3	:	1	ratio.	It	is	a	rediscovery	if	he	did	recognise	the	ratio!101	 On	the	one	hand,	it	is	
not	an	easy	task	to	obtain	such	a	ratio	in	the	crossing	independently	for	a	
nineteenth	century	experimenter.	As	Zirkle	puts	it,	“To	recognize	a	Mendelian	ratio	
for	the	first	time	requires	a	certain	amount	of	plain	good	luck.”	(Zirkle,	1968,	p.	214)	
On	the	other	hand,	it	is	really	difficult	to	recognise	the	3	:	1	ratio	by	idealising	the	
raw	data	if	one	does	not	have	a	Mendelian	explanation	on	mind.	As	shown	in	the	
crossing	between	Lychnis	vespertina	glabra	and	Lynchnis	diurna,	de	Vries	initially	
only	saw	the	2	:	1	ratio	in	the	F2	generation	in	1897	and	did	not	recognise	that	it	
was	the	3	:	1	ratio	until	his	reading	of	Mendel’s	paper.																																																									101	 However,	I	am	still	sceptical	on	if	Tschermak	realised	the	significance	of	the	3	:	1	ratio	in	1899.	The	3	:	1	ratio	(or	more	specifically	the	1	:	2	:	1	ratio)	was	important	for	Mendel	because	it	could	be	well	explained	by	his	law	of	development	concerning	a	pair	of	traits.	But	for	Tschermak,	even	if	he	recognised	the	3	:	1	ratio	independently,	the	ratio	itself,	as	a	mere	description	of	the	phenomenon,	seemed	hardly	an	important	discovery	if	it	yielded	no	theoretical	or	practical	implications.	
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However,	it	is	obvious	that	Tschermak	did	not	conceptualise	the	ratio	in	the	way	as	
Mendel	did.	Mendel	and	Tschermak	had	different	concerns.	As	I	have	emphasised	
in	the	Chapter	3,	Mendel’s	concern	is	about	the	development	of	hybrids.	In	contrast,	
Tschermak’s	main	purpose	is	to	study	the	influence	(Einfluss)	of	foreign	pollen	on	
the	morphological	traits	by	observing	the	inheritance	(Vererbung)	of	the	constant	
morphological	traits.	
The	purpose	was	to	study	the	immediate	influence	of	the	foreign	pollen	
upon	the	constitution	(form	and	color)	of	the	seeds	thus	produced,	and	also	
to	follow,	in	the	next	generation	of	hybrids,	the	inheritance	of	the	constant,	
differentiating	characters	of	the	parental	types	used	in	the	hybridization.	
(Tschermak,	1900b,	p.	232,	1950,	p.	42)	
Moreover,	Mendel’s	law	is	noticeably	called	the	“principle	of	the	regular	
non-equivalence	of	characters”102	 (Satz	von	der	gesetzmässigen	
Ungleichwerthigkeit	der	Merkmale	für	die	Vererbung)	by	Tschermak	(1900a,	
1900b).	
The	principle,	established	by	[Mendel],	of	the	regular	non-equivalence	of	
characters	in	inheritance	[der	gesetzmässigen	Ungleichwerthigkeit	der	
Merkmale	für	die	Vererbung],	is	confirmed	by	my	experiments	on	Pisum	
sativum.	Likewise	the	observations	of	Körnicke,	Correns	and	de	Vries	on	Zea	
Mays	as	well	as	those	made	by	de	Vries	in	his	species	crosses,	completely	
corroborate	it.	It	proves	to	be	of	the	highest	significance	for	the	study	of	
inheritance	in	general.	(Tschermak,	1900b,	p.	235,	1950,	p.	44)	
It	should	be	emphasised	as	a	special	merit	of	[Mendel]	that	he	discovered	
the	principle	of	the	regular	non-equivalence	of	characters	in	inheritance	and	
clearly	proved	it	in	the	most	suitable	species	Pisum	sativum.103	 (Tschermak,	
1900a,	p.	513)	
																																																								102	 This	is	Hannah’s	translation	(Tschermak,	1950,	p.	44).	103	 This	is	my	translation	of	Tschermak’s	text:	“Es	muss	als	besonderes	Verdienst	dieses	Beobachters	hervorgehoben	werden,	dass	er	die	gesetymässig	ungleiche	Werthigkeit	der	verschiedenen	Merkmale	für	die	Vererbung	erkannte	und	an	der	besonders	geeigneten	Species	Pisum	sativum	klar	erwies.”	(Tschermak,	1900a,	p.	513)	
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According	to	my	summary	in	the	section	3.2,	there	is	no	such	a	law	named	“the	
principle	of	the	regular	non-equivalence	of	characters”	in	Mendel’s	paper	(1865).	
Though	Tschermak	did	not	explicitly	formulate	this	principle	or	define	the	term	
valency	(Werthigkeit)	in	his	paper	(1900a,	1900b),	his	terminology	did	sufficiently	
reflect	that	he	tried	to	reformulate	Mendel’s	law	within	a	different	conceptual	
framework.	As	the	new	name	suggests,	Tschermak	reformulates	Mendel’s	law	in	
terms	of	the	valency	of	the	trait	(die	Werthigkeit	der	Merkmale).	In	his	paper	
(1901c),	Tschermak	explicated	Mendel’s	law,	which	is	renamed	“Mendel’s	principle	
of	regular	differential	valency104	 of	traits	in	heredity”	(MENDEL'schen	Lehre	von	der	
gesetzmässigen	Verschiedenwertigkeit	der	Merkmale	für	die	Vererbung)105.	For	
Tschermak	(1901c),	Mendel’s	principle	consists	of	three	principles:	the	principle	of	
regular	dimensional	valency	of	traits	(der	Satz	von	der	gesetzmässigen	
Masswerthigkeit	der	Merkmale),	the	principle	of	regular	quantitative	valency	of	
traits	(der	Satz	von	der	gesetzmässigen	Mengenwerthigkeit	der	Merkmale),	and	the	
principle	of	regular	hereditary	valency	of	traits	or	the	principle	of	segregation	of	
traits	(der	Satz	von	der	gesetzmässigen	Vererbungswerthigkeit	oder	Spaltung	der	
Merkmale).	
The	principle	of	regular	dimensional	valency	of	traits	states	that	certain	traits	
change	their	form	in	the	hybrids.	The	principle	of	regular	quantitative	valency	of	
traits	states	that	the	number	of	carriers106	 of	the	dominant	trait	and	of	the	
recessive	traits	is	in	a	constant	ratio	in	each	generation.	The	principle	of	regular	
hereditary	valency	of	traits	or	the	principle	of	segregation	of	traits	states	that	the	
ratio	of	the	dominant	trait	to	the	recessive	one	is	3	:	1.	For	Tschermak	(1900a,	p.	
532),	the	valency	of	the	trait	is	referred	to	the	influence	(Einfluss)	of	the	trait	to	
prevail	in	the	subsequent	generations.	
																																																								104	 Simunek,	Hoßfeld,	and	Wissemann	(2011;	2012)	translate	Wertigkeit	as	value	or	valuation.	In	contrast,	along	with	Olby	(1985,	1987),	I	find	“valency”	is	a	better	translation.	105	 Though	the	slight	difference	of	the	names,	considering	the	similar	meaning	of	Ungleich	and	
Verschiede,	I	argue	that	both	Satz	von	der	gesetzmässigen	Ungleichwerthigkeit	der	Merkmale	für	
die	Vererbung	and	MENDEL'schen	Lehre	von	der	gesetzmässigen	Verschiedenwertigkeit	der	
Merkmale	für	die	Vererbung	refer	to	Mendel’s	laws	(1865).	106	 The	term	carrier	(Träger)	here	should	be	not	understood	as	a	counterpart	concept	compared	to	Correns’	concept	Anlage,	or	the	later	concept	gene.	Rather	Tschermak	here	refers	the	number	of	carriers	of	dominating	character	to	the	number	of	plants	with	dominating	character.	Thus,	I	agree	with	Olby	(1985,	p.	123)	that	Tschemak	“had	not	arrived	at”	the	conception	of	germinal	segregation.	
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By	his	examination,	Tschermak	(1900a,	p.	555,	1900b,	p.	239)	admits,	along	with	
Correns,	that	Mendel’s	law	is	not	universally	applicable,	but	he	(1901c,	p.	51)	still	
insists	that	“Mendel’s	law”	is	a	classical	teaching	(klassische	Lehre)	for	its	
significance	in	the	theory	and	practice	of	plant	breeding.	
Although	Tschermak’s	understanding	of	Mendel’s	law	in	terms	of	valency	of	trait	in	
1900	was	not	as	sophisticated	as	his	in	1901,	it	is	beyond	doubt	that	he	began	
analysing	and	understanding	the	experiments	in	a	similar	way	where	he	mostly	
talked	of	the	influence	of	the	trait.	
The	taller	type	always	has	the	greater	influence,	regardless	of	whether	it	
characterized	the	maternal	or	paternal	variety.	(Tschermak,	1900b,	p.	234,	
1950,	p.	44)	
Certain	specific	combinations	yielded	this	effect	with	regularity.	The	
characters	which	were	taken	into	consideration	to	recognize	such	an	
influence,	related	to	the	form	of	the	seeds	and	the	color	of	the	storage	
tissue.	(Tschermak,	1900b,	pp.	234–235,	1950,	p.	44)	
The	influence	of	the	character	“yellow”	in	the	seeds	in	the	hybrid	was	in	this	
case	reduced	by	57	per	cent,	while	that	of	the	character	“green”	was	
reduced	by	43.5	percent.	(Tschermak,	1900b,	p.	237,	1950,	p.	46)	
As	to	the	relative	influence	(or	the	relative	valency)	of	parental	plants	on	the	
height,	my	experiments	draw	the	following	conclusions	…107	 (Tschermak,	
1900a,	p.	532)	
Moreover,	in	his	publications	between	1900	and	1901	(1900a,	1900b,	1901a,	
1901b),	the	valency	of	the	trait	was	definitely	a	key	word.	In	other	words,	
Tschermak’s	research	during	this	period	was	conceptualised	in	terms	of	the	
valency	of	the	trait.	Thus,	it	is	reasonable	to	conclude	that	Tschermak’s	papers	
(Tschermak,	1900a,	1900b)	contained	his	premature	attempts	to	analyse	the	3	:	
1	ratio	in	terms	of	valency	of	traits	in	heredity.	
																																																								107	 “Bezüglich	des	relativen	Einflueese	(oder	der	relativen	Werthigkeit)	eines	verschiedenen	Höhenmerkmales	der	Vater-	und	der	Muttersorte	gestatten	meine	Versuche	folgende	Schlüsse:	…”	(Tschermak,	1900a,	p.	532)	
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Now	it	is	the	time	to	reassess	Tschermak’s	contribution	in	1900.	Stern	once	
remarkably	rejected	Tschermak	as	a	rediscoverer	by	arguing	that	“[Tschermak’s]	
publications	in	1900	show	him…	only	an	experimenter	whose	understanding…	had	
‘fallen	short	of	the	essential	discovery’.”	(C.	Stern	&	Sherwood,	1966,	pp.	xi–xii)	
Stern	is	both	right	and	wrong.	He	is	right	on	the	point	that	Tschermak’s	publications	
in	1900	cannot	be	regarded	as	a	rediscovery	of	Mendel’s	theoretical	work.	It	is	a	fair	
point	that,	despite	recognising	the	3	:	1	ratio,	Tschermak	showed	an	insufficient	
understanding	of	Mendel’s	paper	in	his	papers	(Tschermak,	1900a,	1900b).	Nor	is	
the	significance	of	the	3	:	1	ratio	was	highlighted	or	explored	adequately	by	
Tschermak	in	1900.	On	the	other	hand,	Stern	is	wrong.	Tschermak	was	more	than	
an	experimenter:	He	was	also	a	theorist	attempting	to	conceptualise	the	3	:	1	ratio	
in	terms	of	the	valency	of	traits	and	to	adopt	Mendel’s	analysis	to	develop	his	own	
theory.	In	short,	it	is	better	to	understand	Tschermak’s	practice	in	1900	as	an	
incorporation	of	Mendel’s	approach	into	his	analysis	of	valency	of	traits	in	heredity	
rather	than	a	rediscovery	of	Mendel’s	work.	
Correns’	“Rediscovery”:	Testing	and	Reformulating	Mendel’s	Work	
Unlike	Tschermak,	Correns	was	very	explicit,	in	his	paper	(Correns,	1900),	on	the	
point	that	what	he	rediscovered	is	“the	regularity	of	the	phenomena,	and	the	
explanation	thereof”.	Furthermore,	after	citing	Mendel’s	law	of	composition	of	
hybrid	fertilising	cells	(LCC),	Correns	explicitly	reformulated	it	as	an	explanan:	
In	the	hybrids	form,	reproductive	cells	are	produced	in	which	the	anlagen	
for	the	individual	parental	characteristics	are	contained	in	all	possible	
combinations,	but	both	anlagen	for	the	same	pair	of	traits	are	never	
combined.	Each	combination	occurs	with	approximately	the	same	frequency.	
(Correns,	1900,	p.	166,	1966,	p.	130)	
Correns	believed	that	he	found	the	“exactly	same	explanation”	as	Mendel	and	de	
Vries	did	for	the	regular	ratio	obtained	from	the	progeny	of	hybrids.	However,	such	
a	claim	is	problematic.	There	are	substantial	conceptual	differences	between	
Correns’	“Mendel’s	rule”	(Mendel’s	Regel)	and	Mendel’s	laws.	A	first	obvious	
difference	is	about	terminology.	While	both	Mendel	(1865)	and	de	Vries	(1900a)	
used	the	term	Gesetz	(law),	Correns	cautiously	employed	the	term	Regel	(rule).	It	is	
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not	surprising,	since	Correns	repeatedly	emphasised	the	limited	applicability	of	
Mendel’s	rule108	 in	the	paper	(Correns,	1900).	
At	present,	however,	this	[rule]	is	applicable	only	to	a	certain	number	of	
cases...	It	seems	impossible	that	all	pairs	of	characters	of	all	hybrids	should	
behave	according	to	this	[rule].	(Correns,	1900,	p.	167,	1966,	p.	131)	
…	[T]hat	Mendel’s	[rule]	of	segregation	cannot	be	applied	universally.	(Correns,	
1900,	p.	168,	1966,	p.	132)	
On	the	other	hand,	Mendel	was	a	bit	more	confident,	though	he	still	was	uncertain	
on	the	generality	of	his	laws.	
Yet	 even	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 laws	 [Sätze]	 proposed	 for	 Pisum	 needs	
confirmation,	and	a	repetition	of	at	least	the	more	important	experiments	is	
therefore	desirable…	Whether	variable	hybrids	of	other	plant	species	show	
complete	agreement	in	behavior	also	remains	to	be	decided	experimentally;	
one	 might	 assume,	 however,	 that	 no	 basic	 difference	 could	 exist	 in	
important	matters	since	unity	 in	 the	plan	of	development	of	organic	 life	 is	
beyond	doubt.	(Mendel,	1865,	pp.	42–43,	1966a,	p.	43)	
This	difference	is	more	than	a	linguistic	issue.	Rather	it	reflects	a	difference	of	the	
views	on	the	applicability	of	the	“law”	between	Correns,	and	Mendel.	
A	second	significant	difference	between	Correns’	and	Mendel’s	work	is	that	Mendel	
conceptualised	LCC	in	terms	of	kinds	of	cells	(die	Arten	von	Zellen),	while	Correns	in	
terms	of	anlagen	(Anlagen)	in	the	cell.	The	anlagen	here	follows	August	Weismann’s	
usage	(1892)	to	name	the	primary	constituents	in	the	germ	cell.	Correns	refined	it	
to	implicitly	designate	the	hereditary	material	for	a	morphological	trait	in	the	nuclei	
and	the	unit	of	segregation	during	the	formation	of	the	reproductive	nuclei.	
…	[P]rior	to	the	definitive	formation	of	the	reproductive	nuclei	a	complete	
separation	of	the	two	anlagen	occurs,	so	that	one	half	of	the	reproductive	
																																																								108	 In	order	to	emphasise	the	difference,	in	the	following	I	shall	use	the	term	“Mendel’s	rule”	as	the	translation	of	Corren’s	“Mendel’s	Regel”.	In	other	cases,	I	shall	use	the	term	“Mendelian	Rule”	to	refer	to	Correns’	“Mendel’s	Regel”.	
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nuclei	receive	the	anlage	for	[one	trait],	the	other	half	the	[other].	(Correns,	
1900,	p.	166,	1966,	p.	126)	
As	Correns	himself	points	out	in	the	footnote	(1900,	p.	163	n1),	Mendel	did	not	
mention	nuclei	in	his	paper.	Nor	did	Mendel	talk	of	the	fusion	of	the	reproductive	
cells,	or	anlagen.	It	is	obvious	that	cells	and	anlagen	are	in	the	different	biological	
level.	Anlagen,	for	Correns,	are	hereditary	material	in	the	nuclei	of	cells.	Again,	this	
reformulation	is	not	just	about	terminology.	It	is	a	good	example	of	what	Olby	calls	
an	extension	of	“the	explanatory	level	of	[Mendel’s]	paper	on	the	basis	of	[the	
rediscoverers’]	own	understanding	of	the	recent	developments	in	cytology”.	(Olby,	
1985,	p.	242)	Furthermore,	Correns	implicitly	suggests	that	a	pair	of	traits	is	
determined	by	a	pair	of	anlagen,	while	Mendel,	as	Olby	(1979,	1985)	suggests,	
never	had	such	an	idea	of	“the	quantitative	equivalence”	between	traits	and	kinds	
of	cells.	Mendel	did	postulate	that	kinds	of	cells	correspond	to	the	morphological	
traits,	but	he	was	not	very	clear	on	the	numerical	relation	of	kinds	of	cells	and	traits.	
Thus,	the	shift	from	kinds	of	cells	to	anlagen	is	a	significant	conceptual	change	
beyond	Mendel	made	by	Correns.	
Thirdly,	Correns	differs	from	Mendel	in	using	the	terms	“dominating”	and	
“recessive”.	Mendel	uses	the	terms	“dominating/recessive”,	especially	the	term	
“dominating”	in	two	ways.	On	the	one	hand,	“dominating”	refers	to	a	parental	trait,	
which	would	dominate	in	the	hybrid.	On	the	other	hand,	“dominating”	refers	to	a	
hybrid	trait	with	a	certain	behaviour	in	its	progeny	(i.e.	in	all	its	progeny	the	trait	
would	exhibit	the	same	pattern	as	in	the	first	generation).	Although	Correns	also	
employs	the	terms	“dominating”	and	“recessive”	in	two	ways,	his	usage	is	slightly	
different.	The	terms	are	attributed	to	both	morphological	traits	and	anlagen.	
In	many	pairs	one	trait,	or	rather	the	anlage	thereof,	is	so	much	stronger	
than	the	other	trait,	or	its	anlage,	that	the	former	alone	appears	in	the	
hybrid	plant,	while	the	latter	does	not	show	up	at	all.	This	one	may	be	called	
dominating,	the	other	one	the	recessive,	…	(Correns,	1900,	p.	159,	1966,	p.	
121)	
Another	point	should	also	be	highlighted.	Correns’	Mendelian	Rule	is	more	than	a	
reformulation	of	Mendel’s	law	of	composition	of	hybrid	fertilizing	cells	(LCC)	in	
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terms	of	anlagen.	Correns’	formulated	version	of	LCC	is	only	one	constituent	of	
“Mendel’s	rule”.	The	other	constituent	is	quoted	as	follows.	
If	the	parental	strains	differ	only	in	one	pair	of	traits	(2	traits:	A,	a)	the	
hybrid	will	form	only	two	types	of	reproductive	nuclei	(A,	a)	which	are	like	
those	of	the	parents.	Each	type	is	50	percent	of	the	total.	If	the	parents	
differ	in	two	pairs	of	traits	(4	traits:	A,	a;	B,	b)	four	types	of	reproductive	
nuclei	will	be	formed,	(AB,	Ab,	aB,	ab)	and	25	percent	of	the	total	will	be	of	
each	type.	If	the	parents	differ	in	three	pairs	of	traits	(6	traits:	A,	a;	B,	b;	C,	c)	
eight	types	of	reproductive	nuclei	will	be	formed	(ABC,	ABc,	AbC,	Abc,	aBC,	
aBc,	abC,	abc),	and	12.5	percent	of	the	total	are	of	each	type.	(Correns,	1900,	
p.	166,	1966,	pp.	130–131)	
This	formulation	clearly	involves	the	ideas	from	both	Mendel’s	LCC	and	LCT.	Hence,	
Correns’	Mendelian	Rule	is	definitely	not	just	a	reformulation	of	Mendel’s	law.	
Correspondingly,	Correns’	contribution	cannot	be	simply	construed	as	a	
confirmation	of	Mendel’s	laws	or	a	re-introduction	and	reformulation	of	Mendel’s	
laws	in	terms	of	anlage.	
As	I	have	already	argued,	Correns’	original	purpose	of	his	experiments	on	Pisum	
was	to	test	all	the	relevant	assertions	in	the	literature.	This	purpose	is	well	reflected	
in	Correns’	paper	(1900)	from	the	title	“G.	Mendel’s	Law	Concerning	the	Behaviour	
of	Progeny	of	Varietal	Hybrids”	to	the	conclusion	on	the	universality	of	“Mendel’s	
rule”.	The	paper	is	easily	seen	as	an	attempt	to	examine	Mendel’s	work,	which	
contains	the	statements	like:	
The	facts,	which	Mendel	found,	I	can	fully	confirm.	(Correns,	1900,	p.	160,	
1966,	p.	122)	
In	order	to	explain	the	facts,	one	must	assume	(as	did	Mendel)	that	…	
(Correns,	1900,	p.	163,	1966,	p.	125)	
…	[T]hat	Mendel’s	Law	of	segregation	cannot	be	applied	universally…	
(Correns,	1900,	p.	168,	1966,	p.	132)	
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Thus,	it	is	very	clear	that	the	objective	of	Correns’	paper	is	to	test	Mendel’s	work	on	
Pisum.	This	observation	was	also	implicitly	suggested	by	William	Bateson	(1902),	
who	regarded	Correns’	paper	as	a	report	of	a	repetition	of	“Mendel’s	original	
experiment	with	Peas	having	seeds	of	different	colours.”	If	Correns	had	studied	
Pisum	for	a	different	purpose,	or	found	a	Mendelian	explanation	by	himself	
independently,	there	may	have	alternative	ways	of	writing	his	1900	paper.	
Moreover,	as	I	have	shown,	the	entry	Rheiberger	found	(Figure	5)	can	also	be	
construed	as	a	piece	of	evidence	to	support	that	Correns’	concern	is	to	test	
Mendel’s	work	on	Pisum.	Thus,	now	I	contend	that	it	is	quite	well	established	that	
Correns’	experiment	on	Pisum	originates	from	his	project	of	testing	Mendel’	work.	
However,	Correns’	paper	finally	turned	out	to	be	more	than	a	mere	confirmation	of	
Mendel’s	work.	It	also	provides	a	new	analysis	of	the	behavior	of	the	progeny	of	
Pisum	by	incorporating	Mendel’s	and	Weismann’s	work.	Therefore,	Correns’	work	
cannot	be	simply	summarised	as	a	rediscovery.	
de	Vries’	“Rediscovery”:	The	Law	of	Segregation	as	the	Evidential	Support	of	
Theory	of	Pangenesis	
In	his	1900	papers,	de	Vries	claimed	that	what	he	rediscovered	is	“the	law	of	
segregation”.	
The	totality	of	these	experiments	establishes	the	law	of	segregation	of	
hybrids…	(de	Vries,	1900c,	p.	847,	1950,	p.	32)	
From	these	and	numerous	other	experiments	I	draw	the	conclusion	that	the	
law	of	segregation	of	hybrids	as	discovered	by	Mendel	for	peas	finds	very	
general	application	in	the	plant	kingdom…	(de	Vries,	1900a,	p.	84,	1966,	p.	
117)	
The	law	of	segregation109	 is	explicitly	formulated	by	de	Vries	as	follows.	
																																																								109	 It	should	be	noted	that	de	Vries’	law	of	segregation	is	only	confirmed	by	the	crossing	experiments	on	plants	with	the	antagonistic	characteristics,	as	he	explicitly	claims,	“The	crossing	experiment	is	thereby	limited	to	the	antagonistic	characteristics.”	(de	Vries,	1966,	p.	110)	In	other	words,	even	if	as	de	Vries	contends	that	the	law	of	segregation	has	a	“general	application	in	the	plant	kingdom”,	it	is	still	only	applicable	to	a	limited	class	of	hybrids	(i.e.	those	with	antagonistic	characteristics).	
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The	pollen	grains	and	ovules	of	monohybrids	are	not	hybrids	but	belong	
exclusively	to	one	or	the	other	of	the	two	parental	types.	(de	Vries,	1900a,	p.	
86,	1966,	p.	112)	
At	first	glance,	it	seems	evident	that	this	is	hardly	a	rediscovery,	since	Mendel	never	
made	such	a	statement	or	a	similar	statement.	Moreover,	none	of	Mendel’s	three	
laws	can	be	simply	identified	with	an	early	version	of	de	Vries’	law	of	segregation.	
Mendel’s	laws	are	either	about	the	numerical	relationship	between	the	traits	of	the	
hybrid	and	its	progeny,	or	about	the	correspondence	between	the	combination	of	
traits	and	the	composition	of	cells,	while	de	Vries’	law	of	segregation	is	literally	
about	the	behaviour	of	the	pollen	grains	and	ovules	in	the	generative	period.	In	
other	words,	Mendel	did	not	have	a	law	of	segregation	in	de	Vries’	sense.	Nor	did	
Mendel	even	use	the	term	segregation	(Spaltung).	It	is	de	Vries’	contribution	to	
coin	the	term	“law	of	segregation	(Spaltungsgesetz)”	and	to	designate	it	to	a	
phenomenon	in	the	formation	of	pollen	and	ovules.	
Some	might	argue	that	de	Vries’	law	of	segregation	is	derived	from	the	analysis	of	
his	hybrid	experiments	with	a	Mendelian	approach	(e.g.	the	usage	of	the	concepts	
“dominating/recessive”	and	the	recognition	of	the	3:1	ratio),	so	it	is	still	plausible	to	
defend	the	view	that	de	Vries’	work	can	be	understood	as	a	rediscovery	of	
Mendel’s	work	in	a	broad	sense.	However,	I	shall	argue	that	the	Mendelian	
elements	in	de	Vries’	work	well	reflect	an	incorporation	rather	than	a	rediscovery.	
First	of	all,	de	Vries	regards	the	law	of	segregation	as	a	piece	of	evidence	for	his	
own	theory.	As	I	have	argued,	Mendel’s	work	on	hybrids	was	to	study	the	
development	of	hybrid	and	its	progeny.	However,	de	Vries	had	a	different	concern.	
His	work	on	hybrids	was	to	defend	his	theory	of	heredity:	the	theory	of	pangenesis	
(1889).	This	purpose	was	clearly	stated	in	the	introductions	of	de	Vries’	papers	
(1900a,	1900c).	
According	to	the	principles	which	I	have	expressed	elsewhere	(Intracelluläre	
Pangenesis,	1889),	the	specific	characters	of	organisms	are	composed	of	
separate	units.	One	is	able	to	study,	experimentally,	these	units	either	by	
the	phenomena	of	variability	and	mutability	or	by	the	product	of	hybrids.	
(de	Vries,	1900c,	p.	845,	1950,	p.	30)	
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According	to	pangenesis	the	total	character	of	a	plant	is	built	up	of	distinct	
units…	For	many	years	this	principle	has	represented	the	starting	point	for	
my	investigations.	Many	important	consequences	can	be	deduced	from	it	
and	may	be	tested	experimentally.	My	experiments	lie	in	part	in	the	realm	
of	variability	and	mutability	and	in	part	in	that	of	hybridization.	(de	Vries,	
1900a,	p.	83,	1966,	p.	107)	
Thus,	de	Vries’	finding	of	the	law	of	segregation	originates	from	his	study	of	
hybridisation	to	test	the	theory	of	pangenesis	experimentally.	Moreover,	in	the	
conclusions,	de	Vries	contends	that	his	law	of	segregation	confirms	the	theory	of	
pangenesis.	
The	totality	of	these	experiments	establishes	the	law	of	segregation	of	
hybrids	and	confirms	the	principles	that	I	have	expressed	concerning	the	
specific	characters	considered	as	being	distinct	units.	(de	Vries,	1900c,	p.	
847,	1950,	p.	32)	
From	these	and	numerous	other	experiments	I	draw	the	conclusion	that	the	
law	of	segregation	as	discovered	by	Mendel	for	peas	finds	very	general	
application	in	the	plant	kingdom	and	that	it	has	a	basic	significance	for	the	
study	of	the	units	of	which	the	species	character	is	composed.	(de	Vries,	
1900a,	p.	84,	1966,	p.	117)	
For	de	Vries,	the	law	of	segregation	was	important	because	it	seemed	to	support	
the	theory	of	pangenesis	in	1900.	Thus,	de	Vries’	finding	of	the	law	of	segregation	is	
better	characterised	as	a	confirmation	of	his	theory	of	pangenesis	rather	than	a	
rediscovery	of	Mendel’s	work.	
Secondly,	de	Vries’	usage	of	the	term	“dominant/recessive”	(1900a,	1900c,	1900d)	
was	an	incorporation	of	Mendel’s	(1865)	and	his	old	terminology	(1889)	rather	than	
a	rediscovery	of	Mendel’s	usage.	It	was	noticeable	that	de	Vries	interchangeably	
used	the	term	“dominant”	with	“active	(or	visible)”	on	the	one	hand,	and	“recessive”	
with	“latent”	on	the	other	hand	in	his	1900	papers.	
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In	the	hybrid	the	simple	differential	character	from	one	of	the	parents	is	
accordingly	visible	or	dominant	while	the	antagonistic	character	is	in	the	
latent	condition	or	recessive.110	 (de	Vries,	1900c,	p.	845,	1950,	p.	30)	
Of	the	two	antagonistic	characters,	Mendel	calls	the	one	visible	in	the	hybrid	
the	dominating,	the	latent	one	recessive.	(de	Vries,	1900a,	p.	85,	1966,	p.	
111)	
Corcos	and	Monaghan	(1985)	contend	that	de	Vries,	following	Mendel’s	usage,	
attributed	“dominant”	(or	“visible”)	and	”recessive”	(or	“latent”)	to	the	
morphological	trait,	while	Bert	Theunissen	(1994)	argues	that	de	Vries	replaced	
“active/latent”	with	Mendel’s	term	“dominant/recessive”	to	designate	the	states	of	
pagens.	However,	neither	correctly	reflects	de	Vries’	subtle	usage	of	
“dominating/visible”	and	“recessive/latent”	in	1900.	As	I	have	shown,	Mendel	
mainly	refers	“dominant”	and	”recessive”	to	either	the	parental	or	hybrid	trait	with	
certain	behaviour	in	the	progeny.	But	for	de	Vries,	the	terms	“dominant”	and	
“recessive”	are	used	to	label	two	different	pairs	of	things.	On	the	one	hand,	de	
Vries	refer	these	to	the	pair	of	morphological	traits	(caractères,	Merkmal).	
In	the	hybrid	the	simple	differential	character	[caractère]	from	one	of	the	
parents	is	accordingly	visible	or	dominant	while	the	antagonistic	character	
[caractère]	is	in	the	latent	condition	or	recessive.	(de	Vries,	1900c,	p.	845,	
1950,	p.	30)	
The	antagonistic	characters	[caractères]	ordinarily	remain	combined	during	
all	of	the	vegetative	life,	one	dominant,	the	other	latent.	(de	Vries,	1900c,	p.	
845,	1950,	p.	30)	
The	dominating	and	the	recessive	traits	[Merkmal]	are	shown	to	be	constant	
in	the	progeny,	…	In	this	experiment	they	yielded	an	average	of	77%	with	
the	dominating	and	23%	the	recessive	trait	[Merkmal].	(de	Vries,	1900a,	p.	
88,	1966,	p.	114)	
																																																								110	 It	is	the	paragraph	in	the	paper	that	made	Correns	to	realise	that	de	Vries’	already	well	knew	Mendel’s	paper.	In	his	paper(Correns,	1900,	p.	159),	Correns	ironically	indicates	that	de	Vries	used	the	same	terms	as	Mendel	in	describing	the	paired	traits	was	“a	strange	coincidence	(einen	merkwürdigen	Zufall).”	
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On	the	other	hand,	de	Vries	refers	those	to	the	pair	of	hereditary	characteristics	
(Eigenschaften),	or	qualities111	 (qualités).	
One	can	unify	the	whole	of	those	results	by	supposing	that	the	two	
antagonistic	qualities	[qualities],	dominant	and	recessive,	are	distributed	
[mutually	exclusively]	in	equal	parts	to	the	pollen	just	as	to	the	ovules.	(de	
Vries,	1900c,	p.	847,	1950,	p.	32)	
Of	the	two	antagonistic	[characteristics112	 (Eigenschaften)],	Mendel	calls	
the	one	visible	in	the	hybrid	the	dominating,	the	latent	one	recessive.	(de	
Vries,	1900a,	p.	85,	1966,	p.	111)	
The	individuals	d	and	d2	have	only	the	dominating	[characteristics	
(Eigenschaft)],	those	of	r	and	r2	constitution	possess	only	the	recessive	
[characteristics	(Eigenschaft)],	while	the	dr	plants	are	obviously	hybrid.	(de	
Vries,	1900a,	p.	86,	1966,	p.	112)	
Neither	Eigenschaften	(or	qualities)	nor	Merkmal	(or	caractères)	can	be	simply	
conflated.	The	word	Merkmal,	also	used	by	Mendel,	generally	refers	to	what	
nowadays	we	call	the	morphological	trait,	while	Eigenschaften	was	originally	used	
by	de	Vries	in	his	book	Intracellular	Pangenesis	(1889)	to	denote	the	hereditary	
property,	which	can	be	passed	onto	the	next	generation.	Therefore,	de	Vries’	usage	
of	“dominating/recessive”	is	genuinely	different	from	Mendel’s.	
What	is	more,	it	is	worth	noting	that	de	Vries’	interchangeable	usage	of	
“dominant/recessive”	with	“visible	(active)/latent”	is	not	trivial.	In	Intracellular	
Pangenesis	(1889),	de	Vries	originally	attributed	the	terms	“active”	and	“latent”	to	
two	states	of	pangens.	According	to	the	theory	of	pangenesis,	a	pangen	is	the	
bearer	of	hereditary	characteristics.	Every	hereditary	characteristics,	no	matter	in	
how	many	species	it	may	be	found,	has	its	special	kind	of	pangen.	All	living																																																									111	 De	Vries	uses	the	word	Eigenschaften	in	(1900a)	and	qualités	in	(1900d).	It	should	be	noted	that	in	the	book	(1889),	de	Vries	uses	Eigenschaften	to	refer	to	hereditary	characterisitics	or	qualities.	112	 Evelyn	Stern’s	translations	of	Eigenschaften	(de	Vries,	1966)	are	inconsistent.	It	is	translated	as	characteristics	in	some	places,	while	it	is	translated	as	characters	in	others	(see	Appendix	3).	In	order	to	distinguish	Eigenschaften	from	Merkmal	(and	Charakter),	I	find	that	characteristics	is	a	better	translation,	which	is	also	consistent	with	de	Vries’	(1889)	usage	of	Eigenschaften	to	denote	the	hereditary	quality	(Gager’s	translation	(de	Vries,	1910)).	
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protoplasm	is	built	up	of	pangens.	In	the	nucleus	every	kind	of	pangen	of	the	given	
individual	is	represented;	the	remaining	protoplasm	in	every	cell	contains	chiefly	
only	those	that	are	to	become	active	in	it.	With	the	exception	of	those	kinds	of	
pangens	that	become	directly	active	in	the	nucleus,	as	for	example	those	that	
dominate	nuclear	division,	all	the	others	have	to	leave	the	nucleus	in	order	to	
become	active.	But	most	of	the	pangens	of	every	sort	remain	latent	in	the	nuclei,	
where	they	multiply,	partly	for	the	purpose	of	nuclear	division,	partly	in	order	to	
pass	on	to	the	protoplasm.	This	delivery	always	involves	only	the	kinds	of	pangens	
that	have	to	begin	to	function.	During	this	passage	they	can	be	transported	by	the	
currents	of	the	protoplasm	and	carried	into	the	various	organs	of	the	protoplasts.	In	
short,	a	pangen	has	two	states:	active	and	latent.	When	it	is	in	the	active	state,	it	
moves	from	the	nucleus	to	the	cytoplasm	to	manifest	its	characteristics.	When	in	
the	latent	state,	it	remains	in	the	nucleus	with	its	characteristics	“latent”.	Therefore,	
de	Vries’	usage	of	“dominating/recessive”	(1900a,	1900c,	1900d)	is	also	different	
from	his	original	usage	of	“active/latent”	(1889).	
Table	10	
Mendel’s	and	de	Vries’	usages	of	“dominant”	and	“recessive”	
	 Mendel	(1865)	 de	Vries	(1889)	 de	Vries	(1900a,	
1900c,	1900d)	
Morphological	
traits	with	a	
certain	
behaviour	
dominant
/recessive	
(as	a	
parental	
trait)	
dominant
/recessive	
(as	a	
hybrid	
trait)	
	 	
Morphologic
al	traits	
dominant/recessive	
(very	occasionally)	
	 dominant	
(visible)/recessive	
(latent)	
Hereditary	
characteristics	
	 	 dominant/recessive	
Pangens	(unit)	 	 active/latent	 	
Given	Mendel’s	usage	(1865)	of	“dominant/recessive”	and	de	Vries’	usage	(1889)	of	
“active/latent”	(see	Table	9),	de	Vries’	interchangeable	usage	(1900a,	1900c,	1900d)	
	 148	
can	be	seen	as	an	incomplete	attempt	of	incorporating	Mendel’s	terminology.	Since	
de	Vries’	aim	(1900a,	1900c)	was	to	test	the	principle	that	the	character	of	an	
organism	is	built	up	of	distinct	units,	it	is	easily	to	infer	from	de	Vries’	book	(1889)	
that	units	should	be	construed	as	pangens,	though	he	does	not	enunciate	this	point	
in	the	1900	papers.	Thus,	it	can	be	expected	that	if	de	Vries	introduces	the	
conceptions	of	“dominant”	and	“recessive”	to	refer	to	the	morphological	traits,	
there	are	corresponding	hereditary	characteristics.	This	is	exactly	what	de	Vries	did	
in	the	1900	papers.	But	there	was	a	difficulty	for	de	Vries	to	explain	the	pattern	of	
inheritance	of	dominant/recessive	traits	in	terms	of	units	or	pangens.	De	Vries	was	
hesitant	to	conflate	“dominant/recessive”	with	“active/latent”	to	denote	the	state	
of	a	pangen.	All	that	de	Vries	(1900a,	1900c,	1900d)	conclusively	showed	is	that	the	
pollen	grains	and	ovules	having	one	characteristics	in	the	formation	behave	in	
accord	with	the	law	of	probability.	This	is	why	in	the	German	paper	de	Vries	is	more	
modest113	 in	the	conclusion	by	arguing	that	the	law	of	segregation	“has	a	basic	
significance	for	the	study	of	the	units	which	the	species	character	is	composed”.	(de	
Vries,	1966,	p.	117)	He	well	recognised	that	the	principle	that	the	specific	
characters	of	organisms	are	composed	of	units	was	yet	well	established	by	his	
hybridising	experiments,	though	at	that	time	he	must	have	been	optimistic	on	that	
the	law	of	segregation	and	his	Mendelian	analysis	of	the	hybridizing	experiments	
would	be	very	helpful	to	confirm	the	theory	of	pangenesis.	Three	years	later,	de	
Vries	made	a	more	comprehensive	incorporation	in	the	book	(1903).	Over	one	third	
of	the	book	focuses	on	“the	Mendelian	laws	of	segregation.”	
Eventually,	as	Meijer	indicates,	“[de	Vries]	did	not	succeed	in	accommodating	
[Mendel’s	work]	in	to	his	already	existing	findings	and	views.”	(Meijer,	1985,	p.	223)	
Shortly	after	de	Vries	abandoned	his	incorporating	project	by	dismissing	the	
significance	of	Mendel’s	work.	As	he	wrote	to	Bateson	on	October	30th,	1901,	
…	[I]t	becomes	more	and	more	clear	to	me	that	Mendelism	[as	the	law	of	
segregation]	is	an	exception	to	the	general	rule	of	crossing.	It	is	in	no	way	
																																																								113	 In	the	first	French	paper	(1900c),	de	Vries	boldly	concludes	that	his	hybridizing	experiments	“confirms	that	principles	that	I	have	expressed	concerning	the	specific	characters	considered	as	being	distinct	units”.	(de	Vries,	1950,	p.	32)	
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the	rule!	It	seems	to	hold	only	good	in	derivative	cases,	such	as	real	
variety-characters.	(Provine,	1971,	p.	68)	
This	letter	well	reflects	a	fact	that,	for	de	Vries,	the	significance	of	the	law	of	
segregation,	if	there	is	any,	is	its	evidential	support	for	his	theory	rather	than	
being	a	rediscovery	of	an	“old”	law.	Thus,	his	efforts	are	definitely	better	
characterised	as	an	incorporation	than	a	rediscovery.	Hence,	it	is	hardly	clear	
that	de	Vries’	1900	papers	are	a	rediscovery	of	Mendel’s	laws,	nor	can	they	be	
characterised	as	a	rediscovery.	 	
Summary	
None	of	de	Vries’,	Correns’	and	Tschermak’s	publication	in	1900	can	be	simply	
characterised	as	a	rediscovery	of	Mendel’s	work.	De	Vries,	Correns	and	Tschermak	
had	different	research	problems	from	Mendel’s.	Mendel’s	work	were	not	literally	
rediscovered	or	reintroduced,	though	de	Vries,	Correns,	and	Tschermak	all	learnt	
from	Mendel’s	work	both	conceptually	and	methodologically	to	solve	their	
problems.	In	particular,	I	have	shown	that	Mendel’s	terminology,	such	as	the	
concepts	“dominant”	and	“recessive”,	though	adopted	by	de	Vries,	Correns,	and	
Tschermak,	was	used	in	substantially	different	ways.	In	conclusion,	I	argue	that	all	
their	practices	should	be	better	characterised	as	the	attempts	of	incorporation	of	
Mendel’s	work	with	their	own	research	project.	
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4.3	The	Great	Incorporation:	When	Mendel	Met	Heredity	
Both	de	Vries	and	Tschermak	recognised	the	significance	of	Mendel’s	work	on	
Pisum	in	the	study	of	heredity,	but	there	was	no	phrase	like	“Mendel’s	theory	of	
inheritance”	in	their	publications	or	others	in	1900.	As	shown	in	the	section	4.2,	de	
Vries	(1900a,	1900c)	was	explicit	on	point	that	Mendel’s	work	on	Pisum	is	
important	for	his	theory	of	pangenesis,	although	he	did	not	literally	highlight	the	
significance	of	Mendel’s	work	to	the	study	of	heredity.	Tschermak	(1950,	p.	44)	also	
enunciated	that	“[Mendel’s	principle]	proves	to	be	of	the	highest	significance	for	
the	study	of	inheritance,”	but	he	was	implicit	on	in	what	sense	Mendel’s	principle	is	
important.	The	first	explicit	statement	about	the	role	of	Mendel’s	work	in	the	
science	of	inheritance	was	made	by	Charles	Davenport.	In	his	paper	“Mendel’s	Law	
of	Dichotomy	in	Hybrids”	(1901),	based	on	Galton’s	three	categories	of	
inheritance114,	Davenport	is	clear	on	the	point	that	Mendel’s	law	is	a	law	of	
alternative	inheritance.	
[Mendel’s]	law	of	dichotomy	in	hybrids	applies	only	to	the	second	class,	-	
alternative	heritage,	-	although	it	has	recently	been	brought	forward	by	De	
Vries	(1900)	as	the	almost	universal	law	of	inheritance	in	hybrids…	It	has	
been	rediscovered	by	De	Vries	and	Correns,	both	of	whom	are	able	to	add	
new	evidence	of	its	validity	(for	alternative	heritage!).	(Davenport,	1901,	p.	
307)	
In	addition,	Davenport	also	reformulates	the	law	of	dichotomy	in	hybrids	(i.e.	de	
Vries’	law	of	segregation)	by	adopting	Galton’s	terminology.	
1.	Of	the	two	antagonistic	peculiarities	the	hybrid	exhibits	only	one;	and	it	
exhibits	it	completely,	so	as	not	to	be	distinguishable	in	this	regard	from	one	
of	the	parents.	Intermediate	conditions	do	not	occur	[in	alternative	
heritage].	
2.	In	the	formation	of	the	pollen	and	the	egg	cell	the	two	antagonistic	
peculiarities	are	segregated;	so	that	each	ripe	germ	cell	carries	either	one	of	
these	peculiarities.	(Davenport,	1901,	pp.	307–308)																																																									114	 Galton	(1889,	pp.	12–13)	categorises	the	phenomena	of	inheritance	into	three	classes:	blending	heritage,	alternative	heritage,	and	mixed	heritage.	
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It	is	noticeable	that	Davenport’s	translation	of	Eigenschaften	is	slightly	different	
from	Stern’s	(de	Vries,	1966).	He	uses	the	term	“peculiarities”,	which	was	a	term	
used	by	Galton	(1889)	to	designate	hereditary	property115.	It	is	clear	that	
Davenport’s	formulation	is	an	incorporation	of	de	Vires’	formulation	of	the	law	of	
segregation	and	Galton’s	general	study	of	inheritance.	
One	year	later	W.	F.	R.	Weldon	made	a	similar	incorporation	by	understanding	
Mendel’s	work	as	the	laws	of	alternative	inheritance.116	 In	his	paper	“Mendel’s	
Law	of	Alternative	Inheritance	in	Peas”	(1902),	Weldon	identifies	Mendel’s	laws	
with	the	law	of	dominance	and	of	segregation.	The	law	of	dominance	is	formulated	
as	follows.	
If	peas	of	two	races	be	crossed,	the	hybrid	offspring	will	exhibit	only	the	
dominant	characters	of	the	parents;	and	it	will	exhibit	these	without	(or	
almost	without)	alteration,	the	recessive	characters	being	altogether	absent,	
or	present	in	so	slight	a	degree	that	they	escape	notice.	(Weldon,	1902,	p.	
229)	
The	law	of	segregation	is	formulated	as	follows.	
If	the	hybrids	of	the	first	generation,	produced	by	crossing	two	races	of	peas	
which	differ	in	certain	characters,	be	allowed	to	fertilise	themselves,	all	
possible	combinations	of	the	ancestral	race-characters	will	appear	in	the	
second	generation	with	equal	frequency,	and	these	combinations	will	obey	
the	Law	of	Dominance,	so	that	characters	intermediate	between	those	of	
the	ancestral	races	will	not	occur.	(Weldon,	1902,	p.	229)	
In	contrast	to	Davenport’s	paper,	Weldon’s	paper	primarily	aims	to	criticise	the	
universal	validity	of	Mendel’s	laws	to	describe	the	phenomena	of	alternative	
inheritance.	
In	1902,	just	a	few	months	after	Weldon’s	publication	of	his	paper,	William	Bateson	
made	a	defence	of	the	incorporation	of	Mendel’s	work	with	the	study	of	heredity.																																																									115	 In	his	book	(1889),	Galton	uses	the	term	“peculiarity”	to	designate	hereditary	property	rather	than	hereditary	material.	The	statement	that	“[i]t	may	be	that	some	natural	peculiarity	does	not	appear	till	late	in	life”	(Galton,	1889,	p.	5)	is	one	good	piece	of	evidence.	116	 Davenport’s	paper	(1901)	was	not	cited	in	Weldon’s	paper	(1902).	
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Compared	with	Davenport’s	and	Weldon’s	articulation,	Bateson’s	book	Mendel’s	
Principles	of	Heredity:	A	Defence	was	the	first	serious	attempt	in	the	history	to	
introduce	Mendel’s	study	of	Pisum	to	the	study	of	heredity.	By	“serious”	I	mean	
that	Bateson	was	very	explicit	on	the	point	that	Mendel’s	work	on	Pisum,	especially	
the	application	of	his	principle,	“may	be	extended	from	hybridisation	to	heredity	in	
general”.	(Bateson,	1902,	p.	35)	
Bateson	identifies	that	the	aim	of	the	study	of	heredity	is	to	study	both	the	“inward	
nature”	and	“outward”	phenomena	of	heredity.	
We	want	to	know	the	whole	truth	of	the	matter;	we	want	to	know	the	
physical	basis,	the	inward	and	essential	nature,	“the	causes”,	as	they	are	
sometimes	called,	of	heredity;	but	we	want	also	to	know	the	laws	which	the	
outward	and	visible	phenomena	obey.	(Bateson,	1902,	pp.	2–3)	
However,	by	the	beginning	of	the	20th	century	though	there	were	considerable	
observations	and	studies	of	the	visible	phenomena,	few	made	noticeable	
contribution	to	understand	the	physical	basis	of	heredity.	The	real	problem	seemed	
to	Bateson	was	not	only	the	ignorance	of	the	essential	nature	of	heredity,	but	also	
no	one	provided	a	reliable	way	of	studying	it.	In	his	words,	“no	one	has	the	
remotest	idea	how	to	work	on	that	part	of	the	problem”.	(Bateson,	1902,	p.	3)	A	
breakthrough,	recognised	by	Bateson,	occurred	with	the	publication	of	de	Vries’	
papers	(1900a,	1900c).	More	precisely	speaking,	Bateson	would	be	rather	happy	to	
accept	that	“a	marked	step	forward”	was	in	fact	made	by	Mendel.	Bateson	
optimistically	claimed	that	Mendel’s	work	would	“certainly	play	a	conspicuous	part	
in	all	future	discussions	of	evolutionary	problems”,	especially	of	the	problems	of	
heredity.	
[T]here	is	no	doubt	we	are	beginning	to	get	new	lights	of	a	most	valuable	
kind	on	the	nature	of	heredity	and	the	laws	which	it	obeys.	(Bateson,	1902,	
p.	16)	
But,	Bateson	did	not	simply	apply	Mendel’s	work	to	the	problems	of	heredity.	
Rather	he	made	a	serious	incorporation	of	Mendel’s	work	with	“modern	
knowledge”,	especially	by	formulating	Mendelian	conceptions	and	principles.	What	
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is	more,	Bateson	aims	to	defend	these	principles	and	their	significance	in	the	study	
of	heredity	against	the	objections	from	Weldon.	The	following	quoted	passage,	I	
believe,	well	symbolises	the	beginning	of	a	new	science,	genetics,	or	Mendelian	
genetics.	
As	regards	the	Mendelian	principles,	which	it	is	the	chief	aim	of	this	
introduction	to	present	clearly	before	the	reader,	a	professed	student	of	
variation	will	easily	be	able	to	fill	in	the	outline	now	indicated,	and	to	
illustrate	the	various	conceptions	from	phenomena	already	familiar.	To	do	
this	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	short	sketch.	But	enough	perhaps	has	now	
been	said	to	show	that	by	the	application	of	those	principles	we	are	enabled	
to	reach	and	deal	in	a	comprehensive	manner	with	phenomena	of	a	
fundamental	nature,	lying	at	the	very	root	of	all	conceptions	not	merely	of	
the	physiology	of	reproduction	and	heredity,	but	even	of	the	essential	
nature	of	living	organisms;	and	I	think	that	I	used	no	extravagant	words	
when,	in	introducing	Mendel's	work	to	the	notice	of	readers	of	the	Royal	
Horticultural	Society's	Journal,	I	ventured	to	declare	that	his	experiments	
are	worthy	to	rank	with	those	which	laid	the	foundation	of	the	Atomic	laws	
of	Chemistry.	(Bateson,	1902,	p.	35)	
Summary	
To	sum	up,	the	rediscovery	story	distorts	the	history	of	the	origin	of	genetics	
from	1865	to	1902.	Firstly,	in	contrast	to	what	they	maintained,	I	have	argued	
that	de	Vries,	Correns,	and	Tschermak	in	fact	all	read	Mendel’s	paper	before	the	
completion	of	their	research,	and	Mendel’s	paper	influenced	their	“rediscovery”	
papers	substantially.	Secondly,	by	carefully	analysing	the	“rediscovery”	papers	
and	their	historical	research	context,	I	have	shown	that	de	Vries’,	Correns’,	and	
Tschermak’s	papers	well	reflect	the	attempts	to	incorporate	Mendel’s	work	
with	their	researches	both	in	the	methodological	and	terminological	senses	
rather	than	the	rediscovery	of	(or	reintroduction	to)	Mendel’s	work.	The	
incorporation	of	Mendel’s	work	with	the	study	of	heredity	was	further	found	in	
Davenport’s,	Weldon’s,	and	especially	Bateson’s	papers.	Thus,	I	argue	that	the	
historical	process	of	how	Mendel’s	work	was	introduced	to	the	science	of	
	 154	
heredity	should	be	characterised	as	an	incorporation	than	as	a	rediscovery.	
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CHAPTER                                                                       	
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5.	Exemplarising	the	Prelude	of	Genetics	
In	this	chapter,	I	shall	introduce	an	exemplar-based	analysis	of	the	origin	of	genetics.	
Firstly,	on	the	basis	of	my	historical	interpretation,	I	shall	highlight	the	inadequacies	
of	 the	 theory-driven	 analysis	 of	 the	 orgin	 of	 genetics	 and	 of	 naïve	 Kunian	
characterisation.	Secondly,	I	shall	take	the	exemplar-based	approach,	introduced	in	
the	section	2.2,	to	analyse	Mendel’s	work	on	Pisum	 (1865).	Thirdly,	 I	shall	analyse	
de	Vries’	(1900a,	1900c,	1900d)	and	Correns’	(1900)	work	in	the	same	way.	Fourthly,	
based	 on	 my	 analyses,	 I	 shall	 argue	 that	 the	 origin	 of	 genetics	 from	Mendel	 to	
Bateson	is	best	characterised	as	a	chain	of	exemplary	practices.	Fifthly,	I	shall	show	
that	 my	 exemplar-based	 analysis	 is	 also	 helpful	 to	 solve	 the	 problem	 of	 long	
neglect.	
5.1	 The	 Problems	 of	 the	 Theory-Driven	 Analysis	 of	Mendel	 and	 the	
Rediscoverers	
As	I	have	mentioned	in	Chapter	1,	philosophers	used	to	pay	insufficient	attention	to	
the	 origin	 of	Mendelian	 genetics.	What	 is	Mendel’s	 contribution	 to	 the	 origin	 of	
Mendelian	 genetics?	What	 role	 does	Mendel’s	 work	 play	 in	 the	 “rediscovery”	 in	
1900?	What	is	the	rediscoverers’	contribution	to	the	origin	of	Mendelian	genetics?	
These	 questions	 were	 seldom	 articulated	 except	 in	 Ruse’s	 brief	 summary	 of	 the	
origin	of	genetics.	
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Mendel’s	own	work,	as	 is	well	known,	went	practically	unnoticed	for	thirty	
years.	However,	after	its	rediscovery	at	the	beginning	of	[the	20th]	century,	
a	theory	of	heredity	based	on	his	ideas	was	developed	in	great	depth	and	at	
a	rapid	speed.	(Ruse,	1973,	p.	12)	
Ruse’s	 statement	 is	 very	 succinct,	 but	 it	 is	 clearly	 rooted	 in	 a	 theory-driven	
understanding.	The	origin	of	genetics	from	Mendel	to	the	rediscoverers,	for	many	
philosophers	like	Ruse	(1973),	is	basically	a	process	of	the	development	of	a	theory.	
In	 order	 to	make	 a	 fair	 assessment	 of	 the	 theory-driven	 account	 of	 the	 origin	 of	
genetics,	 I	 find	 it	 necessary	 to	 reconstruct	 it	 in	 detail	 based	 on	 my	 historical	
interpretation	 in	 the	 last	 two	 chapters.	 Remember	 the	 theory-driven	 “recipe”	 for	
analysing	the	history	of	science	is	like	the	following:	
One	should	first	analyse	the	history	of	a	science	by	identifying	a	central	explanatory	
theory.	Then	for	that	theory,	one	need	to	analyse	its	central	concepts	and	principles	
(or	 laws)	 in	 different	 periods,	 details	 how	 they	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 explain	 the	
phenomena,	 reconstructs	 how	 they	 develop	 and	 are	 justified,	 and	 explores	 the	
strategies	for	theoretical	changes.	
So,	 if	 we	 follow	 the	 theory-driven	 approach,	 then	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 origin	 of	
genetics	 should	 begin	 with	 identifying	 a	 theory	 of	 genetics.	 Thus,	 Mendel’s,	 de	
Vries’,	Correns’,	and	Bateson’s	work	can	be	identified	with	the	different	versions	of	
the	theory	of	genetics.	In	order	to	understand	the	origin	of	the	theory	of	genetics,	
we	have	to	detail	the	theoretical	variations	of	these	different	versions	of	the	theory.	
Given	 that	Mendel’s	work	 is	 about	development	of	 hybrids	 in	 their	 progeny,	 it	 is	
natural	to	argue	that	Mendel’s	major	contribution	is	to	propose	a	theory	of	hybrid	
development.	 In	 1900	 de	 Vries	 developed	 Mendel’s	 theory	 by	 extending	 its	
applicability	 and	 refining	 the	 law.	 In	 the	 same	 year,	 Correns	 also	 reformulated	
Mendel’s	theory	by	merging	Mendel’s	laws	in	terms	of	anlagen.	
The	Main	Theoretical	Changes	from	Mendel	to	Bateson	
The	 Version	 of	 the	
theory	of	Genetics	
The	 Cellular	 Factor	
relating	to	Trait	
Relation	 of	 Cellular	
Correspondent-Trait	
Applicability	 of	
Mendel’s	Law	
Mendel’s	Version	 Kinds	of	cell	 Correspondence	 Pisum,	Phaseolus,	etc	
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De	Vries’	Version	 Characteristics	 Determination	 All	true	hybrids	
Correns’	Version	 Anlagen	 Determination	 Some	hybrids	
Bateson’s	Version	 Allelomorphs	 Determination	 Certain	 phenomena	
of	 alternative	
inheritance	
It	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 there	 are	 two	 significant	modifications	 to	Mendel’s	 theory	
made	by	de	Vries	and	Correns.	One	 is	 that	 the	correspondence	between	kinds	of	
cell	 and	 morphological	 traits	 in	 Mendel’s	 work	 was	 replaced	 with	 a	 kind	 of	
determination	 in	 de	 Vries’	 and	 Correns’	 work.	 The	 other	 is	 that	 the	 interfiled	
connection	of	 the	 theory	 is	advanced.	Mendel’s	 “kinds	of	cell”	 in	 fertilisation	was	
reconceptualised	as	“characteristics”	in	the	formation	of	pollen	and	ovules	(de	Vries,	
1900a,	1900c,	1900d)	or	“anlagen”	in	the	process	of	the	fusion	of	the	reproductive	
nuclei	 (Correns,	1900).	Three	years	 later,	 inspired	by	de	Vries’	and	Correns’	work,	
Bateson	further	developed	the	theory	by	refining	the	applicability	and	key	concepts.	
Thus,	 the	 “essence”	 of	 the	 origin	 of	 genetics	 from	 Mendel	 to	 Bateson	 is	
characterised	as	a	process	of	the	development	of	a	theory.	
	
However,	this	characterisation	is	highly	problematic.	Firstly,	if	the	“essence”	of	the	
origin	 of	 genetics	 is	 depicted	 as	 the	 development	 of	 a	 theory,	 it	 is	 extremely	
difficulty	to	identify	such	a	theory.	As	I	have	emphasised	repeatedly,	Mendel’s	work	
is	 not	 about	 heredity,	 while	 de	 Vries’	 and	 Correns’	 concern	 were	 not	 about	
development	of	hybrids	in	their	progeny.	As	shown	in	Chapter	3,	de	Vries,	Correns,	
and	 Tschermak	 in	 their	 1900	papers	 had	 all	 different	 concerns.	 In	 particular,	 it	 is	
difficult	 to	 maintain	 if	 they	 proposed	 their	 theories	 explicitly,	 especially	 in	
Tschermak’s	 case.	 Tschermak	 attempted	 to	 incorporate	Mendel’s	 analysis	 of	 the	
progeny	of	hybrids	with	his	 theory	of	 regular	differential	valency	of	 traits,	 though	
he	did	not	have	any	sophisticated	formulation	in	1900.	Thus,	it	is	not	obvious	that	
there	is	a	linear	development	of	a	theory	from	Mendel	(1865)	to	Tschermak	(1900a,	
1900b).	Correns	aimed	to	test	Mendel’s	work	on	Pisum	experimentally,	and	ended	
up	by	proposing	a	Mendelian	Rule.	De	Vries	proposed	the	 law	of	segregation	and	
Mendel's	Theory	of	Hybrid	Development	 de	Vries'	and	Correns'	Theories	 Bateson's	Theory	of	Heredity	
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intended	 to	 use	 it	 to	 support	 his	 theory	 of	 pangenesis.	 So,	 it	 is	 not	 historically	
accurate	to	summarise	de	Vries’	and	Correns’	work	as	the	development	or	revision	
of	Mendel’s	 theory	of	 hybrid	development,	 given	 that	 their	 concerns	 are	not	 the	
development	of	hybrids	in	their	progeny.	
Secondly,	even	if	Correns’	Mendelian	Rule	and	de	Vries’	law	of	segregation	can	be	
construed	as	revised	versions	of	Mendel’s	theory,	such	a	theory-driven	analysis	of	
the	origin	of	genetics	fails	to	reflect	the	radical	change	of	the	subject	of	the	theories.	
Accordingly,	some	more	complicated	problems	occur:	What	makes	Mendel’s	theory	
of	hybrid	development	and	de	Vries’	theory	different	versions	of	a	theory?	What	is	
the	connection	between	Mendel’s	and	de	Vries’	theories?	An	adequate	analysis	of	
the	 origin	 of	 genetics	 has	 to	 articulate	 the	 change	 from	 the	 theory	 of	 hybrid	
development	to	of	heredity.	There	is	much	more	to	be	done	if	one	tries	to	defend	
the	view	that	there	was	a	development	of	the	theory	of	Mendelian	genetics	from	
Mendel	to	Bateson.	
Thirdly,	 the	 theory-driven	 analysis	 of	 the	 origin	 of	 genetics	 from	Mendel	 to	 the	
rediscoverers	 faces	 the	 problem	 of	 practice117.	 As	 I	 shall	 discuss	 in	 detail	 in	 the	
section	5.3,	Mendel’s	work	is	much	more	than	a	theoretical	construction,	so	are	the	
rediscoverers’.	The	rediscoverers’	work	is	heavily	influenced	by	the	non-theoretical	
aspect	of	Mendel’s.	The	non-theoretical	aspect	of	the	origin	of	genetics	 is	missing	
and	largely	neglected	from	the	theory-driven	analysis.	
In	short,	it	can	be	concluded	that	the	theory-driven	approach	to	analysing	the	origin	
of	genetics	is	inadequate.	In	the	next	two	sections,	I	shall	 introduce	an	alternative	
way	 to	 analysis	 the	 origin	 of	 genetics	 from	 Mendel	 to	 Bateson	 by	 taking	 the	
exemplar-based	approach.	
	 	
																																																								117	 For	the	explication	of	the	problem	of	practice,	see	the	section	1.2.	
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5.2	Mendel’s	Exemplary	Practice	on	Pisum	
As	 I	 have	 outlined	 in	 the	 section	 2.3,	 the	 first	 step	 to	 analyse	 the	 practice	 of	 a	
scientist	(or	a	community	of	scientists)	in	the	history	is	to	identify	his	initial	research	
problem	and	the	research	context.	In	Chapter	3,	I	have	shown	that	Mendel	is	very	
explicit	on	his	purpose	of	the	study	of	Pisum:	To	study	the	development	of	hybrids	
in	their	progeny.	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	3)	More	specifically,	the	initial	research	problem	
for	Mendel	is:	
MP1118.	How	could	one	“determine	the	number	of	different	forms	in	which	hybrid	
progeny	 appear,	 permit	 classification	 of	 these	 forms	 in	 each	 generation	 with	
certainty,	and	ascertain	their	numerical	interrelationship”?	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	4)	
Pre-Experiment	Practice	
In	order	to	solve	MP1,	the	first	task	for	Mendel	is	to	select	the	right	experimental	
plant.	(MG1)	Thus,	he	sets	three	criteria	for	the	ideal	experimental	plants.	
MC1. The	experimental	plants	must	necessarily	possess	constant	
differing	traits.	
MC2. Their	hybrids	must	be	protected	 from	 the	 influence	of	 all	 foreign	
pollen	 during	 the	 flowering	 period	 or	 easily	 lend	 themselves	 to	 such	
protection.	
MC3. There	 should	 be	 no	 marked	 disturbances	 in	 the	 fertility	 of	 the	
hybrids	and	their	offspring	in	successive	generations.	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	
5)	
After	carefully	undertaking	two-year	experiments,	Mendel	decided	to	select	Pisum	
as	the	experimental	plants	because	all	the	three	criteria	are	fulfilled:	
1’.	 Some	 distinct	 forms	 of	 Pisum	 possess	 easily	 and	 reliably	 recognisable	
constant	traits.	
																																																								118	 In	this	chapter,	I	shall	use	MPx	to	denote	problem	x,	(for	example,	P1	for	the	problem	1),	and	MEx	to	experiment	x,	MHx	to	hypothesis	x,	MCx	to	concept	x,	MGx	to	practical	guide	x.	(Note	x	represents	number,	and	M	represents	Mendel’s)	
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2’.	 The	 fertilising	organs	of	Pisum	 are	 closely	 surrounded	by	 the	 keel,	 and	
the	anthers	burst	within	the	bud,	so	the	stigma	is	covered	with	pollen	even	
before	 the	 flower	 opens.	 The	 influence	 of	 foreign	 pollens	 is	 negotiable.	
(Only	 a	 very	 few	 among	 10,000	 in	 garden	 beds,	 while	 none	 found	 in	 the	
green	house.)	
3’.	The	offspring	of	hybrids	are	fertile.	
The	 next	 task	 for	Mendel	 is	 to	 select	 several	 pairs	 of	 differing	 traits.	 (MG2)	 For	
Mendel,	 any	 pair	 of	 differing	 traits	 to	 be	 experimented	 should	 be	 a	 sharp	 and	
definite	contrast.	(MC4)	According	to	this	criteria,	seven	pairs	are	chosen:	the	shape	
of	 the	 seed,	 the	 colour	 of	 the	 seed,	 the	 colour	 of	 the	 coat	 around	 the	 seed,	 the	
shape	of	the	ripe	pod,	the	colour	of	the	unripe	pod,	the	location	of	the	flower,	and	
the	 length	 of	 the	 stem.	 In	 addition,	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 and	 observe	 the	
contamination	 with	 foreign	 pollen,	 Mendel	 plants	 most	 of	 peas	 in	 garden	 beds,	
while	places	a	number	of	potted	plants	in	a	greenhouse	during	the	flowering	period	
in	order	to	serve	as	controls	for	the	main	experiment	in	the	garden	against	possible	
disturbance	by	insects	(especially	the	beetle	Bruchus	pisi).	(MG3)119	
The	Problem-Specification	(MP1→MP2)	
After	 the	 identification	of	 the	experimental	plant	and	 the	pairs	of	differing	 traits,	
Mendel	narrows	down	MP1	to	a	more	specific	sub-problem:	
MP2.	 What	 are	 the	 changes	 for	 each	 pair	 of	 differing	 traits,	 selected	 in	 the	
pre-experiment	practice,	 in	 the	offspring	of	Pisum?	Or,	what	 is	 the	 law	deducible	
from	 the	 changes	 for	 each	 pair	 of	 differing	 traits	 selected	 in	 the	 successive	
generations?	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	7)	
This	 problem-specification	 is	 one	 important	 activity	 in	 problem-defining.	 It	 often	
reformulates	a	problem	(or	a	part	of	a	problem)	into	experimentally	testable	or/and	
conceptually	 more	 specific	 problems	 for	 the	 further	 investigation.	 Mendel’s	
problem	 specification	 MP1	 to	 MP2	 is	 based	 on	 his	 pre-experiment	 practice,	
especially	 the	 identification	 of	 the	 experimental	 plant	 and	 the	 pairs	 of	 differing																																																									119	 As	I	shall	discuss	in	the	section	5.4,	Tschermak	also	followed	this	practical	guide	in	his	crossing	experiments.	
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traits.	
Experiments	1,	Conceptualisation,	and	Confirmation	
In	order	to	solve	MP2,	Mendel	finds	 it	necessary	to	break	up	the	study	into	many	
separate	 experiments,	 as	 there	 are	 constantly	 differing	 traits	 in	 Pisum.	 The	 first	
series	 of	 experiments	 (ME1)	 are	 to	 cross	 the	 selected	 peas	 differing	 in	 one	
morphological	trait	(e.g.	the	colour	of	the	seed).	The	results	were	amazing.	Each	of	
the	seven	morphological	traits	either	resembles	one	of	the	two	parental	traits.	For	
example,	when	the	yellow	and	green	peas	are	crossed,	all	 the	hybrids	are	yellow.	
No	intermediate	form	is	found.	This	result	leads	Mendel	to	define	two	key	concepts	
“dominating	traits”	and	“recessive	traits”	to	describe	the	phenomena.	The	concept	
“dominating”	 designates	 the	 parental	 trait,	 which	 passes	 into	 hybrids	 entirely	 or	
almost	 entirely	 unchanged,	while	 “recessive”	 designates	 the	 trait	which	 becomes	
latent	in	hybrids.	This	conceptualisation	is	very	important	for	Mendel	because	this	
pair	of	concepts	 is	helpful	to	analyse	the	change	of	a	pair	of	differing	traits	 in	the	
successive	 generations.	 In	 addition,	 the	 results	 of	 ME1	 also	 make	 Mendel	 to	
confirm	that	confirm	a	rule	(Regel)	that	hybrids	do	not	represent	the	intermediate	
form	between	the	parental	traits,	whether	the	dominating	trait	belongs	to	the	seed	
or	pollen	plant.	
Experiments	2	and	the	Redefinition	of	Dominating	
The	second	series	of	experiments	(ME2)	are	to	cross	the	hybrids	obtained	from	E1.	
In	the	first	generation	of	the	hybrids,	the	recessive	traits	reappear.	By	idealising	the	
raw	data,	Mendel	recognises	that	the	ratio	of	the	dominating	trait	to	the	recessive	
one	is	close	to	3	:	1,	as	shown	in	Table	1.	For	example,	when	the	yellow	hybrids	are	
crossed,	three-fourths	of	the	peas	in	the	next	generation	are	yellow,	while	the	rest	
are	green.	This	recognition	well	shows	that	Mendel,	on	the	basis	of	the	results	of	E2,	
modifies	 the	 concept	 “dominating”,	which	 refers	not	only	 to	 a	parental	 trait	 that	
would	pass	unchanged	to	all	the	offspring	when	self-fertilised,	but	also	to	a	hybrid	
trait	that	would	exhibit	the	same	behaviour	as	it	did	in	the	first	generation.	 	
Experiments	3,	Reconceptualising	the	3	:	1	Ratio,	and	the	Proposal	of	Hypothesis	1	
The	 third	 series	of	experiments	 (ME3)	are	 to	 cross	 the	hybrids	with	 the	 recessive	
traits	 obtained	 and	 the	 hybrids	 with	 the	 dominating	 traits	 obtained	 in	 ME2	
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respectively.	The	results	are,	that	the	offspring	from	those	with	the	recessive	traits	
are	 still	with	 the	 recessive	 traits,	whereas	 only	 one-third	 of	 the	 hybrids	with	 the	
dominating	 traits	 have	 the	 offspring	 with	 dominating	 trait,	 and	 the	 rest	 have	 a	
mixture	 of	 the	 offspring	with	 both	 dominating	 and	 recessive	 traits.	 For	 example,	
among	519	plants	raised	from	the	yellow	peas	 in	the	first	generation,	166	yielded	
yellow	while	353	yielded	yellow	and	green	in	the	proportion	3	:	1.	Based	on	these	
results,	Mendel	insightfully	distinguishes	two	forms	of	those	seemingly	dominating	
traits	 in	 the	 F2	 generation:	 the	 dominating	 constant	 form	 and	 the	 dominating	
hybrid	 form.	The	dominating	constant	 form	 is	 implicitly	defined	by	Mendel	as	 the	
trait,	which	would	pass	onto	the	progeny	without	any	change.	For	example,	all	the	
offspring	of	yellow	(as	a	dominating	constant	form)	seeds	must	be	yellow.	On	the	
other	hand,	the	dominating	hybrid	form	is	implicitly	defined	as	trait,	whose	progeny	
include	both	 the	 seemingly	dominating	 trait	 and	 the	 recessive	 trait.	 For	example,	
some	 of	 the	 offspring	 of	 yellow	 (as	 a	 dominating	 hybrid	 trait)	 seeds	 are	 yellow,	
while	others	are	green.	Thus,	Mendel	categorises	the	morphological	traits	of	Pisum	
into	 three	 classes:	 the	 dominating	 trait,	 the	 (dominating)	 hybrid	 trait,	 and	 the	
recessive	trait.	On	the	basis	of	the	results	 in	the	F1	and	F2	generations	and	newly	
refined	concepts,	Mendel	proposes	a	hypothesis:	 	
MH1.	“of	the	seeds	formed	by	the	hybrids	with	one	pair	of	differing	traits,	one	half	
again	 develop	 the	 hybrid	 form	 while	 the	 other	 half	 yield	 plants	 that	 remain	
constant	and	receive	the	dominating	and	the	recessive	character	in	equal	shares.”	
(Mendel,	1865,	p.	17)	(The	law	of	development	concerning	a	pair	of	differing	traits)	 	
In	 other	words,	 the	 3	 :	 1	 ratio	 (of	 the	 dominating	 and	 recessive	 traits)	 in	 the	 F1	
generation	is	reconceptualised	as	the	1	:	2	:	1	ratio	(of	constant	dominating,	hybrid,	
and	recessive	traits).	
Experiments	n,	Confirmation	of	MH1	and	its	Corollary	
MH1	 is	 confirmed	by	Mendel’s	 experiments	 on	 the	 subsequent	 generations	 from	
hybrids.	In	each	generation	the	offspring	of	those	with	the	hybrid	trait	split	up	into	
the	dominant	constant,	hybrid,	and	recessive	constant	traits	according	to	the	ratios	
1	:	2	:	1.	Moreover,	Mendel	deduces	a	corollary	from	MH1:	 	
MH1’.	In	the	nth	generation	the	distribution	of	the	dominant	constant,	hybrid,	and	
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recessive	constant	traits	 is	the	2n-1	 :	2	:	2n-1	ratio	 if	“on	the	average,	equal	fertility	
for	all	plants	 in	all	generations,	and	if	one	considers,	furthermore,	that	half	of	the	
seeds	that	each	hybrid	produces	yield	hybrids	again	while	in	the	other	half	the	two	
traits	become	constant	in	equal	proportions.”	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	18)	
Thus,	according	to	MH’,	for	each	pair	of	differing	traits,	the	traits	in	each	generation	
is	 quantitatively	 classified	 with	 certainty	 and	 their	 numerical	 interrelationship	 is	
also	determined.	Therefore,	MP2	is	solved	by	an	intertwined	practice	of	ME1,	ME2,	
ME3,	MH1,	MH1’,	and	the	conceptualization	of	“dominating	constant	trait”,	“hybrid	
trait”,	and	“recessive	constant	trait.”	
Generation	 Dominating	
Constant	
Hybrid	 Recessive	
Constant	
1	 1	 2	 1	
2	 3	 2	 3	
3	 7	 2	 7	
4	 15	 2	 15	
5	 31	 2	 31	
n	 2n	-	1	 2	 2n	-	1	
Problem	Specification	(MP1,	MP2	⇒	MP3)	and	Symbolic	Denotation	
After	 the	 resolution	 to	 MP2,	 Mendel	 makes	 another	 problem	 specification	 by	
shifting	 his	 focus	 to	 the	 behaviour	 of	 the	multiple	 pairs	 of	 differing	 traits	 in	 the	
progeny	of	Pisum:	
MP3.	Is	the	law	of	development	concerning	a	pair	of	traits	(i.e.	H1)	still	applicable	
when	several	traits	are	united	in	the	hybrid	of	Pisum	through	fertilisation?	(Mendel,	
1865,	p.	18)	
As	we	can	see,	MP3	is	formulated	with	the	help	of	MP1,	MP2,	and	MH1.	In	order	to	
solve	MP3,	especially	to	make	the	analyse	of	the	data	simpler,	Mendel	denotes	the	
traits	symbolically	by	using	a	capital	letter	to	denote	a	dominating	constant	trait,	a	
lowercase	 letter	 to	 denote	 a	 recessive	 one,	 and	 a	 combination	 of	 a	 capital	 and	
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lowercase	letters	to	a	hybrid	one.	For	example,	suppose	A	denotes	round	shape,	a	
wrinkled	shape,	B	yellow	albumen,	b	green	albumen.	Then	a	round	yellow	plant	is	
denoted	as	AB,	a	wrinkled	green	one	ab,	and	so	on.	
Experiments	1’	and	the	Proposal	of	Hypothesis	2	
Mendel	designs	two	series	of	experiments	to	investigate	MP3.	The	first	series	(ME1’)	
is	 to	 cross	 the	 parental	 plants	 differed	 in	 seed	 shape	 and	 albumen	 colour.	 After	
fertilising	the	seeds	from	round	yellow	(AB)	plants	with	the	pollens	from	wrinkled	
green	(ab)	plants,	Mendel	obtains	315	round	and	yellow	(AB)	seeds,	101	wrinkled	
and	yellow	(aB)	seeds,	108	round	and	green	(Ab)	seeds,	and	32	wrinkled	and	green	
(ab)	seeds.	By	planting	these	seeds,	Mendel	obtains	nine	different	traits	among	the	
offspring	of	hybrids.	
The	Amount	of	Plants	 The	Traits	 The	Denotation	of	Traits	
38	 round	and	yellow	 AB	
35	 round	and	green	 Ab	
28	 Wrinkled	and	yellow	 aB	
30	 Wrinkled	and	green	 ab	
65	 Round	yellow	and	green	 ABb	
68	 Wrinkled	yellow	and	green	 aBb	
60	 Round	yellow	and	wrinkled	yellow	 AaB	
67	 Round	green	and	wrinkled	green	 Aab	
138	 Round	 yellow	 and	 green,	 and	
wrinkled	yellow	and	green	
AaBb	
These	seeds	are	classified	by	Mendel	into	three	groups:	The	first	group	consists	of	
the	only	constant	traits	(i.e.	AB,	Ab,	aB,	ab);	the	second	group	consists	of	the	traits	
in	the	form	of	ABb,	aBb,	AaB,	Aab,	which	are	constant	for	one	trait	and	hybrid	for	
the	other;	the	third	group	consists	of	the	hybrid	traits	(i.e.	AaBb).	The	ratio	of	the	
traits	AB,	Ab,	aB,	ab,	ABb,	aBb,	AaB,	Aab,	and	AaBb	is	idealised	by	Mendel	as	1	:	1	:	
1	 :	 1	 :	 2	 :	 2	 :	 2	 :	 2	 :	 4.	 Furthermore,	 Mendel	 insightfully	 recognises	 that	 the	
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combination	of	two	kinds	of	differing	traits	in	a	series	expression	(AB	+	Ab	+	aB	+	ab	
+	2ABb	+	2aBb	+	2AaB	+	2Aab	+	4AaBb)	can	be	obtained	through	a	combination	of	
the	 expressions	 (A	 +	 2Aa	 +	 a)	 and	 (B	 +	 2Bb	 +	 b).	 This	makes	Mendel	 to	 propose	
another	hypothesis.	
MH2.	“The	progeny	of	hybrids	in	which	several	essentially	different	traits	are	united	
represent	 the	 terms	 of	 a	 combination	 series	 in	which	 the	 series	 for	 each	 pair	 of	
differing	 traits	are	combined…	[T]he	behaviour	of	each	pair	of	differing	 traits	 in	a	
hybrid	association	is	independent	of	all	other	differences	in	the	two	parental	plants.”	
(Mendel,	1865,	p.	22)	(The	law	of	combination	of	differing	traits)	
Experiments	2’	and	the	Confirmation	of	MH2	
MH2	is	also	confirmed	by	Mendel’s	a	further	series	of	experiments	(ME2’)	on	three	
pairs	of	differing	traits.	By	crossing	the	parental	plants	differing	in	the	seed	shape,	
albumen	colour,	and	colour	of	seed	coat,	Mendel	obtains	the	following	results.	
3	Constant	Traits	 2	 Constant	 and	 1	
Hybrid	Traits	
2	 Hybrid	 and	 1	
Constant	Traits	
3	Hybrid	Traits	
8	 ABC	 22	 ABCc	 45	 ABbCc	 78	 AaBbCc	
14	 ABc	 17	 AbCc	 36	 aBbCc	 	 	
9	 AbC	 25	 aBCc	 38	 AaBCc	 	 	
11	 Abc	 20	 abCc	 40	 AabCc	 	 	
8	 aBC	 15	 ABbC	 49	 AaBbC	 	 	
10	 aBc	 18	 ABbc	 48	 AaBbc	 	 	
10	 abC	 19	 aBbC	 	 	 	 	
7	 abc	 24	 Aabc	 	 	 	 	
	 	 14	 AaBc	 	 	 	 	
	 	 18	 AaBc	 	 	 	 	
	 	 20	 AabC	 	 	 	 	
	 	 16	 Aabc	 	 	 	 	
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Again,	Mendel	indicates	that	the	expression	(ABC	+	ABc	+	AbC	+	Abc	+	aBC	+	aBc	+	
abC	+	abc	+	2ABCc	+	2AbCc	+	2aBCc	+	2abCc	+	2ABbC	+	2ABbc	+	2aBbC	+	2aBbc	+	
2AaBC	+	2AaBc	+	2AabC	+	2Aabc	+	4ABbCc	+	4aBbCc	+	4AaBCc	+	4AabCc	+	4AaBbC	+	
4AaBbc	+	8AaBbCc)	is	a	combination	series	of	the	expressions	(A	+	2Aa	+	a),	(B	+	
2Bb	+	b),	and	(C	+	2Cc	+	c).	
Moreover,	Mendel	deduces	a	corollary	from	MH2	to	predict	the	number	of	
different	trait	combination,	of	all	the	possible	combinations,	and	of	combinations	
that	remain	constant.	
MH2’.	If	n	designates	the	number	of	pairs	of	differing	traits	in	the	parental	plants,	
then	3n	is	the	number	of	different	trait	combination,	4n	is	the	number	of	,	2n	is	the	
number	of	combinations	that	remain	constant.	(Mendel,	1865,	pp.	22–23)	
As	 seen	 from	 Mendel’s	 experiments,	 MH2’	 is	 well	 confirmed.	 For	 the	 parental	
plants	differing	one	pair	of	differing	traits,	there	are	3	(=31)	different	traits	among	
the	hybrids:	 the	dominating	constant,	hybrid,	and	recessive	constant	 traits;	and	2	
(=21)	 of	 them	 are	 constant	 traits.	 For	 the	 parental	 plants	 differing	 two	 pair	 of	
differing	 traits,	 there	are	9	 (=32)	different	 trait	 combinations,	and	4	 (=22)	of	 them	
include	only	 constant	 traits.	 Furthermore,	with	 the	 confirmation	of	MH2’,	MP3	 is	
solved.	 	
Problem	Specification	(MP1,	MP2,	MP3	⇒	MP4)	
Although	 with	 MH1,	 MH1’,	 MH2,	 and	 MH2’	 Mendel	 could	 well	 determine	 “the	
number	 of	 different	 forms	 of	 the	 hybrid	 progeny,	 permit	 classification	 of	 these	
forms	 in	 each	 generation	 with	 certainty,	 and	 ascertain	 their	 numerical	
interrelationship”,	 he	 still	 attempts	 to	 find	 a	 reductive	 explanation	 of	 these	
hypotheses.	
MP4.	How	can	MH1	and	MH2	be	explained	in	terms	of	seed	and	pollen	cells?	
A	hypothesis	is	proposed	by	Mendel:	
MH3.	 Pea	 hybrids	 form	 germinal	 and	 pollen	 cells	 that	 in	 their	 composition	
correspond	 in	 equal	 numbers	 to	 all	 the	 constant	 forms	 resulting	 from	 the	
combination	of	traits	united	through	fertilisation.	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	29)	
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Experiments	1’’,	2’’,	and	the	Hypothetico-Deductive	Reasoning	
In	 order	 to	 test	 H3	 experimentally,	 Mendel	 makes	 some	 testable	 predictions	 by	
deducing	from	the	following	assumptions,	
Premise	1.	There	are	many	kinds	of	germinal	cells	 in	 the	ovaries	of	hybrids;	while	
there	are	many	kinds	of	pollen	cells	in	the	anthers	of	hybrids.	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	24)	
Premise	2.	The	germinal	and	pollen	cells	correspond	 in	their	 internal	make-ups	to	
the	individual	forms.	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	24)	
Premise	3.	The	constant	traits	can	be	produced	when	germinal	and	pollen	cells	are	
alike.	
Premise	4.	The	seed	plants	for	the	experiments	all	have	round	shape	(denoted	as	A)	
and	 yellow	 albumen	 (B),	 while	 the	 pollen	 plants	 all	 have	wrinkled	 shape	 (a)	 and	
green	albumen	(b).	
Premise	5.	Four	experiments	are	designed:	 	
(1) The	hybrid	seeds	(i.e.	with	AB,	Ab,	aB,	ab	traits)	are	fertilised	with	the	
pollen	from	the	plants	with	AB	traits.	
(2) The	hybrid	seeds	(i.e.	with	AB,	Ab,	aB,	ab	traits)	are	fertilised	with	the	
pollen	from	the	plants	with	ab	traits.	
(3) The	seeds	from	the	plants	with	AB	traits	are	fertilised	with	the	hybrid	pollen	
(i.e.	with	AB,	Ab,	aB,	ab	traits).	
(4) The	seeds	from	the	plants	with	AB	traits	are	fertilised	with	the	hybrid	pollen	
(i.e.	with	AB,	Ab,	aB,	ab	traits).	
With	 premises	 1,	 4,	 and	 5,	 it	 is	 inferable	 that	 during	 the	 fertilisation,	 there	 are	
corresponding	kinds	of	germinal	and	pollen	cells	that	develop	and	combine.	
(1) Germinal	cells	A’B’,	A’b’,	a’B’,	a’b’	with	pollen	cells	A’B’	
(2) Germinal	cells	A’B’,	A’b’,	a’B’,	a’b’	with	pollen	cells	a’b’	
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(3) Germinal	cells	A’B’	with	pollen	cells	A’B’,	A’b’,	a’B’,	a’b’	
(4) Germinal	cells	a’b’	with	pollen	cells	A’B’,	A’b’,	a’B’,	a’b’	
Mendel	deductively	 infers	 that	 in	 the	each	of	 the	 four	experiments,	 the	 following	
combinations	of	the	cell-types	will	be	expected	and	they	are	in	equal	ratio	to	each	
other.	
(1) !!!!!!!! ∶  !!!!!!!! ∶  !!!!!!!! ∶  !!!!!!!! = 1 ∶ 1 ∶ 1 ∶ 1	
(2) !!!!!!!! ∶  !!!!!!!! ∶  !!!!!!!! ∶  !!!!!!!! = 1 ∶ 1 ∶ 1 ∶ 1	
(3) !!!!!!!! ∶  !!!!!!!! ∶  !!!!!!!! ∶  !!!!!!!! = 1 ∶ 1 ∶ 1 ∶ 1	
(4) !!!!!!!! ∶  !!!!!!!! ∶  !!!!!!!! ∶  !!!!!!!! = 1 ∶ 1 ∶ 1 ∶ 1	
Correspondingly,	 given	 the	premises	2	and	3,	 the	 following	 traits	are	expected	 to	
stand	in	equal	ratio	to	each	other	in	each	experiment.	
(1) AB	:	AabB	:	ABb	:	aAB	=	1	:	1	:	1	:	1	
(2) AaBb	:	ab	:	Aab	:	aBb	=	1	:	1	:	1	:	1	
(3) AB	:	AaBb	:	ABb	:	AaB	=	1	:	1	:	1	:	1	
(4) AaBb	:	ab	:	Aab	:	aBb	=	1	:	1	:	1	:	1	
Moreover,	 in	 the	 experiments	 (1)	 and	 (3),	 since	 the	 dominating	 traits	 A	 and	 B	
appear	in	every	combination,	all	seeds	should	be	imprinted	their	characteristics.	In	
other	words,	it	is	expected	that	all	seeds	obtained	from	experiments	(1)	and	(3)	are	
round	and	yellow.	On	the	other	hand,	in	the	experiments	(2)	and	(4),	it	is	expected	
that	 there	are	 four	 kinds	of	 seeds	obtained:	 round	yellow,	 round	green,	wrinkled	
yellow,	and	wrinkled	green.	
By	undertaking	these	four	experiments,	Mendel	obtains	the	favourable	results	(see	Table	11).	All	seeds	obtained	in	the	experiments	(1)	and	(3)	are	exclusively	round	
and	 yellow.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 amount	 of	 the	 round	 yellow,	 round	 green,	
wrinkled	 yellow,	 and	 wrinkled	 green	 seeds	 are	 observed	 approximately	 in	 equal	
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number	from	the	experiments	(2)	and	(4).	
Table	11	
Experiment	
(1)	
Experiment	
(2)	
Experiment	
(3)	
Experiment	
(4)	
Morphological	
Traits	
98	 31	 94	 24	 round	 yellow	
seeds	
0	 26	 0	 25	 round	 green	
seeds	
0	 27	 0	 22	 wrinkled	
yellow	seeds	
0	 26	 0	 27	 wrinkled	
green	seeds	
Therefore,	Mendel	confirms	MH3.	From	a	philosopher’s	point	of	view,	this	is	a	
perfect	case	of	the	hypothetico-deductive	reasoning,	which	is	normally	in	the	form	
that	e	HD-confirms	h	relative	to	k	if	and	only	if	h∧k	⊨	e	and	k	⊭	e.	In	Mendel’s	case,	
we	have	seen	that	the	results	of	ME	1’’	HD-confirms	MH3	relative	to	Premise	1,	2,	4,	
as	MH3∧Premise	1∧Premise	2∧Premise	4	⊨	the	results	of	ME1’’	and	Premise	
1∧Premise	2∧Premise	4	⊭	the	results	of	ME1’’.	
Furthermore,	when	the	seeds	(with	the	cell-types	 !!!!!!!! , !!!!!!!!  , !!!!!!!! , !!!!!!!!)	obtained	
from	experiments	(1)	and	(3)	are	sown,	it	can	be	predicted	that	the	cell-types	of	the	
seeds	harvested	in	the	following	year	are:	
𝐴′𝐵′𝐴′𝐵′  ;𝐴′𝐵′𝐴′𝐵′ ,𝐴′𝐵′𝐴′𝑏′ , 𝐴′𝑏′𝐴′𝐵′ ,𝐴′𝑏′𝐴′𝑏′ ;  𝐴′𝐵′𝐴′𝐵′ ,𝐴′𝐵′𝑎′𝐵′ , 𝑎′𝐵′𝐴′𝐵′ ,𝑎′𝐵′𝑎′𝐵′ ;𝐴′𝐵′𝐴′𝐵′ ,𝑎′𝑏′𝑎′𝑏′ ,𝐴′𝑏′𝐴′𝑏′ ,𝑎′𝐵′𝑎′𝐵′ ,𝐴′𝐵′𝑎′𝐵′ , 𝑎′𝐵′𝐴′𝐵′ ,𝑎′𝐵′𝑎′𝑏′ , 𝑎′𝑏′𝑎′𝐵′	
Thus,	the	traits	of	the	seeds	in	each	group	are	expected	to	be	round	and	yellow	
(AB);	round	yellow	and	green	seeds	(ABb);	round	and	wrinkle	yellow	seeds	(AaB);	
and	round	and	wrinkle,	yellow	and	green	seeds	(AaBb).	And	the	amount	of	the	
seeds	in	each	group	is	approximately	equal.	Again,	this	prediction	is	confirmed	(see	Table	12).	
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Table	12	
Experiment	1	 Experiment	3	 Morphological	Traits	
20	 25	 Round	yellow	seeds	(AB)	
23	 19	 Round	yellow	and	green	seeds	(ABb)	
25	 22	 Round	and	wrinkled	yellow	seeds	(AaB)	
22	 21	 Round	and	wrinkled,	yellow	and	green	seeds	(AaBb)	
Furthermore,	MH3	 is	 also	 hypothetico-deductively	 confirmed	 by	 the	 experiments	
2’’,	 in	which	Mendel	 tests	 the	 traits	of	 flower	 colour	and	 stem	 length.	Therefore,	
MP4	is	solved.	
Symbolic	Reconceptualisation	of	MH1,	MH2,	and	MH3	
With	 the	 help	 of	 symbolic	 denotation,	 MH1	 can	 be	 easily	 reformulated	 in	 the	
expression	that	 	
A	+	2Aa	+	a	 	
where	 A	 denotes	 the	 dominating	 constant	 trait,	 Aa	 the	 hybrid	 trait,	 and	 a	 the	
recessive	constant	trait.	 	
Similarly,	an	application	of	MH2	to	the	case	of	 two	pairs	of	differing	traits	can	be	
expressed	in	the	way	that	
	 (A	+	2Aa	+	a)(B	+	2Bb	+	b)	=	AB	+	Ab	+	aB	+	ab	+	2aBb	+	2AaB	+	2Aab	+	4AaBb	
where	 B	 denotes	 a	 different	 dominating	 trait,	 Bb	 a	 hybrid	 trait,	 and	 b	 a	
corresponding	recessive	constant	trait.	
Moreover,	the	explanation	of	H1	in	terms	of	H3	can	be	expressed	as	
𝐴′𝐴′+ 𝐴′𝑎′ + 𝐴′𝑎′ + 𝑎′𝑎′ = 𝐴 + 2𝐴𝑎 + 𝑎	
The	explanation	of	MH2	in	terms	of	MH3	in	the	case	of	two	pairs	of	differing	traits	
is	reformulated	as	
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𝐴′𝐵′𝐴′𝐵′+ 𝐴′𝐵′𝑎′𝑏′ + 𝐴′𝐵′𝑎′𝐵′ + 𝐴′𝐵′𝑎′𝑏′ + 𝐴′𝑏′𝐴′𝐵′+ 𝐴′𝑏′𝐴′𝑏′+ 𝐴′𝑏′𝑎′𝐵′+ 𝐴′𝑏′𝑎′𝑏′ + 𝑎′𝐵′𝐴′𝐵′+ 𝑎′𝐵′𝐴′𝑏′ + 𝑎′𝐵′𝑎′𝐵′
+ 𝑎′𝐵′𝑎′𝑏′ + 𝑎′𝑏′𝐴′𝐵′+ 𝑎′𝑏′𝐴′𝑏′+ 𝑎′𝑏′𝑎′𝐵′+ 𝑎′𝑏′𝑎′𝑏′= 𝐴𝐵 + 𝐴𝐵𝑏 + 𝐴𝑎𝐵 + 𝐴𝑎𝐵𝑏 + 𝐴𝐵𝑏 + 𝐴𝑏 + 𝐴𝑎𝐵𝑏 + 𝐴𝑎𝑏 + 𝐴𝑎𝐵+ 𝐴𝑎𝐵𝑏 + 𝑎𝐵 + 𝑎𝐵𝑏 + 𝐴𝑎𝐵𝑏 + 𝐴𝑎𝑏 + 𝑎𝐵𝑏 + 𝑎𝑏= 𝐴𝐵 + 𝐴𝑏 + 𝑎𝐵 + 𝑎𝑏 + 2𝐴𝐵𝑏 + 2𝑎𝐵𝑏 + 2𝐴𝑎𝑏 + 2𝐴𝑎𝐵 + 4𝐴𝑎𝐵𝑏	
Summary	and	Remarks	
I	 have	 shown	 that	 Mendel’s	 work	 on	 Pisum	 can	 be	 well	 characterised	 as	 an	
exemplary	 practice	 in	 the	 study	 of	 the	 development	 of	 Pisum	 by	 contextually	
problem-defining,	 conceptualisation,	 experimentation,	 hypothesisation,	 and	
reasoning,	as	summarised	in	Table	13.	
Table	13	
Mendel’s	Exemplary	Practice	on	Pisum	
Research	
Problems	
Vocabulary	 Practical	Guides	 Hypothesi
sation	
Experim
ents	
Patterns	 of	
Reasoning	
MP1	
MP2	
MP3	
MP4	
Dominating	
constant	 trait	
(A)	
Recessive	
constant	 trait	
(a)	
Hybrid	 trait	
(Aa)	
Kinds	 of	
germinal	 Cell	
(e.g.	A’)	
Kinds	 of	 pollen	
Cell	(e.g.	a’)	
	
MG1.	 The	
selection	 of	
experimental	
plants	 (MC1,	MC2,	
MC3)	
MG2.	 The	
selection	 of	
morphological	
traits	of	peas	(C4)	
MG3.	 Other	
pre-Experimental	
procedures	 (e.g.	
places	of	growing)	
Experimental	
Procedures	 for	
Various	
Experiments	
MH	1	
MH	1’	
MH2	
MH2’	
MH3	
	
ME1	
ME2	
ME3	
MEn	
ME1’	
ME2’	
ME1’’	
ME2’’	
H-D	
confirmation	
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5.3	The	Rediscoverers’	Exemplary	Practices	
de	Vries’	Exemplary	Practice	
As	I	have	discussed,	de	Vries’	papers	(1900a,	1900c,	1900d)	are	part	of	his	project	of	
testing	his	theory	of	pangenesis.	The	initial	problem	(DP1)	for	de	Vries	is	to	
experimentally	test	the	principle	(DH1)	that	the	specific	characters	of	organisms	are	
composed	of	distinct	units.	(de	Vries,	1900a,	pp.	83–84,	1900c,	p.	845)	It	should	be	
noted	that	DH1	is	a	reformulated	version	of	the	hypothesis	(DH1’)	in	the	theory	of	
pangenesis	(de	Vries,	1889)	that	every	hereditary	characteristic	has	its	special	kind	
of	pangen.	
The	Problem-Specification	(DP1 →	 DP2)	and	the	Conceptualisation	of	Traits	
In	order	to	investigate	DP1,	de	Vries	begins	with	the	simplest	case	by	examining	the	
hybrid	plants	differing	in	a	pair	of	antagonistic	traits.	(DG1)	This	is	a	Mendel’s	legacy	
for	de	Vries’	research.	 	
DP2.	What	is	the	change	of	a	pair	of	antagonistic	traits	of	hybrid?	
Moreover,	de	Vries	adopts	Mendel’s	terminology	to	classify	antagonistic	traits,	
though	in	a	different	way120.	One	of	the	two	antagonistic	characteristics	is	called	
the	dominating	characteristic,	while	the	other	the	recessive.	
Hypothesisation	
In	order	to	deduce	testable	hypotheses,	de	Vries	makes	the	following	assumptions.	
DH2.	In	the	hybrids	two	antagonistic	characteristics	lie	next	to	each	other.	
DH3.	In	vegetative	life	only	the	dominating	characteristics	is	visible.	
DH4.	In	the	formation	of	pollen	grains	and	ovules	these	characteristics	separate	and	
behave	independently.	
DH5.	The	pollen	grains	and	ovules	of	monohybrid	have	the	pure	characteristic	one	
of	the	parents.	
																																																								120	 See	my	in-depth	discussion	on	this	distinction	in	section	4.2.	
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At	first	glance,	these	hypotheses	are	confusing.	In	the	paper,	de	Vries	makes	some	
seemingly	inconsistent	statements.	For	example,	one	of	the	two	conclusions	drawn	
from	the	experiments	by	de	Vries	is	that	“[o]f	the	two	antagonistic	characteristics,	
the	hybrid	carries	only	one”	 (de	Vries,	1900a,	p.	84,	1966,	p.	110),	while	 it	 is	also	
assumed	that	“[i]n	the	hybrid	the	two	antagonistic	[characteristics]	lie	next	to	each	
other”	 (de	 Vries,	 1900a,	 p.	 85,	 1966,	 p.	 111).	 Does	 the	 hybrid	 carry	 one	
characteristic	or	 two	at	all?	 In	addition,	 some	statements	are	a	bit	 confusing.	For	
example,	DH2	states	that	in	the	hybrids	two	antagonistic	characteristics	lie	next	to	
each	other.	How	can	the	hereditary	characteristics	“lie	next	 to	each	other”	 in	 the	
cell?	In	order	to	fully	understand	and	clarify	de	Vries’	reasoning,	I	find	it	necessary	
to	reformulate	the	argument	by	relating	the	1900	papers	with	the	book.	
As	I	have	introduced,	pangens,	the	independent	hereditary	units,	are	the	carriers	of	
hereditary	characteristics.	Since	de	Vries	never	mentioned	the	term	“pangen”	in	the	
1900	 papers,	 this	 well	 reflects	 his	 caution121.	 DH2	 can	 be	 reformulated	 as	 the	
hypothesis	that	 	
DH2’.	 In	 the	hybrids	 the	pangens	carrying	two	antagonistic	characteristics	 lie	next	
to	each.	
Correspondingly,	DH3	can	be	reformulated	in	the	way	that	 	
DH3’.	 In	 vegetative	 life,	 only	 the	pangen	 carrying	 the	dominating	 characteristic	 is	
active.	
DH4	can	be	reformulated	in	the	way	that	
DH4’.	In	the	formation	of	pollen	grains	and	ovules	these	pangens	separate.	
On	the	basis	of	DH1’,	DH2’,	DH3’,	DH4’,	de	Vries	uses	a	mathematical	model	(“law	
of	probability”	in	his	words)	to	explicate	the	formation	of	pollen	grains	and	ovules	
as	follows.	
DH6.	(d	+	r)(d	+	r)	=	d2	+	2dr	+	r2																																																									121	 It	has	already	been	recognized	by	Meijer	“From	1889	onwards	[de	Vries]	published	a	large	number	of	papers	related	to	pangenesis,	but	he	hardly	ever	mentioned	pangenesis	explicitly	unless	he	was	confident	of	having	found	conclusive	evidence	for	one	of	its	premises.”	(Meijer,	1985,	p.	203)	
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where	d	represents	the	pangen	carrying	the	dominating	characteristic,	while	r	the	
recessive	one.	This	mathematical	model	is	an	indispensable	hypothesis	in	de	Vries’	
papers,	since	it	implicitly	suggests	that	in	the	offspring	of	the	hybrids,	two	pangens	
still	next	to	each	other.	The	seeds	with	two	pangens	both	carrying	the	dominating	
characteristics	have	the	dominating	trait,	those	with	two	pangens	both	carrying	the	
recessive	ones	have	the	recessive	trait,	while	the	seeds	with	two	pangens	carrying	
two	 antagonistic	 characteristics	 have	 the	 dominating	 trait.	 Moreover,	 (DH6’)	 the	
ratio	of	these	combinations	of	pangens	is	1	:	2	:	1.	Correspondingly,	(DH6’’)	the	ratio	
of	the	dominating	trait	to	the	recessive	one	is	3	:	1.	
The	Confirmation	of	DH6’’	
This	 testable	 hypothesis	 (DH6’’)	 is	 widely	 (hypothetico-deductively)	 confirmed	 by	
the	results	of	de	Vries’	crossing	experiments.	(See	Table	14)	
Table	14	
DE1.	De	Vries’	Data	on	the	Crossing	Experiments	(1900a,	1900c)	
Parent	with	
dominant	
character	
Parental	with	
the	recessive	
character	
Proportion	of	hybrids	
with	the	recessive	
character	
Year	of	
Crossing	
Agrostermma	
Githgao	
Agrostermma	
nicaeensis	
24%	 1898	
Chelidonium	
majus	
Chelidonium	
laciniatum	
26%	 1898	
Coreopis	
tinctoria	
Coreopis	
brunea	
25%	 1896	
Datura	Tabula	 Datura	
Stramonium	
28%	 	
Hyoscyamus	
niger	
Hyoscyamus	
pallidus	
26%	 1898	
Lynchnis	diurna	 	 Lychnis	
vespertina	
27%	
	
1892	
Lychnis	
vespertina	 	
Lychnis	
glabra	
28%	 1892	
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Oenothera	
Lamarckiana	
Oenothera	
Brevistylis	
22%	 1898	
Solanum	nigrum	 	 Solanum	
chlorocarpum	
24%	 1894	
Trifolium	
pratense	
Trifolium	
album	
25%	 	
Veronica	
longifolia	
Veronica	alba	 22%	 1899	
Another	 testable	hypothesis	proposed	by	de	Vries’	 is	 that	when	crossing	a	hybrid	
with	 the	 pollen	 of	 one	 of	 the	 two	 parents	 (or	 in	 reverse),	 one	would	 obtain	 the	
offspring	with	the	combination	of	pangens	expressed	mathematically	as	follows.	
DH7.	(d	+	r)d	=	d2	+	dr	
or	
(d	+	r)r	=	dr	+	r2	
The	empirical	interpretation	of	DH7	is	that:	 	
DH7’.	The	offspring	of	the	hybrid	seeds	with	the	pollens	of	one	of	the	two	parents	
have	 two	 combinations	 of	 pangens:	 One	 is	 with	 two	 pangens	 both	 carrying	 the	
same	one	parental	characteristic,	while	the	other	is	with	two	pangens	carrying	two	
parental	characteristics	each.	
A	testable	interpretation	is:	
DH7’’.	Half	of	the	offspring	of	the	hybrid	seeds	with	the	pollens	of	one	of	the	two	
parents	have	one	of	 the	 two	parental	 traits,	while	 the	other	half	have	 the	hybrid	
trait	(i.e.	the	dominating	trait).	In	other	words,	the	ratio	of	the	dominating	trait	to	
the	recessive	one	is	1	:	1	in	the	case	of	(d	+	r)r	=	dr	+	r2,	while	in	the	case	of	(d	+	r)d	
=	d2	+	dr,	all	the	offspring	exhibit	the	dominating	trait.	
The	Confirmation	of	DH7’’	
DH7’’	is	(hypothetico-deductively)	confirmed	by	several	crossing	experiments.	(See	Table	15)	
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Table	15	
DE2.	De	Vries’	Data	on	the	Back-Crossing	Experiments	(1900a,	1900c)	
Parent	with	
dominant	
character	
Parental	with	
the	recessive	
character	
Proportion	of	hybrids	
with	the	recessive	
character	
Year	of	
Crossing	
Clarikia	
pulchuella	 	
Clarikia	white	 50%	 1896	
Oenothera	
Lamarckiana	
Oenothera	
brevistylis	
25%	 1895	
Silene	Armeria	 Silene	white	 22%	 1895	
On	 the	 basis	 of	 his	 hypotheses	 (DH2,	 DH3,	 DH4,	 and	 DH5)	 and	 experimentally	
confirmed	 hypotheses	 (DH6’’	 and	 DH7’’),	 de	 Vries	 concludes	 that	 DH1	 is	 well	
confirmed.	
Therefore,	de	Vries’	exemplary	practice	can	be	summarised	as:	
Table	16	
De	Vries’	Exemplary	Practice	on	Character-Unit	
Research	
Problems	
Vocabulary	 Practical	Guides	 Hypothese
s	
Experim
ents	
Patterns	 of	
Reasoning	
DP1	
DP2	
	
Dominating	
trait	(A)	
Recessive	 trait	
(a)	
Dominating	
characteristic	
Recessive	
characteristic	
Units	
DG1	 DH1	
DH1’	
DH2	
DH2’	
DH3	
DH3’	
DH4’	
DH5	
DH6	
DH6’	
DH6’’	
DH7	
DH7’	
DH7’’	
DE1	
DE2	
H-D	
confirmation	
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Correns’	Exemplary	Practice	
As	I	have	argued	in	the	section	4.1,	Correns’	initial	concern	is	the	xenia	question.	
CP1.	Does	foreign	pollen	have	a	direct	 influence	on	the	characteristics	of	the	fruit	
and	seed?	
In	1896	Correns	began	studying	this	problem	in	the	case	of	Pisum.	The	purpose	of	
the	 paper,	 as	 I	 have	 argued,	 is	 to	 test	 Mendel’s	 work	 on	 Pisum.	 Thus,	 CP1	 is	
specialised	into	another	problem.	
CP2.	Is	Mendel’s	observation	and	the	law	on	Pisum	verifiable?	
In	order	to	test	Mendel’s	observation	and	analysis,	Correns	follows	Mendel	to	focus	
on	a	pair	of	differing	traits.	(CG1)	In	other	words,	a	more	specific	problem	occurs.	
CP3.	 Is	 Mendel’s	 observation	 and	 law	 concerning	 a	 pair	 of	 differing	 traits	
confirmable?	
In	addition,	Correns	also	adopts	Mendel’s	terminology	to	distinguish	a	pair	of	traits	
in	 terms	of	 “dominating/recessive”.	 It	 is	worth	noting	 that	Correns	 attributes	 the	
terms	“dominating”	and	“recessive”	implicitly	to	the	kinds	of	anlagen.	
By	undertaking	the	crossing	experiments	on	peas	differing	in	the	colour	of	embryos	
(CE1)	 through	 six	 generations,	 Correns	 confirms	 Mendel’s	 observation	 (1865)	 as	
follows.	
1.	In	the	first	generation,	all	hybrid	individuals	are	uniform	and	only	the	dominant	
trait	(i.e.	yellow	in	this	case)	appears.	
2.	When	these	seeds	with	yellow	embryos	are	sown,	plants	are	obtained,	whose	
pods,	which	were	produced	by	self-fertilisation,	contain	seeds	with	yellow	embryos	
and	seeds	with	green	embryos.	On	the	average,	there	are	three	yellow	ones	for	
each	green	one.	
3.	When	the	seeds	with	a	green	embryo,	obtained	in	the	F2	generation,	are	sown,	
plants	are	obtained,	whose	pods,	which	were	produced	by	self-fertilisation,	contain	
only	seeds	with	green	embryos,	(the	F3	generation).	These,	in	turn,	produce	only	
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seeds	with	green	embryos,	(the	F4	generation),	etc.	With	respect	to	this	trait,	the	
recessive	one,	they	behave	like	the	pure	variety,	which	carries	it.	
4.	If	the	seeds	with	yellow	embryo,	obtained	in	the	F2	generation,	are	sown,	plants	
are	produced	which	may	be	grouped	into	two	classes,	Class	A,	those	plants,	whose	
pods,	which	were	obtained	by	self-fertilization,	contain	only	seeds	with	yellow	
embryos	(the	F3	generation)	and	Class	B,	these	plants,	whose	pods,	which	were	
produced	by	self-fertilization,	contain	seeds	with	yellow	as	well	as	seeds	with	green	
embryos	(the	F3	generation).	Numerically,	there	are	again	on	the	average	three	
seeds	with	yellow	embryos	for	each	one	with	a	green	embryo,	just	as	in	the	F2	
generation.	The	number	of	individuals	in	classes	A	and	B	is	approximately	one	to	
two.	
Moreover,	embryos	of	Class	A	do	not	differ	in	their	appearance	in	any	way	from	
those	in	Class	B,	only	after	the	pods,	which	were	produced	by	self-fertilization,	have	
been	harvested,	can	it	be	decided	to	which	one	of	the	classes	the	seed	belonged.	
5.	Seeds	with	yellow	embryos,	which	descended	from	plants	of	Class	A	(paragraph	
4),	produce	plants,	whose	pods,	which	originated	by	self-fertilization,	again	contain	
only	seeds	with	yellow	embryos	(the	fourth	generation).	Plants,	which	develop	from	
them	in	turn	produce	only	seeds	with	yellow	embryos	etc.	As	regards	this	character,	
the	dominant	one,	they	behave	like	the	pure	variety,	which	carries	it.	
6.	The	seeds	with	green	embryos,	which	are	obtained	from	plants	of	Class	B	
(paragraph	4,	B)	produce	plants,	whose	pods,	which	originated	by	self-fertilisation	
again	contain	only	seeds	with	green	embryos	(the	fourth	generation).	Plants	which	
develop	from	them	in	turn	produce	only	seeds	with	green	embryos,	(the	fifth	
generation)	etc.;	––	just	as	did	the	green	embryos	of	the	second	generation	
(paragraph	3).	
7.	The	seeds	with	yellow	embryos,	which	are	obtained	from	plants	of	Class	B	
(paragraph	4,	B)	again	produce,	just	as	it	was	described	in	paragraph	4,	two	types	of	
plants,	in	the	ratio	one	to	two,	whose	seeds	behave	in	the	same	way	as	described	in	
paragraphs	5	and	6	and	so	forth.	
Thus,	it	is	evident	that	Mendel’s	1	:	2:	1	ratio	in	the	progeny	of	pea	plants	with	the	
	 179	
hybrid	form	was	also	observed	and	confirmed	by	Correns.	In	order	to	explain	this	
phenomenon,	Correns	propose	a	hypothesis	
CH1.	In	the	fusion	of	the	reproductive	nuclei,	the	anlage	for	the	recessive	trait	is	
suppressed	by	the	one	for	the	dominating	trait.	Prior	to	the	definitive	formation	of	
the	reproductive	nuclei	a	complete	separation	of	the	two	anlagen	occurs,	so	that	
one	half	of	the	reproductive	nuclei	receive	the	anlage	for	the	recessive	trait,	the	
other	half	the	anlage	for	the	dominating	trait.	
By	applying	CH1,	Correns	predicts	the	phenomena	described	by	Mendel’s	LCT.	Thus,	
Mendel’	LCT	is	also	confirmed,	and	CP3	is	assertively	answered.	
Correns	specifies	CP2	into	another	problem.	
CP4.	Is	Mendel’s	observation	and	law	concerning	two	or	more	pair	of	differing	traits	
confirmable?	
More	precisely,	Correns’	problem	is	
CP4’.	Is	Mendel’s	LCD	confirmable?	
According	to	Mendel’s	LCD,	Correns	predicts	that	there	are	four	morphologically	
distinct	classes	of	the	combination	of	traits	among	the	seeds	in	F2	generation,	and	
the	ratio	of	these	classes	should	be	in	a	ratio	of	9	:	3	:	3	:	1.	Correns	accept	Mendel’s	
idealisation	of	the	ratio	of	315	:	101	:	108	:	32	into	the	ratio	of	9	:	3	:	3	:	1.	Moreover,	
the	actual	ratio	obtained	from	Correns’	experiments	on	maize	(CE2)	is	308	:	104	:	
96	:	37.	Correns	idealises	the	actual	ratio	into	the	ratio	of	9	:	3	:	3	:	1,	and	concludes	
that	Mendel’s	LCD	is	well	confirmed.	Hence,	Correns	solves	the	CP4’.	
Finally,	Correns	specifies	CP2	into	a	third	question.	
CP5.	Is	Mendel’s	LCC	universally	applicable?	
In	fact	what	Correns	was	discussing	is	a	reformulated	version	of	Mendel’s	LCC.	
CH2.	In	the	hybrid,	reproductive	cells	are	produced	in	which	the	anlagen	for	the	
individual	parental	characteristics	are	contained	in	all	possible	combinations,	but	
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both	anlagen	for	the	same	pair	of	traits	are	never	combination.	Each	combination	
occurs	with	approximately	the	same	frequency.	
The	universality	of	CH2	is	doubted	by	Correns.	Correns	suggests	that	there	are	
constraints	of	applying	CH2.	Firstly,	it	only	applies	to	the	plants	with	pairs	of	
differing	traits	where	one	member	of	a	pair	of	traits	dominates.	Secondly,	it	may	be	
only	applicable	to	hybrids	between	varieties.	These	doubts	are	confirmed	by	
Correns’	observations	on	his	experiments.	For	example,	by	crossing	Erfuter	
Folgerebse	(with	colourless	seed	coat)	with	Kneifelerbse	(with	orange-red	seed	
coat),	or	Pahlerbse	(with	orange-red	seed	coat),	the	seed	coats	within	the	same	pod,	
obtained	in	the	F1	generation,	are	sometimes	colourless,	sometimes	intensely	red,	
but	usually	orange	with	purplish-black	spots.	In	other	words,	none	of	the	traits	can	
be	regarded	as	the	dominating	trait.	Moreover,	in	the	F2	generation,	the	seeds	
obtained	would	display	many	transitional	forms	between	two	parental	traits	(i.e.	
colourless	and	orange-red).	Therefore,	Correns	concludes	that	CH2	is	not	
universally	applicable.	
Thus,	Correns’	exemplar	on	Mendel’s	study	of	Pisum	can	be	summarised.	
Table	17	
Correns’	Exemplary	Practice	on	Mendel’s	Study	of	Pisum	
Research	
Problems	
Vocabulary	 Practical	Guides	 Hypothese
s	
Experim
ents	
Patterns	 of	
Reasoning	
CP1	
CP2	
CP3	
CP4	
CP4’	
CP5	
	
Anlage	
Dominating	
trait	(A)	
Recessive	 trait	
(a)	
Dominating	
Anlage	
Recessive	
Anlage	
	
CG1	 CH1	
CH2	
CE1	
CE2	
H-D	
confirmation	
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5.4	The	Road	to	1900:	Mendel’s	Legacy	
From	a	close	reading	of	Mendel’s,	de	Vries’,	Correns’,	Tschermak’s,	and	Bateson’s	
writings,	 I	 recognise	 that	 some	 constituents	 of	 Mendel’s	 exemplary	 practice	 are	
preserved	(or	preserved	with	minor	modifications)	and	passed	on	in	the	successors’	
exemplary	practices,	despite	their	different	initial	research	problems.	For	example,	
Mendel’s	practical	guide	(MG3)	that	planting	peas	both	in	the	field	and	in	the	pots	
indoors	to	protect	plants	from	the	foreign	contamination	is	adopted	by	Tschermak.	
The	plants	grew	in	pots	in	a	closed	room	under	the	most	uniform	conditions	
possible.	In	the	year	1899,	competing	plants	from	seeds	of	equal	weight	
were	also	grown	in	pots	in	a	covered	place.	Concurrently,	parallel	
experiments	were	also	made	by	growing	plants	in	the	open.	(Tschermak,	
1900b,	p.	233,	1950,	p.	43)	
Some	preserved	constituents	are	not	very	surprising,	but	some	are	really	Mendelian.	
In	this	section,	I	shall	at	first	examine	Mendel’s	legacy	for	the	origin	of	genetics	on	
the	basis	of	my	exemplar-based	analysis.	Then	 I	 shall	propose	an	exemplar-based	
analysis	of	the	origin	of	genetics.	
Mendel’s	Legacy	1:	The	Focus	on	a	Pair	of	Differing	Traits	
Some	 (for	 example,	Müller-Wille	&	Orel,	 2007;	Olby,	 1997)	 have	 already	 pointed	
out	that	one	of	Mendel’s	important	achievements	is	that	his	approach	to	the	study	
of	 the	problem	of	development	by	 focusing	on	 the	paired	 traits	 in	 the	 successive	
generations	(MP1→MP2).	Mendel’s	important	observations	and	hypotheses	are	all	
about	paired	 traits	of	hybrids	and	 their	progeny.	As	Müller-Wille	and	Orel’s	point	
out,	“Mendel’s	focus	on	character	pairs	was	not	only	an	important	methodological	
step,	 but	 had	 immediate	 consequences	 for	 his	 theorizing.”	 (Müller-Wille	 &	 Orel,	
2007,	 p.	 211)	 The	 significance	 of	 Mendel’s	 problem-specification	 (MP1→MP2)	 is	
also	reflected	 in	 its	reception	at	the	beginning	of	the	twentieth	century.	Although	
de	Vries,	Correns,	Tschermak,	and	Bateson	were	not	studying	hybrid	development,	
all	 of	 them	 adopted	Mendel’s	 approach	 to	 concentrate	 on	 paired	 traits.	 It	 is	 no	
surprise	that	de	Vries’	problem-specification	(DP1→DP2)	was	indebted	to	Mendel’s	
problem-specification	(MP1→MP2).	
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In	every	crossing	experiment	only	a	single	character	or	a	definite	number	of	
them	 is	 to	 be	 taken	 into	 consideration…	 for	 experimental	 purposes	 the	
simplest	 conditions	 are	 presented	 by	 hybrids	 whose	 parents	 differ	 from	
each	other	in	one	trait	only.	(de	Vries,	1900a,	p.	84,	1966,	p.	108)	
Tschermak	also	adopted	the	Mendelian	problem-specification	to	study	his	
research	problem.	
The	purpose	was	to	study	the	immediate	influence	of	the	foreign	pollen	
upon	the	constitution	(form	and	color)	of	the	seeds	thus	produced,	and	also	
to	follow,	in	the	next	generation	of	hybrids,	the	inheritance	of	the	constant,	
differentiating	characters	of	the	parental	types	used	in	the	hybridization.	
(Tschermak,	1900b,	p.	232,	1950,	pp.	42–43)	
In	particular,	 Bateson	 is	 explicit	 on	 the	point	 that	 a	 significant	 lesson	 learnt	 from	
Mendel	in	the	study	of	heredity	is	that	of	focusing	on	differing	traits.	
[T]he	subjects	of	experiment	should	be	chosen	in	such	a	way	as	to	bring	the	
laws	of	heredity	to	a	real	test.	For	this	purpose	the	first	essential	is	that	the	
differentiating	 characters	 should	 be	 few,	 and	 that	 all	 avoidable	
complications	should	be	got	 rid	of.	Each	experiment	should	be	 reduced	 to	
its	 simplest	 possible	 limits…	 [I]t	 is	 certain	 that	 by	 similar	 treatment	 our	
knowledge	of	heredity	may	be	rapidly	extended.	(Bateson,	1902,	p.	16)	
As	I	have	argued	in	the	previous	section,	what	de	Vries,	Correns,	and	Bateson	in	
fact	learnt	from	Mendel	here	is	a	way	of	refining	a	general	problem	into	a	more	
specific	one.	Despite	beginning	with	different	initial	research	problems,	de	Vries,	
Correns	and	Bateson,	influenced	by	Mendel’s	work	(1865),	all	find	that	refining	
their	initial	problems	into	a	better	defined	and	more	narrowly	scoped	problem	
on	paired	traits	is	helpful	in	the	further	investigation.	
Mendel’s	 Legacy	 2:	 The	 Conceptions	 of	 Dominating	 and	 Recessive	 and	 their	
Statistical	Relations	
Another	 legacy	 from	 Mendel’s	 work	 is	 his	 use	 of	 the	 term	 “dominating”	 and	
“recessive”	to	conceptualise	the	paired	traits	and	analyse	the	statistical	relation	of	
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them.	 Though	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 dominance	 had	 been	 observed	 by	 many	 (for	
example,	Goss,	1824;	Knight,	1799;	Seton,	1824)	by	the	first	half	of	the	nineteenth	
century,	 Mendel	 was	 the	 first	 to	 conceptualise	 the	 phenomenon	 in	 terms	 of	
“dominance”	and	“recessiveness”,	and	record	and	analyse	the	statistical	relation	of	
“dominating”	 and	 “recessive”	 traits.	Mendel’s	 terminology	was	 important	 for	 his	
work	in	the	sense	that	it	lay	down	the	conceptual	foundation	for	his	analysis	of	data,	
recognition	 of	 the	 statistical	 regularity	 (e.g.	 the	 3	 :	 1	 ratio)	 and	 proposal	 of	 the	
hypotheses.	It	should	be	highlighted	that	the	significance	of	Mendel’s	terminology	
and	his	statistical	analysis	are	intertwined.	The	statistical	analysis	cannot	be	made	
without	 the	 terms	 “dominating”	 and	 “recessive”,	 while	 the	 introduction	 to	 the	
conceptions	of	“dominance”	and	“recessiveness”	 is	not	 interesting	 if	no	statistical	
regularity	is	obtained.	
As	I	have	shown,	Mendel’s	terminology	was	not	only	important	for	his	work	on	the	
development	of	hybrids,	but	also	enlightened	 the	 study	of	heredity	around	1900.	
The	 terms	 “dominating”	 and	 “recessive”	 were	 adopted	 by	 de	 Vries,	 Correns,	
Tschermak,	and	Bateson,	though	their	usages	are	different	from	Mendel’s	in	some	
aspects	 (for	a	summary,	see	Table	18).	Correspondingly,	 the	statistical	analysis	of	
the	dominating	and	recessive	traits	was	also	introduced	into	the	study	of	heredity,	
especially	by	de	Vries	and	Bateson.	
Table	18	
	 Dominating/Recessive	
Morphological	Traits	 Mendel,	de	Vries,	Correns,	Tschermak,	Bateson	
Morphological	 Traits	 with	 a	
Certain	 Behaviour	 in	 the	
Progeny	
Mendel	
Hereditary	Characteristics	 De	Vries	
Hereditary	Material	 Correns,	Bateson	
I	 have	 to	 emphasise	 that	 the	 conceptions	 of	 dominance	 and	 recessiveness	 are	
important	 in	 the	 origin	 of	 genetics	 because	 they	 are	 useful	 in	 conceptualisation,	
hypothesisation,	and	idealisation	rather	than	because	they	are	essential	conceptual	
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components,	which	are	invariantly	shared	by	both	Mendel	and	the	rediscoverers.	
Mendel’s	Legacy	3:	The	Morphological-Cellular	Correspondence	
Among	 his	 laws,	 Mendel’s	 LCC	 (MH3)	 was	 particularly	 important.	 In	 addition	 to	
illustrate	the	composition	of	seed	and	pollen	cells	 in	hybrids,	 it	provides	a	“rather	
simple	 explanation”	 of	 “the	 most	 difficult	 [problem]	 in	 hybrid	 production”:	 the	
problem	of	 transformation	of	 species.	What	 is	 really	novel	 in	Mendel’s	 LCC	 is	 the	
correspondence	of	the	statistical	 relations	of	morphological	 traits	and	of	germinal	
and	 pollen	 cells.	 It	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 correspondence	 is	 a	weaker	 notion	 than	
determination.	Mendel	never	used	the	notion	of	determination,	or	causation	in	the	
LCC.	Nevertheless,	the	morphological-cellular	correspondence	proposed	by	Mendel	
became	a	key	to	advance	the	study	of	heredity	three	decades	later.	
As	I	have	mentioned,	the	biggest	difficulty	identified	by	Bateson	(1902)	in	the	study	
of	heredity	at	the	turn	of	the	twentieth	century	was	the	lack	of	a	reliable	approach	
to	study	the	physical	basis	of	heredity.	In	fact	there	were	a	few	theories	of	heredity	
concerning	 the	 physical	 basis.	 Weismann’s	 theory	 of	 germ-plasm	 (1892)	 and	 de	
Vries’	 theory	 of	 pangenesis	 (1889)	 are	 two	 representative	 ones.	 Each	 proposes	 a	
conception	of	the	physical	basis	of	heredity.	For	Weismann,	a	biophore	is	a	special	
particle	in	the	cell	as	the	determinant	of	a	morphological	trait,	while	for	de	Vries,	a	
pangen	 is	 the	 fundamental	 unit,	 carrying	 a	 hereditary	 characteristics.	 However,	
neither	provided	a	feasible	way	to	test	the	hypothesis.	In	particular,	the	relation	of	
visible	 characters	 and	 invisible	 “physical	 basis	 of	 heredity”	 is	 untestable	
experimentally.	 The	 state	 of	 art	 of	 the	 study	 of	 heredity	 by	 1902	 is,	 as	 Bateson	
neatly	 summarises,	 “[n]o	 one	 has	 yet	 any	 suggestion,	 working	 hypothesis,	 or	
mental	picture	that	has	thus	far	helped	in	the	slightest	degree	to	penetrate	beyond	
what	we	see.”	(Bateson,	1902,	p.	3)	
In	 1900,	 de	 Vries	 adopted	 and	 revised	 Mendel’s	 morphological-cellular	
correspondence	 to	 support	 his	 theory	 of	 pangenesis,	 though	he	was	 never	 brave	
enough	 to	 formulate	 the	 law	 of	 segregation	 (DH2,	 DH3,	 DH5)	 as	 a	 trait-pangen	
correspondence	(or	determination)	explicitly.	 In	addition,	de	Vries	also	limited	the	
application	of	his	 trait-characteristics	 correspondence	 in	 the	 case	of	 true	hybrids.	
Correns	 made	 “a	 significant	 step	 beyond	 Mendel”	 by	 reformulating	 Mendel’s	
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morphological-cellular	correspondence	as	a	trait-anlage	correspondence	(CH1,	CH2),	
though	 he	was	 not	 clear	 on	 the	 implication	 of	 this	 reformulation	 in	 the	 study	 of	
heredity.	 Bateson	 was	 the	 first	 to	 make	 a	 sophisticated	 attempt	 to	 incorporate	
Mendel’s	morphological-cellular	correspondence	with	the	study	of	heredity.	Firstly,	
Bateson	 reformulated	 Mendel’s	 correspondence	 as	 a	 trait-paired	 allele	
determination.	 It	 is	 determination	 rather	 than	 correspondence,	 because	 Bateson	
explicitly	 talked	 of	 “the	 bearers	 of	 the	 character”.	 Secondly,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	
limited	 applicability	 of	 Mendel’s	 correspondence,	 Bateson’s	 trait-paired	 alleles	
determination	is	applicable	broadly	in	certain	phenomena	of	alternative	inheritance.	
Though	Mendel’s	morphological-cellular	correspondence	was	not	adopted	without	
modification	in	de	Vries’,	Correns’,	and	Bateson’s	work,	it	was	really	helpful	to	set	
out	an	approach	to	work	on	the	“inward	and	essential	nature”	of	heredity.	
Mendel’s	Legacy	4:	Mathematical	Representation	and	Manipulation	
Another	 lasting	 legacy	 of	 Mendel’s	 to	 the	 study	 of	 heredity	 in	 1900	 is	 his	
mathematical	 approach.	 Mendel	 denotes	 the	 dominating	 (constant)	 trait	 A,	 the	
hybrid	trait	Aa,	the	recessive	(constant)	trait	a,	and	the	distribution	of	these	traits	in	
the	 F2	 generation	 (A	 +	 2Aa	 +	 a).	 All	 these	 symbolic	 notations	 are	 much	 more	
important	and	useful	 than	 thought.	All	Mendel’s	 three	 laws	can	be	 formulated	 in	
terms	of	these	notations.	
LDT:	 𝐴 + 2𝐴𝑎 + 𝑎	
LCT: 𝐴 + 2𝐴𝑎 + 𝑎 𝐵 + 2𝐵𝑏 + 𝑏 = 𝐴𝐵 + 𝐴𝑏 + 𝑎𝐵 + 2𝐴𝐵𝑏 + 2𝑎𝐵𝑏 + 2𝐴𝑎𝐵 +2𝐴𝑎𝐵 + 4𝐴𝑎𝐵𝑏	
LCC:	 !!!! + !!!! + !!!! + !!!! = 𝐴 + 2𝐴𝑎 + 𝑎	
Moreover,	as	we	can	see	in	the	section	5.1,	Mendel’s	LCT	and	LCC	are	 introduced	
and	 articulated	 with	 the	 help	 of	 these	 notations	 and	 the	 mathematical	
manipulation	 of	 these.	 Mendel’s	 mathematical	 notation	 was	 also	 adopted	 and	
further	 developed	 by	 de	 Vries.	 The	 distribution	 of	 characteristics	 in	 the	 F2	
generation	is	formulated	by	de	Vries	as	d2	+	2dr	+	r2.	The	move	from	A	+	2Aa	+	a	to	
d2	+	2dr	+	r2	was	a	breakthrough	in	the	history	of	genetics.	The	equation	(d	+	r)(d	+	r)	
=	d2	+	2dr	+	 r2	 implicitly	 suggests	 the	phenomena	of	 the	separation	of	hereditary	
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characteristics	within	pollen	grains	and	ovules.	This	lays	down	the	cornerstone	for	a	
later	 conception	 of	 particulate	 inheritance.	 The	 Mendel’s	 laws	 and	 concepts	
“allelomorph”	(Bateson,	1902,	1909),	“factor”	(Morgan	et	al.,	1915;	R.	C.	Punnett,	
1905),	“gene”	(Morgan,	1926)	were	all	articulated	with	the	help	of	similar	notations.	
Although,	as	many	have	pointed	out,	Mendel	himself	never	had	the	conception	of	
pairs	of	hereditary	elements	determining	the	morphological	trait,	his	mathematical	
approach	still	played	an	indispensable	role	in	the	founding	of	genetics	as	a	school	of	
scientific	practice.	Therefore,	the	focus	on	a	pair	of	differing	traits,	the	conceptions	
of	dominating	and	recessive	and	their	statistical	relation,	the	morphological-cellular	
correspondence,	 and	 the	 mathematical	 approach	 are	 four	 main	 components	 of	
Mendel’s	legacy.	
Mendel’s	Contribution	and	the	Origin	of	Mendelian	Genetics	Revisited	
Now	it	is	the	time	to	reinterpret	Mendel’s	contribution.	It	would	be	now	clear	that	
the	“typical”	textbook	interpretations	are	problematic:	
Mendel’s	contribution	was	…	the	basic	Laws	of	Heredity...	(Brown,	1989,	p.	
5)	
From	the	results	of	these	experiments,	 [Mendel]	described	two	basic	rules	
governing	 the	 inheritance	 of	 traits.	 Since	 the	 early	 part	 of	 the	 1900s,	
researchers	have	wondered	why	Mendel	was	successful	in	discovering	how	
traits	 are	 inherited	when	earlier	 scientists	were	unable	 to	make	 this	 basic	
conclusion.	(Atherly,	Girton,	&	McDonald,	1999,	p.	17)	
Gregor	 Mendel…	 discovered	 the	 basic	 principles	 of	 genetics	 in	 the	
mid-nineteenth	 century…	 [H]e	 examined	 the	 inheritance	 of	 such	 clear-cut	
alternative	 traits	 in	 pea	 plants	 as	 purple	 versus	 white	 flowers	 or	 yellow	
versus	 green	 seeds.	 In	 so	 doing,	 he	 discovered	 why	 some	 of	 these	 traits	
disappeared	 in	 one	 generation	 and	 then	 reappeared	 in	 another.	 By	
rigorously	 analysing	 the	 patterns	 of	 transmission	 through	 generations,	 he	
inferred	genetic	laws	that	allowed	him	to	make	verifiable	predictions	about	
which	 traits	 would	 appear,	 disappear,	 and	 then	 reappear	 in	 which	
generations.	(Hartwell	et	al.,	2008,	pp.	13–14)	
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In	 1866	 Gregor	Mendel	 published	 the	 results	 of	 experiments	 in	 which	 he	
had	 investigated	 inheritance	 in	 garden	 peas.	 From	 these	 findings	 he	
discovered	 the	 existence	 of	 discrete	 hereditary	 elements	 and	 rules	
determining	their	transmission	from	parent	to	offspring.	(Hartl,	Freifelder,	&	
Snyder,	1989,	p.	7)	
As	a	result	of	his	research	with	pea	plants,	Mendel	proposed	…	a	theory	of	
particulate	 inheritance.	 A	 genetic	 determinant	 of	 a	 specific	 character	 is	
passed	on	from	one	generation	to	the	next	as	a	unit,	without	any	blending	
of	 the	 units.	 This	 model	 explained	 many	 observations	 that	 could	 not	 be	
explained	by	blending	 inheritance.	 It	also	proved	a	very	 fruitful	 framework	
of	further	progress	in	understanding	the	mechanism	of	heredity.	(Suzuki	et	
al.,	1981,	p.	100)	
There	 are	 two	 common	 mistakes	 in	 these	 interpretations.	 First	 of	 all,	 as	 I	 have	
shown	in	Chapter	3,	Mendel’s	concern	was	with	the	development	of	hybrids	in	their	
progeny,	 so	 it	 is	 historically	 flawed	 to	 understand	 Mendel’s	 contribution	 as	 the	
introduction	 to	 the	 law	 or	 theory	 of	 heredity.	 Secondly,	 as	 I	 have	 argued	 in	 the	
section	 5.1,	 it	 is	 inadequate	 to	 take	 the	 theory-driven	 approach	 to	 analyse	 the	
origin	of	genetics,	so	taking	Mendel’s	contribution	to	be	the	formulation	of	a	theory	
is	problematic.	
Alternatively	one	might	regard	Mendel’s	contribution	to	the	history	of	genetics	as	a	
discovery	 of	 the	 laws	 of	 hybrid	 development.	 From	 a	 historical	 viewpoint,	 this	
interpretation	 is	 better	 than	 the	 standard	 textbook	 interpretations.	 Mendel’s	
concern	 was	 about	 hybrid	 development,	 and	 his	 work	 did	 make	 a	 substantial	
contribution.	However,	there	are	two	main	problems:	
Firstly,	 it	 is	 controversial	 that	 Mendel’s	 laws	 of	 hybrid	 development	 are	 laws	 of	
nature,	 from	 a	 philosopher’s	 point	 of	 view.	 Among	 philosophers,	 there	 is	 no	
consensus	on	what	 is	a	 law	of	nature122,	but	most	philosophers	would	agree	that																																																									122	 Nevetheless,	there	are	two	mainstream	ways	of	understanding	laws	of	nature122:	the	regularity	view	(for	example,	Ayer,	1963;	Goodman,	1983;	Molnar,	1969)	and	the	necessitarian	view	(for	example,	Armstrong,	1983;	Dretske,	1977;	Tooley,	1977).	According	to	the	minimal	account	of	the	regularity	view,	laws	of	nature	are	empirical	regularities	in	the	sense	that	it	is	a	law	that	all	Fs	are	Gs	if	and	only	if	all	Fs	are	Gs	where	no	local	terms	are	involved.	According	to	a	minimal	account	of	the	necessitarian	view,	laws	are	singular	statements	describing	the	
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laws	of	nature	must	be	spatiotemporally	universal.	Take	the	case	of	Mendel’s	LDT.	
…	[O]f	the	seeds	formed	by	the	hybrids	with	one	pair	of	differing	traits,	one	
half	 again	 develop	 the	 hybrid	 form	 while	 the	 other	 half	 yield	 plants	 that	
remain	constant	and	receive	the	dominating	and	the	recessive	character	in	
equal	shares.	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	17,	1966a,	p.	15)	
It	 is	very	clear	 that,	as	Mendel	himself	 recognised,	 such	a	“law”	 is	not	universally	
true.	Though	 it	can	be	argued	that	Mendel’s	 laws	are	 in	 fact	ceteris	paribus	 laws,	
this	 move	 might	 not	 be	 very	 helpful.	 Yes,	 if	 we	 could	 well	 define	 the	 limit	 of	
Mendel’s	laws	and	put	it	into	a	ceteris	paribus	clause,	Mendel’s	laws	would	look	like	
a	 good	 case	 of	 ceteris	 paribus	 laws.	 However,	 given	 the	 non-universality	 of	
Mendel’s	 laws	 (especially	 LCT),	 it	 seems	 dubious	 if	 Mendel’s	 laws	 can	 be	
characterised	as	ceteris	paribus	 laws,	 just	 like	nobody	would	 insist	 that	all	Roman	
emperors	 are	 male	 is	 a	 ceteris	 paribus	 law.	 Hence	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 Mendel’s	
contribution	would	be	better	not	understood	as	a	discovery	of	the	laws	of	nature,	
especially	given	the	philosophical	controversy	on	the	definition	of	laws	of	nature.	
Secondly,	 even	 if	 Mendel’s	 laws	 can	 be	 legitimately	 accepted	 as	 laws	 of	 nature,	
Mendel’s	 proposal	 of	 the	 laws	 of	 hybrid	 development	 is	 not	 an	 obvious	
contribution	 to	 the	 history	 of	 genetics.	 It	 is	 not	 obvious	 in	what	 sense	Mendel’s	
laws	of	hybrid	development	are	 important	 to	 the	history	of	 genetics.	Nor	 is	 clear	
what	aspects	of	Mendel’s	laws	played	an	important	role	in	the	history.	In	addition,	
as	I	have	shown	in	Table	13,	Mendel’s	influence	is	much	more	than	his	theoretical	
construction.	The	 interpretation	of	Mendel’s	contribution	as	the	discovery	of	 laws	
of	nature	suggests	the	neglect	of	the	other	crucial	elements	from	scientific	practice.	
Thus,	 it	 is	 problematic	 to	 argue	 that	 Mendel’s	 contribution	 to	 the	 history	 of	
genetics	is	his	proposal	of	the	laws	of	hybrid	development.	
Another	 potential	 interpretation	 is	 that	 Mendel’s	 contribution	 is	 a	 discovery	 of	
some	 important	 facts	 of	 hybrid	 development.	 Unfortunately,	 this	 interpretation	
encounters	a	similar	problem	to	the	 law-based	 interpretation.	Mendel’s	discovery	
																																																																																																																																																												relationships	that	exist	between	universals	in	the	sense	that	it	is	a	law	that	all	Fs	are	Gs	if	and	only	if	there	is	a	relation	of	necessitation	between	the	properties	F-ness	and	G-ness	such	that	all	Fs	are	Gs.	Clearly,	both	views	agree	on	the	univsersality	of	laws	of	nature.	
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of	the	facts	of	hybrid	development	also	fails	to	make	an	obvious	contribution	to	the	
history	 of	 genetics.	 Moreover,	 facts	 can	 never	 be	 discovered	 without	 a	 proper	
representation.	 As	 Peter	 Bowler	 puts	 it,	 “Facts	 only	 appear	 as	 facts	 within	 an	
appropriate	 conceptual	 scheme.”	 (Bowler,	 1989,	 p.	 6)	 Such	 an	 understanding	
overlooks	 Mendel’s	 conceptual	 contribution	 to	 the	 history	 of	 genetics	 by	
introducing	 a	 vocabulary	 to	 describe	 and	 explain	 the	 phenomena.	 As	 Curt	 Stein	
indicates,	
[Mendel’s	paper	“Experiments	on	Plant	Hybrids”]	does	not	simply	announce	
the	 discovery	 of	 important	 facts	 by	 new	 methods	 of	 observation	 and	
experiment.	Rather	is	an	act	of	highest	creativity,	it	presents	these	facts	in	a	
conceptual	 scheme	 which	 gives	 them	 general	 meaning.	 (C.	 Stern	 &	
Sherwood,	1966,	p.	v)	
Thus,	 Mendel’s	 contribution	 is	 more	 than	 the	 discovery	 of	 some	 facts	 of	 hybrid	
development.	
In	 contrast	 to	 all	 these	 interpretations,	 I	 argue	 that	Mendel’s	 contribution	 to	 the	
history	of	genetics	 is	an	exemplary	practice	of	 the	development	of	pea	hybrids	 in	
their	 progeny.	 More	 specifically,	 Mendel	 introduced	 a	 set	 of	 contextually	
well-defined	research	problems	on	the	development	of	hybrids	in	their	progeny	and	
the	 corresponding	 solutions,	 and	 some	 components	 of	 his	 exemplary	 practice	
greatly	inspired	and	influenced	de	Vries’,	Correns’,	Tschermak’,	and	Bateson’s	work,	
and	 lay	 down	 the	 cornerstone	 for	 the	 study	 of	 heredity	 in	 the	 20th	 century.	 In	
particular,	 as	 I	 have	 argued	 earlier	 in	 this	 section,	 Mendel’s	 focus	 on	 a	 pair	 of	
differing	 traits,	 the	 conceptions	 of	 dominating	 and	 recessive	 and	 their	 statistical	
relation,	 the	 morphological-cellular	 correspondence,	 and	 his	 mathematical	
approach	made	an	enormous	impact	on	de	Vries’	and	Bateson’s’	work	on	heredity.	
Similarly,	de	Vries’,	Correns’,	and	Bateson’s	contribution	can	also	be	characterised	
as	the	exemplary	practices,	which	also	inspired	and	influenced	the	successors’	work	
(for	example,	Castle	&	Allen,	1903;	Castle,	1903;	Hurst,	1906;	R.	C.	Punnett,	1905;	
Raynor	 &	 Doncaster,	 1905)	 on	 heredity	 in	 the	 first	 decade	 of	 the	 20th	 century.	
Therefore,	 the	 origin	 of	 genetics	 from	 Mendel	 to	 Bateson,	 I	 argue,	 can	 be	
characterised	as	a	chain	of	exemplary	practices.	 	
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In	the	origin	of	genetics,	the	earlier	exemplary	practices	are	accepted	and	learnt	by	
the	 successor	 practitioners.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 to	 say	 that	 the	 practitioners	
accept	 an	 exemplary	 practice	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 all	 the	 components	 of	 that	
exemplary	practice	are	accepted	and	shared	dogmatically.	Instead	what	is	accepted	
and	shared	by	all	practitioners	 is	 the	way	of	defining	the	problems	and	of	solving	
these	 problems.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 origin	 of	 genetics,	 what	 de	 Vries,	 Correns,	
Tschermak,	and	Bateson	all	shared	and	accepted	is	Mendel’s	problem-defining	and	
problem-solving.	 Nevertheless,	 they	 still	 differed	 in	 how	 to	 understand	 the	
components	 of	 Mendel’s	 exemplary	 practice	 and	 how	 to	 use	 them	 (or	 some	 of	
them)	to	solve	their	problems.	For	the	“rediscoverers”,	Mendel’s	conceptualisation,	
hypothesisation,	 experimentation,	 and	 reasoning	 are	 just	 tools	 to	 solve	Mendel’s	
problems.	And	some	of	these	are	also	useful	to	their	own	research	problems.	Thus,	
Mendel’s	 vocabulary,	 hypotheses,	 practical	 guides,	 experiments	 and	 patterns	 of	
reasoning	are	accepted	as	tools	to	solve	Mendel’s	problem	of	hybrid	development	
in	 their	 progeny	 and	 their	 implication	 to	 solve	 successors’	 problems.	 The	
rediscoverers’	 acceptance	 of	 Mendel’s	 exemplary	 practice	 is	 mainly	 due	 to	 the	
instrumental	or	pragmatic	reason.	In	addition,	to	say	that	the	exemplary	practices	
are	 accepted	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 they	 are	 accepted	 invariantly	 by	 all	 the	 late	
practitioners.	For	example,	it	would	be	plausible	to	argue	that	de	Vries	and	Bateson	
accepted	and	worked	on	the	basis	of	Mendel’s	exemplar	practice,	while	Hurst	and	
Punnett	accepted	and	worked	on	the	basis	of	Bateson’s	exemplary	practice	rather	
than	Mendel’s.	This	is	why	I	argue	that	the	origin	of	genetics	is	better	characterised	
as	a	chain	of	exemplary	practices	rather	than	a	set	of	exemplary	practices.	
To	 some	 extent,	 characterising	Mendel’s	 contribution	 as	 the	 introduction	 to	 new	
problems	 and	 their	 solutions	 is	 not	 a	 completely	 new	 idea.	 In	 particular,	 the	
significance	 of	 Mendel’s	 introduction	 of	 new	 research	 problems	 had	 been	
highlighted	 by	 many	 historians	 (For	 example,	 Bowler,	 1989;	 Sandler	 &	 Sandler,	
1985).	In	particular,	Iris	Sandler	and	Laurence	Sandler	explicitly	pointed	out:	
Mendel	 …	 defined	 his	 problem	 in	 purely	 genetic	 terms,	 and	 produced	 a	
correct	and	amazingly	complete	answer.	(Sandler	&	Sandler,	1985,	p.	69)	
However,	one	crucial	difference	between	Sandlers’	and	my	 interpretation	 is	that	 I	
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do	not	think	that	Mendel’s	work	can	be	understood	as	a	study	of	heredity.	Sandlers	
fail	to	recognise	that	Mendel’s	study	was	in	fact	about	hybrid	development	rather	
than	 heredity	 in	 general,	 and	 the	 problem	 of	 hybrid	 development	 cannot	 be	
conflated	with	of	heredity.	 In	addition,	Sandlers’	focus	 is	mainly	historical.	Little	 is	
said	about	what	the	problem	is	and	what	the	answer	is,	or	how	the	problem	and	its	
solution	 influence	 the	 successor’s	 work	 methodologically,	 conceptually,	
theoretically,	etc.	
Before	 finishing	 this	 section,	 I	have	 to	emphasise	 that	 the	origin	of	genetics	 from	
Mendel	 to	 Bateson	 discussed	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 definitely	 not	 a	 complete	 and	
comprehensive	picture	of	the	origin	of	genetics.	As	the	title	of	Olby’s	book	Origins	
of	Mendelism	has	suggested,	there	are	multiple	origins	of	genetics.	What	I	focus	on	
here	 is	 only	 one	 path	 to	 genetics,	 as	 the	 subtitle	 of	 my	 thesis	 indicates.	 More	
precisely	 speaking,	my	 task	 is	 to	 explore	 a	 new	philosophical	way	 to	 analyse	 and	
understand	 the	 development	 from	 Mendel’s	 (1865),	 de	 Vries’	 (1900a,	 1900c,	
1900d),	Correns’	(1900),	Tschermak’s	(1900a,	1900b)	to	Bateson’s	work	(1902).	To	
sum	up,	so	far	I	have	argued	that	Mendel’s	contribution	can	be	characterised	as	an	
introduction	 to	 new	 research	 problems	 and	 their	 corresponding	 solutions.	 The	
origin	of	genetics	from	Mendel	to	Bateson	is	accordingly	understood	as	a	chain	of	
exemplary	practices.	
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5.5	Reconsidering	the	Problem	of	Long	Neglect	
In	 addition	 to	 provide	 an	 alternative	way	 to	 characterise	 the	 origin	 of	 genetics,	 I	
shall	argue	that	my	exemplar-based	analysis	of	the	origin	of	genetics	sheds	light	on	
a	 long-debated	 puzzle	 among	 historians	 of	 genetics,	 namely,	 the	 problem	 of	 the	
long	neglect	of	Mendel’s	paper.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 shall	 first	 review	the	problem	of	
long	neglect	and	 its	 responses.	Then	 I	 shall	 take	 the	exemplar-based	approach	 to	
showing	that	why	Mendel’s	work	was	neglected	by	those	who	studied	the	problem	
of	heredity	in	the	19th	century	is	a	pseudo-problem.	
The	Problem	of	Long	Neglect	
Given	 the	 vital	 role	 of	 Mendel’s	 paper	 in	 the	 history	 of	 genetics,	 it	 has	 been	 a	
persistent	puzzle:	Why	was	the	significance	of	Mendel’s	work	not	recognised	earlier?	
In	 general,	 the	 explanations	 fall	 into	 two	 main	 groups.	 The	 first	 is	 that	 the	
significance	 of	 Mendel’s	 work	 was	 not	 recognised	 earlier	 simply	 because	 his	
contemporaries	did	not	accept	 it.	The	second	 is	that	the	 long	neglect	of	Mendel’s	
work	 was	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 was	 largely	 unknown	 to	 his	 contemporaries,	
especially	those	of	importance.	In	addition,	there	is	a	third	solution:	The	problem	of	
long	 neglect	 is	 a	 pseudoproblem.	 Mendel’s	 work	 was	 neither	 unaccepted	 nor	
unknown	 in	 his	 time.	 From	 the	 eyes	 of	Mendel’s	 contemporaries,	Mendel’s	 was	
hardly	revolutionary	at	all.	In	the	following,	I	shall	first	examine	these	old	responses	
to	 the	 problem,	 and	 then	 propose	 a	 new	 solution	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 my	
exemplar-based	analysis.	
Old	Response	1:	Mendel’s	Work	was	Not	Accepted	
For	a	long	time,	Hugo	Iltis’s	explanation	(1932)	had	been	the	“standard”	answer	to	
the	problem	of	long	neglect.	Iltis	argues	that	during	the	mid-nineteenth	century	the	
time	was	not	ripening	 for	understanding	Mendel’s	work.	But	 finally	at	 the	turn	of	
the	twentieth	century,	“his	time	has	come”.	 	
[T]he	study	of	the	cell	nucleus	during	the	closing	decades	of	the	nineteenth	
century,	 thanks	 to	which	 the	chromosomes	had	come	 to	be	 recognised	as	
the	bearers	of	heredity,	while	the	reduction	division	had	been	observed	and	
its	purpose	understood,	and	fertilisation	(amphimixis)	had	been	recognised	
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as	one	of	the	most	important	causes	of	variability;	Johannsen’s	experiments,	
and	this	investigator’s	vivid	formulation	of	“population”	and	“pure	line,”	of	
“phenotype”	 and	 “genotyple”;	 de	 Vries’	 discovery	 of	 mutation,	 and	 the	
conception	he	based	upon	the	mutation	theory	that	a	species	is	a	mosaic	of	
characters.	 Thanks	 to	 these	 converging	 trends,	 by	 1900	 the	 scientific	
situation	was	such	that	experiments	of	the	kind	performed	thirty-five	years	
earlier	 by	 Mendel	 had	 become	 absolutely	 essential	 to	 the	 testing	 of	 the	
various	theoretical	views.	(Iltis,	1932,	pp.	301–302)	
In	short,	for	Iltis,	Mendel’s	work	was	ahead	of	his	time.	The	significance	of	Mendel’s	
work	was	not	recognisable	until	the	further	development	in	the	fields	like	cytology	
and	heredity.	This	explanation	had	been	widely	accepted.	Similar	views	were	also	
held.	
Mendel	 had	 produced	 a	 key	 piece	 for	 the	 jigsaw	 of	 biological	 theory	 –	 a	
much	more	important	piece	than	he	could	have	realized	–	but	it	was	of	no	
general	use	until	the	picture	was	sufficiently	complete	for	it	to	be	fitted	in.	
(Gasking,	1959,	p.	77)	
One	 may	 say	 that	 the	 criterion	 of	 prematurity123,	 as	 defined	 by	 Stent,	
without	 question	 applies	well	 to	 the	 class	 cases	 of	 neglect	 of	 the	work	 of	
Mendel…	(Glass,	1974,	p.	110)	
It	 is	clear	that	“ahead	of	his	time”	cannot	be	the	one	and	only	one	explanation	of	
why	Mendel’s	work	was	not	accepted	by	his	contemporaries.	 In	addition,	the	 lack	
of	 generality	 of	 Mendel’s	 laws	 is	 another	 explanation.	 I	 have	 shown	 that	 even	
Mendel	 himself	 well	 realised	 that	 his	 laws	were	 not	 universally	 applicable.	 Thus,	
some	 historians	 regarded	 this	 as	 a	 key	 factor	 of	 the	 lack	 of	 success	 of	Mendel’s	
work.	
Although	 Mendel's	 theory	 in	 fact	 ordered	 a	 mass	 of	 existing	 empirical	
knowledge,	its	application	to	this	was	not	immediately	and	easily	apparent.																																																									123	 In	his	article	“Prematurity	and	Uniqueness	in	Scientific	Discovery”,	Gunther	Stent	provides	a	criterion	of	the	prematurity	of	a	scientific	discovery	to	explain	its	failture	to	make	an	impact	in	its	time:	“A	discovery	is	premature	if	its	implications	cannot	be	connected	by	a	series	of	simple	logical	steps	to	canonical,	or	generally	accepted,	knowledge.”	(Stent,	1972,	p.	84)	
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The	theory	must	have	seemed	to	have	no	other	evidence	in	its	favour	than	
that	collected	by	Mendel	himself.	(Wilkie,	1962,	p.	5)	
The	analysis	also	suggests	strongly	that	another	criterion	should	be	added	to	
the	determinative	process,	that	of	a	lack	of	generality.	Mendel’s	peas	were	
thought	 to	 be	 unsuitable	 material	 for	 studying	 the	 heredity	 of	 species	
difference,	and	his	 laws	were	not	clearly	applicable	 to	 the	other	plants	he	
attempted	to	use.	(Glass,	1974,	p.	110)	
Mendel’s	 mathematical	 approach	 is	 also	 regarded	 as	 an	 obstacle	 for	 his	
contemporaries	to	understand	and	appreciate	his	work.	
[Mendel]	was	really	a	physicist,	and	brought	to	one	of	the	great	problems	of	
biology	 the	attitude	of	mind	and	 the	quantitative	method	of	 attack	which	
had	been	in	use	for	some	time	by	physicists	and	by	astronomers,	and	which	
was	 just	 coming	 to	 be	 used	more	widely	 by	 chemists.	 It	was	 an	 unknown	
language	 to	 biology,	 though	 it	 fulfilled	 the	 essential	 requirements	 of	
scientific	research	better	than	anything	which	had	gone	before;	and	it	came	
to	 biology	 at	 a	 time	 when	 those	 who	 were	 endeavouring	 to	 investigate	
inheritance	 by	 means	 of	 hybridization	 were	 not	 prepared	 for	 their	 task.	
(East,	1923,	p.	232)	
Mendel's	mathematical	 treatment	of	his	botanical	data	must	have	seemed	
strange	 in	 that	 time,	when	 quantitative	 biology	was	 unheard	 of.	 (Dodson,	
1955,	p.	194)	
[B]iology	was	 not	 ready	 for	mathematical	 treatment.	 (Weinstein,	 1962,	 p.	
999)	
In	 addition	 to	his	mathematical	 approach,	Mendel’s	 concern	 seems	 to	have	been	
removed	 from	 the	 interests	 of	 both	 biologists	 and	 breeders	 at	 his	 time.	 In	 other	
words,	 Mendel’s	 work	 was	 thought	 to	 be	 irrelevant	 to	 the	 central	 problems	 in	
breeding	studies	(and	biology	more	generally)	in	the	19th	century.	
Mendel’s	contemporaries	therefore	tended,	either	to	misinterpret	his	work	
as	a	confused	attempt	to	investigate	the	nature	of	species,	or	else	to	dismiss	
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it	as	being	 irrelevant	 to	 their	own	crucial	problem	of	 the	origin	of	species.	
(Gasking,	1959,	p.	61)	
[A]	more	general	 reason	 for	 the	neglect	of	Mendel’s	work…	that	Mendel’s	
contemporaries	 were	 unable	 to	 see	 the	 importance	 of	 his	 ideas	 because	
these	ideas	did	not	seem	to	them	have	any	relevance	to	the	problem	of	the	
nature	and	origin	of	species,	which	at	that	time	appeared	to	be	the	central	
problem	of	biology.	(Wilkie,	1962,	p.	5)	
This	explanation	was	reinforced	by	Sandler	and	Sandler	(1985).	As	I	have	mentioned	
in	 the	 section	 5.3,	 they	 provide	 another	 interpretation	 of	 “Mendel’s	
contemporaries	 failed	 to	 understand	 Mendel’s	 work	 properly”	 by	 arguing	 that	
Mendel’s	usage	of	the	term	Entwicklung	was	so	novel	that	no	one	fully	understood	
it.	 At	 Mendel’s	 time,	 there	 was	 no	 well-defined	 problem	 of	 inheritance	 of	 a	
morphological	trait	at	all.	The	distinction	between	the	problem	of	heredity	and	the	
problem	of	development	was	fuzzy.	Most	of	Mendel’s	contemporaries	(for	example,	
Darwin)	accepted	a	developmental	model	of	heredity	in	which	the	transmission	of	
morphological	traits	from	one	generation	to	the	next	and	the	process	by	which	the	
morphological	 traits	 are	 produced	 in	 the	 growing	 organisms	 are	 just	 different	
stages	 of	 the	 same	 biological	 process.	 As	 Bowler	 put	 it,	 “[A]	 separate	 study	 of	
transmission	 was	 inconceivable.”	 (Bowler,	 1989,	 p.	 6)	 It	 was	 Mendel	 who	 first	
explicitly	defined	 the	problem	of	heredity,	 the	 significance	of	which	was	not	ever	
recognised.	 Thus,	 Mendel’s	 work	 was	 not	 fully	 understood,	 and	 its	 significance	
failed	to	be	appreciated	until	1900.	
Old	Response	2:	Mendel’s	Work	was	Unknown	
Another	popular	solution	to	the	problem	of	long	neglect	is	to	argue	that	Mendel’s	
work	was	 to	 a	 great	 extent	 unknown	 to	most	 of	 his	 contemporaries.	 It	 has	 been	
argued	 that	Mendel	was	 an	unknown	monk	and	published	a	paper	 in	 a	 new	and	
obscure	 journal	at	 the	 time.	Moreover,	Mendel	did	not	have	any	collaborators	or	
students	 to	 follow	 his	 work.	 Even	 worse,	 some	 (for	 example,	 Mayr,	 1982)	 have	
pointed	out	 that	Mendel’s	characteristic	modesty	prevented	him	from	advertising	
his	work	 to	others.	All	 these	 factors	 lead	 to	 the	 inaccessibility	of	Mendel’s	paper,	
and	thus	its	silence.	
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In	 addition,	 Bateson	 suggests	 that	 another	 key	 factor	 of	 the	 inaccessibility	 of	
Mendel’s	work	 is	that	 it	was	published	at	the	wrong	time	when	most	of	Mendel’s	
contemporaries	were	distracted	by	Darwin’s	Origin	of	Species.	
It	is	true	that	the	journal	in	which	[Mendel’s	paper]	appeared	is	scarce,	but	
his	circumstance	has	seldom	long	delayed	general	recognition.	The	cause	is	
unquestionably	to	be	found	in	that	neglect	of	the	experimental	study	of	the	
problem	 of	 Species	 which	 supervened	 on	 the	 general	 acceptance	 of	 the	
Darwinian	doctrines.	The	problem	of	Species,	as	Kölreuter,	Gärtner,	Naudin,	
Wichura,	and	the	other	hybridists	of	 the	middle	of	 the	nineteenth	century	
conceived	it,	attracted	thenceforth	no	workers.	(Bateson,	1902,	p.	37)	
Michael	 MacRoberts	 (1985)	 suggests	 another	 factor	 of	 the	 inaccessibility	 of	
Mendel’s	work.	By	comparing	the	fate	of	Mendel’s	paper	on	Pisum	with	the	one	on	
Hieracium	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	 informal	 communication	 network	 around	
these	two	papers	on	the	other	hand,	he	finds	that	the	reception	of	Mendel’s	papers	
well	 confirms	William	Garvey	and	Belver	Griffith’s	psychological	 study	 (1971)	 that	
most	 scientific	 communication	 takes	 place	 at	 the	 informal	 level.	 Therefore,	
MacRoberts	argues	that	one	significant	explanation	of	the	long	neglect	problem	is	
that	Mendel	made	so	little	informal	communication.	 	
Old	Response	3:	Mendel’s	Work	was	Nothing	New	
A	third	response	to	the	problem	of	long	neglect	is	to	question	the	legitimacy	of	the	
question.	
…	 [T]he	problem	of	 the	 long	neglect	of	 the	Versuche	 is	 to	a	 large	extent	a	
pseudo-problem.	(Olby,	1979,	p.	67)	
The	 ‘Great	 Neglect’	 is	 a	 product	 of	 historians	 of	 science,	 not	 of	 scientific	
history.	(Callender,	1988,	p.	72)	
Both	 Olby	 and	 Brannigan	 argue	 that	 Mendel’s	 paper	 was	 well	 within	 the	
hybridist	 tradition,	 and	 his	 work	 was	 not	 really	 revolutionary	 in	 this	 context.	
Based	 on	 Zirkle’s	 research	 (1951),	 Brannigan	 (1979)	 concludes	 that	 “Mendel	
was	not	an	obscure	historical	figure,	long	neglected	for	three	and	a	half	decades.	
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Nor	was	Mendel	entirely	accurately	read	by	those	who	were	most	familiar	with	
his	 work”	 because	 his	 important	 observations	 and	 “novel”	 approach	 were	
“recorded”	and	“pioneered”	by	his	predecessors	and	contemporaries!	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Callender	 argues	 that	 the	 anti-Darwinian	 implication	 of	
Mendel’s	work	sufficiently	“accounts	for	the	failure	of	his	theories	to	make	any	
significant	impression	on	serious	scientific	opinion	of	his	time,”	especially	given	
that	 both	 Alexander	 Makowsky,	 a	 leading	 member	 of	 the	 Natural	 History	
Society	 of	 Brünn	 who	 also	 presented	 in	 the	 same	 conference	 where	Mendel	
presented	his	paper	on	Pisum,	and	Nägeli,	the	only	known	correspondence	with	
Mendel	on	his	paper,	were	supporters	of	Darwinism.	
The	Explanations	of	the	Long	Neglect	of	Mendel’s	Paper	
Explanation	 Further	Explanation	
Mendel’s	 work	 was	
not	 accepted	 by	 his	
contemporaries.	
Ahead	of	his	time	/	Prematurity	(Gasking,	1959;	Glass,	
1974;	Iltis,	1932;	Zirkle,	1964)	
Lack	of	generality	(Glass,	1974;	Wilkie,	1962)	
Obscure	 application	 of	 mathematical	 models	
(Dodson,	1955;	East,	1923;	Gasking,	1959;	Weinstein,	
1962;	Wilkie,	1962)	
Irrelevance	 to	 the	 central	 problems	 of	 his	 time	
(Gasking,	1959;	Wilkie,	1962)	
Failure	 of	 comprehension	 (Gasking,	 1959;	 Sandler	 &	
Sandler,	1985;	Sorsby,	1965)	
Mendel’s	 work	 was	
to	 a	 large	 extent	
unknown	 to	 his	
contemporaries.	
Lack	of	informal	communication	(MacRoberts,	1985)	
Distraction	by	Darwin’s	work	(Bateson,	1902)	
Inaccessiblity	 of	 Mendel’s	 paper	 (Dodson,	 1955;	
Dorsey,	 1944;	 Gasking,	 1959;	 Mayr,	 1982;	 Posner	 &	
Skutil,	1968)	
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The	 problem	 of	 long	
neglect	 is	 a	
pseudo-problem.	
Anti-Darwinian	Implication	(Callender,	1988)	
Nothing	Revolutionary	(Brannigan,	1979;	Olby,	1979)	
The	Re-examination	of	the	Long	Neglect	
Despite	many	efforts	of	diagnosing	the	problem	of	long	neglect,	it	still	has	yet	to	be	
well	 resolved.	None	of	 these	explanations	alone	sufficiently	accounts	 for	 the	 long	
neglect.	 It	 has	 been	 overwhelmingly	 discussed,	 so	 I	 do	 not	 intend	 to	 repeat	 the	
objections	 here.	 Rather,	 I	 intend	 to	 re-examine	 the	 problem	 of	 long	 neglect	 by	
analysing	 the	 problem	 first.	 The	 problem	 of	 the	 long	 neglect	 originates	 from	 the	
rediscovery	 event	 in	 1900.	 Considering	 its	 great	 impact	 on	 the	 study	of	 heredity,	
Bateson	 was	 puzzled	 by	 a	 fact	 that	 Mendel’s	 work	 seemed	 to	 be	 forgotten	 for	
thirty-five	years.	
It	may	seem	surprising	that	a	work	of	such	importance	should	so	long	have	
failed	 to	 find	 recognition	 and	 to	 become	 current	 in	 the	 world	 science.	
(Bateson,	1902,	p.	37)	
It	seemed	to	be	natural	for	Bateson,	as	a	first	serious	proponent	of	Mendelism,	to	
have	such	a	question.	If	Mendel’s	work	was	so	important	to	the	study	of	heredity,	
how	could	it	be	ignored	or	neglected	for	such	a	long	time?	Why	was	its	significance	
not	 recognised	 earlier?	 However,	 this	 also	 reflects	 another	 fact.	 From	 the	 very	
beginning,	 the	 problem	 of	 long	 neglect	 is	 deeply	 rooted	 in	 a	 traditional	
understanding	 of	 Mendel’s	 work:	 Mendel’s	 work	 is	 about	 heredity.	 Because	
Mendel’s	work	 is	 about	heredity,	 it	must	 be	puzzling	why	 so	many	world-leading	
scientists	like	Darwin	and	Galton	who	made	efforts	to	understand	the	phenomena	
failed	 to	 recognise	 the	 valuable	 implication	 of	 Mendel’s	 work.	 This	 is	 also	 why	
Bateson’s	 counterfactual	 fantasy	 had	 been	 so	 widespread	 among	 historians	 and	
biologists	for	a	long	time.	
Had	Mendel’s	work	come	into	the	hands	of	Darwin,	it	is	not	too	much	to	say	
that	the	history	of	the	development	of	evolutionary	philosophy	would	have	
been	very	different	from	that	which	we	have	witnessed.	(Bateson,	1902,	p.	
39)	
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If	this	 is	the	logic	of	the	problem	of	the	long	neglect,	 I	argue	that	 it	 is	no	longer	a	
problem.	 	 Remember	my	 argument	 that	Mendel’s	 concern	 was	 development	 of	
hybrids	in	their	progeny,	it	is	not	surprising	that	his	work	was	not	warmly	received	
by	those	who	studied	heredity	 in	the	19th	century.	What	seems	obvious	to	us	was	
not	 obvious	 to	 Mendel’s	 contemporaries,	 especially	 those	 who	 were	 particularly	
interested	in	the	problem	of	heredity.	For	most	Mendel’s	contemporaries,	a	work	on	
the	development	of	pea	hybrid	would	not	obviously	make	a	potential	contribution	
to	 the	 study	of	heredity.	 The	 silence	on	Mendel’s	work	before	1900	and	also	 the	
struggle	 and	 confusion	 of	 understanding	 Mendel’s	 work	 by	 de	 Vries,	 Correns,	
Tschermak,	and	many	others	in	the	first	years	of	the	twentieth	century	confirm	my	
explanation.	 This	 reflects	well	 the	 fact	 that	Mendel’s	work	on	pea	hybrid	did	not	
seem	 to	 be	 an	 obvious	 supplement	 to	 the	 study	 of	 heredity	 in	 the	 nineteenth	
century.	
Nevertheless,	 my	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 long	 neglect	 based	 on	 the	
exemplar-based	 analysis	 should	 not	 be	 mistaken	 or	 conflated	 with	 the	 third	
solution	 I	mentioned.	 Though	 I	 agree	with	Brannigan,	Callender,	 and	Olby	on	 the	
point	that	to	some	extent	the	problem	of	long	neglect	is	a	pseudo-problem,	I	differ	
from	 them	 in	why	 it	 is	 a	 pseudo-problem.	Brannigan’s	 solution	 is	 on	 the	basis	 of	
Zirkle’s	 research,	 in	 which	 Zirkle	 identifies	 five	 important	 discoveries	 (i.e.	 the	
principle	 of	 dominance,	 the	 principle	 of	 segregation,	 the	 3	 :	 1	 ratio,	 the	
perpetuation	of	these	patterns	over	generations	and	the	principle	of	 independent	
assortment)	 in	Mendel’s	work	and	dismiss	them	in	terms	of	originality	or	novelty.	
For	example,	the	phenomena	of	dominance	and	segregation,	and	the	3	:	1	ratio	had	
been	 recorded	 by	 Mendel’s	 predecessors.	 As	 I	 have	 mentioned,	 Zirkle	 and	
Brannigan	are	correct	that	the	observation	on	the	phenomenon	of	dominance	was	
nothing	 new.	 In	 fact	Mendel	 admitted	 that	 his	 observation	 on	 the	 phenomenon	
was	merely	a	confirmation.	
Experiments	on	ornamental	plants	undertaken	in	previous	years	had	proven	
that,	 as	 a	 rule,	 hybrids	 do	 not	 represent	 the	 form	 exactly	 intermediate	
between	the	parental	strains.	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	10,	1966a,	p.	9)	
However,	 I	 argue	 the	 3	 :	 1	 ratio	 was	 really	 a	 novel	 observation	 and	
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conceptualisation	 made	 by	 Mendel.	 Zirkle	 argues	 that	 Johann	 Dzierzon,	 a	
bee-breeder,	already	suggested	the	3	:	1	ratio	11	years	before	Mendel’s	publication.	
In	fact,	in	his	publication	in	1854,	Dzierzon	only	wrote,	
If	 [the	 queen]	 originates	 from	 a	 hybrid	 brood,	 it	 is	 impossible	 for	 her	 to	
produce	pure	drones,	but	she	produces	half	Italian	and	half	German	drones,	
but	 strangely	 enough,	 not	 according	 to	 the	 type	 [not	 a	 half	 and	 half	
intermediate	 type]	 but	 according	 to	 number,	 as	 if	 it	were	 difficult	 to	 fuse	
both	species	into	a	middle	race.	(Zirkle,	1951,	p.	102)	
On	the	basis	of	this	passage,	Zirkle	boldly	argues,	
The	 genetic	 implication	 of	 this	 passage	 is	 obvious.	 Two	 types	 of	 drones	
being	derived	from	unfertilized	eggs	means	that	two	types	of	eggs	were	laid.	
If	 hybrid	 females	 produced	 two	 kinds	 of	 eggs	 in	 equal	 numbers,	 then	 the	
production	by	hybrid	males	of	two	types	of	sperms	also	in	equal	numbers	is	
indicated	 by	 the	 internal	 logic	 of	 the	 situation.	 (This	 of	 course	 does	 not	
apply	 to	 bees	 for	 reasons	which	we	 need	 not	mention	 here.	 A	 drone	 can	
produce	only	one	kind	of	sperm.)	Random	fusion	of	such	eggs	and	sperms	
could	produce	only	a	1	 :	2	 :	1	ratio.	 In	the	presence	of	dominance,	so	well	
recorded	by	Knight,	Sageret,	Gärtner	et	al,	this	would	appear	as	a	3	:	1	ratio.	
(Zirkle,	1951,	p.	102)	
Nevertheless,	it	is	hardly	a	piece	of	evidence	to	show	that	Dzierzon	recognised	the	
3	 :	1	 ratio.	The	3	 :	1	 ratio	was	explicitly	 found	nowhere	 in	his	paper,	nor	was	 it	a	
natural	 implication	 that	 could	 have	 been	 easily	 made	 by	 Dzierzon	 or	 his	 reader.	
Zirkle’s	argument	 is	definitely	a	20th	 century	 reading	of	Dzierzon’s	paper.	Thus,	 in	
contrast	 to	 Zirkle	 and	 Brannigan,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 novelty	 of	 the	 3	 :	 1	 ratio	 in	
Mendel’s	work	should	not	be	dismissed.	In	addition,	Callender’s	argument	has	gone	
too	far.	We	have	too	little	evidence	to	confirm	or	falsify	Callender’s	conviction	that	
Mendel	was	an	opponent	of	descent	with	modification	and	his	work	was	dismissed	
for	 his	 anti-Darwinian	 attitude.	 Therefore,	 my	 solution	 by	 applying	 the	
exemplar-based	approach	provides	a	new	way	out	of	the	maze	of	long	neglect.	
Of	course	this	should	not	be	the	end	of	the	story	of	the	exemplar-based	analysis	of	
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the	 problem	of	 long	 neglect.	 There	 are	 still	 unsolved	 problems.	 Even	 if	Mendel’s	
work	was	not	about	heredity,	it	is	undoubtful	that	Mendel’s	work	on	Pisum	was	still	
novel	and	 interesting	 in	both	theoretical	and	methodological	ways	 in	the	study	of	
plant	 breeding.	 Why	 was	 the	 novelty	 and	 significance	 of	 Mendel’s	 exemplary	
practice	on	Pisum	overlooked	in	the	19th	century?	And,	why	was	 it	adopted	by	de	
Vries,	Correns,	Tschermak,	and	Bateson	at	the	turn	of	the	20th	century?	Although	I	
would	not	be	able	 to	explore	a	comprehensive	solution	 to	 these	problems	 in	 this	
thesis	here,	 I	definitely	contend	that	my	exemplar-based	approach	also	shed	new	
lights	 on	 these	 issues.	 As	 I	 have	 indicated	 in	 the	 section	 4.3,	 repeatability	 and	
usefulness	 are	 two	 intellectual	 characteristics	 of	 a	 good	 exemplary	 practice.	 The	
“rediscovery”	of	Mendel’s	work	in	1900	is	such	a	good	example	to	illustrate	this.	
In	 1900-1902,	 de	 Vries,	 Correns,	 Tschermak,	 and	 Bateson	 all	 acknowledged	 the	
usefulness	of	Mendel’s	exemplary	practice	to	other	research	problems.	
[T]he	law	of	segregation	of	hybrids	as	discovered	by	Mendel	for	peas]	has	a	
basic	significance	for	the	study	of	the	units	of	which	the	species	character	is	
composed.	(de	Vries,	1900a,	p.	90,	1966,	p.	117)	
In	 order	 to	 explain	 the	 facts,	 one	 must	 assume	 (as	 did	 Mendel)	 that	 …	
(Correns,	1900,	p.	163,	1966,	p.	125)	
[Mendel’s	principle]	proves	to	be	of	the	highest	significance	for	the	study	of	
inheritance	in	general.	(Tschermak,	1900b,	p.	235,	1950,	p.	44)	
[B]y	the	application	of	those	[Mendelian]	principles	we	are	enabled	to	reach	
and	 deal	 in	 a	 comprehensive	 manner	 with	 phenomena	 of	 a	 fundamental	
nature,	lying	at	the	very	root	of	all	conceptions	not	merely	of	the	physiology	
of	 reproduction	 and	 heredity,	 but	 even	 of	 the	 essential	 nature	 of	 living	
organisms,	…	(Bateson,	1902,	p.	35)	
Moreover,	 all	 de	 Vries,	 Correns,	 Tschermak,	 and	 Bateson	 repeated	 Mendel’s	
exemplary	practice	on	Pisum	 in	 their	own	ways.	Correns,	as	 I	have	showed	 in	 the	
section	4.1,	to	a	great	extent	repeated	Mendel’s	experiments	and	hypothesisation	
to	 test	his	 laws.	 In	contrast,	de	Vries	mainly	 repeated	Mendel’s	conceptualisation	
and	 hypothesisation	 to	 reinterpret	 his	 old	 data,	 drawn	 from	 his	 massive	
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experiments	 on	 hybridisation	 in	 1890s.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 not	 hasty	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	
repeatability	and	usefulness	of	Mendel’s	exemplary	practice	were	recognised	by	de	
Vries,	 Correns,	 Tschermak,	 and	Bateson	 at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 20th	 century.	 To	 some	
extent,	 it	also	explains	why	the	significance	of	Mendel’s	work	was	well	recognised	
in	1900	by	these	men.	The	failure	of	recognising	the	repeatability	and	usefulness	(in	
particular)	of	Mendel’s	exemplary	practice	is	one	important	intellectual	explanation	
of	why	so	many	Mendel’s	contemporaries	overlooked	the	significance	of	Mendel’s	
work.	
Summary	
To	sum	up,	in	this	chapter,	I	have	proposed	an	exemplar-based	characterisation	of	
the	origin	of	genetics	from	Mendel	to	Bateson.	Furthermore,	I	also	argued	that	my	
exemplar-based	 characterisation	 provides	 an	 alternative	 understanding	 of	 the	
development	 of	 the	 practice	 from	 Mendel	 to	 Bateson,	 which	 is	 not	 framed	 by	
theory,	and	offers	a	new	way	to	re-examine	the	problem	of	long	neglect.	
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CHAPTER                                                                       	
	
6 
	
6.	Why	Exemplars?	A	Defence	and	Further	
Articulation	
In	this	chapter,	I	aim	to	defend	my	exemplar-based	approach	to	analysing	the	origin	
of	 genetics.	 Firstly,	 I	 shall	 discuss	 and	 examine	 the	 potential	 responses	 to	 my	
objections	 from	 the	 theory-driven	 approach,	 and	 defend	 the	 superiority	 of	 the	
exemplar-based	 account	 of	 the	 origin	 of	 genetics	 to	 the	 theory-driven	 one.	
Secondly,	 I	 shall	 argue	 that	 my	 exemplar-based	 approach	 is	 better	 fit	 than	 a	
potential	mechanism-based	one	 to	 characterising	 the	origin	of	 genetics.	 Thirdly,	 I	
shall	make	some	further	notes	on	the	exemplar-base	approach	in	general.	
6.1	 The	 Potential	 Responses	 and	 Challenges	 from	 the	 Theory-Driven	
Approach	
Potential	Response	1:	The	Problem	of	Theory-Identification	Revisited	
One	crucial	problem	that	I	identify	for	the	theory-driven	approach	in	the	section	1.2	
is	 the	 problem	 of	 theory-identification:	 If	 the	 origin	 of	 genetics	 is	 basically	
construed	 as	 a	 development	 of	 a	 theory	 of	 heredity,	 there	 is	 a	 difficulty	 of	
identifying	 that	 theory	 in	 history.	 There	 are	 two	 potential	ways	 of	 defending	 the	
theory-driven	account	of	the	origin	of	genetics.	
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One	 way	 to	 defend	 the	 theory-driven	 approach	 is	 to	 argue	 that	 there	 is	 a	
theoretical	consensus	invariantly	shared	by	Mendel,	de	Vries,	Correns,	Tschermak,	
and	Bateson.	It	can	be	argued	that	the	idea	that	there	are	two	determinants	for	a	
heritable	trait	consisted	in	the	“core”	of	the	theory	that	was	invariantly	preserved	
in	 the	 practices	 of	 these	 scientists	 and	 distinguished	 theirs	 from	 other	
contemporaries	working	 in	 the	problem	of	heredity	 in	 the	 late	19th	and	early	20th	
century.	 The	 determinants	 can	 be	 loosely	 construed	 as	 the	 postulated	 factors,	
whether	the	factors	are	understood	realistically	or	instrumentally.	It	is	evident	that	
the	 idea	of	 two	determinants	 for	a	heritable	trait	can	be	found	 in	all	of	de	Vries’,	
Correns’,	and	Bateson’s	work,	 though	not	all	explicitly	 formulated.	For	de	Vries,	a	
heritable	trait	is	somehow	dependent	on	the	composition	of	two	characteristics	in	
the	reproductive	cell.	 	
In	the	hybrid	the	two	antagonistic	[characteristics]	lie	next	to	each	other	as	
anlagen.	In	vegetative	life	only	the	dominating	one	is	usually	visible...	
In	 the	 formation	 of	 pollen	 grains	 and	 ovules	 these	 [characteristics]	
separate....	
If	dominating	is	designated	by	d	and	recessive	by	r,	fertilization	yields:	
(d	+	r)(d	+	r)	=	d2	+	2dr	+	r2	
or	
25%	d	+	50%	dr	+	25%	r	
The	individuals	d	and	d2	have	only	the	dominating	characteristics,	those	of	r	
and	r2	constitution	possess	only	the	recessive	the	recessive	characteristics,	
while	the	dr	plants	are	obviously	hybrids.	(de	Vries,	1900a,	p.	86,	1966,	pp.	
111–112)	
Correns	suggested	that	a	heritable	trait	is	somehow	dependent	on	two	anlagen	in	
the	reproductive	nuclei.	
…	[P]rior	to	the	definitive	formation	of	the	reproductive	nuclei	a	complete	
separation	of	the	two	anlagen	occurs,	so	that	one	half	of	the	reproductive	
nuclei	receive	the	anlage	for	[one	trait],	the	other	half	the	[other].	(Correns,	
1900,	p.	166,	1966,	p.	126)	
For	Bateson,	a	heritable	trait	is	dependent	on	a	pair	of	allelomorphs.	
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Each	such	character,	which	is	capable	of	being	dissociated	or	replaced	by	its	
contrary,	must	henceforth	be	conceived	of	as	a	distinct	unit-character;	and	
as	we	know	that	the	several	unit-characters	are	of	such	a	nature	that	any	
one	of	them	is	capable	of	independently	displacing	or	being	displaced	by	
one	or	more	alternative	characters	taken	singly,	we	may	recognize	this	fact	
by	naming	such	unit-characters	allelomorphs.	So	far,	we	know	very	little	of	
any	allelomorphs	existing	otherwise	than	as	pairs	of	contraries,	but	this	is	
probably	merely	due	to	experimental	limitations	and	the	rudimentary	state	
of	our	knowledge.	
In	one	case	(combs	of	fowls)	we	know	three	characters,	pea	comb,	rose	
comb	and	single	comb;	of	which	pea	and	single,	or	rose	and	single,	behave	
towards	each	other	as	a	pair	of	allelomorphs,	but	of	the	behaviour	of	pea	
and	rose	towards	each	other	we	know	as	yet	nothing.	(Bateson,	1902,	pp.	
18–19)	
Although	Mendel	never	explicitly	stated	the	 idea	that	there	are	two	determinants	
for	a	heritable	 trait,	 it	 can	be	argued	 that	he	 implicitly	 suggested	 that	a	heritable	
trait	is	somehow	dependent	on	a	pair	of	cells	with	a	kind.	
[I]n	an	average	of	many	cases	it	will	always	happen	that	every	pollen	form	A	
and	 a	 will	 unite	 equally	 often	 with	 every	 germinal-cell	 form	 A	 and	 a;	
therefore,	in	fertilization,	one	of	the	two	pollen	cells	A	will	meet	a	germinal	
cell	a,	and	equally,	one	pollen	cell	a	will	become	associated	with	a	germinal	
cell	A,	the	other	with	a.	
…	The	striking	phenomenon,	that	hybrids	are	able	to	produce,	in	addition	to	
the	two	parental	types,	progeny	that	resemble	themselves	is	thus	explained:	
and	both	give	the	same	association,	Aa,	…	Therefore	!! + !! + !! + !! = 𝐴 + 2𝐴𝑎 + 𝑎	 (Mendel,	1865,	pp.	29–30,	1966a,	p.	30)	
In	contrast,	no	one	else	in	the	period	1865	-	1900	expressed	a	similar	idea	on	two	
determinants	for	a	heritable	trait.	For	example,	as	an	influential	theory	of	heredity	
in	 the	 19th	 century,	 Darwin’s	 theory	 of	 pangenesis	 (1868)	 says	 little	 on	 the	
numerical	relation	of	gemmules	in	the	formation	of	a	heritable	trait.	Therefore,	the	
idea	on	the	two	determinants	for	a	heritable	trait	 is	the	characteristic	component	
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of	 the	 theory	 of	 early	 Mendelian	 genetics.	 Thus,	 the	 problem	 of	
theory-identification	is	resolved.	Moreover,	given	the	idea	of	two	determinants	for	
a	 heritable	 trait	 as	 the	 theoretical	 consensus,	 the	 origin	 of	 genetics	 can	 still	 be	
characterised	in	a	theory-driven	way:	Mendel	proposed	a	theory	in	1865.	De	Vries	
developed	 Mendel’s	 theory	 by	 incorporating	 his	 theory	 of	 pangenesis.	 Correns	
tested	Mendel’s	 theory	 by	 conducting	 similar	 experiments	 and	 reformulated	 it	 in	
terms	of	anlagen.	Bateson	defended	and	further	developed	Mendel’s	theory	on	the	
basis	of	de	Vries’	and	Correns’	 revision.	Moreover,	 there	 is	a	development	of	 the	
conception	of	determinant	 for	 a	heritable	 trait,	 from	Mendel’s	 “kinds	of	 cell”,	 de	
Vries’	 “characteristics”,	Correns’	 “anlagen”,	 to	Bateson’s	 “allelomorphs”.	The	only	
price	has	to	be	paid	in	this	defence	is	to	exclude	Tschermak’s	work	from	the	origin	
of	genetics.	
However,	 I	 shall	 argue	 that	 this	 potential	 defence	 is	 unsuccessful.	 It	 is	 still	
problematic	to	argue	that	the	idea	that	there	are	two	determinants	for	a	heritable	
trait	was	 the	theoretical	consensus	among	Mendel,	de	Vries,	Correns,	Tschermak,	
and	Bateson,	though	it	seems	that	the	idea	was	implicitly	suggested	in	their	works.	
Recall	de	Vries’	statement	that	“In	the	hybrid	the	two	antagonistic	[characteristics]	
lie	 next	 to	 each	 other	 as	 anlagen.	 In	 vegetative	 life	 only	 the	 dominating	 one	 is	
usually	visible”.	 In	addition	 to	 read	 this	as	a	piece	of	evidence	 to	support	 that	de	
Vries	had	an	idea	on	that	two	determinants	for	a	heritable	trait,	one	can	use	it	to	
support	 that	 de	 Vries	 had	 an	 idea	 on	 one	 determinant	 for	 a	 heritable	 trait.	 This	
second	 interpretation	 seems	 to	 be	 better	 compatible	 with	 de	 Vries’	 theory	 of	
pangenesis	(1889).	As	I	have	mentioned,	for	de	Vries,	every	heritable	characteristic	
has	 its	 special	 kind	 of	 pangen.	 When	 a	 pangen	 is	 in	 the	 active	 state,	 the	
corresponding	heritable	characteristic	 is	visible.	 It	 is	evident	 that	 in	1889	de	Vries	
held	 the	 view	 that	 there	 is	 one	 pangen	 for	 one	 heritable	 trait,	 and	 it	 is	 more	
plausible	 to	 argue	 that	 his	 1900	 statement	 that	 “in	 vegetative	 life	 only	 the	
dominating	[characteristic]	is	usually	visible”	suggests	his	belief	on	one	determinant	
for	a	heritable	trait	rather	than	two.	Thus,	it	is	doubtful	that	de	Vries	had	an	explicit	
idea	that	there	are	two	determinants	on	a	heritable	trait.	 	
What	 is	worse,	a	careful	 reading	of	Mendel’s	paper	 (1865)	will	 show	that	Mendel	
did	not	have	the	idea	that	there	are	two	determinants	for	a	heritable	trait.	Firstly,	
	 207	
there	 are	 some	 texts	 which	 do	 not	 support	 that	Mendel	 had	 the	 idea	 of	 paired	
determinants.	Mendel,	 for	 example,	 (1865,	 p.	 31,	 1966a,	 p.	 32)	 denotes	 the	 trait	
type	 of	 the	 combined	 kinds	 of	 cells	 !"!"	 as	 Aab.	 If	Mendel	 had	 had	 the	 idea	 that	
paired	kinds	of	 cells	determines	 (or	at	 least	 corresponds	 to)	 a	heritable	 type,	 the	
trait	type	should	have	been	Ab	rather	than	Aab.	Secondly,	although	Mendel	(1865,	
p.	30,	1966a,	p.	30)	indicates	that	the	cell	type	 !!	 corresponds	to	the	morphological	
trait	 A,	 !!	 to	 Aa,	 and	 !!	 to	 a,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 it	 is	 in	 fact	 the	 cell	 type	 𝐴	
corresponds	 to	 the	 morphological	 trait	 A.	 When	 one	 pollen	 cell	 𝐴 	 becomes	
associated	with	the	germinal	cell	 𝐴,	the	fertilised	cell	only	has	the	cell	type	A.	It	is	
the	 cell	 type	 𝐴	 rather	 than	 !!	 that	 corresponds	 to	 the	morphological	 trait	 A.	 In	
other	 words,	 it	 is	 the	 cell	 type	 rather	 than	 a	 pair	 of	 cell	 types	 corresponds	 to	 a	
heritable	trait.	This	is	also	why	Mendel	indicates	that	the	cell	type	 !"!"	 corresponds	
to	the	trait	type	Aab	rather	than	Ab.	So,	the	speculation	that	Mendel	had	the	idea	
of	paired	determinants	 is	not	well	supported	by	Mendel’s	paper.	Therefore,	given	
the	current	evidence	we	have,	it	is	insufficient	to	show	that	the	idea	that	there	are	
two	 determinants	 for	 a	 heritable	 consisted	 in	 the	 core	 of	 the	 theory,	which	was	
invariantly	shared	by	Mendel,	de	Vries,	Correns,	and	Bateson.	Hence,	the	problem	
of	theory-identification	remains	unsolved.	
The	 other	 way	 to	 defend	 the	 theory-driven	 approach	 against	 the	 problem	 of	
identification	 is	 to	 take	 a	 pluralist	 stance	 by	 arguing	 that	 even	 if	 there	 was	 no	
well-formulated	 theoretical	 consensus	 in	 the	origin	of	 genetics,	 it	 is	not	a	 serious	
objection	 to	 the	 theory-driven	 approach.	 It	 seems	 possible	 to	 characterise	 and	
structure	some	discussion	by	reference	to	aspects	of	an	underlying	theory	without	
actually	 identifying	 that	underlying	 theory	as	a	whole.	Perhaps	one	could	use	 the	
set	of	models	instantiated	by	the	theory,	or	similar.	A	practitioner	of	genetics	in	the	
early	 period	 could	 identify,	 say,	 the	 theory	 of	 genetics,	 and	 then	move	 on	 to	 do	
some	 of	 these	 subsequent	 activities,	 without	 fully	 defining	 or	 characterising	 the	
entire	underlying	theory.	In	the	case	of	the	origin	of	genetics,	it	can	be	argued	that	
despite	 theoretical	 variations	 of	 Mendel’s,	 de	 Vries’,	 Correns’,	 Tschermak’s,	 and	
Bateson’s	work,	 they	 all	 could	 be	 characterised	 as	 different	 versions	 of	 a	 theory.	
Thus,	the	origin	of	genetics	can	be	characterised	as	a	pluralistic	development	of	a	
theory.	
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Unfortunately,	 this	 response	 is	 not	 tenable,	 either.	 If	Mendel,	 de	 Vries,	 Correns,	
Tschermak,	and	Bateson	are	identified	within	a	school	of	scientific	practice	centrally	
based	 on	 a	 theory,	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	 they	 share	 some	 theoretical	 components.	
There	must	be	a	theoretical	consensus	among	them	so	as	to	identify	them	within	in	
a	 school	 of	 scientific	 practice.	 The	 “theoretical	 consensus”	 here	 does	 not	
necessarily	 suggest	 a	 full-fledged	 theory	 of	 heredity.	 However,	 some	 theoretical	
components,	 like	 concepts	 or	 hypotheses,	 are	 necessarily	 accepted	 as	 the	
theoretical	 foundation	 for	 their	 practices.	 Otherwise	 it	 is	 arbitrary	 to	 examine	
Mendel’s,	Mendel’s,	de	Vries’,	Correns’,	Tschermak’s,	and	Bateson’s	work	to	study	
the	origin	of	genetics.	It	is	a	task	for	anyone	who	takes	the	theory-driven	approach	
to	identify	the	theoretical	consensus	among	Mendel,	de	Vries,	Correns,	Tschermak,	
and	Bateson.	 It	 is	also	a	task	for	anyone	who	takes	the	theory-driven	approach	to	
articulate	 the	 theoretical	 change	 (or	 progress)	 made	 by	 de	 Vries,	 Correns,	
Tschermak,	 and	Bateson.	After	 all,	 anyone	who	 takes	 the	 theory-driven	approach	
has	 to	encounter	 the	problem	of	 identification.	What	 is	more,	 it	 should	be	noted	
that	 even	 if	 a	 pluralist	 response	 is	 successful,	 the	 defence	 of	 the	 theory-driven	
approach	 is	 not	 complete.	 As	 I	 have	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 there	 are	 four	main	
problems.	It	is	difficult	to	see	how	a	pluralistic	can	overcome	all	the	four	problems.	
To	sum	up,	I	have	shown	that	firstly,	the	idea	that	there	are	two	determinants	for	a	
heritable	trait	cannot	be	the	core	of	the	theory	of	heredity	in	the	origin	of	genetics,	
and	 secondly,	 the	 problem	 of	 theory-identification	 is	 still	 an	 urgent	 question	 for	
those	whom	take	the	theory-driven	approach	to	answer.	
Potential	Response	2:	The	Problem	of	Exemplar-Centrality?	
Another	problem	 that	 I	 identify	 for	 the	 theory-driven	approach	 is	 the	problem	of	
theory-centrality,	 which	 is,	 the	 theory-driven	 approach	 assumes	 the	 centrality	 of	
the	 role	 of	 theory	 in	 the	 origin	 of	 genetics.	 Some	 might	 argue	 that	 the	
exemplar-based	approach	is	vulnerable	to	a	similar	objection.	The	exemplar-based	
approach	 provides	 nothing	 really	 novel,	 compared	 with	 the	 theory-driven	 one.	
Those	philosophers	who	take	the	theory-driven	approach	are	accused	of	identifying	
an	 explanatory	 central	 theory	 when	 studying	 the	 history	 of	 genetics,	 while	 it	
appears	to	some	that	the	exemplar-based	approach	suggests	that	the	first	task	of	
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studying	the	history	of	genetics	is	to	identify	an	exemplary	practice.	The	shift	from	a	
theory	to	an	exemplary	practice	does	not	seem	to	change	too	much.	In	response,	I	
argue	that	the	crucial	difference	 is	 that	according	to	the	theory-driven	account	of	
the	 origin	 of	 genetics	 suggests	 that	 the	 practices	 of	 Mendel,	 de	 Vries,	 Correns,	
Tschermak,	 and	 Bateson	 were	 centred	 on	 a	 theory,	 while	 according	 to	 the	
exemplar-based	 account,	 the	 origin	 of	 genetics	 was	 characterised	 as	 a	 chain	 of	
exemplary	 practices.	 The	 exemplar-based	 approach	 does	 not	warrant	 the	 central	
role	of	any	exemplary	practice	in	history.	Nor	were	all	of	the	practices	in	the	early	
history	of	genetics	centred	on	any	exemplary	practice.	
Nevertheless,	some	may	further	argue	that	according	to	the	theory-driven	account,	
the	origin	of	genetics	can	also	be	characterised	as	a	chain	of	versions	of	a	theory.	
No	single	version	of	a	theory	of	heredity	was	regarded	as	the	driving	force	for	the	
practices	 in	 the	 origin	 of	 genetics.	 The	 theoretical	 changes	 of	 these	 different	
versions	of	the	theory	of	genetics	are	detailed	in	Darden’s	analysis.	In	reply,	I	argue	
that,	the	problem	of	centrality	is	still	there.	Only	if	one	characterises	Mendel’s,	de	
Vries’,	Correns’,	Tschermak’s,	and	Bateson’s	work	as	different	versions	of	a	theory,	
it	 still	 implicitly	 assumes	 a	 central	 theory.	 Therefore,	 the	 problem	 of	
theory-centrality	remains.	In	contrast,	the	exemplary	account	does	not	privilege	the	
centrality	of	any	exemplary	practice.	
Moreover,	 there	 are	 two	 substantial	 differences	 between	 the	 theory-driven	 and	
exemplar-based	approaches.	Firstly,	the	exemplar-based	approach	provides	a	new	
unit	 of	 analysis	 in	 the	 history	 of	 genetics.	 The	 philosophers,	 who	 take	 the	
theory-driven	approach,	used	to	use	theories,	as	the	most	popular	unit	of	analysis,	
to	characterise	the	history	of	genetics,	or	the	practice	of	genetics.	However,	such	an	
approach	 leads	 to	 a	 dream	 of	 a	macro-unit,	 which	 can	 identify	 the	 practice	 of	 a	
scientific	community	by	a	set	of	common	features.	For	instance,	whether	a	scientist	
is	 part	 of	 a	 theory	 is	 to	 see	 if	 she	 makes	 a	 commitment	 to	 a	 set	 of	 theoretical	
components,	which	 consist	 in	 the	 core	 of	 a	 theory.	 I	 call	 the	 unit	 of	 analysis	 like	
theory	macro	because	it	is	assumed	to	be	a	compressive	system	or	structure,	which	
can	capture	the	multifaceted	nature	of	the	practice	of	a	scientific	community.	The	
macro	unit	 suggests	 that	 there	 is	a	 consensus,	which	consists	 in	 the	 fundamental	
component	 of	 the	 practice	 of	 a	 community	 and	 is	 invariantly	 shared	 by	 the	
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practitioners	of	a	scientific	community	throughout	the	time.	
However,	this	dream	of	a	macro-unit	is	too	utopian.	There	are	two	main	difficulties	
of	the	search	for	a	macro-unit.	The	first	problem	is	about	 identification.	As	 I	have	
shown	 in	 1.2,	 it	 is	 extremely	 difficult	 to	 determine	 the	 common	 features	 of	 the	
practice	 of	 a	 scientific	 community.	 Consider	 the	 explanatory	 aim	 of	 the	 theory.	
Though	classical	geneticists’	work	in	1910s	can	be	characterised	as	a	coherent	set	of	
epistemic	 activities	 aiming	 at	 explaining	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 transmission	
inheritance,	there	are	some	important	works	(e.g.	Sturtevant’s	investigation	on	CIIIB),	
which	were	undertaken	without	such	an	aim.	Thus,	 it	 is	a	difficult	 task	 to	 identify	
some	 common	 features	 of	 the	 practice	 of	 a	 scientific	 community.	 In	 addition,	 a	
related	problem	is	about	investigative	freedom.	The	macro-unit,	I	mean	the	notion	
of	 a	 theory,	 has	 the	 limitation	 to	 reflect	 the	 investigative	 freedom	 of	 scientists’	
practice.	As	we	 can	 see	 in	 the	 case	of	 Sturtevant’s	 investigation	of	 the	CIIIB,	 even	
with	the	same	ultimate	aim,	scientists	in	the	actual	practice	often	have	other	aims,	
while	these	practices	cannot	be	excluded	from	the	school	of	practice.	If	we	take	the	
theory-driven	 approach	 dogmatically,	 we	 have	 to	 bite	 the	 bullet	 by	 excluding	
Sturtevant’s	 work	 from	 the	 practice	 of	 classical	 geneticists,	 which	 is	 highly	
implausible.	
In	comparison,	an	exemplar	is	not	this	kind	of	macro-unit.	Rather	it	is	a	micro-unit.	
Unlike	 the	 macro-unit,	 the	 micro-unit	 is	 not	 assumed	 to	 be	 the	 fundamental	
component	of	 the	practice	of	 a	 scientific	 community	 in	 the	 sense	 it	 is	 invariantly	
shared	by	the	practitioners	in	history.	However,	a	micro-unit	suggests	 	
Remember	that	an	exemplar	is	a	set	of	contextually	co-defined	research	problems	
and	 their	 solutions.	 Though	de	Vries,	 Correns,	 Tschermak,	 and	Bateson	all	 accept	
Mendel’s	exemplary	practice	on	Pisum,	 it	does	not	mean	 that	 they	all	 accept	 the	
concepts,	methodologies,	hypotheses	themselves.	Rather	they	accept	the	concepts,	
methodologies,	and	hypotheses	as	the	tools	to	define	and	solve	their	own	research	
problems.	As	 I	 have	argued	 in	 the	 section	5.4,	 there	 is	no	 common	 feature	of	 an	
exemplary	 practice	 shared	 invariantly	 by	 a	 scientific	 community	 throughout	 the	
history.	 Instead	 there	 is	 a	 chain	 of	 exemplary	 practices,	 in	 which	 successive	
exemplary	practices	are	correlated	with	earlier	ones	via	the	reception,	modification,	
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and	 application	 of	 some	 constituents.	 Thus,	 the	 practice	 of	 early	 genetics	 is	 not	
identified	by	any	persistent	common	feature	of	a	macro-unit	(e.g.	a	theory).	Rather,	
it	 is	 identified	by	a	series	of	exemplary	practices.	Thus,	 it	 is	 in	 this	 sense	 that	 the	
exemplar	is	a	micro-unit	of	analysis.	
In	 addition,	 there	 is	 another	 crucial	 difference	 between	 the	 exemplar-based	 and	
the	 theory-driven	 approaches.	 The	 theory-driven	 approach	 is	 a	 descriptivistic	
approach	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 assumes	 that	 a	 school	 of	 scientific	 practice	 can	 be	
identified	by	a	consensus	among	practitioners,	which	can	be	summarised	as	a	set	of	
descriptive	 conditions.	 For	 example,	 the	 theory-driven	 approach	 relies	 on	 the	
theory-centric	view	which	assumes	the	central	role	of	a	theory	T	in	the	practice	of	a	
scientific	 community.	 Thus,	 a	 school	 of	 scientific	 practice	 is	 identified	 by	 a	 set	 of	
descriptive	 conditions,	which	 suffice	 to	 determine	T.	 Such	 a	 descriptive	 approach	
encounters	the	problem	of	identification.	When	scrutinising	the	history	of	science,	
we	have	great	difficulties	of	 identifying	such	a	set	of	descriptive	conditions.	In	the	
case	 of	 the	 origin	 of	 genetics,	 it	 is	 extremely	 difficult	 to	 identify	 any	 theoretical	
consensus	 among	 Mendel,	 de	 Vries,	 Correns,	 Tschermak,	 and	 Bateson.	 The	
descriptivistic	 approach	 assumes	 too	 much.	 In	 addition,	 as	 I	 have	 shown	 in	 the	
section	 1.3,	 such	 an	 analysis	 overlooks	 the	 role	 of	 investigative	 practice.	 Even	 if	
within	 a	 community	 of	 scientists	 with	 a	 definite	 aim,	 there	 are	 some	 practices	
which	 do	not	 strictly	 follow	 the	ultimate	 aim.	Again,	 Sturtevant’s	 investigation	of	
the	CIIIB	is	such	a	good	example.	Sturtevant	is	a	leading	figure	in	the	Morgan	school,	
but	 his	work	on	CIIIB	 cannot	 be	 simply	 characterised	 as	 a	 practice	 centred	on	 the	
theory	of	the	gene	or	the	discovery	of	the	mechanism	of	transmission	inheritance.	
In	 comparison,	 the	 exemplar-based	 approach	 is	 a	 non-descriptivistic	 approach	 to	
analyse	 and	 understand	 the	 history	 of	 genetics.	 An	 established	 school	 of	 genetic	
practice	is	not	identified	by	a	set	of	descriptive	conditions	(e.g.	explanatory	aims	or	
theoretical	consensus).	Rather	it	is	characterised	by	a	historically	contingent	series	
of	 exemplary	 practices.	 The	 series	 of	 exemplary	 practices	 cannot	 be	 reductively	
identified	 by	 an	 invariantly	 accepted	 set	 of	 descriptive	 conditions.	 The	 relation	
between	any	 two	 successive	exemplary	practices	 is	historically	 contingent.	 This	 is	
the	 second	 novel	 contribution	 of	 the	 exemplar-based	 approach,	 namely,	 the	
introduction	 to	a	non-descriptivistic	 approach	 to	analysing	 the	history	of	 genetics	
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(especially	 the	 origin	 of	 genetics).	 Therefore,	 the	 exemplar-base	 analysis	 of	 the	
origin	 of	 genetics	 is	 not	 reducible	 to	 a	 theory-driven	 analysis.	 To	 sum	 up,	 the	
exemplar-based	 approach	 is	 exempt	 from	 the	 potential	 attack	 of	 the	 problem	 of	
centrality.	
Challenge	1:	Why	are	Exemplars	better	in	any	sense?	
Still	 some	may	 challenge	 the	 superiority	 of	 the	 exemplar-based	 approach	 to	 the	
theory-driven	one.	Even	if	the	exemplar-based	approach	helps	us	have	a	plausible	
account	of	the	origin	of	genetics,	it	just	provides	an	alternative	way	to	characterise	
the	 history	 of	 genetics.	 It	 is	 still	 too	 early	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	 exemplar-based	
approach	is	better	fit	than	the	theory-driven	one	in	analysing	the	origin	of	genetics.	
In	 the	 following,	 I	 shall	 summarise	 the	 reasons	 for	 the	 superiority	 of	 the	
exemplar-based	approach	in	analysing	the	origin	of	genetics.	
Firstly,	 as	 I	 have	 argued	 earlier	 in	 this	 section,	 the	 exemplar-based	 approach	 is	
exempt	 from	any	kind	of	problem	of	 identification.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 theory-driven	
account	 cannot	 overcome	 the	 problem	 of	 theory-identification.	 Secondly,	 the	
exemplar-based	 approach	 does	 not	 encounter	 a	 problem	 of	 centrality	 as	 the	
theory-driven	one	does.	No	single	exemplary	practice	is	assumed	to	play	a	central	
role	 in	 the	practice	 throughout	 the	history.	Thirdly,	 the	exemplar-based	approach	
enables	us	 to	articulate	more	 facets	of	 the	origin	of	genetics.	The	non-theoretical	
aspects	 of	 the	 practice	 and	 their	 relation	 to	 the	 theoretical	 ones	 have	 been	
investigated	 and	 highlighted	 in	 greater	 detail.	 Fourthly,	 the	 exemplar-based	
approach	 provides	 a	 new	 way	 to	 examine	 the	 puzzle	 of	 long	 neglect,	 which	
persistently	puzzled	those	who	take	the	theory-driven	approach.	Not	only	does	the	
exemplar-based	 approach	 provide	 a	 new	 explanation	 of	 why	 those	 who	 were	
interested	 in	 the	 problem	 of	 heredity	 in	 19th	 century	 failed	 to	 recognise	 the	
significance	of	Mendel’s	work,	it	but	also	offers	a	contrastive	explanation	of	why	it	
is	 that	 de	 Vries,	 Correns,	 Tschermak,	 and	 Bateson	 rather	 than	 Mendel’s	
contemporaries	who	recognised	the	significance	of	Mendel’s	work	by	appealing	to	
the	characteristics	of	a	good	exemplary	practice.	Therefore,	given	the	four	reasons	
above,	 I	 am	 confident	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	 exemplar-based	 approach	 not	 only	
provides	us	a	new	way	to	analyse	the	origin	of	genetics,	but	also	enables	us	to	have	
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a	better	fit	account.	 		 	
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6.2	A	Mechanistic	Salvage?	
Some	may	wonder	that	even	if	the	exemplar-based	approach	is	better	fit	than	the	
theory-driven	one	in	analysing	the	origin	of	genetics,	is	there	any	other	alternative	
way	 to	 analyse	 and	 characterise	 it?	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 shall	 attempt	 to	 explore	 a	
mechanistic	 analysis	 of	 the	 origin	 of	 genetics	 and	 compare	 it	 with	 the	
exemplar-based	one.	
Recently,	 Darden	 (2005,	 2006b)	 develops	 an	 alternative	 way	 of	 analysing	 the	
biologists’	practices	in	terms	of	seeking	mechanisms.	For	Darden,	“biologists	often	
seek	 to	 discover	 mechanisms”.	 (Darden,	 2006b,	 p.	 271)	 A	 mechanism	 is	 the	
explanans	 for	 a	 certain	 phenomenon.	 Darden’s	 favourite	 characterisation	 of	
mechanisms	is	as	follows.	
Mechanisms	 are	 entities	 and	 activities	 organized	 such	 that	 they	 are	
productive	of	 regular	changes	 from	start	or	set-up	to	 finish	or	 termination	
conditions.	(Machamer,	Darden,	&	Craver,	2000,	p.	3)	
The	 discovery	 of	 a	 mechanism	 is	 a	 piecemeal	 and	 incremental	 process	 with	
refinement	via	the	practices	of	phenomena-characterisation,	schema-construction,	
schema-evaluation,	 and	 schema-revision.	 The	 discovery	 begins	 with	 the	
characterisation	 of	 a	 certain	 phenomenon	 by	 precipitating	 conditions,	 inhibiting	
conditions,	 modulating	 conditions	 and	 so	 on	 to	 constrain	 the	 space	 of	 possible	
mechanisms	 for	 the	 phenomenon.	 The	 characterisation	 of	 a	 phenomenon	 is	
followed	 by	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 mechanism	 schema,	 a	 highly	 abstract	
representation	 for	 a	 mechanism,	 involving	 finding	 analogies	 in	 the	 history	 or	
contemporary	practice	of	science,	localising	the	phenomenon	to	a	certain	place	(or	
level),	 or	 sketching	 hypothetical	 roles	 that	 components	 of	 the	 mechanism	 being	
sought	are	expected	to	carry	out	and	work	to	specify	them.	Then	the	task	is	to	look	
for	the	working	entities	and	activities	that	play	the	roles	in	the	abstract	schema	by	
filling	 the	 black	 boxes	 and	 grey	 boxes	 in	 the	 mechanism	 schema	 to	 produce	 a	
mechanism	in	which	all	the	parts	are	glass	boxes.	
The	evaluation	of	a	mechanism	may	begin	with	a	superficial	schema	which	merely	
redescribes	 a	 phenomenon	 rather	 than	 explains	 it.	 Alternatively,	 the	 evaluation	
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begins	with	an	incomplete	sketch	of	components	of	the	mechanism	with	black	and	
grey	 boxes.	 The	 location	 and	 nature	 of	 the	 missing	 parts	 in	 a	 sketchy	 schema	
provides	guidance	as	to	what	is	to	be	sought	by	exploring	an	experimental	setup.	Or	
in	 other	 cases,	 the	 evaluation	may	 also	 begin	with	 conjecturing	 the	 possibility	 or	
plausibility	of	the	work	of	a	mechanism,	or	may	be	undertaken	to	compare	with	the	
rivals.	
There	 are	 two	 main	 kinds	 of	 failures	 in	 the	 sketch	 of	 a	 mechanism	 schema:	
incompleteness	and	incorrectness.	While	the	evaluation	deals	with	the	problem	of	
incompleteness,	the	main	task	in	the	revision	stage	is	to	remove	the	incorrectness	
in	 mechanistic	 hypotheses	 when	 an	 evaluation	 strategy	 detects	 an	 anomaly,	 an	
empirical	 finding	 that	 provides	 evidence	 against	 a	 hypothesised	 mechanism.	
Anomaly	resolution	begins	with	an	examination	to	ensure	that	the	anomaly	 is	not	
an	observational	or	experimental	error.	Then	a	diagnosis	of	the	anomaly	is	required.	
It	 is	 to	be	determined	 if	 the	anomaly	 can	be	 localised	outside	 the	domain	of	 the	
mechanism	schema,	or	if	it	results	from	an	abnormality	and	thus	is	immune	to	the	
modification	of	the	mechanism	schema,	or	if	the	anomaly	requires	a	splitting	of	the	
domain	 in	 which	 the	 mechanism	 was	 claimed	 to	 operate,	 or	 if	 it	 is	 a	 falsifying	
anomaly	 so	 that	 the	 entire	 proposed	 mechanism	 schema	 needs	 to	 be	
abandoned.124	 	
Thus,	a	mechanism-based	approach	can	be	proposed	accordingly	as	follows:	
In	 order	 to	 study	 the	 history	 of	 biology,	 first	 of	 all	 one	 has	 to	 characterise	 and	
identify	 the	 mechanism	M	 that	 a	 community	 of	 scientists	 are/were	 working	 on.	
Then	 for	M,	 one	has	 to	 determine	 the	working	 entities	 and	 activities,	 detail	 how	
they	are	discovered	by	filling	the	black	boxes	and	grey	boxes	in	the	abstract	schema,	
and	examine	how	the	mechanism	schema	is	evaluated	and	revised.	
Certainly	 this	 mechanism-based	 approach,	 compared	 to	 the	 theory-driven	
approach	in	analysing	the	history	of	biology,	has	several	advantages.	Firstly,	many	
biologists	do	label	their	work	as	the	discovery	of	mechanism.	The	term	“mechanism”	
																																																								124	 Note	that	the	three	stages	of	the	discovery	of	a	mechanism	are	not	equally	weighted	in	the	actual	practice.	One	can	have	weak	practice	of	construction	while	one	has	good	practices	of	evaluation	and	revision.	
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is	 not	 only	widely	 used	 in	 the	 discourse	 of	 contemporary	 biological	 sciences,	 but	
also	 talked	 of	 in	 the	 history.	 The	 title	 of	 Morgan’s	 book	 The	 Mechanism	 of	
Mendelian	Heredity	 (1915)	 is	a	good	example.	Secondly,	Darden’s	characterisation	
of	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 mechanism	 schema	 (e.g.	 filling	 the	 black	 boxes)	 well	
captures	and	 reflects	 some	characteristics	of	 the	actual	practice	of	biologists.	 For	
example,	 the	 practice	 of	 the	 protein	 synthesis	 is	 convincingly	 characterised	 and	
explained	by	the	mechanism-based	approach.125	 	
But,	what	about	the	origin	of	genetics?	By	applying	the	mechanism-based	approach,	
Darden	(2005)	characterises	the	history	of	Mendelian	genetics	as	a	process	of	the	
discovery	of	the	mechanism	of	heredity.	Accordingly,	the	origin	of	genetics	can	be	
characterised	as	a	chain	of	early	attempts	to	discover	the	mechanism	of	heredity	as	
follows.126	 Mendel	 (1865)	 characterised	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 transmission	 in	 the	
case	of	Pisum	by	describing	the	1:2:1	ratio	among	the	offspring	of	peas	hybrids	and	
the	 independent	 behaviour	 of	 morphological	 traits	 in	 the	 transmission	 through	
generations.	In	addition,	Mendel	also	constructed	a	mechanism	schema	within	the	
hybridist	framework	by	postulating	the	kinds	of	cell	(the	working	entities)	and	their	
correspondence	 with	 morphological	 traits	 (the	 activities).	 Mendel’s	 mechanism	
schema	 has	 two	 main	 problems:	 superficiality	 and	 incorrectness.	 Although	 it	 is	
useful	to	predict	and	describe	the	behaviour	of	the	mechanism,	Mendel’s	schema	
fails	 to	 explain	 explicitly	 how	 the	 internal	 components	 or	 the	 organisational	 and	
productive	features	by	which	the	mechanism	works.	Secondly,	Mendel’s	schema	is	
incorrect	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 was	 eventually	 shown	 that	 kinds	 of	 cell,	 as	
“determinants”	of	morphological	traits,	do	not	exist.	
Based	 on	 Mendel’s	 phenomenon-characterisation	 and	 schema-construction,	 de	
Vries	 (1900a,	 1900c,	 1900d)	 recharacterised	 the	 phenomenon	 in	 a	 wider	 scope	
(with	 data	 of	 more	 species)	 and	 reconstructed	 a	 mechanism	 schema	 within	 the																																																									125	 For	more	detail,	see	Darden	and	Craver	(2002).	126	 Darden	did	not	provide	a	detailed	articulation	of	the	mechanism-based	account	of	the	origin	of	genetics.	According	to	our	conversation	in	ISHPSSB	2015	(Montreal,	Canada),	Darden	contended	that	the	first	“mature”	mechanism	schema	in	the	history	of	genetics	was	constructed	by	Morgan	in	1910s.	Her	work	on	the	discovery	of	mechanism	of	heredity	concentrates	on	Morgan’s	and	his	colleagues’	schema-construction	since	1910s.	Mendel’s	and	early	Mendelians’	work	are	not	taken	into	consideration.	The	mechanism-based	account	illustrated	here	is	my	attempt	to	take	a	mechanism-based	approach	based	on	my	understanding	of	Darden’s	and	Craver’s	work	(Craver	&	Darden,	2013;	Darden,	2005,	2006a).	
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framework	 of	 his	 work	 on	 pangenesis	 (1889).	 De	 Vries’	 schema	 is	 better	 than	
Mendel’s	with	respect	to	completeness	in	the	sense	that	de	Vries’	schema	is	more	
explicit	 on	 the	 behaviour	 of	 hereditary	 characteristics	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 pollen	
and	ovules,	which	 is	 a	black	box	 in	Mendel’s	 schema.	Nevertheless,	 de	Vries	was	
still	implicit	on	the	activities	of	pangens	(working	entities)	in	his	schema.	
Following	 Mendel’s	 phenomenon-characterisation,	 Correns	 (1900)	 revised	
Mendel’s	 schema	by	 specifying	 the	working	entities	 to	be	anlagen	 in	 the	 cell	 and	
their	activities	in	the	formation	of	the	reproductive	nuclei.	Compared	with	Mendel’s	
and	 de	 Vries’	 ones,	 Correns’	 schema	 is	 closer	 to	 Morgan’s	 classical	 schema.	 In	
particular,	 Correns	 made	 a	 significant	 step	 forward	 in	 the	 localisation	 of	 the	
working	entities	of	the	mechanism	of	transmission	heredity.	
The	significance	of	Bateson’s	book	 (1902)	was,	 to	a	great	extent,	methodological.	
By	the	time	Bateson	had	not	begun	his	experimental	work	on	testing	the	Mendelian	
approach	in	studying	the	problem	of	heredity.	However,	he	still	sketched	an	outline	
for	the	discovery	of	a	mechanism	of	heredity.	By	identifying	the	problem127,	namely,	
how	one	can	bridge	the	gap	between	the	study	of	visible	phenomenon	of	heredity	
and	of	physical	basis	of	heredity,	Bateson	specified	the	blackboxes	in	the	discovery	
of	a	mechanism.	In	addition,	Bateson	made	a	substantial	revision	of	the	mechanism	
schema	 by	 introducing	 new	 terminology	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 contemporary	 scientific	
knowledge.	 In	 particular,	 his	 usage	 of	 the	 conceptions	 “gamete”,	 “zygote”,	 and	
“allelomorph”	reinforced	Correns’	localisation	of	the	hereditary	material	within	the	
cell.	Therefore,	the	origin	of	genetics	from	Mendel	to	Bateson	can	be	characterised	
as	a	series	of	attempts	to	discover	the	mechanism	of	heredity	from	1850s	to	1900s.	
	
	
																																																									127	 For	more	detail,	see	section	4.3.	
Mendel's	Mechanism	Schema:	 Transmission	of	Kinds	of	Cell	 Blackbox	 Transmission	of	Paired	Traits	
de	Vries'	Mechanism	Schema:	 Transmission	of	Pangens	(Units)	 ?	 Blackbox	 ?	 Transmission	of	Characteristics	 Balckbox	 Transmission	of	Paired	Traits	
Correns'	Mechanism	Schema:	 Transmission	of	Anlagen	 Blackbox	 Transmission	of	Paired	Traits	
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This	mechanism-based	 analysis	 is	 attractive	 in	 some	 aspects.	 Firstly,	most	 of	 the	
practice	 in	 the	origin	of	 genetics	 can	be	well	 characterised	 as	 the	practice	of	 the	
discovery	of	a	mechanism.	For	example,	both	Mendel’s	and	de	Vries’	work	involved	
in	charactersing	the	phenomena,	while	Bateson’s	introduction	of	Mendel’s	work	to	
the	 study	 of	 heredity	 is	 well	 characterised	 as	 the	 practice	 of	 black	 box-filling.	
Secondly,	 the	 mechanism-based	 approach	 captures	 and	 characterises	 the	
continuity	underlying	Mendel’s,	de	Vries’,	Correns’,	and	Bateson’s	work,	related	by	
recharactersing	the	phenomenon,	refining	the	working	entities	and	their	activities.	
In	particular,	my	interpretation	that	Correns	aimed	to	test	Mendel’s	work	fits	well	
with	the	characterisation	that	Correns’	work	can	be	understood	as	the	evaluation	of	
Mendel’s	 schema.	 Thirdly,	 the	 conceptual	 development	 from	 Mendel’s	 “kind	 of	
cell”,	 de	 Vries’	 “characteristics”,	 Correns’	 “anlage”,	 to	 Bateson’s	 “allelomorph”	 is	
well	reflected	in	the	characterisation	of	schema-construction.	
Nevertheless,	this	mechanism-based	characterisation	of	the	origin	of	genetics	is	still	
problematic.	 Firstly,	 it	 is	 indeed	 controversial	 as	 to	 whether	 Mendel,	 de	 Vries,	
Correns,	 Tschermak,	 and	 Bateson	 worked	 on	 the	 same	 mechanism.	 As	 I	 have	
emphasised,	 though	 all	 of	 Mendel,	 de	 Vries,	 Correns,	 Tschermak,	 and	 Bateson	
made	substantial	 contribution	 to	 the	origin	of	genetics,	 they	 in	 fact	differed	 from	
each	 other	 in	 the	 research	 problems	 they	were	working	 on.	 Of	 course	 it	 can	 be	
argued	that	they	all	tried	to	explain	the	same	phenomena	(e.g.	the	1:2:1	ratio),	but	
they	characterised	 the	same	phenomena	differently.	Although	Craver	and	Darden	
(2013,	p.	52)	recognise	that	“[t]o	describe	a	phenomenon	is	to	characterize	it	in	the	
language	 of	 a	 given	 field”,	 they	 say	 little	 on	 the	 implication	 of	 the	 different	
characterisations	of	the	same	phenomenon.	If,	as	Craver	and	Darden	maintain,	the	
characterisation	of	a	phenomenon	P	 is	crucial	for	the	discovery	of	the	mechanism	
of	P,	then	it	seems	natural	to	postulate	that	different	characterisations	of	P	lead	to	
the	 construction	 of	 the	 different	 mechanism	 schemas.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	
maintain	that	Mendel,	de	Vries,	Correns,	Tschermak,	and	Bateson	are	searching	for	
the	same	mechanism.	Nor	can	their	practices	be	simply	characterised	as	working	on	
the	same	mechanism	schema.	Recall	my	historical	analysis.	Although	de	Vries’	and	
Bateson's	Mechanism	Schema:	 Transmission	of	Allelormphs	 Blackbox	 Transmission	of	Paired	Traits	
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Bateson’s	 work	 can	 be	 characterised	 as	 the	 practice	 of	 seeking	 mechanisms	 of	
heredity,	 it	 is	 not	 obvious	 that	 they	 were	 working	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 same	
mechanism	schema.	If	de	Vries	had	had	any	mechanism	schema	in	mind	in	1900,	it	
must	 have	 been	 his	 own	 in	 terms	 of	 pangens.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 even	 in	 1902	
Bateson	did	not	seem	to	have	an	explicit	mechanism	schema	of	heredity.	The	main	
task	of	his	book	(1902)	was	to	defend	a	prospect	of	a	Mendelian	approach	to	study	
heredity	against	Weldon’s	criticisms.	Therefore,	even	 if	de	Vries’,	Tschermak’,	and	
Bateson’s	 work	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 attempts	 to	 discover	 the	 mechanism	 of	
heredity,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 they	 all	 have	 different	 mechanism	 schemas.	 It	 is	 more	
plausible	 to	 argue	 that	 de	 Vries	 initially	 constructed	 a	 mechanism	 schema	 with	
pangens	 as	 working	 entities	 in	 1889,	 while	 Tschermak’s	 schema	 was	 implicitly	
constructed	with	valency	(Werthigkeit)	as	working	entities.	In	other	words,	they	are	
working	on	different	mechanism	schemas	rather	than	the	same	mechanism	schema.	
Thus,	even	if	part	of	de	Vries’	work	(1900a,	1900c,	1900d)	is	well	characterised	as	
the	practice	of	black	box-filling,	it	seems	more	convincing	to	argue	that	de	Vries	was	
filling	the	black	boxes	in	his	own	schema	(1889)	rather	than	Mendel’s.	Moreover,	if	
Mendel’s	 work	 is	 better	 characterised	 as	 discovering	 a	 mechanism	 of	 hybrid	
development,	 while	 de	 Vries’	 as	 seeking	 a	 mechanism	 of	 heredity,	 the	
mechanism-based	characterisation	seems	difficult	to	characterise	the	continuity	or	
connection	between	Mendel’s	 and	de	Vries’	work.	 In	 addition,	 it	 remains	unclear	
how	 Mendel’s	 mechanism	 schema	 is	 incorporated	 into	 de	 Vries’	 mechanism	
schema.	 The	 relation	 and	 influence	 of	 different	 mechanism	 schemas	 are	
insufficiently	articulated	in	Darden	and	Craver’s	work.	
In	 comparison,	my	exemplar-based	analysis	 is	exempt	 from	 these	challenges.	The	
exemplar-based	analysis	does	not	assume	that	Mendel	and	his	successors	aimed	to	
discover	 the	 same	 mechanism.	 The	 continuity	 underlying	 Mendel’s	 and	 the	
rediscoverers’	 work	 is	 better	 characterised	 as	 the	 reception,	 modification	 and	
application	 of	 Mendel’s	 problem-defining,	 conceptualisation,	 hypothesisation,	
experimentation,	and	reasoning	in	the	exemplary	practices.	Thus,	in	the	case	of	the	
origin	 of	 genetics,	 the	 exemplar-based	 approach	 is	 better	 fit	 to	 analysing	 and	
interpreting	the	actual	scientific	practice.	
More	generally,	the	mechanism-based	approach	has	another	serious	problem.	The	
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mechanism-based	 approach	 is,	 to	 a	 large	 extent,	 similar	 to	 the	 theory-driven	
approach.	 The	 theory-driven	 approach	 assumes	 the	 central	 role	 of	 theory	 in	 the	
scientific	 practice,	 while	 the	 mechanism-based	 one	 presupposes	 that	 the	 aim	 of	
practice	 is	 to	 discover	 a	mechanism.	Once	 a	mechanism	 is	 identified,	 the	 rest	 of	
work	is	to	formulate	a	good	schema	by	construction,	evaluation,	and	revision.	Yes,	
the	scientists,	especially	biologists,	sometimes	work	in	this	way.	However,	it	is	often	
not	the	case	in	the	actual	practice	of	scientists.	Obviously,	the	origin	of	genetics,	as	I	
have	shown,	cannot	be	simply	understood	in	such	a	way.	It	 is	difficult	to	maintain	
that	Mendel,	de	Vries,	Correns,	and	Bateson	all	shared	the	same	aim	as	searching	
for	 a	mechanism	of	 heredity.	 Therefore,	 the	mechanism-based	 analysis	 faces	 the	
problem	of	mechanism-identification.	
Thus,	 even	 more	 boldly,	 I	 shall	 argue	 that	 the	 mechanism-based	 approach	 is	 a	
variant	 of	 the	 theory-driven	 approach.	 Though	 this	mechanism-based	 analysis	 of	
Mendelian	genetics	 is	 theory-free,	 it	 is	 still	 “theory-driven”,	where	Waters	 (2004)	
broadly	 construes	 “theory”	 as	 “some	 explanatory	 practice”.	 Since	 the	
mechanism-based	 approach	 explicitly	 assumes	 that	 the	 history	 of	 Mendelian	
genetics	is	structured	by	the	discovery	of	a	hereditary	mechanism	(as	a	pattern	of	
explanatory	reasoning),	and	the	practice	of	Mendelian	genetics	is	organised	around	
efforts	 to	 discover	 the	 hereditary	 mechanism,	 it	 is	 quite	 similar	 to	 what	Waters	
refers	to	as	theory-driven	understanding128.	As	I	have	shown,	Craver	and	Darden’s	
approach	(2013)	starts	with	characterising	a	given	phenomenon,	and	then	explore	
the	 mechanism	 of	 that	 phenomenon	 by	 construction,	 evaluation,	 and	 revision.	
Hence,	 Darden’s	 mechanism-based	 approach	 evidently	 assumes	 a	 variant	 of	
theory-centric	view	where	theory	is	broadly	understood	as	the	practice	with	certain	
explanatory	aim	(e.g.	the	practice	of	discovery	of	a	mechanism).	In	other	words,	like	
the	 theory-driven	 one,	 the	 mechanism-based	 approach	 encounters	 another	
problem,	namely,	the	problem	of	mechanism-centrality.	
Moreover,	when	 analysing	 the	 history	 of	 biology	 by	 taking	 the	mechanism-based	
approach,	one	has	to	ask	questions	like:	What	is	the	mechanism	of	heredity?	What	
are	 the	 working	 entities	 of	 the	 mechanism	 of	 heredity?	 These	 questions	 in	 fact	
																																																								128	 For	a	detailed	discussion	on	Waters’	summary,	see	section	1.3.	
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expect	ultimately	monistic	answers,	while	the	biologists’	practice	is	definitely	not	so	
monistically	oriented.	In	other	words,	the	mechanism-based	approach	suggests	an	
oversimplified	understanding	of	the	history	of	biology.	Even	within	the	framework	
of	 the	 discovery	 of	 a	 mechanism,	 some	 practices	 in	 history	 still	 cannot	 be	 well	
captured.	 Recall	 Sturtevant’s	 investigation	 of	 CIIIB129.	 It	 is	 little	 controversial	 that	
Sturtevant,	 a	 leading	 figure	 of	 the	 Morgan	 school,	 was	 devoted	 to	 studying	
transmission	inheritance.	Thus,	it	is	convincing	to	argue	that	his	work	on	Drosophila	
can	be	characterised	as	the	discovery	of	a	mechanism	of	transmission	inheritance.	
However,	 as	 Waters	 has	 shown,	 the	 ultimate	 goal	 of	 his	 experiments	 on	 CIIIB	
mapping	was	not	to	explain	the	inheritance,	but	to	reveal	information	about	basic	
biological	 processes.	 Sturtevant’s	 investigation	 of	 CIIIB	 cannot	 be	 characterised	 as	
the	 construction,	 evaluation,	or	 revision	of	 the	mechanism	 schema.	 Furthermore,	
many	biological	practices	cannot	be	completely	 rendered	as	monistically	oriented	
explanatory	 practices.	 The	 mechanism-based	 approach	 is	 vulnerable	 to	 Waters’	
criticism.	 It	 is	 highly	 problematic	 to	 characterise	 the	 practice	 of	 any	 biological	
school	in	terms	of	explaining	certain	phenomena.	
Therefore,	 I	 conclude	 that	 the	 exemplar-based	 approach	 is	 better	 fit	 than	 the	
mechanism-base	approach	 in	analysing	and	understanding	the	history	of	genetics,	
especially	 the	 origin	 of	 genetics.	 However,	 I	 also	 have	 to	 note	 that	 the	
mechanism-based	 approach	 formalised	 in	 this	 section	 is	 definitely	 not	 the	
authoratative	 or	 unique	 account	 of	 the	 mechanism-based	 approach.	 Nor	 do	 I	
conclusively	 argue	 that	my	exemplar-based	approach	 is	better	 than	any	potential	
mechanism-based	one.	Rather,	my	exemplar-based	approach	 is	better	 fit	 than	my	
formulation	of	a	potential	mechanism-based	approach	 in	 this	section	to	analysing	
the	origin	of	genetics.	Hopefully	this	is	the	starting	point	of	analysing	the	origin	of	
genetics	 in	 terms	 of	 mechanism-discovery.	 There	 is	 much	 more	 to	 do	 on	 the	
mechanism-based	approach	and	its	comparison	with	the	exemplar-based	one.	
	 	
																																																								129	 For	a	more	detailed	introduction,	see	section	1.3.	
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6.3	Further	Notes	on	the	Exemplar-Based	Approach	
The	Prospect	of	the	Exemplar-Based	Approach:	Monism?	Pluralism?	
So	 far	 I	 have	 tried	 to	 argue	 for	 the	 superiority	 of	 taking	 the	 exemplar-based	
approach	to	analysing	the	origin	of	genetics.	It	is	naturally	to	ask	about	the	prospect	
of	the	exemplar-based	approach.	Is	it	universally	applicable	to	the	history	of	science	
in	general?	Or,	is	it	only	applicable	to	study	the	origin	or	early	period	of	the	history	
of	biological	sciences?	
Although	I	have	argued	that	my	exemplar-based	account	of	the	origin	of	genetics	is	
better	 fit	 with	 the	 history	 than	 the	 theory-driven	 and	mechanism-based	 ones,	 it	
should	be	noted	that	I	am	not	trying	to	argue	that	the	exemplar-based	approach	is	
the	only	good	approach	 to	analysing	 the	origin	and	history	of	a	 science.	Nor	do	 I	
venture	 to	 argue	 that	 the	 exemplar-based	 approach	 is	 better	 than	 all	 other	
alternatives	 here.	 Rather,	 I	 am	 pluralistic	 on	 the	 approaches	 to	 analysing	 and	
interpreting	 the	 history	 of	 a	 science.	 Though	 I	 contend	 that	 my	 exemplar-based	
account	of	 the	origin	of	 genetics	 is	 better	 than	 the	 theory-driven	and	a	potential	
mechanism-based	ones,	 I	am	open	 to	 the	possibility	 that	other	approaches	might	
be	 better	 fit	 to	 analysing	 and	 interpreting	 a	 different	 period	 of	 the	 practice	 of	
genetics,	or	the	origin	of	a	different	science.	
Moreover,	I	believe	that,	to	some	extent,	the	exemplar-based	approach	and	other	
approaches	 (e.g.	 the	 theory-driven	 and	 mechanism-based	 ones)	 are	
complementary	to	each	other.	On	the	one	hand,	the	exemplar-based	analysis	can	
learn	 and	 benefit	 from	 the	 discussions	 on	 theory	 construction	 and	 mechanism	
discovery.	 Take	 the	 case	 of	 hypothesisation	 in	 an	 exemplary	 practice.	 As	 I	 have	
emphasised	 in	 4.3,	 there	 is	 no	 universal	 account	 of	 hypothesisation.	 Rather	 the	
practice	 of	 hypothesisation	 in	 different	 exemplars	 should	 be	 analysed	 and	
characterised	within	its	context.	For	example,	in	Mendel’s	case,	his	hypothesisation	
is	 best	 characterised	 as	 proposing	 hypothesising	 and	 confirming	 them	 by	
experiments.	However,	 in	 other	 cases,	 the	 theory-driven	 approach	may	better	 fit	
characterise	 the	 practice	 of	 hypothesisation,	 while	 the	 mechanism-based	 works	
better	in	others.	
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On	the	other	hand,	 the	 theory-driven	analyses	 (or	 the	others)	 can	 learn	 from	the	
exemplar-based	approach.	For	example,	 the	theory-driven	analysis	 focuses	on	the	
activity	 of	 hypothesisation	 and	 says	 little	 on	 the	 activities	 of	 problem-defining,	
conceptualisation,	and	experimentation.	Thus,	the	exemplar-based	approach	could	
provide	a	tool	to	make	a	fuller	articulation	of	the	practices	framed	by	theories,	like	
theory-construction	and	theory-confirmation.	In	a	word,	what	I	have	aimed	to	do	in	
this	thesis	 is	to	propose	an	alternative	approach	to	analysing	and	 interpreting	the	
history	 of	 genetics	 rather	 than	 to	 argue	 for	 a	 monistic	 way	 to	 understand	 the	
history	of	a	science	in	general.	
Exemplary	Practice	and	Kitcher’s	Practice	
It	 might	 seem	 to	 some	 that	 my	 reinterpretation	 of	 exemplar	 is	 very	 similar	 to	
Kitcher’s	 notion	 of	 practice.	 The	 components	 of	 Kitcher’s	 practice	 include	 a	
common	 language,	 a	 set	 of	 accepted	 statements,	 a	 set	 of	 questions,	 a	 set	 of	
patterns	of	reasoning,	and	a	set	of	experimental	procedures,	while	the	constituents	
of	 my	 “exemplary	 practice”	 are	 a	 vocabulary,	 a	 set	 of	 well-defined	 research	
problems,	 a	 set	 of	 practical	 guides,	 a	 set	 of	 hypotheses,	 and	 a	 set	 of	 patterns	 of	
reasoning.	 Thus,	 some	 might	 argue	 that	 if	 exemplary	 practices	 are	 merely	 a	
reformulation	 of	 Kitcher’s	 practices,	 the	 exemplar-based	 approach	 is	 also	
vulnerable	to	the	objections	to	the	theory-driven	approach.	
However,	 I	 argue	 that,	 despite	 the	 apparent	 similarity,	 there	 are	 substantial	
differences	between	Kitcher’s	“practice”	and	my	“exemplary	practice”.	Firstly,	a	set	
of	 hypotheses	 cannot	 be	 conflated	 with	 Kitcher’s	 “set	 of	 statements”.	 As	 I	 have	
emphasised,	 the	 hypotheses	 in	 an	 exemplary	 practice	 should	 not	 be	 simply	
construed	 as	 statements.	 Yes,	 in	 some	 exemplary	 practices,	 the	 hypotheses	 are	
originally	 formulated	as	 statements	 (e.g.	Mendel’s	exemplar).	But	 the	hypotheses	
can	also	appear	in	other	forms	like	models	and	mechanism	schemas.	In	addition,	a	
pattern	of	 reasoning	 in	 an	 exemplar	 is	 different	 from	a	pattern	of	 reasoning	 in	 a	
practice.	 Kitcher	 defines	 a	 pattern	 of	 reasoning	 as	 a	 sequence	 of	 schematic	
sentences,	 while	 I	 refer	 to	 a	 pattern	 of	 reasoning	 as	 the	 reasoning	 behind	 the	
solution	 to	 the	 research	 problem	 in	 using	 other	 components	 of	 an	 exemplary	
practice.	
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Secondly,	the	significance	of	each	component	 in	a	practice	for	Kitcher	 is	different.	
For	 example,	 Kitcher	 downplays	 the	 significance	 of	 experimental	 procedures	 and	
methodological	 rules.	 In	 contrast,	 I	 contend	 that	 the	 vocabulary,	 hypotheses,	
experiments,	practical	guides,	and	patterns	of	 reasoning	 in	an	exemplary	practice	
weigh	equally	in	the	sense	that	they	all	play	an	important	role	to	solve	the	research	
problems.	
Thirdly,	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 problem	 is	 not	 emphasised	 in	 Kitcher’s	
practice-based	approach.	In	addition,	although	pedigree	problems	are	important	in	
the	practice	of	classical	genetics	given	that	 they	underlie	 the	different	versions	of	
the	theory	of	classical	genetics,	Kitcher	fails	to	articulate	the	pattern	of	the	changes	
of	 pedigree	 problems.	 In	 other	 words,	 Kitcher	 overlooks	 the	 problem	 of	
problem-identification,	that	is,	how	to	identify	a	problem	in	a	practice.	
Fourthly,	 Kitcher’s	 practice-base	 approach,	 as	 Waters	 contends,	 is	 still	 basically	
theory-driven;	since	Kitcher	contends	that	a	practice	is	centred	on	a	theory	with	an	
explanatory	 purpose.	 It	 is	 vulnerable	 to	 the	 objections	 to	 the	 theory-driven	
approach,	 while	 the	 exemplar-based	 one	 is	 not.	 Therefore,	 the	 exemplar-based	
approach	 is	 not	 a	 disguised	 practice-based	 approach.	 What	 is	 more,	 there	 is	
another	more	substantial	difference.	
More	on	Exemplar	and	Theory	
Finally,	 it	should	be	highlighted	that	my	proposal	of	the	exemplar-based	approach	
should	not	be	simply	construed	as	a	way	to	eliminate	or	overlook	the	role	of	theory	
in	scientific	practice.	The	traditional	theory-driven	approach	clearly	overemphasises	
and	exaggerates	the	role	of	theory.	It	assumes	the	centrality	role	of	some	theory	in	
a	school	of	scientific	practice.	However,	as	I	have	argued	in	Chapter	1,	theories	are	
not	the	driving	force	of	scientific	practice.	Nor	can	any	theory	alone	be	regarded	as	
the	 fundamental	 component	 of	 the	 consensus	 among	 a	 scientific	 community.	
Nevertheless,	theories	are	indispensable	in	many	scientific	practices.	For	example,	
the	 theory	 of	 pangenesis	 is	 indispensable	 in	 de	 Vries'	 1900	 works,	 but	 it	 is	
indispensable	instrumentally	in	the	sense	that	it	is	a	useful	tool	to	help	define	and	
solve	 the	 research	 problems.	 Thus,	 according	 to	 the	 exemplar-based	 approach,	
theories	are	important	 in	scientific	practice	because	they	are	useful	 to	define	and	
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solve	 the	 research	 problems	 to	 investigate	 the	 phenomena	 rather	 than	 they	
describe	 or	 explain	 the	 phenomena.	 The	 descriptive,	 explanatory,	 and	 predictive	
powers	of	a	 theory	are	 the	means	 rather	 than	 the	end.	 In	 short,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	
significance	 of	 theory	 in	 scientific	 practice	 should	 not	 be	 overestimated	 or	
underestimated.	
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7.	Conclusion	
Philosophers	 are	 used	 to	 analysing	 the	 history	 of	 science	 with	 a	 theory-based	
prejudice.	However,	I	have	argued	that	the	theory-driven	analysis	of	the	history	of	
science	 is	 highly	 problematic,	 especially	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Mendelian	 genetics.	 The	
theory-driven	approach	relies	on	an	unexamined	assumption	(i.e.	the	theory-centric	
view)	that	the	history	of	a	school	of	scientific	practice	is	centred	on	a	central	theory.	
However,	 there	 are	 four	main	 problems	 of	 taking	 the	 theory-driven	 approach	 to	
analysing	 the	 history	 of	 scientific	 practice.	 Firstly,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 identify	 and	
articulate	a	central	theory	for	a	school	of	scientific	practice,	especially	in	the	case	of	
Mendelian	 genetics.	 Secondly,	 it	 pays	 insufficient	 attention	 to	 how	 a	 school	 of	
scientific	 practice	 is	 established	 and	 develops.	 Thirdly,	 it	 overlooks	 the	
non-theoretical	 aspect	 of	 scientific	 practice.	 Fourthly,	 it	 incorrectly	 assumes	 the	
central	 role	 of	 a	 theory	 in	 scientific	 practice.	 In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 have	 proposed	 and	
defended	 an	 exemplar-based	 approach	 as	 a	 new	way	 to	 analyse	 and	 understand	
one	origin	of	genetics	from	Mendel	(1865)	to	Bateson	(1902).	In	short,	an	exemplar	
is	 defined	 as	 a	 set	 of	 contextually	 well-defined	 research	 problems	 and	 their	
solutions.	Accordingly,	a	common	recipe	 for	 the	exemplar-based	approach	can	be	
summarised	in	the	following	way.	
In	order	to	analyse	the	history	of	the	practice	of	a	scientific	school,	we	first	should	
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identify	the	 initial	problem	as	the	starting	point	of	the	research130,	and	then	trace	
the	way	of	solving	the	initial	problem	by	identifying	the	actual	problems	that	were	
investigated	and	 the	way	 they	occur	 in	 the	practice,	and	analysing	 the	process	of	
problem-defining,	 conceptualisation,	 experimentation,	 hypothesisation,	 and	
reasoning	 involved.	 Then,	 we	 should	 detail	 the	 development	 of	 the	 intertwined	
practices	in	history	to	explore	the	development	of	a	school	of	scientific	practice.	
My	articulation	of	the	exemplar-based	approach	is	based	on	my	historical	analysis	
of	the	origin	of	genetics.	By	showing	Gärtner’s	influence	on	Mendel’s	work,	I	have	
strengthened	the	view	that	Mendel’s	concern	(1865)	was	about	the	developmental	
series	 of	 pea	 hybrid	 in	 the	 progeny	 rather	 than	 heredity	 in	 general.	 Moreover,	
Mendel’s	 work	 on	 Pisum	 cannot	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 work	 on	 heredity,	 whether	
heredity	 is	 interpreted	 in	 the	19th	or	20th	century	sense.	Furthermore,	 I	have	also	
challenged	the	traditional	account	of	the	“rediscovery”	story	in	1900.	By	examining	
the	historical	context	of	the	“rediscoverers”	carefully,	I	have	argued	that	the	work	
of	 “rediscoverers”	 should	 be	 better	 understood	 as	 an	 incorporation	 of	Mendel’s	
work	into	their	own	research	rather	than	a	merely	rediscovery	of	(or	reintroduction	
to)	 Mendel’s	 work.	 I	 have	 strengtnened	 the	 view	 that	 de	 Vries’	 initial	 concern	
(1900a,	1900c,	1900d)	was	to	verify	his	hypothesis	of	pangenesis	that	the	heritable	
trait	is	composed	of	distinct	hereditary	units	in	the	cell	experimentally.	In	particular,	
I	 have	 shown	 that	 in	 1900	 –	 1903,	 de	 Vries	 attempted	 to	 incorporate	Mendel’s	
methodology	and	terminology	into	his	theory	of	pangenesis,	though	was	shown	to	
be	 unsuccessful	 and	 quickly	 abandoned	 by	 himself	 shortly	 after.	 Correns’	 initial	
concern	 (1900)	 was	 to	 examine	 Mendel’s	 work	 on	 Pisum,	 and	 ended	 up	 with	 a	
confirmation	 of	 Mendel’s	 observations	 and	 a	 reformulation	 of	 Mendel’s	 rule	 by	
incorporating	 Mendel’s	 work	 with	 Weismann’s	 terminology.	 Tschermak’s	 initial	
concern	(1900a,	1900b)	was	to	study	the	 influence	of	the	foreign	pollen	upon	the	
constitution	 of	 the	 seeds.	 Although	 his	 1900	 papers	 fail	 to	 show	 that	 he	 well																																																									130	 Although	 I	 emphasised	 many	 times	 that	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 contributions	 of	 an	exemplary	practice	is	the	way	of	defining	the	research	problems,	it	is	unlikely	for	a	scientist	to	begin	his	studies	without	an	initial	problem,	which	was	a	well-defined	research	problem.	These	kind	of	 initial	problems	might	not	be	 interesting	at	all	 for	 the	subsequent	development	of	 the	studies.	 A	 classical	 example	 is	 that	 the	 initial	 problem	 that	 inspired	 Morgan	 to	 conduct	experiments	 on	Drosophila	 was	 in	 search	 for	 an	 experimental	 approach	 to	 evolution,	 but	 he	finally	made	 a	 great	 achievement	 on	 solving	 the	 problems	 of	Drosophila’s	 heredity.	 It	 is	 also	likely	that	an	initial	problem	is	re-formulated	in	new	terms.	
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understood	Mendel’s	work,	Tschermak	was	the	first	who	was	explicit	on	the	point	
that	Mendel’s	work	would	be	important	to	the	study	of	heredity.	In	addition,	I	have	
shown	 that	he	 seriously	 attempted	 to	develop	Mendel’s	 theory	 in	his	 conceptual	
framework.	 Bateson’s	 concern	 (1902)	 was	 to	 defend	 and	 develop	 a	 Mendelian	
theory	of	heredity	against	the	charge	by	Weldon.	It	was	the	first	time	in	the	history	
that	Mendel’s	work	on	pea	hybrid	was	seriously	 introduced	and	incorporated	into	
the	subject	of	heredity.	
On	the	basis	of	my	historical	 interpretation,	 I	have	argued	that	Mendel’s	work	on	
Pisum	 can	 be	 best	 characterised	 as	 an	 exemplary	 practice	 on	 the	 study	 of	 pea	
hybrid	 by	 introducing	 novel	 problem-specification,	 novel	 conceptualisation,	 novel	
hypothesisation,	and	novel	experimentation,	which	were	useful	 for	the	exemplary	
practices	on	the	study	of	heredity	around	1900.	Similarly,	de	Vries’,	Correns’,	and	
Bateson’s	works	can	be	characterised	as	the	exemplary	practices	which	all	adopted,	
modified,	and	applied	some	constituents	of	Mendel’s	exemplary	practice	 to	 solve	
their	own	research	problems.	A	kind	of	continuity	can	be	traced	in	these	exemplary	
practices.	Accordingly,	the	origin	of	genetics	from	Mendel	(1865)	to	Bateson	(1902)	
can	be	better	characterised	as	a	chain	of	successive	exemplary	practices	than	as	the	
development	 of	 a	 theory,	 or	 the	 discovery	 of	 a	 mechanism.	 In	 addition,	 I	 have	
shown	 that	 the	 exemplar-based	 approach	 provides	 a	 new	 way	 to	 articulate	 a	
perennial	puzzle	in	the	history	of	genetics,	namely,	the	problem	of	long	neglect.	
Finally,	 I	 have	 discussed	 some	 potential	 responses	 and	 challenges	 from	 the	
theory-driven	 analysis	 and	defended	 the	 exemplar-based	 analysis	 of	 the	origin	of	
genetics	against	a	potential	formulation	of	the	mechanism-based	one.	Nevertheless,	
I	 have	 to	 emphasise	 that	my	 defence	 of	 the	 exemplar-based	 approach	 does	 not	
suggest	that	I	am	defending	a	monistic	way	of	analysing	and	interpreting	the	history	
of	sciences.	
It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 this	 thesis	 is	 still	 an	 incomplete	 attempt	 to	 explore	 the	
exemplar-based	approach.	Its	applicability	and	implications	are	still	awaiting	further	
exploration.	 I	 believe	 that	 the	 exemplar-based	 approach	 is	 not	 only	 applicable	 to	
historical	 cases,	 but	 also	 to	 contemporary	 cases.	 Furthermore,	 taking	 the	
exemplar-based	approach	will	 also	help	 recharacterise	our	philosophical	 views	on	
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the	 nature	 of	 scientific	 knowledge.	 The	 habit	 of	 analysing	 science	 in	 terms	 of	
exemplary	practices	would	make	us	realise	that	scientific	practice	is	fundamentally	
about	proposing	problems	and	solving	problems.	In	particular,	proposing	problems	
and	solving	problems	are	intertwined	activities	rather	than	two	independent	ones.	
Moreover,	scientific	confirmation	and	explanation	can	be	recharacterised	by	taking	
the	exemplar-based	approach	to	be	evidential	practice	and	explanatory	practice.	All	
these	 will	 be	 taken	 into	 consideration	 of	 a	 further	 articulation	 of	 the	
exemplar-based	approach	in	the	future.	In	short,	there	is	much	more	to	do	on	the	
exemplar-based	approach.	
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Appendix	1	
Entwicklung	in	Mendel’s	Versuche	über	Pflanyen-Hybriden	(1865)	
	 German	Text	 English	Translation	by	Sherwood	
1	 die	Entwicklung	der	Hybriden	in	ihren	
Nachkommen	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	3)	
the	 development	 of	 hybrids	 in	
their	progeny	 (Mendel,	1966a,	p.	
1)	
2	 die	 Bildung	 und	 Entwicklung	 der	
Hybriden	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	3)	
the	 formation	 and	 development	
of	hybrids	(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	2)	
3	 Entwicklungs-Geschichte	 (Mendel,	
1865,	p.	4)	
evolutionary	 history	 (Mendel,	
1966a,	p.	2)	
4	 die	 Glieder	 der	 Entwicklungsreihe	 in	
jeder	einzelnen	Generation	 (Mendel,	
1865,	p.	5)	
members	 of	 the	 series	 of	
offspring	 in	 each	 generation	
(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	4)	
5	 mangelhafte	 Entwicklung	 des	
Schiffchens	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	10)	
defective	development	of	the	keel	
(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	8)	
6	 An	 einigen	wenigen	 Pflanzen	 kamen	
in	 den	 zuerst	 gebildeten	 Hülsen	 nur	
einzelne	 Samen	 zur	 Entwicklung	
(Mendel,	1865,	p.	13)	
In	 the	 pods	 first	 formed	 by	 a	
small	number	of	plants	only	a	few	
seeds	developed	 (Mendel,	1966a,	
p.	11)	
7	 Samen,	 welche	 während	 ihrer	
Entwicklung	 von	 Insecten	beschädigt	
wurden	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	14)	
Seeds	 damaged	 during	 their	
development	 by	 insects	 (Mendel,	
1966a,	p.	12)	
8	 die	 Entwicklungsreihe	 für	 die	
Nachkommen	der	Hybriden	je	zweier	
differirender	 Merkmale	 (Mendel,	
1865,	p.	17)	
the	 series	 for	 the	 progeny	 of	
plants	hybrid	in	a	pair	of	differing	
traits	(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	16)	
9	 das	 gefundene	 Entwicklungs-Gesetz	
auch	 dann	 für	 je	 zwei	 differirende	
Merkmale	 gelte	 (Mendel,	 1865,	 p.	
18)	
the	 law	 of	 development	 thus	
found	would	 also	 apply	 to	 a	 pair	
of	differing	traits	(Mendel,	1966a,	
p.	17)	
10	 Die	 Entwicklungsreihe	 besteht	
demnach	 aus	 9	 Gliedern.	 (Mendel,	
1865,	p.	20)	
Accordingly,	the	series	consists	of	
nine	 terms.	 (Mendel,	 1966a,	 p.	
20)	
11
,	
12	
Diese	 Entwicklungsreihe	 ist	
unbestritten	eine	Combinationsreihe,	
in	 welcher	 die	 beiden	
Entwicklungsreihen	für	die	Merkmale	
A	 und	 a,	 B	 und	 b	 gliedweise	
verbunden	 sind.	 (Mendel,	 1865,	 p.	
21)	
Indisputably	 this	 series	 is	 a	
combination	 series	 in	 which	 the	
two	series	for	the	traits	A	and	a,	B	
and	 b	 are	 combined	 term	 by	
term.	(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	20)	
13	 Die	 Entwicklungsreihe	 umfasst	 27	
Glieder.	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	21)	
The	 series	 comprises	 27	
members.	(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	21)	
14	 Die	 Entwicklung	 der	 Hybriden	 The	 development	 of	 hybrids	
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(Mendel,	1865,	p.	22)	 (Mendel,	1966a,	p.	21)	
15	 in	welcher	 die	 Entwicklungsreihe	 für	
die	 Merkmale	 A	 und	 a,	 B	 und	 b,	 C	
und	 c	 mit	 einander	 verbunden	 sind.	
(Mendel,	1865,	p.	22)	
in	which	the	series	for	traits	A	and	
a,	B	and	b,	C	and	c	are	combined	
with	each	other	hybrids.	(Mendel,	
1966a,	p.	21)	
16	 in	 welchen	 die	 Entwicklungsreihen	
für	 je	 zwei	 differirende	 Merkmale	
verbunden	 sind.	 (Mendel,	 1865,	 p.	
22)	
in	 which	 the	 series	 for	 each	 pair	
of	 differing	 traits	 are	 combined.	
(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	22)	
17	 die	 Entwicklung	 der	 Hybriden	
bezüglich	 dieses	 Merkmales	
wahrscheinlich	 in	 der	 nämlichen	
Weise	erfolgt	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	23)	
development	 of	 the	 hybrids	
probably	 proceeds	 in	 the	 same	
manner	with	 respect	 to	 this	 trait	
as	it	does	for	the	remaining	traits	
(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	22-23)	
18	 in	welcher	die	Entwicklungsreihen	für	
je	 zwei	 differirende	 Merkmale	
vereinigt	sind.	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	24)	
in	 which	 the	 series	 for	 any	 one	
pair	 of	 differing	 traits	 are	
combined.	(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	23)	
19	 die	Entwicklung	 der	Hybriden	 in	den	
einzelnen	 Generationen	 zu	 erklären	
(Mendel,	1865,	p.	24-25)	
to	 explain	 the	 development	 of	
hybrids	 in	 separate	 generations	
(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	24)	
20	 Den	 einfachsten	 Fall	 bietet	 die	
Entwicklungsreihe	 für	 je	 zwei	
differirende	 Merkmale.	 (Mendel,	
1865,	p.	29)	
The	 simplest	 case	 is	 given	by	 the	
series	 for	 one	 pair	 of	 differing	
traits.	(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	29)	
21	 Die	 Entwicklungsreihe	 für	 Hybriden,	
in	 denen	 zweierlei	 differirende	
Merkmale	 verbunden	 sind,	 (Mendel,	
1865,	p.	31)	
The	 series	 for	 hybrids	 in	 which	
two	 kinds	 of	 differing	 traits	 are	
associated	(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	31)	
22	 die	 Entwicklungsreihe	 der	 Hybriden	
(Mendel,	1865,	p.	31)	
The	 series	 of	 hybrids	 (Mendel,	
1966a,	p.	32)	
23	 nach	 welchem	 die	 Entwicklung	 der	
Hybriden	 erfolgt	 (Mendel,	 1865,	 p.	
32)	
According	 to	 which	 hybrid	
development	 proceeds	 (Mendel,	
1966a,	p.	32)	
24	 das	 für	 Pisum	 gefundene	
Entwicklungsgesetz	 (Mendel,	 1865,	
p.	32)	
the	 law	 of	 development	
discovered	 for	 Pisum	 (Mendel,	
1966a,	p.	32)	
25	 die	Entwicklung	der	constanten	
Verbindungen	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	32)	
The	 formation	 of	 constant	
associations	 (Mendel,	 1966a,	 p.	
33)	
26	 die	 Entwicklung	 der	 Hybriden	
(Mendel,	1865,	p.	34)	
development	 of	 hybrid	 (Mendel,	
1966a,	p.	35)	
27	 der	 Combinirung	 der	 einzelnen	
Entwicklungsreihen	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	
35)	
the	combination	of	the	individual	
series	(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	36)	
28	 so	 entsprechen	 den	 Hybriden	 A1a	
und	 A2a	 die	 Entwicklungsreihen	
(Mendel,	1865,	p.	35)	
Then	 the	 series	 that	 correspond	
to	 hybrids	 A1a	 und	 A2a	 are	
(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	36)	
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29	 die	 Entwicklung	 der	 Culturformen	
(Mendel,	1865,	p.	36)	
the	 development	 of	 cultivated	
forms	(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	37)	
30	 die	Entwicklung	der	Pflanze	im	freien	
Lande	durch	andere	Gesetze	geleitet	
wird.	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	36)	
plant	development	in	the	wild	and	
in	the	garden	beds	was	governed	
by	 different	 laws.	 (Mendel,	
1966a,	p.	37)	
31	 auch	 hier	 die	 Entwicklung	 nach	
einem	 bestimmten	 Gesetze	 erfolgt,	
(Mendel,	1865,	p.	38)	
here,	 too,	development	 proceeds	
according	 to	 a	 certain	 law	
(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	38)	
32	 In	Bezug	auf	die	Gestalt	der	Hybriden	
und	 ihre	 in	 der	 Regel	 erfolgende	
Entwicklung	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	38)	
With	 respect	 to	 the	 features	 of	
hybrids	 and	 their	 regular	
development	 (Mendel,	 1966a,	 p.	
39)	
33	 Wird	 angenommen,	 dass	 die	
Entwicklung	 der	 Hybriden	 nach	 dem	
für	 Pisum	 geltenden	 Gesetze	
erfolgte,	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	39)	
If	 it	 is	assumed	that	development	
of	hybrid	follows	the	law	valid	for	
Pisum	(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	40)	
34	 für	 7	 differirende	 Merkmale	 die	
Entwicklungsreihe	 (Mendel,	 1865,	 p.	
39)	
the	 series	 for	 7	 differing	 traits	
(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	40)	
35	 dann	 muss	 an	 den	 Gliedern	 der	
Entwicklungsreihe	 immer	 jene	 der	
beiden	 Stammarten	 mehr	
hervortreten,	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	39)	
then	the	one	of	the	two	parental	
types	having	the	larger	number	of	
dominating	traits	must	always	be	
the	 more	 prominent	 among	 the	
members	 of	 the	 series.	 (Mendel,	
1966a,	p.	40)	
36	 wo	 die	 Entwicklung	 eine	
regelmässige	 war	 (Mendel,	 1865,	 p.	
40)	
where	 development	 was	 regular	
(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	40)	
37	 Bei	 sehr	 ausgedehnten	
Entwicklungsreihen	 konnte	 es	 in	 der	
That	 nicht	 anders	 eintreffen.	
(Mendel,	1865,	p.	40)	
Indeed,	 it	cannot	be	otherwise	 in	
very	 extensive	 series.	 (Mendel,	
1966a,	p.	40)	
38	 Für	 die	 Entwicklungsgeschichte	 der	
Pflanzen	 ist	 dieser	 Umstand	 von	
besonderer	 Wichtigkeit,	 (Mendel,	
1865,	p.	40)	
This	 feature	 is	 of	 particular	
importance	 to	 the	 evolutionary	
history	of	plants,	(Mendel,	1966a,	
p.	41)	
39	 Diese	Entwicklung	erfolgt	nach	einem	
constanten	 Gesetze,	 (Mendel,	 1865,	
p.	41)	
This	 development	 proceeds	 in	
accord	 with	 a	 constant	 law	
(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	42)	
40	 dann	wird	die	Entwicklung	des	neuen	
Individuums	 durch	 dasselbe	 Gesetz	
geleitet,	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	41)	
development	 of	 new	 individual	 is	
governed	 by	 the	 same	 law	
(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	42)	
41	 dessen	Entwicklung	nothwendig	nach	
einem	 anderen	 Gesetze	 erfolgt,	
(Mendel,	1865,	p.	41)	
whose	 development	 must	
necessarily	 proceed	 in	 accord	
with	 a	 law	 different	 (Mendel,	
1966a,	p.	42)	
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42	 der	 Entwicklung	 der	
Befruchtungszellen	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	
42)	
the	 formation	 of	 these	 cells	
(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	43)	
43	 die	 Entwicklung	 der	 Hybriden	
(Mendel,	1865,	p.	42)	
the	 development	 of	 hybrids	
(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	43)	
44	 da	 die	 Einheit	 im	 Entwicklungsplane	
des	organischen	Lebens	ausser	Frage	
steht.	(Mendel,	1865,	p.	43)	
Since	 unity	 in	 the	 plan	 of	
development	 of	 organic	 life	 is	
beyond	doubt.	(Mendel,	1966a,	p.	
43)	
45	 Dürfte	 man	 voraussetzen,	 dass	 bei	
diesen	 Versuchen	 die	 Entwicklung	
der	 Formen	auf	 eine	 ähnliche	Weise	
wie	 bei	 Pisum	 erfolgte,	 (Mendel,	
1865,	p.	43)	
If	 one	 may	 assume	 that	 the	
development	of	 forms	proceeded	
in	these	experiments	in	a	manner	
similar	to	that	in	Pisum,	(Mendel,	
1966a,	p.	44)			 	
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Appendix	2	
Entwicklung	in	Gregor	Mendels	Briefe	an	Carl	Nägeli		
	 German	Text	 English	 Translation	 by	 Piternick	 and	
Piternick	
1	 In	den	Entwicklungsreihen	für	zwei	
und	 dreierlei	 differirende	
Merkmale,	 ...	 (Correns,	 1906,	 p.	
194)	
In	 the	 developmental	 series	 for	 two	 and	
three	 differentiating	 characters,	 …	
(Piternick	&	Piternick,	1950,	p.	1)	
2	 …	 Entwicklungsgesetze	 …	
(Correns,	1906,	p.	195)	
…	 laws	 of	 development	 (Piternick	 &	
Piternick,	1950,	p.	1)	
3	 Lassen	sich	für	je	zwei	differirende	
Merkmale	 dieselben	
Verhältniszahlen	 und	 einfachen	
Entwicklungsreihen	 nachweisen,	
wie	 bei	 Pisum,	 …	 (Correns,	 1906,	
p.	195)	
If	for	two	differentiating	characters,	the	
same	ratios	and	developmental	series	
which	exist	in	Pisum	can	be	found,	…	
(Piternick	&	Piternick,	1950,	p.	2)	
4	 Der	Entwicklungsgang	…	(Correns,	
1906,	p.	201)	
The	course	of	development	…	(Piternick	&	
Piternick,	1950,	p.	5)	
5	 …	 ,	 Entwicklungsreihe	 für	 je	 zwei	
differirende	 Merkmale.	 (Correns,	
1906,	p.	202)	
…,	developmental	series	for	two	
differentiating	characters.	(Piternick	&	
Piternick,	1950,	p.	5)	
6	 die	Entwicklungsreihe	für	aus	zwei	
oder	 drei	 einfachen	 Reihen	
combinirt	 erscheint.	 (Correns,	
1906,	p.	202)	
the	developmental	series	is	a	combination	
of	two	or	three	simple	series.	(Piternick	&	
Piternick,	1950,	p.	5)	
7	 Wenn	ich	endlich	die	Combinirung	
der	 einfachen	 Entwicklungsreihen	
auf	 jede	 Anzahl	 von	 Differenzen	
zwischen	 den	 beiden	
Stammpflanzen,	…	(Correns,	1906,	
p.	202)	
If	then	I	extend	this	combination	of	simple	
series	to	any	number	of	differences	
between	the	two	parental	plants,	…	
(Piternick	&	Piternick,	1950,	p.	5)	
8	 ...,	 dass	 die	 Entwicklung	
hinsichtlich	je	zweier	differirender	
Merkmale	 unabhängig	 von	 den	
übrigen	 Differenzen	 erfolgt.	
(Correns,	1906,	p.	202)	
…	that	the	development	of	any	two	
differentiating	characteristics	proceeds	
independently	of	any	other	differences.	
(Piternick	&	Piternick,	1950,	p.	5)	
9	 …,	 weil	 ich	 in	 dem	 Resultate	
derselben	 die	 Erklärung	 für	 die	
beobachtete	 Entwicklung	 der	
Hybriden	 von	 Pisum	 zu	 finden	
glaube.	(Correns,	1906,	p.	202)	
…,	for	I	believe	that	their	results	furnish	
the	explanation	for	the	development	of	
hybrids	as	observed	in	Pisum.	(Piternick	&	
Piternick,	1950,	p.	5)	
10	 Für	 die	 Untersuchung	 der	
Farben-Entwicklung	 ...	 (Correns,	
To	study	color	development	in	flowers	of	
hybrids,	…	(Piternick	&	Piternick,	1950,	p.	
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1906,	p.	210)	 9)	
11	 …	 die	 Entwicklung	 des	 Pollens	 …	
(Correns,	1906,	p.	212)	
…	 pollen	 development	 …	 (Piternick	 &	
Piternick,	1950,	p.	11)	
12	 In	 meiner	 Versuchsplantage	
haben	 dier	 Pflanzen	 im	
Durchschnitte	 gut	 überwintert,	
auch	ist	die	Entwicklung	derselben	
ziemlich	 weit	 vorgeschritten;	 …	
(Correns,	1906,	p.	220)	
On	the	whole	the	plants	have	wintered	
well	in	the	experimental	plots,	and	their	
development	has	progressed	fairly	well;	…	
(Piternick	&	Piternick,	1950,	p.	15)	
13	 Ihrer	 weiteren	 Entwicklung	 sehe	
ich	 mit	 einiger	 Spannung	
entgegen.	(Correns,	1906,	p.	221)	
I	am	awaiting	their	further	development	
with	some	suspense.	(Piternick	&	
Piternick,	1950,	p.	15)	
14	 Die	 Köpfschen	 sind	 auffallend	
gross,	 weit	 über	 die	 Mittelgrösse	
hinaus,	 was	 wohl	 nur	 eine	 Folge	
der	sehr	üppigen	Entwickelung	der	
Pflanze	 sein	 dürfte.	 (Correns,	
1906,	p.	223)	
The	heads	are	strikingly	large,	much	
exceeding	the	average,	but	this	might	be	
due	only	to	the	very	luxuriant	
development	of	this	plant.	(Piternick	&	
Piternick,	1950,	p.	16)	
15	 Will	 man	 die	 Nachkommen	 jener	
Bastarde,	 die	 nur	 eine	 theilweise	
Fruchtbarkeit	 besitzen,	 in	 ihrer	
Entwicklung	 verfolgen,	 ...	
(Correns,	1906,	p.	234)	
If	one	wants	to	follow	the	development	of	
those	hybrids	having	only	partial	fertility,	
…	(Piternick	&	Piternick,	1950,	p.	22)	
16	 Anfänglich	 schien	 es,	 als	 ob	
einzelne	 Pflanzen	 in	 der	
Entwicklung	 zurückbleiben	
wollten,	...	(Correns,	1906,	p.	239)	
In	the	beginning	it	seemed	as	if	individual	
plants	might	lag	behind	in	development;	…	
(Piternick	&	Piternick,	1950,	p.	24)	
17	 Im	letzteren	Falle	müsste	auch	die	
Entwicklung	 der	 Nachkommen	
eine	 andere	 sein,	 ...	 (Correns,	
1906,	p.	240)	
In	the	latter	case,	development	of	the	
progeny	should	also	be	different	from	that	
in	the	two	simple	color	hybrids.	(Piternick	
&	Piternick,	1950,	p.	25)	
18	 Man	 erhält	 dann	 für	 die	
verschiedenen	 Farben	 Varianten	
Zahlen,	 welche	 für	 die	 Ableitung	
einer	 Entwicklungsformel	
unbrauchbar	sind.	 (Correns,	1906,	
p.	241)	
The	numbers	thus	obtained	for	the	
frequency	of	the	different	color	variants	
are	useless	for	the	derivation	of	the	
developmental	series.	(Piternick	&	
Piternick,	1950,	p.	25)	
19	 Anderseits	 lässt	 sich	 die	 Frage	
nicht	 so	 leicht	 von	 der	 Hand	
weisen,	 wenn	 man	 erwägt,	 dass	
die	Anlage	 für	die	 functionsfähige	
Entwicklung	 entweder	 blos	 des	
Stempels,	 oder	 nur	 der	
Staubgefässe	 schon	 in	 der	
Organisation	 der	 Grundzellen	
ausgesprochen	 sein	 musste,	 aus	
welchen	 die	 Pflanzen	
On	the	other	hand	the	problem	can	not	be	
so	easily	dismissed	if	one	considers	that	
the	anlage	for	the	functional	development	
of	either	the	pistil	alone	or	of	the	anthers	
alone,	must	have	been	expressed	in	the	
organization	of	the	primordial	cells	from	
which	the	plants	developed,	…	(Piternick	&	
Piternick,	1950,	p.	26)	
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hervorgegangen	 sind,	 ...	 (Correns,	
1906,	p.	241)			 	
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Appendix	3	
Two	Printings	of	L.H.	Bailey’s	Paper	Cross-Breeding	Hybridizing	
	The	Wright	&	Potter	Printing	(This	is	extracted	from	a	copy	sent	by	Michael	Buttolph)	
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		The	Rural	Library	Printing	(extracted	from	a	copy	downloaded	from	Archive.org)	 	
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Appendix	4	
Evelyn	Stern’s	Inconsistent	Translation	of	Eigenschaften	(de	Vries,	1966)	
Original	Text	 Translation	
…,	 so	 sind	 sie	 in	 diesen	 Eigenschaften	
antagonistisch,	…	(de	Vries,	1900a,	p.	84)	
…,	 in	 these	 characteristics	 they	 are	
antagonistic,	…	(de	Vries,	1966,	pp.	108–
110)	
Der	Kreuzungsversuch	wird	dadurch	auf	
die	 antagonistisch	 Eigenschaften	
beschränkt.	(de	Vries,	1900a,	p.	84)	
The	 crossing	 experiment	 is	 thereby	
limited	 to	 the	 antagonistic	
characteristics.	(de	Vries,	1966,	p.	110)	
Von	 den	 beiden	 antagonistischen	
Eigenschaften	trägt	der	Bastard	stets	nur	
die	eine,	…	(de	Vries,	1900a,	p.	84)	
Of	 the	 two	 antagonistic	 characteristics,	
the	hybrid	carries	only	one,	…	(de	Vries,	
1966,	p.	110)	
Bei	 der	 Bildung	 des	 Pollens	 und	 der	
Eizellen	 trennen	 sich	 die	 beiden	
antagonistischen	 Eigenschaften.	 (de	
Vries,	1900a,	p.	84)	
In	 the	 formation	 of	 pollen	 and	 ovules	
the	 two	 antagonistic	 characteristics	
separate,	…	(de	Vries,	1966,	p.	110)	
Das	 Fehlen	 von	 Mittelbildungen	
zwischen	 je	 zwei	 einfachen	
antagonistichen	 Eigenschaften	 im	
Bastard	 ist	 vielleicht	 der	 beste	 Beweis	
dafür,	 dass	 solche	 Eigenschaften	 wohl	
abgegrenzte	Einheiten.	(de	Vries,	1900a,	
p.	85)	
The	 lack	 of	 transitional	 forms	 between	
any	 two	 simple	 antagonistic	 characters	
in	 the	 hybrid	 is	 perhaps	 the	 best	 proof	
that	 such	 characters	 are	 well	 delimited	
units.	(de	Vries,	1966,	p.	110)	
Von	 den	 beiden	 antagonistischen	
Eigenschaften	(de	Vries,	1900a,	p.	85)	
Of	 the	 two	 antagonistic	 characters,	 …	
(de	Vries,	1966,	p.	111)	
Gewöhnlich	 ist	 die	 systematisch	 höhere	
Eigenschaft	 die	 dominirende,	 oder	 bei	
bekannter	 Abstammung	 die	 ältere,	 …	
(de	Vries,	1900a,	p.	85)	
Ordinarily	 the	 character	 higher	 in	 the	
systematic	order	 is	the	dominating	one,	
or,	 in	 cases	of	known	ancestry,	 it	 is	 the	
older	one.	(de	Vries,	1966,	p.	111)	
IM	 Bastard	 liegen	 die	 beiden	
antagonistischen	 Eigenschaften	 als	
Anlagen	 neben	 einander.	 (de	 Vries,	
1900a,	p.	86)	
In	 the	 hybrid	 the	 two	 antagonistic	
characters	 lie	 next	 to	 each	 other	 as	
anlagen.	(de	Vries,	1966,	p.	111)	
Bei	 der	 Bildung	 der	 Pollenkörner	 und	
Eizellen	 trennen	 sie	 sich.	 Die	 einzelnen	
Paare	 antagonistischer	 Eigenschaften	
verhalten	 sich	 dabei	 unabhängig	 von	
einander.	(de	Vries,	1900a,	p.	86)	
In	the	formation	of	pollen	grains	and	
ovules	these	characters	separate.	The	
individual	pairs	of	antagonistic	
characters	behave	independently	during	
this	process.	(de	Vries,	1966,	p.	112)	
Die	 Individuen	 d	 und	 d2	 haben	 nur	 die	
dominirende,	die	Exemplare	r	und	r2	nur	
die	 recessive	 Eigenschaft,	 während	 die	
dr	 offenbar	 Bastarde	 sind.	 (de	 Vries,	
1900a,	p.	86)	
The	individuals	d	and	d2	have	only	the	
dominating	character,	those	of	r	and	r2	
constitution	possess	only	the	recessive	
character,	while	the	dr	plants	are	
obviously	hybrid.	(de	Vries,	1966,	p.	112)	
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Nennt	man	 z.	B.	A.	das	eine,	und	B	das	
andere	 Paar	 antagonistischer	
Eigenschaften,	 …	 	 (de	 Vries,	 1900a,	 p.	
89)	
If,	for	instance,	one	pair	of	antagonistic	
characters	is	called	A	and	the	other	pair	
B,	…	 	 (de	Vries,	1966,	p.	116)	
Wendet	 man	 ferner	 den	 Satz	 an,	 dass	
die	 Bastarde	 das	 dominirende	Merkmal	
zur	 Schau	 tragen,	 so	 findet	man	 für	 die	
sichtbaren	 Eigenschaften	 der	
Nachkommenschaft.	(de	Vries,	1900a,	p.	
89)	
If	one	applies	the	rule	that	hybrids	
exhibit	the	dominating	traits,	one	finds	
for	the	visible	characteristics	of	the	
progeny.	(de	Vries,	1966,	p.	116)	
Es	 gelingt	 häufig,	 durch	 die	
Spaltungsveruche	 einfache	
Eigenschaften	 in	 mehrere	 Factoren	 zu	
zerlegen.	(de	Vries,	1900a,	p.	89)	
Success	is	frequently	had	in	separating	
simple	characters	into	a	number	of	
factors	by	means	of	segregation.	(de	
Vries,	1966,	p.	117)	
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Appendix	5	
Entwicklung	in	Gärtner’s	Versuche	und	Beobachtungen	über	die	
Bastarderzeugung	im	Pflanzenreich	(1849)		
	 German	text	 English	Translation	 Page	
Number	
2	 Durch	 die	 erste	 Reihe	 unserer	
Versuche,	 namlich	 durch	 die	
Bestaubung	der	Narbe	mit	dem	
eigenen	 Pollen,	 suchten	 wir	
darüber	 Gewissheit	 zu	
erlangen:	 ob	 diese	 künstliche	
Bestaubung	einen	wesentlichen	
Unterschied	 von	 der	 Wirkung	
der	 natürlichen	 und	 normalen	
Befruchtung	 in	 Beziehung	 auf	
den	Entwicklungsgang,	und	auf	
den	 Zustand	 der	 hieraus	
entstandenen	 Früchte	 und	
Samen	 und	 die	 Form	 der	
daraus	 erzeugten	 Pflanzen	
begründe?	So	nothwendig	aber	
diese	 Versuche	 nach	 den	
angezeigten	 Rücksichten	 auch	
waren,	so	könnten	sie	bei	dem	
stillen	 und	 geheimnissvollen	
Gang	 der	 Natur	 bei	 der	
natürlichen	 und	 künstlichen	
Befruchtung	 mit	 dem	 eigenen	
Pollen	 doch	 noch	 keine	
auffallende	 Resultate	 und	
absolute	 Gewissheit	 oder	
Zuverlässigkeit	 geben;	weil	 aus	
dem	 Erfolge	 dieser	 künstlichen	
Befruchtungen	 die	 moglichen	
Afterbefruchtungen	 nicht	
erkennen	 sind:	 daher	 blieb	 die	
Fremdbestäubung	 und	
Bastardbefruchtung	 als	 der	
einzige	sichere	und	zuverlassige	
Weg	übrig,	die	Befruchtung	der	
Gewächse	 in	 ein	 helleres	 Licht	
zu	setzen,	der	Entwickelung	der	
Theile	 zu	 verfolgen;	 weil	 der	
Through	 the	 first	 series	 of	 our	
experiments,	 namely	 through	 the	
pollination	of	the	stigma	with	their	
own	 pollen,	 we	 studied	 about	
certainty	 gain:	 whether	 this	
artificial	 pollination	 a	 significant	
difference	 from	 the	 effect	 of	
natural	 and	 normal	 fertilization	 in	
relation	 to	 the	 course	 of	
development,	and	on	the	state	the	
resulting	 therefrom	 fruits	 and	
seeds	 and	 the	 shape	of	 the	 plants	
produced	 from	 it	 is	 founded?	 So	
necessary	 these	 attempts	 were,	
however,	 according	 to	 the	
displayed	considerations	also,	they	
could	 still	 be	 in	 the	 natural	 and	
artificial	fertilization	with	their	own	
pollen	 no	 striking	 results	 and	
absolute	 certainty	 or	 reliability	 of	
the	silent	and	mysterious	course	of	
nature;	 because	 of	 the	 success	 of	
artificial	 insemination	 the	 possible	
after	 fertilization	 are	 not	 seen:	
therefore	remained	the	pollination	
and	 hybridisation	 as	 the	 only	 safe	
and	 reliable	 way	 left	 to	 put	 the	
fertilization	 of	 plants	 in	 a	 brighter	
light	to	pursue	the	development	of	
the	 parts;	 because	 the	 observer	 it	
hiebei	longer	has	in	his	power,	the	
beginning	 to	 determine	 the	 same,	
and	 to	 observe	 the	 moment	 of	
impact	 of	 the	 pollen,	 and	 also	 to	
put	 the	 final	 result	 in	 complete	
certainty:	whether	 the	 fertilization	
ever	 succeeded,	 or	 if	 an	 error	 in	
the	pollination	had	crept	in;	to	give	
IIV	-	IV	
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Beobachter	 es	 hiebei	 mehr	 in	
seiner	 Gewalt	 hat,	 den	 Beginn	
derselben	 zu	 bestimmen,	 und	
den	 Moment	 der	 Wirkung	 des	
Pollens	 zu	 beobachten,	 und	
ebenso	 das	 Endresultat	 in	
völlige	Gewissheit	zu	setzen:	ob	
die	 Befruchtung	 überhaupt	
gelungen,	 oder	 ob	 ein	 Fehler	
bei	 der	 Bestäubung	 sich	
eingeschlichen	 hatte;	 aus	
dieser	 Classe	 von	 Versuchen	
die	 möglichst	 grosse	
Ausdehnung	zu	geben.	
the	 greatest	 possible	 expansion	of	
this	class	of	experiments.	
1	 Wir	 werden	 daher	 den	 Grund	
der	 Seltenheit	 solcher	
Befruchtungen	 und	 des	
Hindernisses	 der	
Bastardbefruchtung	 überhaupt	
vorzüglich	 in	 den	 weiblichen	
Organen	 der	 Unterlage	 suchen	
müssen,	 was	 schon	 daraus	
hervorzugehen	 scheint,	 dass	
zuerst	 die	 Narbe	 den	 fremden	
Pollen	 schwieriger,	 und	 oft	 gar	
nicht	so	anzieht,	dass	er	auf	ihr	
haftet,	 obgleich	 die	
Pollenschlauche	 aus	 den	
Pollenkörnern	 durch	 die	
Narbenfeuchtigkeit	 zum	
Austreten	 veranlasst	 werden:	
da	 im	 Gegentheil	 bei	 der	
natürlichen	 Befruchtung,	 wenn	
auch	alle	Theile	der	weiblichen	
Organe	 ihre	 vollstandige	
Entwickelung	 noch	 nicht	
erlangt	haben,	eine	Bestäubung	
der	 Narbe	 mit	 dem	 eigenen	
Pollen	 sehr	 selten	 erfolglos	
bleibt:	 indem	sich	die	Kraft	des	
Pollens	 bis	 zum	 Zeitpunkt	 der	
allgemein	 eingetretenen	
Conceptionsfähigkeit	 der	
weiblichen	 Organe	 erhält:	 dies	
beweisen	 unsere,	 eigens	 mit	
friiher	 und	 später	 Bestaubung	
angestellten	Versuche,	wie	sich	
We	 are	 therefore	 the	 reason	 for	
the	rarity	of	such	fertilizations	and	
the	obstacle	of	 hybridisation	 at	 all	
especially	 need	 to	 look	 into	 the	
female	 organs	 of	 the	 base,	 which	
seems	to	follow	from	the	fact	that	
first	 the	 scar	 the	 foreign	 pollen	
difficult,	 and	 often	 do	 not	 attract	
so	 that	 he	 on	 her	 liable,	 although	
the	pollen	hoses	are	initiated	from	
the	 pollen	 grains	 by	 the	 grain	
moisture	 to	 escape:	 because	 on	
the	 contrary	 in	 the	 natural	
fertilization,	 although	 all	 parts	 of	
the	 female	 organs	 have	 not	 yet	
reached	 their	 complete	
development,	 pollination	 of	 the	
stigma	with	their	own	pollen	rarely	
been	unsuccessful:	by	the	power	of	
the	 pollen	 until	 the	 time	 of	
generally	occurred	maturity	of	 the	
female	 organs	 is	 preserved:	 this	
prove	our	specially	with	earlier	and	
later	 employed	 pollination	
experiments,	as	will	be	apparent	in	
the	episode.	
9	
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in	der	Folge	ergeben	wird.	
1	 Bei	 einem	 grossen	 Theil	 der	
Bastardzeugungen	der	Pflanzen	
scheint	 also	 ein	 eigener	
günstiger	Befruchtungsmoment	
in	den	weiblichen	Organen,	ein	
gewisser	 Hohenpunkt	 des	
Conceptionsvermögens,	 ein	
Analogon	 der	 Brunst	 der	
Thiere,	nöthig	zu	sein,	vermöge	
dessen	 nur	 allein	 bei	manchen	
Verbindungen	 eine	
Bastardbefruchlung	 wirklich	
anschlagen	 kann:	 welcher	
Moment	 aber	 bei	 Blumen	 von	
gleicher	 Art	 und	 gleichem	
äusserlichen	
Entwickelungsgrade	 nicht	 ganz	
constant	 zu	 sein	 scheint	 und	
offenbar	 nicht	 von	 äusseren	
Verhaltnissen	abhängt	
For	 a	 large	 part	 of	 the	 hybrid	
generation	 of	 the	 plants	 seems	 a	
separate	 cheaper	 fertilization	
moment	 in	 the	 female	 organs,	 a	
certain	 high	 point	 of	
Conceptionsvermögens,	 an	
analogue	of	the	heat	of	animals	to	
be	 necessary,	 its	 a	 hybridisation	
really	 virtue	 alone	 for	 some	
compounds	 may	 strike:	 what	
moment	but	not	seem	to	be	quite	
constant	 in	 flowers	 of	 the	 same	
type	 and	 the	 same	 external	
developmental	 state	 and	
apparently	 does	 not	 depend	 on	
outer	ratios	
9	
1	 indem	 die	 bestaubten	 Blumen	
entweder	 abfielen,	 oder	 doch	
nur	 unvollkommene	 Früchte	
und	 taube,	 oder	 nur	 sehr	
wenige	 gute	 Samen	 angesetzt	
haben:	 vielleicht	 auch	
deswegen,	 weil	 es	 wegen	 der	
Castration	an	der	Entwickelung	
der	eigenen	Wärme	der	Blumen	
fehlte	
by	the	dusty	flowers	either	fell	off,	
or	 only	 imperfect	 fruits	 and	 deaf,	
or	very	 few	good	seeds	have	been	
used:	 perhaps	 also	 because	 it	was	
missing	 because	 of	 castration	 on	
the	 development	 of	 the	 own	 heat	
of	flowers	
11	
1	 Wir	 haben	 die	 Bemerkung	
gemacht,	 dass	 zum	 Gelingen	
mancher	 Bastardbefruchtung	
eine	 wiederholte	 oder	
mehrmalige	 Bestäubung	 der	
Narbe	 mit	 Pollen	 und	 eine	
grossere	 Menge	 desselben	
nöthig	 zu	 sein	 scheint,	 als	 bei	
der	 künstlichen	 Befruchtung	
mit	 eigenem	 Pollen,	 z.	 B.	 bei	
Digitalis,	 Aquilegia,	 Potentilla,	
Nicotiana	 u.	 s.	 w.,	 indem	
entweder	 der	 frisch	
aufgetragene	 Pollen	 immer	
wieder	 auf	 der	 Narbe	
verschwindet	 oder	 sich	 in	 der	
We	 have	 remarked	 that	 the	
success	 of	 some	 hybridisation	 of	
the	 same	 repeated	 or	 repeated	
pollination	 of	 the	 stigma	 with	
pollen	and	a	greater	amount	seems	
to	 be	 necessary,	 as	 in	 artificial	
insemination	with	own	pollen,	z.	B.	
at	 Digitalis,	 Aquilegia,	 Potentilla,	
Nicotiana	etc	By	 either	 the	 freshly	
applied	 pollen	 disappears	 again	
and	 again	 on	 the	 scar	 or	 loses	
moisture	 in	 the	 grain;	 the	 reason	
thereof	can	be	searched	in	various	
causes.	 1)	 In	 the	 intake	 of	 grain	
moisture:	by	the	pollen	mixed	with	
it;	 2)	 the	 rapid	 penetration	 of	 the	
21	
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Narbenfeuchtigkeit	verliert;	der	
Grund	 hievon	 kann	 in	
verschiedenen	 Ursachen	
gesucht	 werden.	 1)	 In	 der	
Ansaugung	 der	
Narbenfeuchtigkeit:	 indem	sich	
der	Pollen	mit	 ihr	vermengt;	2)	
im	 schnelleren	 Eindringen	 des	
Befruchtungsstoffs;	 3)	 in	 einer	
ungleichformigen	 Entwickelung	
der	 Conceptionsfähigkeit	 der	
weiblichen	Organe;	4)	 in	einem	
grosseren	 Bedarf	 zur	
Befruchtung	der	Eichen.	
fertilization	 substance;	 3)	 in	 a	
differential	 development	 of	
maturity	 of	 the	 female	 organs;	 4)	
of	a	 larger	need	 for	 fertilization	of	
the	oaks.	
2	 Wenn	 eine	 solche	 durch	
Fremdbestäubung	 erzeugte	
Bastardfrucht	 in	 dem	weiteren	
Verlauf	 ihres	 Wachsthums,	
etwa	 in	 der	 Hälfte	 ihrer	
Entwickelung,	 anatomisch	
untersucht	wird:	 so	 finden	sich	
an	 dem	 Fruchthalter	 nur	 hie	
und	 da,	 bald	 an	 der	 Spitze	
desselben,	 bald	 in	 dessen	
Mitte,	 bald	 aber	 auch	 an	 der	
Basis	unordentlich	vertheilte,	in	
verschiedenen	 Graden	 der	
Entwickelung	 begriffene,	 mit	
einem	 Embryo	 versehene	
Eichen	oder	Samen:	
If	 such	 a	 hybrid	 fruit	 produced	 by	
pollination,	anatomically	examined	
in	 the	 further	 course	 of	 their	
growth,	 about	 half	 of	 its	
development:	 it	 can	 be	 found	 at	
the	 fruit	 holder	 only	 here	 and	
there,	 sometimes	 of	 the	 same	 at	
the	 top,	 sometimes	 in	 the	middle,	
but	 soon	 messy	 at	 the	
base-distributed,	 in	 various	
degrees	of	development	conceived,	
provided	 with	 an	 embryo	 or	 oak	
seeds:	
24-25	
1	 besonders	 aber	 dass	 diese	
unbefruchtet	 gebliebene	
Eichen	 nach	 einem	 nicht	 sehr	
langen	 Zeitraume	 nach	 der	
Fremdbestäubung	 (s.	 unten	
von	 der	 suecessiv-gemischten	
Bastardbefruchtung)	 ihre	
Empfänglichkeit	 für	 die	
Befruchtung	 (selbst	 mit	 dem	
eigenen	 Pollen),	 sowie	 ihr	
Entwickelungsvermögen	
überhaupt	verlieren	
but	 especially	 that	 these	
unfertilized	 remaining	oaks	after	 a	
not	 very	 long	 space	 of	 time	 after	
pollination	 (see	 Fig.	 below	 of	 the	
suecessiv-mixed	 hybridisation)	
their	 susceptibility	 to	 fertilization	
(even	 with	 their	 own	 pollen),	 as	
well	 as	 their	 potentiality	 of	
development	ever	lose	
25	
1	 so	 dass	 die	 unbefruchtet	
gebliebenen	 Eichen	 durch	 eine	
Nachbestäubung	 mit	 dem	
eigenen	 Pollen	 nicht	 mehr	
belebt	 und	 zur	 Entwickelung	
so	 that	 the	 unfertilized	 remaining	
oaks	can	be	no	longer	animated	by	
a	pollination	with	their	own	pollen,	
and	 brings	 to	 development,	 but	
soon	assume	a	yellow	color,	shrivel	
26	
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erweckt	 werden	 können,	
sondern	 bald	 eine	 gelbe	 Farbe	
annehmen,	einschrumpfen	und	
verderben.	
and	spoil.	
1	 Nun	 tritt	 aber,	 je	 nach	 einer	
vollständigeren	 oder	
unvollständigeren	
Schwängerung	 des	 Ovariums,	
ein	 deutlich	 erkennbarer	
Stillstand	 der	 weiteren	
Entwickelung	 des	
Fruchtknotens	 auf	 einige	 Tage	
ein	 und	 zwar	 bestimmter,	 als	
sich	 dieses	 nach	 der	
künstlichen	 Befruchtung	 mit	
dem	 eigenen	 Pollen	 zu	
erkennen	gibt.	
Now,	 however,	 occurs	 depending	
on	 a	 more	 complete	 or	 less	
complete	 impregnation	 of	 the	
ovary,	 a	 clearly	 recognizable	
standstill	and	indeed	certain,	when	
this	 is	 to	 recognize	 after	 artificial	
insemination	with	their	own	pollen	
further	development	of	the	ovary	a	
few	days.	
26	
1	 Dieser	 scheinbare	 Stillstand	 in	
dem	 Wachsthum	 der	 jungen	
Frucht	 in	 der	 ersten	 Periode	
ihrer	 Entwickelung	 ist	 bei	 den	
einer,	 längeren	
Zeitigungsperiode	
unterworfenen	 Gewächsen	 so	
bedeutend,	dass	man	eher	das	
Abfallen	 der,	 der	 Blume	 und	
des	 Griffels	 längst	 entledigten,	
Frucht	 besorgt,	 als	 am	
folgenden	 Morgen,	 gleichsam	
nach	 überwundenern	 innerem	
Kampfe	 und	 durchbrochenem	
Hinderniss,	die	junge	Frucht	ein	
entschiedenes	Wachsthum	und	
Gedeihen	zeigt.	
This	apparent	halt	in	the	growth	of	
the	young	fruit	in	the	first	period	of	
its	development	 is	 so	 significant	at	
the	 one,	 longer	 priod	 of	
maturation	 subject	 growths	 that	
one	 rather	 long	 since	 the	 fall	 of,	
the	 flower	 of	 the	 pen	 and	 got	 rid	
of,	 fruit	 concerned,	 as	 the	
following	 morning,	 speak	 after	
about	 sore	 partners	 inner	 struggle	
and	openwork	obstacle,	the	young	
fruit	 a	 decided	 growth	 and	
prosperity	shows.	
27	
1	 zugleich	 scheint	 diese	
Verlangsamerung	 in	 der	
Entwickelung	 der	 Frucht	 mit	
dem	 langsameren	 Gang	 der	
Befruchtung	 oder	 dem	
späteren	 Eindringen	 des	
fremden	 Befruchtungsstoffs	 in	
die	 Eichen	 in	 genauer	
Verbindung	zustehen	
at	 the	 same	 time	 seems	 this	
slowdown	 in	 the	 development	 of	
the	 fruit	 with	 the	 slower	 of	 the	
fertilization	 or	 the	 subsequent	
penetration	 of	 foreign	 material	
fertilization	 entitled	 in	 the	 oaks	 in	
exact	conjunction	
27	
1	 Wir	 werden	 hieraus	 schliessen	
können,	 dass	 die	 fernere	
Fruchtentwickelung	 durch	 ein	
inneres	 Hinderniss	 gestört	
We	 are	 therefrom	 may	 conclude	
that	 the	 further	 fruit	 development	
has	 been	 disturbed	 by	 an	 inner	
obstacle:	 so	 that	 the	 fruit	 of	 their	
28	
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worden	 ist:	 so	 dass	 die	 Frucht	
ihr	 völliges	 Wachsthum	 nicht	
erlangen	 konnte,	 und	 dass	
diese	 Abortion	 nicht	 von	 dem	
gelb	 gewordenen	 Fruchtstiel,	
als	 dem	 ersten	 Zeichen	 der	
Abnahme	 des	 Wachsthums,	
sondern	 von	 dem	 Ovarium	
ausgegangen	ist	
complete	 growth	 could	not	 attain,	
and	 that	 these	 Abortion	 not	 from	
the	yellowed	fruit	stalk,	as	the	first	
signs	 of	 decline	 of	 growth,	 but	 of	
the	ovary	is	assumed	
1	 Wenn	 eine	 solche	 durch	
Bastardzeugung	 entstandene	
Frucht	 in	 der	 ersten	 Periode	
ihrer	 Entwickelung	 im	 Innern	
untersucht	wird,	 so	 findet	man	
die	 befruchteten	 Eichen	 nicht	
in	 gleichem	 Grade	 der	
Entwickelung	und	der	Grösse	
If	 such	 a	 hybrid	 caused	 by	
procreation	fruit	is	examined	in	the	
first	period	of	their	development	in	
the	interior,	so	no	one	can	find	the	
fertilized	 oaks	 in	 the	 same	 degree	
of	development	and	the	size	
29	
2	 De	Mirbel	hat	jedoch	auch	nach	
der	 naturlichen	 Befruchtung	 in	
der	 ersten	 Periode	 der	
Entwickelung	 in	 einem	 und	
demselben	Ovarium	die	Eichen	
von	 verschiedener	 Grosse	
angetroffen.	 Zuweilen	 holen	
die	 kleineren	 Eichen	 die	
grosseren	 in	 der	 weiteren	
Entwickelung	 im	 Wachsthum	
wieder	ein	
De	 Mirbel,	 however,	 has	
encountered	 the	 oaks	 of	 various	
sizes	even	after	natural	fertilization	
in	 the	 first	 period	 of	 development	
in	 a	 single	 ovary.	 Sometimes	
bringing	small	oaks	while	bigger	 in	
the	 further	development	 in	growth	
again	
29	
1	 Meistens	 werden	 nur	 wenige	
und	 hie	 und	 da	 blos	 einzelne	
Eichen	zwischen	vielen	anderen	
befruchtet;	 indem	 die	
unmittelbar	 an	 sie	
anstossenden	 entweder	 gar	
keine	 oder	 nur	 eine	 leichte	
Anregung	 zur	 Entwickelung	
erhalten	haben.	
In	most	cases,	only	a	few	here	and	
there	 fertilized	 merely	 individual	
oaks	 among	 many	 others;	 by	 the	
abutting	 directly	 to	 either	 have	
received	 no	 or	 only	 a	 slight	
stimulus	to	development.	
29	
1	 Dieser	 Unterschied	
verschwindet	aber	 in	der	Folge	
des	 weiteren	 Wachsthums,	
wenn	das	innere	Hinderniss	der	
Entwickelung	sich	gehoben	hat	
But	 this	 difference	 disappears	 in	
the	wake	of	 further	 growth,	when	
the	 inner	 obstacle	 of	 development	
has	lifted	itself	
31	
1	 Die	 Sonnenwärme	 scheint	
daher	 nicht	 nur	 bios	 bei	 der	
Befruchtung	 mit	 fremdem	
Pollen	 (s.	 oben	 S.	 10),	 sondern	
auch	 bei	 der	 weiteren	
The	 sun's	heat	 therefore	 seems	 to	
be	a	nothwendigere	condition	than	
in	the	natural	 fertilization	not	only	
bios	 at	 fertilization	 with	 foreign	
pollen	 (see	 Fig.	 Above,	 p	 10),	 but	
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Entwickelung	 der	 Früchte	 und	
Samen	 eine	 nothwendigere	
Bedingung	 zu	 sein,	 als	 bei	 der	
natürlichen	Befruchtung.	
also	 in	 the	 further	 development	 of	
fruits	and	seeds.	
1	 Es	 sind	 von	 uns	 schon	 früher	
uber	 fruhe	 und	 späte	
Bestäubung	 Versuche	
angestellt	worden,	um	über	die	
Entwickelung	und	die	Dauer	der	
Conceptionsfähigkeit	 der	
weiblichen	Organe	der	Pflanzen	
einige	 nähere	 Kenntniss	 zu	
erhalten	
There	 have	 been	 earlier	 about	
EARLY	 and	 late	 pollination	
employed	 by	 us	 attempts	 to	 get	
some	 more	 knowledge	 about	 the	
development	 and	 the	 duration	 of	
the	maturity	 of	 the	 female	 organs	
of	plants	
32	
1	 Durch	 vielfältige	 Erfahrung	
belehrt,	 dass	 die	 blose	
Verletzung	 oder	 theilweise,	
selbst	 gänzliche	 Hinwegnahme	
der	Corolle	der	Befruchtung	der	
Ovarien	 nicht	 den	 Nachtheil	
bringt,	 welchen	 Schelver	 und	
Henschel	 derselben	
zugeschrieben	 haben,	 haben	
wir	 drei	 noch	 enggeschlossene	
und	 in	 gleichem	
Entwickelungsgrade	 befindliche	
Blumen	der	Nicoliana	rustica	a,	
b	 und	 c	 (den	 20.	 August	 1832)	
in	 der	 Halfte	 der	 Länge	 ihres	
Tubus	 mit	 aller	 Vorsicht	 quer	
rund	herum	abgeschnitten,	
Through	varied	experience	teaches	
that	the	Blose	injury	or	partly	even	
utter	 taking	 away	 the	 corolla	
fertilization	 of	 ovaries	 does	 not	
bring	 the	 disadvantage	 which	
Schelver	 and	 Henschel	 have	
attributed	the	same,	we	have	three	
more	 tightly	 closed	 and	 located	 in	
the	 same	 developmental	 state	 of	
flowers	Nico	Liana	rustica	a,	b	and	
c	 (20	 August	 1832)	 cut	 in	 half	 the	
length	 of	 its	 tube	 with	 caution	
across	all	around,	
40	
1	 Von	 Nicotiana	 rustica	 haben	
wir	 (den	 15.	 Juli	 1832)	 neun	
Blumen	 von	 ganz	 gleicher	
Entwickelung	 zu	 gleicher	 Zeit	
castrirt.	
For	 Nicotiana	 rustica	 we	 have	 (15	
July	 1832)	 nine	 castrated	 flowers	
are	in	quite	the	same	development	
at	the	same	time.	
46	
1	 Es	 scheint	 also,	 dass	 die	
Befruchtung	 der	 N.	 paniculata	
mit	 dem	 Pollen	 der	 N.	
Langsdorfii	 erst	 nach	 45	
Minuten	 unter	 günstigen	
Umständen	 (bei	 +	 24	 R)	
vollbracht	 und	 Wirkung	 des	
eigenen	 Pollens	 aufgehoben	
wird;	obgleich	der	grösste	Theil	
der	 Eichen	 des	 Ovariums	
unbefruchtet	 geblieben	 war,	
und	 zu	 keiner	 Entwickelung	
So	it	seems	that	the	fertilization	of	
N.	paniculata	with	the	pollen	of	N.	
langsdorfii	 only	 after	 45	 minutes	
under	 favorable	 circumstances	 (at	
+	 24	 R)	 accomplished	 and	 lifted	
action	 of	 its	 own	 pollen;	 although	
the	greater	part	of	the	oaks	of	the	
ovary	 had	 remained	 unfertilized,	
and	has	been	no	development.	
48	
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gekommen	ist.	
1	 Diese	 Versuche	 scheinen	
abermals	zu	zeigen,	dass	neben	
den	 verschiedenen,	 dem	 Auge	
unsichtbaren	
Entwickelungsgraden	 der	
weiblichen	 Organe	 der	
Gewächse,	 die	 beide	 Agentien,	
das	 Sonnenlicht	 und	 die	
Wärme,	 (s.	 oben	 S.	 10)	 einen	
grossen	 Einfluss	 auf	 den	 Gang	
der	 Befruchtung	 der	 Pflanzen	
haben	
These	 experiments	 seem	 to	 show	
once	 again	 that	 in	 addition	 to	 the	
various	 sight	 unseen	 the	
developmental	 state	of	 the	 female	
organs	 of	 plants,	 both	 agents,	 the	
sunlight	 and	 the	 heat,	 (see	 Fig.	
Above,	p	10)	have	a	great	influence	
on	 the	 course	 of	 fertilization	 of	
plants	
49	
1	 Die	 (im	 Jahr	 1827)	 ausgesäten	
Samen	 gaben	 acht	 Pflanzen,	
wovon	 zwei	 bald	 wieder	
eingegangen,	 und	 sechs	 zur	
völligen	 Entwickelung	 und	
Blüthe	 gekommen	 sind;	 von	
diesen	 Samlingen	 waren	 vier	
männlich	und	zwei	weiblich.	
The	 (in	 1827)	 sown	 seeds	 yielded	
eight	plants,	two	of	which	received	
soon,	and	six	came	to	the	complete	
development	 and	 bloom;	 of	 these	
seedlings	were	 four	male	 and	 two	
female.	
49	
1	 Die	 wenigsten	 Blumen	 kamen	
aber	 zur	 vollkommenen	
Entwickelung,	 sondern	 die	
meisten	 derselben	 verdarben	
unentwickelt,	 besonders	 in	 der	
späteren	 Lebensperiode	 der	
Pflanze,	 auch	 hatten	 die	
wirklich	 entwickelten	 Blumen	
nur	eine	kurze	Dauer.	
But	 few	 flowers	 came	 to	 the	
perfect	 development,	 but	 most	 of	
them	 spoiled	 undeveloped,	
especially	in	the	later	period	of	life	
of	 the	 plant,	 also	 had	 really	
developed	 flowers	 only	 a	 short	
duration.	
50	
1	 Dies	 ist	 nun	 ein	 seltener	 Fall	
einer	gemischten	Befruchtung;	
in	 Gewachshausern	 scheinen	
aber	solche	Befruchtungen	
bei	 exotischen	 Gewachsen	
wegen	 unregelmässiger	 Blüthe	
und	
Sexualorgane-Entwickelung	
nicht	 selten	 vorzukommen,	
wodurch	 Bastardzeugungen	
entstehen	
Now	this	 is	a	 rare	case	of	a	mixed	
fertilization;	 	
in	 greenhouses	 but	 seem	 such	
fertilizations	 	
often	 occur	 in	 exotic	 Grown	 for	
irregular	 flower	 and	 sexual	
organs-development,	 whereby	 the	
hybrid	generation	arises	
51	
1	 weil	 sich	 bei	 einer	
unzureichenden	 Menge	 des	
Pollens	 dessen	
Befruchtungsstoff	 nicht	 auf	
einzelne	 Eichen	 zu	 deren	
Sehwängerung	 concentrirt,	
because	 when	 an	 insufficient	
amount	 of	 pollen	 fertilization	
whose	 substance	 is	 not	
concentrated	on	 individual	oaks	to	
their	 Sehwängerung,	 but	 by	 only	
an	 'imperfect	 fertilization	 of	 the	
56	
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sondern	 dadurch	 nur	 eine	 '	
unvollkommene	 Befruchtung	
des	 Ovariums	 und	 keine	
Erzeugung	 eines	 lebendigen	
und	 der	 Entwickelung	 fähigen	
Embryos	bewirkt	wird.	
ovary	 and	not	 producing	 a	 vibrant	
and	the	development	of	the	normal	
embryo	is	effected.	
1	 und	 dabei	 bemerkt,	 dass	 die	
Narben	 dieser	 Gewächse	 von	
dem	Oele	schwarz	wurden,	wie	
andere	grüne	Theile	
der	 Gewächse,	 wahrscheinlich	
weil	 es	 die	 Gasentwickelung	
aus	der	Narbe	hinderte	(s.	oben	
S.	42)	
and	 it	 noted	 that	 the	 stigmas	 of	
these	growths	were	black	from	the	
oils,	 like	 other	 green	 parts	 of	
plants,	 probably	 because	 it	
prevented	 the	 development	 from	
the	stigmas	(see	Fig.	above,	p	42)	
60	
1	 Die	belebende	Kraft	des	Pollens	
zeigt	sich	vorzüglich	
bei	 der	 unvollkommenen	
Befruchtung	 ,	 und	 ist	 nur	 ein	
geringerer	 Grad	 seiner	
schaffenden	 Wirkung:	 indem	
der	 fremde	 Pollen	 die	 Eichen	
im	 Ovarium	 nur	 zur	 Belebung	
und	Entwickelung	der	äusseren	
Umhüllungen	 der	 Samen	 in	
verschiedenen	 Graden	 ihrer	
Ausbildung	erweckt,	 aber	nicht	
so	 viel	 Kraft	 besitzt,	 einen	
Embryo	 in	 dem	 Samen	 zu	
erzeugen	
The	 animating	 force	 of	 the	 pollen	
shows	excellently	 	
in	 the	 imperfect	 fertilization,	 and	
only	 a	 lesser	 degree	 of	 creative	
action	is	by	the	foreign	pollen	that	
oak	 brings	 in	 the	 ovary	 only	 for	
recovery	 and	 development	 of	 the	
outer	 envelopes	 of	 the	 seeds	 in	
different	 levels	 of	 their	 formation,	
but	 not	 so	 much	 power,	 holds	 an	
embryo	in	to	generate	the	seed	
69	
1	 Es	 ist	 uns	 noch	 die	
formbestimmende	Wirkung	des	
Pollens	 bei	 der	
Bastardbefruchtung	 zu	
untersuchen	 übrig:	 wir	 haben	
sie	 in	 zweifacher	 Beziehung	 zu	
betrachten	 :	 A)	 in	 Hinsicht	 der	
äusseren	 Verhältnisse	 der	
durch	 die	 Bastardbefruchtung	
unmittelbar	 erzeugten	 Früchte	
und	Samen	,	und	B)	 in	Hinsicht	
der	 Typen,	 welche	 aus	 diesen	
Samen	 durch	 das	 Keimen	 und	
die	 weitere	 Entwickelung	 der	
daraus	 hervorgegangenen	
Pflanzen	gebildet	werden	
We	are	still	the	shape-determining	
effect	 of	 the	 pollen	 on	 the	
hybridisation	to	investigate	left:	we	
have	 to	 consider	 them	 in	 double	
relationship:	 A),	 in	 respect	 of	 the	
external	conditions	of	the	fruit	and	
seeds	 directly	 generated	 by	
hybridisation,	 and	 B)	 in	 terms	 of	
the	 types	 which	 are	 formed	 from	
these	 seeds	 by	 germination	 and	
further	 development	 of	 the	
emerging	plants.	
73	
1	 Vier	 Blumen	 mit	 dem	 Pollen	
der	 Vicia	 Faba	 bestäubt	 flelen	
Four	 flowers	 pollinated	 with	 the	
pollen	 of	 Vicia	 Faba	 Flelen	 after	
83	
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nach	 eilf	 Tagen	 verdorrt	 und	
ohne	 Entwickelung	 des	
Ovariums	ab.	
eleven	 days	 of	 withered	 and	
without	development	of	the	ovary.	
1	 Die	 mit	 dem	 Pollen	 der	 Vicia	
Faba	hortemis	(Ackerbohne	mit	
weisser	 Blüthe)	 und	 der	 Vicia	
sativa	 (gemeine	 Wicke)	
versuchten	 Bestäubungen	
blieben	 ohne	 Erfolg,	 und	 die	
Blumen	 fielen	 ohne	 einige	
Entwickelung	 des	 Ovariums	 in	
16	Tagen	verdorrt	ab.	
With	 the	 pollen	 of	 Vicia	 Faba	
hortemis	 (broad	 bean	 with	 white	
flower)	 and	 Vicia	 sativa,	 (common	
vetch)	attempted	pollinations	were	
unsuccessful,	 and	 the	 flowers	 fell	
without	 some	 development	 of	 the	
ovary	in	16	days.	
85	
1	 dass	 nämlich	 der	 Einfluss	 des	
fremden	Pollens	nichts	
in	 den,	 der	 Mutterpflanze	
eigenthümlichen	 Formen	 und	
äusserlichen	 Eigenschaften	 der	
Früchte	und	Samen	unmittelbar	
verändere;	sondern	dass	nur	 in	
dem	 Embryo	 die	 Fähigkeit	
erzeugt	 werde,	 durch	 das	
Keimen	 und	 die	 weitere	
Entwickelung	der	neuen	Pflanze	
eine	 Modification	 der	
betreffenden	 Arten	 und	 der	
Form	 ihrer	 Theile	
hervorzubringen.	
namely	 that	 the	 influence	 of	 the	
foreign	pollen	nothing	 	
in,	 the	 mother	 plant	 peculiar	
shapes	and	external	characteristics	
of	 fruits	 and	 seeds	 immediately	
alters;	but	that	only	in	the	embryo,	
the	ability	will	produce,	bring	forth	
by	 the	 germination	 and	 further	
development	of	 the	new	plant	 is	 a	
modification	 of	 the	 species	
concerned	 and	 the	 shape	 of	 their	
parts.	
89	
2	 Die	 zweite	 Rücksicht	 der	
formbestimmenden	 Wirkung	
des	 fremden	 Pollens	 auf	 die	
Eichen	 der	 weiblichen	
Unterlage	
(s.	 oben	 S.	 73)	 betrifft	 die	
Veränderung	 in	 der	 Form	 der	
Entwickelung	 der	 durch	 die	
Bastardbefruchtung	 gebildeten	
Keime,	 welche	 Veränderung	 in	
den	 Keimen	 zwar	 nicht	 durchs	
Mikroskop	 zu	erkennen	 ist,	 die	
aber	 bei	 der	 Entwickelung	 der	
Keime	 und	 ihrem	 Wachsthum	
an	 den	 abweichenden	 Typen	
sich	aufs	Deutlichste	zeigt.	
The	 second	 consideration	 of	 the	
shape-determining	 effect	 of	
foreign	 pollen	 on	 the	 oaks	 of	
feminine	pad	(see	Fig.	Above,	p	73)	
relates	 to	 the	 change	 in	 the	 form	
of	 the	 development	 of	 the	 nuclei	
formed	by	the	hybridisation,	not	to	
see	 what	 a	 change	 in	 the	 germs	
through	 a	microscope	 is,	 but	 with	
the	 development	 of	 germs	 and	
their	growth	on	the	different	types,	
shows	most	clearly.	
89-90	
2	 Lychnicucubalus	 albus	 und	
ruber	zeigte	für	sich	selbst	nicht	
die	 geringste	 Entwickelung	 des	
Ovariums,	aber	mit	dem	Pollen	
Lychnicucubalus	 albus	 and	 ruber	
did	 not	 show	 for	 themselves	 the	
least	development	of	the	ovary,	but	
with	 the	 pollen	 of	 Lychnis	 diurna	
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der	 Lychnis	 diurna	 und	
vesperlina	 bestäubt	
entwiekelten	 sich	 die	 äusseren	
Fruchtumhüllungen,	 namlich	
Kelch	und	Fruchtknoten	bis	auf	
einen	 gewissen	 Grad:	 das	
Receptaculum	 und	 die	 Eichen	
blieben	 aber	 ohne	
Entwickelung;	 in	 viel	
geringerem	 Grade	 erfolgte	
dieses	 durch	 die	 Bestaubung	
mit	 dem	 Pollen	 des	 Cucubalus	
viscosus.	 (S.	 unten	
Umwandelung.)	
and	 vesper	 lina	 dusted	 the	 outer	
fruit	 servings,	 namely	 calyx	 and	
ovary	escape	disgusted	to	a	certain	
degree:	 the	 receptaculum	 and	 the	
oaks	 remained	 but	 without	
development;	 to	 a	 much	 lesser	
degree	 this	 was	 done	 by	
pollination	 with	 pollen	 of	
Cucubalus	 viscosus.	 (See	 below	
Umwandelung.)	
2	 Eine	 unvollkommene	 Wirkung	
des	 fremden	Pollens,	a.	1.	eine	
unvollkommene	 Befruchtung	
gibt	 sich	besonders	dadurch	zu	
erkennen,	 dass,	 wenn	 die	
Früchte	 auch	 normal	 zu	 sein	
scheinen,	 die	 Samen	 jedoch	
klein	 und	 mager	 und	 in	
verschiedenen	 Graden	 der	
Entwickelung	 stehen	 geblieben	
sind:	 dagegen	 aber	 doch	 die	
Samenrudimente	 ,	welche	man	
von	 einer	 Blume	 derselben	
Pflanze	 erhalt,	 deren	 Narbe	
nicht	unit	Pollen	belegt	worden	
war,	 an	 Grösse	 und	
Vollkommenheit	 weit	
übertreffen:	 hieraus	 ist	 zu	
schliessen,	 dass	 in	 den	 Eichen	
jener	bestäubten	Blumen	durch	
den	 fremden	 Pollen	 eine	
Anregung	 zur	 Entwickelung	
bewirkt	worden,	ohne	dass	ein	
Embryo	 erzeugt	 worden,	 dass	
also	 eine	 unvollkommene	
Befruchtung	 erfolgt	 ist;	 hiemit	
stimmen	 auch	 Kölreuter's	
Beobachtungen	
überein.Befruchtung	erfolgt	ist;	
hiemit	 stimmen	 auch	
Kölreuter's	 Beobachtungen	
überein.	
An	 imperfect	 effect	 of	 the	 foreign	
pollen,	a	first	imperfect	fertilization	
are	 particularly	 characterized	 to	
recognize	that	if	the	fruits	seem	to	
be	 normal,	 the	 seeds	 are	 left,	
however,	and	are	small	and	lean	in	
different	 degrees	 of	 development:	
Contrast,	 but	 but	 the	 seed	
rudiments	 which	 you	 exceed	 that	
of	 a	 flower	 of	 the	 same	
plant-keeping,	whose	scar	was	not	
occupied	 unit	 pollen	 in	 size	 and	
perfection	 far:	 from	 this	 it	 can	 be	
concluded	 that	 in	 the	 oaks	 that	
pollinated	 flowers	 caused	 by	 the	
foreign	 pollen	 a	 stimulus	 to	 the	
development	 was	 without	 an	
embryo	 produced,	 so	 that	 an	
imperfect	 fertilization	 has	 taken	
place;	 hereby	 also	 agree	
Kölreuter's	observations	match.	
93-94	
1	 Bei	 diesen	 zeigt	 sich	 aber	 With	 these	 but	 usually	 shows	 the	 94	
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gewöhnlich	 der	 Unterschied,	
dass	die	Ovula	zwar	bis	auf	eine	
gewisse	 Grösse	wachsen,	dann	
aber	 in	 der	 Entwickelung	 stille	
stehen,	 worauf	 die	 ganzen	
Blumen	gemeiniglich	abfallen	
difference	 that	 while	 the	 ovules	
grow	 to	 a	 certain	 size,	 but	 then	
stand	 still	 in	 the	 development,	
whereupon	 the	 whole	 flowers	 fall	
commonly	
1	 Bei	 der	 unvollkommenen	
Befruchtung	 aber	 erlangen	 die	
Eichen	 nicht	 nur	 in	 den	
verschiedenen	 Früchten	
derselben	Art,	sondern	in	einer	
und	 derselben	 Frucht	 sehr	
verschiedene	 Grade	 der	
Entwickelung,	von	dem	einfach	
staubartig	verlrockneten	Eichen	
bis	 zum	 vollkommenen	
keimungsfähigen	Samen.	
In	 the	 imperfect	 fertilization	 but	
gain	 the	 oaks	 not	 only	 in	 the	
different	fruits	of	the	same	species,	
but	 in	one	and	the	same	fruit	very	
different	 degrees	 of	 development,	
from	 the	 simple	 dust-like	 rock	
laughed	 Neten	 oaks	 until	 the	
perfect	sprouting	of	the	seeds.	
95	
1	 der	 Kelch	 erhält	 sich	 und	
wachst	gewöhnlich	noch	
etwas;	 der	 Fruchtknoten	 und	
seine	 äussere	 Umhüllungen	
bleiben	aber	unverandert,	oder	
erlangen	 nur	 eine	 geringe	
Entwickelung,	 und	 die	 Eichen	
erfahren	 gar	 keine	 Anregung	
von	einer	Befruchtung:	sondern	
verderben	 und	 vertrocknen	 zu	
staubartigenTheilen.	
the	cup	maintains	 itself	and	grows	
usually	 still	 something;	 but	 the	
ovary	 and	 its	 outer	 wrappings	
remain	unchanged,	or	acquire	only	
a	small	development,	and	the	oaks	
out	 any	 suggestion	 of	 a	
fertilization:	 but	 destroy	 and	 dry	
up	to	dust-like	divide.	
97	
1	 Die	 Bestäubung	 der	 Narbe	mit	
Semen	 Lycopodii	 bewirkte	
diesen	 Grad	 der	 Entwickelung	
bei	 einigen	 Ovarien	 der	
Nicotiana	 rustica	und	Aquilegia	
vulgaris.	
The	 pollination	 of	 the	 stigma	with	
Semen	 Lycopodii	 caused	 this	
degree	 of	 development	 in	 some	
ovaries	 of	 Nicotiana	 rustica	 and	
Aquilegia	vulgaris.	
97	
1	 Die	Blumenkrone	verdirbt	oder	
löst	 sich	 nur	 wenig	 später	 als	
bei	 wirklich	 stattfindender	
Befruchtung	 ab;	 Kelch	 und	
Ovarium	 wachsen	 ein	 wenig	
und	 entwickeln	 sich	 zu	 einer	
kleinen	 mageren	 Frucht:	 die	
Eichen	 aber	 nehmen	 keinen	
oder	 einen	 nur	 sehr	 geringen	
Antheil	 an	 diesem	 Bestreben	
der	 Entwickelung,	 sondern	
verderben	 und	 vertrocknen	 zu	
sehr	 kleinen	 staubartigen	
The	corolla	corrupts	or	comes	off	a	
little	 later	 than	 in	 actually	 taking	
place	 fertilization;	 Calyx	 and	ovary	
grow	 a	 little,	 and	 develop	 into	 a	
small	 lean	 fruit:	 the	 oaks	 take	 but	
no	or	only	a	very	small	part	 in	this	
endeavor	 of	 development,	 but	
destroy	 and	 dry	 up	 to	 very	 small	
dust-like	 particles.	 Often	 the	 fruit	
of	 this	 degree	 falls	 separated	 long	
before	the	time	of	the	stems	from,	
as	in	the	two	preceding	degrees.	
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Partikeln.	Häufig	fällt	die	Frucht	
dieses	 Grades	 lange	 vor	 der	
Zeit	vom	Stiele	getrennt	ab,	wie	
bei	 den	 beiden	
vorhergehenden	Graden.	
2	 Gmou	 de	 Buzareingues	 meint,	
dass	 zu	 diesem	 Grade	 der	
Fruchtentwickelung	 nur	 eine	
geringe	 Menge	 steriler	
Pollenkorner	 (petit	 nombre	 de	
graines	 steriles)	 erforderlich	
seie.	 Hier	 tritt	 namentlich	 bei	
den	 Hybriden	 der	 Zweifel	 ein:	
ob	nicht	auch	der	 taube	Pollen	
die	 Kraft	 besitze,	 die	
Entwickelung	 der	 äusseren	
Umhüllungen	 der	 Frucht	 und	
der	Samen	zu	bewirken.	
Gmou	de	Buzareingues	says	that	at	
this	 degree	 of	 fruit	 development	
only	 a	 small	 amount	 of	 sterile	
pollen	 grains	 (petit	 nombre	 de	
graines	 sterile)	 was	 required.	 This	
occurs	especially	in	the	hybrids	of	a	
doubt	 whether	 even	 the	 deaf	
pollen	 possess	 the	 power	 to	 bring	
about	 the	 development	 of	 the	
outer	envelopes	of	the	fruit	and	the	
seed.	
98	
2	 Bei	 dieser	 und	 der	
vorhergehenden	 Stufe	 der	
Entwickelung	 der	 Samen,	 wo	
die	 Testa	 einerseits	 und	
andererseits	 der	 Kern	 eine	
weitere	 Entwickelung	 erlangt,	
ist	 zu	 hoffen,	 dass	 unter	 ganz	
gunstigen	 Umstanden,	 …	 doch	
einmal	 ein	 keimungsfähiger	
Embryo	 erzeugt	 werden	
konnte.	
In	 this	 and	 the	 preceding	 stage	 of	
development	 of	 the	 seed,	 where	
the	Testa	on	the	one	hand	and	on	
the	other	hand,	 the	 core	attains	a	
further	 development,	 it	 is	 hoped	
that,	 under	 very	 favorable	
circumstances,	 …	 but	 once	 a	
germinable	 embryo	 could	 be	
created.	
99	
1	 Mit	 mageren,	 seltener	 mit	
normal	 ausgebildeten	
Früchten,	 welche	 neben	 einer	
grossen	 Anzahl	 von	 staubartig	
vertrockneten	 Eichen	 und	
leeren	 Samenbälgen	 von	
verschiedenen	 Graden	 der	
Entwickelung	 auch	 einige	
scheinbar	 vollkommene	 Samen	
enthalten,	 die	 eine	
albuminösen	Kern,	aber	keinen	
Embryo	 in	 sich	 festen	
schliessen,	 und	 daher	 nicht	
keimungsfähig	sind.	
With	lean,	rare	with	normal	shaped	
fruits,	 which	 contain	 not	 only	 a	
large	number	of	dust-like	withered	
oaks	 and	 empty	 seeds	 with	
different	 degrees	 of	 development,	
some	 apparently	 perfect	 seeds,	
which	include	an	albuminous	core,	
but	 no	 embryo	 is	 fixed,	 and	
therefore	not	of	germination	have.	
100	
1	 Die	 Eichen	waren	 aber	 in	 ihrer	
Entwickelung	 gegen	 das	
Pericarp	 zurück	 geblieben,	
wurden	 missfarbig	 und	
The	oaks	were	but	stayed	behind	in	
their	 development	 against	 the	
pericarp,	 were	 discolored	 and	
spoiled.	
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verdorben.	
1	 Eine	 Pflanze	 der	 Lobelia	
fulgenti-stiphilitica	 hatte	 aus	
sich	 selber	 nicht	 die	 mindeste	
Entwickelung	 ihrer	
Fruchtknoten	gezeigt	
A	 plant	 of	 Lobelia	
Fulgenti-stiphilitica	 had	 not	 shown	
itself	the	least	development	of	their	
ovaries	
104	
1	 dann	 aber	 standen	 sie	 auf	
einmal	 in	 ihrer	 Entwickelung	
stille,	
wurden	 gelb	 und	 schrumpften	
ein	
but	 then	 they,	 suddenly	 silent	 in	
their	 development,	 were	 yellow	
and	shriveled	
104	
1	 sondern	 haufig	 nur	 die	
Entwickelung	 der	 ausseren	
Umhüllungen	 der	 Frucht	 und	
der	 Samen	 zu	 Stande	 kommt,	
und	kein	Embryo	erzeugt	wird.	
but	often	only	 the	development	of	
the	outer	envelopes	of	the	fruit	and	
the	 seed	 comes	 to	 pass,	 and	 no	
embryo	is	create	
104-105	
1	 Es	 bleibt	 daher	 immer	 noch	
eine	 unaufgeklärte	
Erscheinung,	 dass	 bei	 den	
Pflanzen	 durch	 die	 vis	
vegetativa	 (das	
Fruchtungsvermögen)	in	Fällen,	
wo	 kein	 Atom	 von	 Pollen	
wirksam	 sein	 kann,	 ganz	 die	
gleichen	 Erscheinungen	 der	
Entwickelung	 an	 Früchten	 und	
Samen	sich	äussern,	wie	bei	der	
unvollkommenen	
Bastardbefruchtung,	 nämlich	
Früchte-	 und	 Samenbildung	 in	
verschiedenen	 Graden	 der	
Vollkommenheit,	 doch	 mit	
entschiedenem	 Ausschluss	 des	
Embryo;	
Therefore,	 it	 still	 remains	 an	
unexplained	 phenomenon	 that	 in	
the	 plants	 by	 the	 vis	 vegetativa	
(the	Fruchtungsvermögen)	in	cases	
where	 no	 atom	 of	 pollen	 can	 be	
effective,	all	 the	same	phenomena	
of	development	of	fruits	and	seeds	
manifest	 themselves,	 as	 in	 the	
imperfect	 hybridisation,	 namely	
fruit	 and	 seed	 production	 in	
various	 degrees	 of	 perfection,	 but	
with	 resolute	 exclusion	 of	 the	
embryo;	
105	
1	 Obgleich	 die	
Entwickelungsgrade	 der	 durch	
die	 Basfardbefruchtung	
erzeugten	 Früchte	 und	 Samen	
bei	den	Arten	der	Gewächse	 in	
der	Wirklichkeit	nicht	so	genau	
begrenzt	sind	,	als	wir	sie	(oben	
S.	 92)	 der	 genaueren	
Uebersicht	 wegen	 classificirt	
haben,	 sondern	 mehr	 vag	 und	
zufallig	 bei	 den	 gleichen	 Arten	
in	 verschiedenen	Versuchen	 zu	
sein	scheinen	
Although	the	developemental	state	
of	the	fruits	and	seeds	produced	by	
hybridisation	are	not	limited	in	the	
species	 of	 plants	 in	 the	 reality	 as	
accurately	 as	 we	 (page	 92	 above)	
have	 classed	 the	 survey	 due	 to	
more	 accurate,	 but	 more	 vague	
and	 randomly	 in	 the	 same	 species	
appear	 to	 be	 in	 different	
experiments	
106	
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1	 Da	 die	 Früchte	 der	 wirklichen	
Bastarde	 in	 Beziehung	 ihrer	
Entwickelung	 und	 Qualität	 der	
Pericarpien	 und	 Samen	 mit	
denen	 aus	 der	 ursprünglichen	
Bastardzeugung	 entstandenen	
in	 manchen	 Stücken	
übereinkommen	
As	 the	 fruits	 of	 real	 bastards	
incurred	 in	 relation	 to	 their	
development	 and	 quality	 of	
pericarps	 and	 seeds	 with	 those	
from	 the	 original	 Bastard	
procreation	agree	in	many	respects	
106	
1	 Auch	Prof.	Hornschuch	hält	die	
hybride	 Abkunft	 dieser	 Farne	
fur	 unwahrscheinlich,	 und	
vielmehr	 für	 verschiedene	
Entwickelungsstufen	 einer	
Formenreihe	 und	 durch	
zufällige	 aussere	 Einflüsse	
entstandene	Zwischenformen.	
Also	 Prof.	 Horn	 Schuch	 keeps	 the	
hybrid	 origin	 of	 these	 ferns	 for	
unlikely	 and	 rather	 for	 different	
stages	 of	 development	 of	 a	 series	
of	 forms	 and	 caused	by	 accidental	
outer	 influences	 intermediate	
forms.	
119	
1	 Wenn	wir	voraussetzen	dürfen,	
dass	bei	diesen	Beobachtungen	
auf	die	grossen	Veränderungen	
der	 Blätter	 der	
Farnkrautsämlinge	 im	
Fortschritt	 ihrer	 Entwickelung,	
wie	 sie	 auch	 bei	 anderen	
Gattungen	 stattfinden,	
Rücksicht	 genommen	 worden	
ist	
Has	 been,	 if	 we	 may	 assume	 that	
these	 observations	 to	 the	 large	
changes	 in	 the	 leaves	 of	 fern	
seedlings	 progress	 in	 their	
development,	as	they	also	occur	 in	
other	 species,	 taken	 into	
consideration	
119	
1	 Prof.	 H.	 F.	 Autenrieth	 erwähnt	
einer	 Verbindung	 zwischen	
Carica	 Papaja	 und	 Cucumis	
Melo,	welche	dem	botanischen	
Gärtner	 H.	 Ortmann	 in	
Tübingen	 gelungen	 seie,	 deren	
Sämlinge	 aber	 noch	 vor	 ihrer	
vollkommenen	Entwickelung	 zu	
Grunde	gegangen	seien.	
Prof.	 HF	 Autenrieth	 mentioned	 a	
connection	between	Carica	papaya	
and	 Cucumis	 Melo	 which	 the	
botanical	Gärtner	H.	Ortmann	was	
succeeded	 in	 Tübingen,	 whose	
seedlings	were	but	perished	before	
their	perfect	development.	
133	
1	 Die	 Frage,	 worin	 sich	 die	 Art	
von	 der	 Varietat	 unterscheide,	
ist	daher,	wie	E.	Fries	bemerkt,	
eine	rein	biologische;	indera	
ein	 sicherer	 Grund	 der	
Artbestimmung	 nicht	 bios	 in	
der	 Abstraktion	 gefunden	
werden	 kann	 ,	 weder	 in	 den	
Merkmalen	 noch	 in	 den	
Uebergangsformen	 ;	 sondern	
man	muss	 ihn	 in	 der	 Reflexion	
suchen,	 d.	 h.	 in	 der	
The	question	of	what	the	nature	of	
the	Varietat	distinguish,	 therefore,	
as	 E.	 Fries	 noted,	 a	 purely	
biological;	indera	 	
a	 secure	 base	 the	 identification	of	
species	 can	 not	 be	 found	 in	 the	
bios	 abstraction,	 neither	 in	 the	
features	 still	 in	 the	 transitional	
forms;	 but	 you	 must	 seek	 him	 in	
the	 reflection,	 ie.	 within	 the	
individual	 story	 of	 each	 species,	
their	 whole	 development,	 and	 not	
151	
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individuellen	 Geschichte	 einer	
jeden	 Art,	 deren	 ganzen	
Entwickelung,	 und	 nicht	 in	
einem	gewissen	Moment.	
at	a	certain	moment	
1	 Der	 Wechsel	 des	 pflanzlichen	
Organismus,	 seine	
Veränderungen	 und	
Verwandlungen	 erfolgen	
gewiss	 nach	 bestimmten	
Gesetzen,	 und	 der	 Lauf	 der	
Veränderungen	 der	
Pflanzenspecies	 wird	 bei	 den	
vollkommeneren	 Gewächsen	
durch	den	ewigen	Wechsel	des	
Absterbens	 und	 die	
Wiederentstehung	 durch	 die	
geschlechtliche	Zeugung,	durch	
die	 Entwickelung	 aus	 dem	
Keim,	 das	Wachsthum	 und	 die	
Metamorphose	 der	 Theile	
vollbracht	 und	 erschöpft,	 und	
die	 Art	 (Species)	 durch	 diesen	
ewigen	 Kreislauf	 erneuert	 und	
in	 ihrem	Wesen	erhalten,	ohne	
dass	 ihre	 Natur	 und	 ihr	
Grundtypus	 eine	 wesentliche	
Veranderung	erlitte.	
The	change	of	 the	plant	organism,	
its	 changes	 and	 transformations	
take	 place	 certainly	 according	 to	
certain	 laws,	and	is	the	way	of	the	
changes	in	the	plant	species	in	the	
more	 perfect	 plants	 through	 the	
eternal	 exchange	of	dying	and	 the	
re-emergence	 of	 the	 sexual	
generation,	 through	 the	
development	 of	 the	 germ,	 the	
growth	 and	metamorphosis	 of	 the	
parts	done	and	exhausted,	and	the	
type	 (species)	 of	 this	 eternal	 cycle	
renewed	 and	 receive	 its	 essence	
without	their	nature	and	basic	type	
would	 suffer	 a	 substantial	
alteration.	
161	
1	 der	 Pollen	 kann	 aber	 fur	 seine	
Art	 vollkommen	 potent,	 aber	
doch	 unvermögend	 sein,	 das	
Ovarium	 einer	 anderen,	
obgleich	 sehr	 nahe	
verwandten,	 Art	 auch	 nur	 zu	
einiger	 Entwickelung	
anzuregen,	geschweige	wirklich	
zu	 befruchten	 (s.	
unvollkommene	Befruchtung);	
the	pollen	can	also	be	 for	his	 type	
perfectly	 potent,	 but	 incapable,	
also	 stimulate	 the	 ovary	 to	
another,	 although	 very	 closely	
related,	 species	 only	 some	
development,	 let	 alone	 actually	
fertilize	(s	imperfect	fertilization.);	
183	
1	 Die	 verschiedenen	 Grade	 der	
sexuellen	 Affinitat	 treten	 aber	
in	 dem	 weiteren	 Verlauf	 der	
Entwickelung	der	Ovarien,	ganz	
besonders	 aber	 in	 der	
grosseren	 oder	 geringeren	
Vollkommenheit	 der	 Fruchte	
und	 Samen	 und	 vorzuglich	 in	
der	 geringeren	 oder	 grosseren	
Anzahl	 von	 guten	
The	 various	 degrees	 of	 sexual	
affinity	 occur	 but	 produce	 in	 the	
further	 course	 of	 development	 of	
the	ovaries,	but	especially	in	giving	
the	 greater	 or	 less	 perfection	 of	
the	 fruit	 and	 seeds	 and	 vorzuglich	
in	 the	 smaller	 or	 larger	 size	
number	 of	 good	 keimungsfahigen	
seeds.	
189	
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keimungsfahigen	 Samen	
hervor.	
1	 Die	 Früchte	 wachsen	 und	
vergrössern	 sich	 beinahe	 bis	
zur	 Vollkomenheit,	 und	
erreichen	 fast	 ihre	 vollstandige	
Grösse:	 ohne	 dass	 jedoch	 die	
Samen	 ihre	 gehörige	
Entwickelung	erhalten.	
The	fruits	grow	and	enlarge	almost	
to	 the	 full	 Komen	 awareness,	 and	
reach	 almost	 their	 full	 plete	 Size:	
without,	 however,	 the	 seeds	 get	
their	proper	development.	
190	
1	 Die	 Fruchtstiele	 bekommen	
dann	 am	 Verbindungsgelenk	
einen	 gelben	 Ring	 und	 fallen	
hierauf	 immer	 unreif	 ab,	 zu	
einer	 Zeit,	 wo	 die	 Samen	 ihre	
weitere	 Entwickelung	 und	
Ausbildung	 erhalten	 sollten:	
obgleich	 die	 äusseren	
Fruchtumhüllungen	 das,	 in	
dieser	 Periode	 angemessene	
Wachsthum	 beinahe	 erreicht	
hatten.	
The	 fruit	 stalks	 then	 get	 a	 yellow	
ring	at	the	connecting	joint	and	fall	
thereon	 from	always	 immature,	 at	
a	 time	 where	 the	 seeds	 should	
receive	 their	 further	 development	
and	 training:	 although	 the	 outer	
fruit	 servings	 had	 the	 almost	
achieved	reasonable	growth	in	this	
period.	
190	
1	 doch	 ist	 auch	 hier	 im	 freien	
Stand	 der	 Natur	 der	
Unterschied	 selten	 so	 gross,	
dass	 man	 in	 den	 Früchten	 von	
normaler	 Grösse	 und	
Entwickelung	 nicht	 einen	
Anhaltspunkt	finden,	und	durch	
Zählung	 der	 Samen	 von	
mehreren	 vollkommenen	
Früchten	 ein	 Mittel	 erheben	
könnte	
but	the	difference	is	also	seldom	so	
large	that	you	can	not	find	a	clue	in	
the	 fruits	 of	 normal	 size	 and	
development	 in	 the	 free	 state	 of	
nature,	and	could	raise	a	means	by	
counting	 the	 seeds	 of	 several	
perfect	fruit	
207	
1	 Beweis	 gegen	 die	
Schleiden'sche	
Entstehungstheorie	des	Embrzo	
aus	 dem	 Ende	 des	
Pollenschlauchs;	 denn	 wie	
könnte	 aus	 zwei	 ganz	
verschiedenen	Arten	von	Pollen	
der	 vollkommen	 gleiche	
Embryo	 mity	 seinem	 ganz	
gleichen	 Entwickelungstypus	
hervorgehen?	
Evidence	against	 the	 theory	of	 the	
origin	 of	 the	 Schleiden'sche	
Embrzo	from	the	end	of	the	pollen	
tube;	 for	 how	 could	 emerge	 from	
two	 very	 different	 types	 of	 pollen	
from	the	same	embryo	completely	
mity	 his	 very	 same	 type	 of	
development?	
230	
1	 Eine	jede	Frucht	mit	den	daraus	
erhaltenen	 Samen	 wurde	
abgesondert	 gehalten	 und	 für	
sich	 ausgesät,	 und	 ein	
Each	 fruit	with	 the	seeds	obtained	
therefrom	 was	 kept	 isolated	 and	
seeded	for	themselves,	and	special	
attention	given	to	ensuring	that	at	
233	
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besonderes	 Augenmerk	 darauf	
gerichtet,	 dass	 bei	 der	 Aussaat	
kein	Samenkorn,	und	nach	dem	
Keimen	 kein	 einziges	
Keimpflänzchen	 verloren,	
sondern	 alle	 in	 einer	 Frucht	
erhaltenen	 Samen	 zur	 völligen	
Entwickelung	 ihrer	 Pflanzen	
gelangen	möchten,	damit	nicht	
in	 einem	 oder	 dem	 anderen	
Samen	 oder	 Sämlinge	 eine	
abweichende	 Form	 zu	 Grunde	
gehen	 möchte,	 welche	 für	 das	
Hauptresultat	 der	 Normalität	
oder	 Unstätigkeit	 der	
Bastardtypen	 von	 Wichtigkeit	
oder	 Einfluss	 hätte	 sein	
können.	
sowing	 no	 seed,	 and	 after	
germination	 lost	 a	 single	 seed	
plants,	 but	 all	 seeds	 obtained	 in	 a	
fruit	 to	 complete	 development	 of	
their	 plant,	 so	 not	 in	 one	 or	 the	
other	seeds	or	seedlings	would	like	
to	 go	 a	 different	 shape	 to	 reason,	
which	would	for	the	main	result	of	
the	 normality	 or	 Unstätigkeit	 the	
bastard	 types	 of	 importance	 or	
influence	can	be.	
1	 Hauptsächlich	 ist	 über	 die	
Beobachtung	 Kölreuteräs	 zu	
bemerken,	 dass,	 da	 die	
vollendete	 Entwickelung	 und	 	
Zeitigung	 der	 Früchte	 dieser	
Tinkturen	 nicht	 abgewartet	
worden,	 und	 der	 Zustand	 der	
Samen	 unentschieden	
geblieben	 ist,	 diese	
Beobachtung	 eines	
vollständigen	 Beweises	
entbehrt	
Mainly	 it	 is	 noted	 on	 the	
observation	 Kölreuteräs	 that	 since	
the	 completed	 development	 and	
maturation	 of	 the	 fruits	 of	 these	
tinctures	have	not	waited,	and	the	
condition	 of	 the	 seeds	 remained	
undecided,	this	observation	lacks	a	
complete	proof	
246	
1	 Es	 kann	 hier	 auch	 noch	 die	
Frage	 entstehen:	 ob	 nicht	 ein	
verschiedener	
Entwickelungszustand	 der	
Narbe	 bei	 der	 Befruchtung	
einen	Einfluss	auf	die	Typen	der	
Bastarde	 habe,	 und	 zu	 diesen	
Tinkturen	 Veranlassung	 geben	
könnte?	
It	 can	 also	 still	 arise	 the	 question	
whether	a	different	developmental	
state	 of	 the	 stigma	 at	 fertilization	
have	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 types	 of	
hybrids	have,	and	could	give	rise	to	
these	tinctures	authority?	
248	
	 Bei	 der	 einfachen	 Bastard	
Zeugung	 sind	 nämlich	 zwei	
Faktoren,	 der	 mütterliche	 und	
der	 väterliche,	 von	 zwei	
verschiedenen	 Pflanzenarten	
thätig,	 wovon	 jede	 ihre	 eigene	
Natur	 und	 Bildungskraft	 und	
ihre	 eigenthümliche	
In	 simple	 hybrid	 genesis	 two	
factors,	 the	maternal	 and	paternal	
of,	from	two	different	plant	species	
are	in	fact	active,	each	of	which	its	
own	 nature	 and	 formation	 force	
and	 their	 peculiar	 form	 and	
develop	the	characters	possessing	
254	
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Entwickelung	 und	 Ausbildung	
der	Charaktere	besitz	
1	 denn	 im	 ersten	 Fall	 hat	 die	
Menge	 des	 zur	 Befruchtung	
eines	 Ovariums	 angewandten	
Pollens	nur	auf	die	Menge	und	
Qualität	 des	 zur	 Entwickelung	
kommenden	Samens	Einfluss	
because	 in	 the	 first	 case,	 the	
amount	 of	 procedure	 used	 to	
fertilize	an	ovary	pollen	only	on	the	
quantity	 and	 quality	 of	 seeds	
coming	to	development	influence	
274	
2	 Da	es	uns	noch	an	Mitteln	fehlt,	
die	 Entstehung	 und	
Entwickelung	 der	
verschiedenen	 Pflanzenformen	
von	 der	 einfachen	 Zelle	 an	 bis	
zur	 vollendeten	 Entwickelung	
des	 vollkommenen	 Gewächses	
in	 ihren	 verschiedenen	 Phasen	
zu	erklären	und	im	Organismus	
zu	 verfolgen	 oder	 zu	
construiren:	 so	 sind	 wir	 auch	
noch	 nicht	 im	 Stande,	 die	
Bande	 zu	 bestimmen,	 womit	
der	 Metaschematismus	 der	
hybriden	 Bildung	 mit	 der	
vegetabilischen	Metamorphose	
überhaupt	zusammenhängt.	
Because	 there	 we	 still	 lack	 of	
means,	 to	 declare	 in	 its	 various	
phases	 and	 to	 follow	 in	 the	
organism	or	to	construct	the	origin	
and	 development	 of	 the	 various	
forms	of	plants	 from	simple	cell	to	
at	 completed	 development	 of	 the	
perfect	crop:	we	are	not	even	able	
to	 determine	 the	 band,	 bringing	
the	 Metaschematismus	 of	 hybrid	
formation	 with	 the	 vegetable	
metamorphosis	at	all	related.	
293	
1	 L.C.	 Marquart	 hält	 zwar	 Weiss	
für	 eine	 Uebergangsstufe	
zwischen	grün	und	blau,	und	es	
ist	 nicht	 zu	 läugnen,	 dass	 wie	
schon	 Meyen	 bemerkt	 hat,	 in	
den	meisten	Fällen	entweder	in	
dem	 Anfang	 der	 Entwickelung	
der	 weissen	 Blumen	 oder	 bald	
nach	 ihrem	 vollendeten	 Vigor	
sich	 irgend	 ein	 anderer	
Farbenton	zu	erkennen	gibt.	
L.C.	 Although	 Marquart	 holding	
white	 for	 a	 transition	 stage	
between	green	and	blue,	and	it	can	
not	be	denied,	 that	has	as	already	
noted	Meyen,	in	most	cases,	either	
in	 the	 early	 development	 of	 white	
flowers	 or	 soon	 after	 the	 ages	 of	
Vigor	 is	 any	 other	 hue	 are	
recognized.	
306	
1	 Die	 weissen	 Blumen	 sind	 vor	
ihrer	 Entwickelung	 in	 den	
Knospen	 entweder	 grün	 oder	
gelblich.	
The	 white	 flowers	 are	 in	 front	 of	
their	 development	 in	 the	 bud	
either	green	or	yellow.	
306	
1	 so	dass	an	einer	und	derselben	
Pflanze,	 je	nach	dem	Alter	und	
dem	 Entwickelungsgrade	 der	
Blumen	und	der	Einwirkung	des	
Lichts	 und	 der	 Sonne	 sehr	
verschieden	 stark	 gefärbte	
Blumen	angetroffen	werden.	
so	that	at	one	and	the	same	plant,	
depending	 on	 the	 age	 and	 the	
developmental	stage	of	the	flowers	
and	the	action	of	light	and	the	sun	
very	 different	 highly	 colored	
flowers	are	found.	
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1	 Demnach	 gingen	 bei	 der	 Zea	
Mays	 nana	 aus	 Einer	 Zeugung	
durch	 die	 ursprüngliche	
Bastardbefruchtung	 äusserlich	
ganz	 gleiche,	 von	 denen	 der	
Stammmutter	 nicht	
verschiedene	 Samen	 hervor,	
welche	 erst	 in	 der	 weiteren	
Entwickelung	 der	 Keimpflanzen	
verschieden	 gefärbte	 Samen	
erzeugten	
Thus	went	 in	Zea	Mays	nana	 from	
one	 generation	 by	 the	 original	
hybridisation	 externally	 very	
similar,	of	which	the	ancestress	not	
different	 seeds	 produced,	 which	
produced	 only	 in	 the	 further	
development	 of	 the	 seedlings	
differently	colored	seeds	
323	
1	 sondern	in	dem	Embryo	nur	die	
Fähigkeit	 erzeugt,	 durch	 das	
Keimen	 und	 die	 weitere	
Entwickelung	der	neuen	Pflanze	
ein	 aus	 beiden	 concurrirenden	
Faktoren	 vermischtes	 Produkt	
hervorzubringen.	
but	 in	 the	 embryo	 produces	 only	
the	 ability	 to	 produce	 a	 blended	
product	 of	 both	 factors	
concurrirenden	by	the	germination	
and	 further	 development	 of	 the	
new	plant.	
327	
1	 Nachdem	 wir	 die	
Bastardzeugung	 von	 ihrem	
Anfang	 an	 bis	 zur	 völligen	
Entwickelung	 der	 aus	 den	
erzeugten	 Samen	
hervorgegangenen	 Pflanzen	
nach	 ihren	 verschiedenen	
Phasen	verfolgt	haben	
After	we	have	followed	the	bastard	
generation	 of	 its	 beginning	 until	
the	 complete	 development	 of	 the	
plants	 produced	 from	 the	 seeds	
according	to	their	different	phases	
329	
1	 Da	 die	männlichen	Organe	 der	
Pflanzen	 in	 den	 Blumen	 die	
früheren	 in	 der	 Entwickelung	
und	Reife	sind:	
Since	the	male	organs	of	plants	the	
earlier	 in	 the	 development	 and	
maturity	are	in	the	flowers:	
329	
1	 Unzählige	 Blumen	 dieses	
äusserst	 floriden	 Bastards	 sind	
auch	 nach	 der	 künstilichen	
Bestäubung,	 nachdem	 die	
Corolle	 vorher	 verdorben	 und	
eingeschrumpft	 sich	
abgestossen	 hatte,	 ohne	 alle	
Entwickelung	des	Ovariums	 am	
dritten	vierten	Tage	abgefallen.	
Countless	 flowers	 this	 extremely	
florid	 hybrids	 are	 also	 after	 the	
künstilichen	 pollination	 after	 the	
corolla	 spoiled	 before	 and	 had	
shrunk	 repelled	 by	 it,	 dropped	
without	 any	 development	 of	 the	
ovary	on	the	third	fourth	day.	
338	
1	 Aus	 der	 beschränkten	 und	
häufig	 gänzlich	 fehlenden	
Potenz	 der	 Stauborgane	 der	
Bastarde	 sind	 wir	 geneigt,	 auf	
einen	 Mangel	 der	
Wärmeentwickelung	 in	 deren	
Blumen	 zu	 schliessen;	 da	 zur	
Potenzierung	 des	 Pollens	 nicht	
From	 the	 limited	 and	 often	
complete	 lack	 of	 potency	 of	 the	
dust	organs	of	the	bastards	we	are	
inclined	 to	 infer	 a	 lack	 of	 heat	
development	 in	 their	 flowers;	
because	not	only	external,	but	also	
internal	 heat	 appears	 to	 be	
required	for	potentiation	of	pollen.	
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nur	 äussere,	 sondern	 auch	
innere	 Wärme	 erforderlich	 zu	
sein	scheint.	
1	 oder	 sind	 solche	
unvollkommene	 Früchte	 dem	
allgemeinen	
Fruchtungsvermögen	
zuzuschreiben,	 welches	 durch	
die	Bestäubung	der	Narbe	auch	
mit	 indifferenten	 Stoffen	 zu	
einer	 theilweisen	 Entwickelung	
der	Ovarien	unter	besconderen	
Umständen	 zuweilen	 angeregt	
zu	 werden	 scheint,	 wie	 wir	
nicht	 selten	 bei	 Dianthus	 und	
Digitalis	-	Bastarden	sehen	
or	 are	 those	 imperfect	 fruits	
attributed	 to	 the	 general	
Fruchtungsvermögen,	which	seems	
to	be	inspired	by	the	pollination	of	
the	scar	with	inert	materials	to	this	
partial	 development	of	 the	ovaries	
under	 besconderen	 circumstances	
sometimes,	 as	 we	 often	 at	
dianthus	and	digitalis	-	see	hybrids	
341	
1	 weil	 die	 sterilen	 Fruchtknoten	
dieselben	 Erscheinungen	 und	
Veränderungen	 im	 Laufe	 ihrer	
Entwickelung	 vor	 dem	
Zeitpunkt	 der	 Befruchtung	
darbieten,	 welche	 die	 reinen	
Arten	 in	 der	 gleichen	 Period	
ihres	 Wachsthums	 zeigen,	
worin	 Kolreuter	 und	 Prof	
Wiegmann	 mit	 uns	
übereinstimmen.	
because	 the	 sterile	 ovary	 same	
phenomena	 and	 changes	 in	 the	
course	of	their	development	before	
the	 date	 of	 fertilization	 present,	
showing	 the	 pure	 species	 in	 the	
same	period	of	their	growth,	which	
Kolreuter	 and	 Prof	 Wiegmann	
agree	with	us.	
342	
1	 In	 einer	 späteren	 Periode,	
wenn	 die	 Entwickelung	 der	
Blumen	 der,	 mit	 schwachem	
oder	 gänzlich	 mangelndem	
Conceptionsvermögen	
begabten	 weiblichen	 Organe	
weiter	 vorgeschritten	 ist:	 so	
haben	 wir	 jedoch	 zweierlei	
Erscheinungen	 an	 denselben	
beobachtet,	 welche	 mit	
ziemlicher	 Wahrscheinlichkeit	
auf	 ihre	 sehr	beschränkte	oder	
gänzlich	 mangelnde	
Fruchtbarkeit	schliessen	lassen.	
At	 a	 later	 period,	 when	 the	
development	of	flowers,	gifted	with	
weak	 or	 entirely	 lack	
Conceptionsvermögen	 female	
organs	 is	 more	 advanced:	 so,	
however,	we	have	two	phenomena	
observed	 in	 the	 same,	 which	 can	
include	quite	possibly	on	their	very	
limited	 or	 completely	 lack	 of	
fertility.	
342	
1	 Die	 Bestäubung	 der	 Narben	
dieses	Bastards	mit	dem	Pollen	
der	 Lzchnis	 diurna	 äusserte	
eine	 entschiedenere	 Wirkung	
auf	die	Ovarien	dieses	Bastards:	
es	 entstanden	 zwar	 auch	 nur	
The	 pollination	 of	 the	 genesis	 of	
this	 hybrid	 with	 the	 pollen	 of	 the	
Lzchnis	 diurna	 expressed	 a	 more	
decisive	 effect	 on	 the	 ovaries	 of	
this	 hybrids:	 Although	 it	 just	 goes	
back	 to	 small	 imperfect	 fruit,	 in	
346	
	 262	
kleine	unvollkommene	Früchte,	
in	 welchen	 sich	 weder	 das	
Receptaculum,	 noch	 die	 Ovula	
im	 geringsten	
entwickelthatten:	 aber	 der	
Kelch	 und	 die	 äussere	
Umhüllung	der	Frucht	gelangte	
zu	 mehr	 Ausbildung,	 und	 es	
bildete	 sich	 eine	 härtere	
Schale:	 da	 im	 Gegentheil	
diejenigen	Blumen,	welche	sich	
selbst	 überlassen	 blieben	 und	
nicht	 bestäubt	 worden	 waren,	
nicht	 das	 geringste	 Zeichen	
einer	 weiteren	 Entwickelung	
gezeigt	haben.	
which	 neither	 the	 receptaculum,	
nor	 the	 ovules	 in	 the	 least	
developed	had:	but	the	chalice	and	
the	 outer	 envelope	 of	 the	 fruit	
reached	 more	 training,	 and	 it	
formed	a	harder	shell:	since	on	the	
contrary	 those	 flowers	 which	
themselves	 were	 left	 and	 had	 not	
been	 pollinated,	 have	 not	 shown	
the	 slightest	 sign	 of	 a	 further	
development.	
1	 Der	 Kelch	 des	 Lychnicucubalus	
albus	bläht	sich	nach	dem	
Abbliihen	 kugelförmig	 auf,	 es	
setzen	 aber	 keine	 Friichte	 an,	
und	 die	 Ovarien	 bleiben	 ohne	
alle	 Entwickelung,	 und	
vertrocknen	 zu	 kleinen	
knopfförmigen	Körperchen.	
The	 cup	 of	 Lychnicucubalus	 albus	
inflates	after	the	 	
Abbliihen	 spherical,	 but	 it	 set	 no	
Friichte,	 and	 the	 ovaries	 remain	
without	 any	 development,	 and	 to	
dry	up	small	button-shaped	bodies.	
346	
1	 Die	 Verbindung	 der	 Lychnis	
diurna	mit	der	Silene	noctiflora,	
welche	 nur	 für	 eine	 Varietät	
von	 der	 L.	 diurna	 angesehen	
werden	 könnte	 hatte	 in	 den	
Befruchtungsorganen	 des	
erzeugten	 Bastards	 nicht	 die	
gleiche	 Wirkung,	 wie	 bei	 den	
vorigen	 aus	 diclinischen	 und	
hermaphroditischen	
Gewächsen	 gebildeten	
Hybriden;	indem	die	Anzahl	der	
Griffel	 von	 der	Mutter	 in	 alien	
Blumen	unverandert	geblieben,	
und	 die	 Conceptionsfähigkeit	
nicht	 geschwächt	 war:	 die	
Rudimente	 der	 mannlichen	
Organe	 aber	 mehr	 zur	
theilweisen	 Entwickelung	
gekornmen	 waren,	 wodurch	
die	 Neigung	 zum	
Cryptohermaphroditismus	
vermehrt	worden	ist.	
The	 compound	 of	 Lychnis	 diurna	
with	 the	 Silene	 noctiflora,	 which	
could	 be	 considered	 only	 for	 a	
variety	 of	 the	 L.	 diurna	 had	 not	
diclinischen	 in	 the	 organs	 of	
fertilization	Bastards	produced	 the	
same	effect	as	 in	the	previous	and	
hermaphroditic	 plants	 hybrids	
formed;	 by	 the	 number	 of	 pens	
from	 the	 mother	 in	 alien	 flowers	
remained	 unchanged,	 and	 the	
maturity	 was	 not	 weakened:	 the	
rudiments	 of	 male	 organs,	
however,	 were	 more	 gekornmen	
for	 this	 partial	 development,	
thereby	reducing	the	tendency	has	
been	 increased	 to	
Cryptohermaphroditismus.	
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1	 In	 Beziehung	 auf	 den	 Zustand	
der	 männlichen	 Organe	 haben	
wir	 auch	 die	 kurzen	
pyramidalischen,	 drüsenartigen	
Rudimente	 des	
Staubfädenkranzes	 der	 L.	
vespertina	 niemals	 zu	 einer	
weiteren	 Entwickelung	
gelangen	sehen;	aber	bei	der	L.	
diurna	die	eine	oder	die	andere	
der	 rudimentaren	 Antheren	 in	
einzelnen	weiblichen	Blumen	in	
diesem	 oder	 jenem	 Exemplar	
zuweilen	 theilweise	 so	 weit	
entwickelt	 gefunden,	 dass	 sie	
etwas	 potenten	 Pollen	
erzeugten,	 welcher	 zur	
Befruchtung	 eines	 oder	 einiger	
Eichen	 seines	 Ovariums	
zureichend	war,	wodurch	dann	
ein	 einziger	 oder	 auch	 einige	
vollkommene	 keimungsfahige	
Samen	hervorgebracht	wurden.	
In	 relation	 to	 the	 condition	 of	 the	
male	organs,	we	also	see	the	short	
pyramidal,	 glandular	 rudiments	 of	
stamens	ring	of	L.	vespertina	never	
reach	 a	 further	 development;	 but	
in	L.	diurna	one	or	the	other	of	the	
rudimentary	 anthers	 in	 single	
female	 flowers	 in	 this	 or	 that	
instance	 sometimes	 partially	
developed	 so	 far	 found	 that	 they	
produced	something	potent	pollen	
which	 one	 or	 some	 of	 its	 oaks	
ovary	 was	 insufficient	 for	
fertilization,	which	then	a	single	or	
even	a	few	perfect	keimungsfahige	
seeds	were	produced.	
349	
1	 Als	 allgemeines	 Resultat	 hat	
sich	 aus	 unseren	 Versuchen	
ergeben,	 dass	 die	
Befruchtungsthätigkeiten,	 die	
mannliche	 sowohl,	 als	 die	
weibliche,	 in	 alien	 Bastarden	
(die	 Varietatenbastarde	 etwa	
allein	 ausgenommen)	
geschwächt	 und	 in	 sehr	 vielen	
gänzlich	 zerstört	 sind:	 so	 dass	
man	 versucht	 sein	 könnte,	 zu	
schliessen,	 dass	 die	 beiden	
Geschlechter	 im	 pflanzlichen	
Hermaphroditisms,	 in	 einem	
nothwendigen	
Entwickelungsnexus	 mit	
einander	stehen,	und	nur	unter	
gewissen	 Bedingungen	 von	
einander	 getrennt	 angetroffen	
würden	
As	 a	 general	 result	 has	 emerged	
from	 our	 experiments	 that	 the	
Befruchtungsthätigkeiten	 that	
manly	 either,	 as	 the	 female,	 in	
alien	 hybrids	 (the	
Varietatenbastarde	 about	 alone	
excepted)	 are	 weakened	 and	
completely	 destroyed	 in	 very	
many:	 so	 that	 one	 might	 be	
tempted	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	 two	
sexes	were	found	separately	in	the	
plant	 Hermaphroditisms,	 in	 a	
necessary	 developmental	
connections	 are	 with	 each	 other,	
and	 only	 under	 certain	 conditions	
from	each	
353	
4	 wenn	wir	endlich	noch	einzelne	
Erscheinungen	 der	
Entwickelung	 der	
Geschlechtsorgane	 bei	 den	
when	 we	 finally	 pull	 even	
individual	 phenomena	 of	 the	
development	 of	 the	 sex	 organs	 in	
the	 plant	 into	 consideration,	 for	
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Pflanzen	in	Betrachtung	ziehen,	
z.	 B.	 dass	 mit	 der	
Verkümmerung	 (Contabescenz)	
der	 Staubgefässe	 in	 manchen	
Blumen	 die	 Frühzeitigkeit	 des	
Conceptionsvermögens	 der	
weiblichen	 Organe	 gewöhnlich	
verbunden	 ist	 (was	 übrigens	
doch	 nicht	 immer	 stattfindet;	
indem	 z.	 B.	 bei	 Geum,	 Primula	
u.	a.	die	frühzeitigen	Griffel	von	
den	 normalen	 Staubgefässen	
im	 Wachsthum	 und	 in	 der	
vollkommenen	 Entwickelung	
wieder	eingeholt	worden	sind,)	
und	 auf	 der	 anderen	 Seite	mit	
einer	 frühzeitigen	Entwickelung	
der	 männlichen	 Organe	 und	
ihrer	 Kraft	 in	 den	 Blumen	 die	
später	 eintretende	
Zeugungsfähigkeit	 der	
weiblichen	 Organe	 normal	
verbunden	 ist:	 so	 könnte	 man	
den	 obigen	 Schluss	 noch	mehr	
begründet	 finden	 und	 aus	
allem	 Diesem	 noch	 weiter	
folgern,	 dass	 die	 beiden	
Geschlechtsorgane	 und	 ihre	
Thätigkeiten,	 sowie	 ihre	
Entwickelung	 in	 den	
hermaphroditischen	 Blumen	 in	
einem	 ursächlichen	
Zusammenhang	 mit	 einander	
stehen	
example,	 with	 stunting	
(Contabescenz)	 of	 stamens	 is	 that	
the	 earliness	 of	
Conceptionsvermögens	 the	 female	
organs	 usually	 connected	 in	 some	
flowers	(which	by	the	way	but	does	
not	 always	 occur,.	 using	 eg	 when	
Geum,	Primula	have	been	obtained	
including	 the	 early	 style	 of	 the	
normal	 stamens	 in	 growth	 and	 in	
perfect	development	again),	and	on	
the	 other	 side	 with	 an	 early	
development	 of	 male	 organs	 and	
their	 power	 in	 the	 flower	 the	
subsequent	relevant	fertility	of	the	
female	 organs	 is	 normally	
connected:	 one	 might	 find	 even	
more	 reasons	 to	 the	 above	
conclusion	 from	 all	 this	 and	
conclude	 further	 that	 the	 two	
sexual	 organs	 and	 their	
Thätigkeiten,	 as	 well	 as	 their	
development	in	the	hermaphroditic	
flowers	are	in	a	causal	relationship	
with	each	other.	
1	 Dass	 aber	 die	 männlichen	
Organe	 vor	 den	 weiblichen	
durch	 den	 Hybriditismus	
krankhaft	 afficirt	 werden,	
scheint	 seinen	 natürlichen	
Grund	 in	 der	 normalen	
frühzeitigen	 Entwickelung	 der	
männlichen	 Organe	 von	 den	
weiblichen	 zuhaben:	 und	 dass	
sie	 mehr	 leiden	 und	 später	
wieder	 zu	 ihrer	 Integrität	
zurückkehren,	 beweist	 nur,	
dass	 die	 beiden	
But	 that	 the	 male	 organs	 are	
morbidly	 affected	 in	 front	 of	 the	
female	 by	 the	 Hybriditismus,	
seems	 its	 natural	 base	 in	 the	
normal	 early	 development	 of	 the	
male	organs	of	the	female	to	have:	
and	that	they	suffer	more	and	later	
return	to	their	integrity	again,	only	
proves	 that	 the	 two	 organs	 of	
generation	 on	 Material,	 as	 are	
their	 powers	 in	 any	 way	 related	
context	both	in	relationship.	
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Zeugungsorgane	 sowohl	 in	
Beziehung	 aufs	 Materielle,	 als	
auf	 ihre	 Kräfte	 in	 keinem	 so	
nahen	Zusammenhang	stehen.	
1	 Auf	 der	 anderen	 Seite	 findet	
man	 aber	 auch	 manche	
normale	
Dichogamen,	 wie	 Lychnis	
diurna,	 Cannabis	 sativa,	
Mercurialis	 annua	 u.	 a.	 durch	
Entwickelung	 und	 Ausbildung	
eines	oder	mehrerer	Rudimente	
der	 mannlichen	 Organe	 in	 den	
weiblichen	 Blumen	 in	
unvollständig	
hermaphroditische	 sich	
verwandeln.	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 there	 are	 also	
some	normal	 	
Dichogamen	 as	 Lychnis	 diurna,	
Cannabis	 sativa,	Mercurialis	 annua	
including	 through	 development	
and	 training	 of	 one	 or	 more	
rudiments	 of	 male	 organs	 in	 the	
female	 flowers	 in	 incomplete	
hermaphroditic	turn.	
361	
1	 Zuweilen	 erfolgt	 aber	 auch	 die	
Entwickelung	 solcher	
Staubgefasse	 in	 dieser	 oder	
jener	 Blume	 auf	 eine	
vollständigere	 Weise:	 wie	 wir	
dies	bei	Spinacia,	Cannabis	und	
Mercurialis	 angetroffen	 haben,	
wo	 sich	 manche	 Blume	 zur	
vollstandigen	
hermaphroditischen	 entwickelt	
und	 dadurch	 mehrere	
benachbarte	weibliche	Ovarien	
befruchtet	hatte.	
But	 sometimes	 also	 takes	 the	
development	 of	 such	 Stamens	 in	
this	 or	 that	 flower	 in	 a	 more	
complete	 way:	 as	 we	 have	
encountered	 in	 Spinacia,	 cannabis	
and	 Mercurialis,	 where	 some	
flower	 full	 news	 hermaphroditic	
developed	 and	 characterized	
several	 adjacent	 female	 ovaries	
had	fertilized.	
362	
1	 Das	weibliche	 Rudiment	 in	 der	
männlichen	Blume	scheint	aber	
bei	 den	 meisten	 dieser	
Gewächse,	 wenigstens	 in	 den	
genannten	 und	 von	 uns	
genauer	untersuchten	Pflanzen	
zu	 unvollkommen	 und	 die	
morphologische	 Kraft	 in	 dem	
mannlichen	 Individuum	
überhaupt	 zu	 schwach	 zu	 sein,	
als	 dass	 es	 einer	 weiteren	
Entwickelung	 zu	 einem	
conceptionsfähigen	 Pistill	 fähig	
wäre	
But	 the	 female	 rudiment	 in	 male	
flower	 seems	 the	 morphological	
force	 to	 be	 imperfect	 and	 in	 the	
male	individual	in	general	too	weak	
for	most	of	these	plants,	at	least	in	
those	 and	 we	 precisely	
investigated	 plants,	 as	 it	 further	
development	 to	 a	
conceptionsfähigen	 would	 be	 able	
pestle	
362	
1	 Dass	 aber	 die	
Wiederherstellung	 der	
Staubgefässe	 in	 ihre	 normale	
But	that	the	restoration	of	stamens	
in	 their	 normal	 Integrilät	 both	 in	
form,	but	particularly	is	slower	and	
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Integrilät	 sowohl	 nach	 Form,	
besonders	 aber	 nach	 der	
ursprünglichen	 Kraft	 bei	 der	
Urn-	 und	 Rückbildung	
langsamer	 und	 einige	
Generationen	 später	 erfolgt;	
davon	 finden	 wir	 in	 der	 Natur	
der	 Gewächse	 und	 der	
Metamorphose	 der	 Blumen	
noch	 keine	 genügende	
Erklarung.	 Steht	 diese	
Thatsache	 nicht	 im	
Widerspruch	 mit	 der	
Behauptung:	 dass	 die	
weiblichen	 Organe	 der	
Gewächse	ein	höherer	Grad	der	
pflanzlichen	 Bildung	 und	
Entwickelung	 seien,	 als	 die	
männlichen,	 wie	 Schelver	 und	
Engelmann	behaupten?	
some	 generations	 later	 after	 the	
original	 force	 in	 the	 URN	 and	
regression;	 which	 we	 find	 in	 the	
nature	 of	 plants	 and	 the	
metamorphosis	 of	 flowers	 still	 no	
satisfactory	explanation.	If	this	fact	
is	 not	 in	 contradiction	 with	 the	
assertion	that	the	female	organs	of	
plants,	 a	 higher	 degree	 of	 plant	
formation	 and	 development	 are	
the	 male,	 as	 Schelver	 and	
Engelmann	say?	
1	 Bei	 der	 Rückbildung	 und	 der	
Umwandelung	 der	 Bastarde	 ist	
daher	 die	 Castration	 der	
Blumen	 nicht	 nothwendig:	
denn	 der	 Pollen	 der	
Stammeltern	 macht	 den	
eigenen	 des	 Bastards	 völlig	
unwirksam:	 wie	 der	
stammelterliche	 Pollen	 selbst	
bei	 manchen	 absolut	 sterilen	
Bastarden	dadurch	noch	einige	
Einwirkung	 auf	 die	 damit	
bestäubte	 Blume	 zu	 äusseren	
scheint,	 dass	 dieselbe	 sich	
mehrere	 Tage	 länger	 frisch	 am	
Stocke	erhält,	ohne	dass	jedoch	
der	Fruchtknoten	und	die	
Eichen	 ein	 Zeichen	 einer	
Entwickelung	 zu	 erkennen	
geben	
In	 the	 regression	 and	 the	
Umwandelung	 the	 bastards	
therefore	 castration	 of	 flowers	 is	
not	 necessary:	 because	 the	 pollen	
of	the	first	parents	make	their	own	
the	 Bastards	 completely	
ineffective:	 as	 the	 originating	
parental	 pollen	 itself	 in	 some	
absolutely	 sterile	 hybrids	 by	 some	
action	 on	 the	 so-pollinated	 flower	
to	 outer	 seems	 that	 the	 same	
several	days	fresher	longer	gets	on	
the	 stick,	 but	 without	 the	 ovary	
and	 nevertheless	 reveal	 a	 sign	 of	
development	of	oaks	
364	
1	 Die	 Zeugungskraft	 der	 reinen	
Arten	 ist	 zwar	 in	 der	 ersten	
Periode	 ihrer	
Blüthenentwickelung	
gewöhnlich	 von	 mehr	
Fruchtbarkeit	 begleitet	 als	 in	
der	späteren	Periode	
The	 generative	 power	 of	 pure	
species	is	indeed	in	the	first	period	
of	their	flower-development	usually	
accompanied	by	more	fertility	than	
in	the	later	period	
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1	 Wohl	 haben	 wir	 von	 einigen	
reinen	 Arten	 der	 Diclinen	
Beispiele,	 dass	 sich	 die	
Geschlechtsverhältnisse	 in	 den	
Individuen	 mit	 den	 Jahren	
verändert	 haben,	 wie	 wir	 von	
der	Myristica	 und	 von	 Corylus,	
erfahren	 haben,	 bei	 welch	
letzteren	 die	 weiblichen	
Blumen	 ein	 Jahr	 später	 als	 die	
männlichen	 zur	 Entwickelung	
kamen.	
Well	 we	 have	 of	 some	 pure	 types	
of	 Diclinen	 examples	 that	 the	 sex	
ratios	 have	 changed	 in	 individuals	
over	the	years,	as	we	have	learned	
from	 the	Myristica	 and	 Corylus,	 in	
what	the	female	flowers	latter	one	
year	 later	 than	 the	 male	 to	 the	
development	came.	
368	
1	 Wie	Clima,	Witterung,	Boden	u.	
s.	 w.	 auf	 die	 Pflanzen	
uberhaupt	 und	 ihre	
Fruchtbarkeit	 insbesondere	
einen	 nicht	 zu	 bestreitenden	
Einfluss	 haben,	 (s.	 nnten	
Fruchtbarkeit	der	Bastarde),	 so	
mag	 dies	 noch	 in	 höherem	
Grade	 bei	 den	 Bastarden	 der	
Fall	 sein,	 weil	 bei	 ihnen	 ein	
gestörtes	 Verhältniss	 der	
zeugenden	 Kräfte	 an	 sich	
stattfindet:	 dieser	 Einfluss	
scheint	 aber	 nur	 auf	 die	
Entwickelung	 der	 vorhandenen	
Anlage,	 nicht	 auf	 die	 specielle	
Bestimmung	 des	 Geschlechts	
zu	 gehen,	 welcher	 Meinung	
auch	G.	R.	Treviranus	ist	
How	climate,	weather,	soil	u.	S.	W.	
at	 all	 on	 the	 plants	 and	 their	
fertility	 in	 particular	 have	 an	
undeniable	 influence	 (see	 Fig.	
Nnten	 fertility	 of	 hybrids),	 so	 this	
may	 still	 higher	 degree	 when	 the	
bastards	be	the	case,	because	with	
them	 a	 disturbed	 relation	 of	 the	
creative	forces	takes	place	in	itself:	
this	 influence	 appears	 only	 on	 the	
development	 of	 the	 existing	
system,	 not	 to	 go	 to	 the	 especial	
determination	of	sex,	which	is	also	
the	opinion	GR	Treviranus	
370	
1	 Die	 ausserordentliche	
Produktivitat	 in	 Blumen,	
welche	von	
alien	Beobachtern,	die	sich	der	
Bestarderzeugung	 gewidmet	
haben,	bestätigt	wird	,	mag	die	
unmittelbare	 Folge	 der	
Schwachung	 der	
Zeugungskrafte	 der	 Bastarde	
sein;	 so	 dass	 dieselbe	 in	
geradem	 Verhältniss	 mit	 der	
Sterilitat	 derselben	 zu	 stehen	
scheint,	 und	 wovon	 wir	 keine	
Ausnahme	 beobachtet	 haben;	
weil	 selbst	 die	 fruchtbarsten	
Hybriden	 ungleich	 mehr	
The	 extraordinary	 productivity	 in	
flowers,	which	of	 	
alien	observers	who	have	devoted	
themselves	 to	 the	
Bestarderzeugung	 is	 confirmed,	
may	be	 the	direct	 consequence	of	
the	 weakening	 of	 the	 forces	
generating	 the	 bastards;	 so	 that	
the	 same	 in	 direct	 ratio	 with	 the	
same	 sterility	 seems	 to	 be,	 and	
what	 we	 have	 observed	 no	
exception;	 because	 even	 the	most	
fertile	 hybrids	 display	 far	 more	
infertile	 than	 fertile	 flowers,	 and	
even	 these	 besitzten	 only	
one-Limited	 fertility	 (see	 Fig.	
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unfruchtbare	 als	 fruchtbare	
Blumen	 tragen,	 und	 selbst	
diese	 nur	 eine	 beschrankte	
Fruchtbarkeit	 besitzten	 (s.	
unten	Blumenentwickelung).	
flower-development	below).	
1	 Bei	 sehr	 vielen	 Gewachsen	
kommt	 aber	 die	 ursprüngliche	
Frucht-	 und	 Samenanlage	
normal	 niemals	 oder	 doch	
äusserst	 selten	 zu	 ihrer	 vollen	
Ausbildung:	 wobei	 man	
annehmen	 kann,	 dass	 dies	
nicht	 von	 dem	 Mangel	 des	
befruchtenden	 männlichen	
Stoffes,	 sondern	 von	 einer,	 in	
der	 ganzen	 Pflanze	 liegenden	
Disposition,	 einem	 besonderen	
Bildungstrieb	herrühre,	welcher	
die	 Entwickelung	 der	 Anlage	
hindert	
For	 very	 many	 grown	 but	 is	 the	
original	 fruit	 and	 ovule	 normally	
never	or	but	very	rarely	to	their	full	
training:	 where	 one	 can	 assume	
that	 this	 disposition	 lies	 not	 from	
the	 lack	 of	 male	 fertilizing	
substance,	but	of	one	in	the	whole	
plant,	a	special	education	herrühre	
drive,	 which	 prevents	 the	
development	of	plant	
375	
1	 Innere	individuelle	Verhältnisse	
und	 besondere	
Conceptionsfähigkeit	 einzelner	
Blumen	 eines	 Individuums,	
woraus	 sich	 allein	 die	
Erscheinung	erklären	lässt,	dass	
unter	 (wenigstens	 dem	
Anschein	 nach)	 völlig	 gleicher	
Umständen,	 mit	 demselbigen	
Pollen,	 an	 demselben	
Individuum,	 bei	 gleicher	
Samenanlage,	 bei	 vollig	
gleichem	 Entwickelungsgrade	
und	 in	 demselbigen	 Momente	
der	Bestaubung,	die	eine	Blume	
eine	 grössere,	 die	 andere	 eine	
geringere	 Anzahl,	 ja!	 manche	
gar	keine	Samen	geben.	
Inside	individual	circumstances	and	
special	 Conceptionsfähigkeit	
individual	 flowers	 of	 an	 individual,	
from	which	alone	the	phenomenon	
can	 be	 explained	 that	 under	 (at	
least	 apparently)	 completely	 the	
same	 circumstances,	 state	 of	 that	
pollen,	 the	 same	 individual,	 at	 the	
same	ovule,	with	completely	same	
developmental	state	and	in	To	him	
moments	of	pollination,	a	flower,	a	
larger,	the	other	a	smaller	number,	
yes!	give	some	no	seeds.	
375	
1	 Trockenheit,	 weil	 durch	
Feuchtigkeit	 sowohl	 die	 Pollen	
Entwickelung	 gehindert,	 als	
auch	 die	 Einsaugungsfunktion	
der	Narbe	unterdrückt	wird.	
Dry	because	moisture	is	prevented	
by	 both	 pollen	 development,	 as	
well	 as	 the	 Einsaugungsfunktion	
the	scar	is	suppressed.	
378	
1	 So	 beobachteten	 wir	 im	
Sommer	 1839	 ein	 im	 Topfe	
befindliches	 Exemplar	 des	
Verb.	 Blattaria,	 dessen	 erste	
As	we	 observed	 in	 the	 summer	 of	
1839	a	building	under	pots	copy	of	
the	 verb.	 Blattaria,	 the	 first	 and	
lowest	three	flowers	were	infertile,	
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und	 unterste	 drei	 Blumen	
unfruchtbar	 waren,	 die	 vierte	
fruchtbar,	 die	 fünfte	 taub,	 die	
sechste	 bis	 dreiundzwanzigste	
fruchtbar,	 die	
vierundzwanzigste	 taub,	 die	
fünf-bis	 achtundzwanzigste	
fruchtbar,	 —	 nun	 folgten	 acht	
vollig	 taube	 Kelche,	 welche	
ohne	alle	Blumen-Entwickelung	
geblieben	 waren,	 —	 die	
siebenund	 achtunddreissigste	
taub,	 die	 neununddreissigste	
bis	 dreiundvierzigste	 fruchtbar,	
die	 vierundvierzigste	 bis	
sechsundsechzigste	 taub,	 die	
letzten	 und	 obersten	 drei	
Blumen	wieder	fruchtbar.	
the	 fourth	 fertile,	 the	 fifth	 deaf,	
the	 sixth	 to	 twenty-third	 fertile,	
the	twenty-fourth	deaf,	the	five-to	
twenty-eighth	 fruitful,	 -	 now	
followed	 eight	 completely	 deaf	
chalices,	 which	 had	 remained	
without	any	 flower	development,	 -	
the	 thirty-eighth-seven	 deaf,	 the	
Thirty-ninth	 to	 forty-third	 fertile,	
the	 forty-fourth	 and	 sixty-sixth	
deaf,	 the	 last	 and	 highest	 three	
flowers	fertile	again.	
1	 Manche	 Individuen	 der	
genannten	 Arten	 und	 viele,	
weniger	 fruchtbare	 Bastarde	
setzen	 auch	 gar	 keine	 Früchte	
und	 Samen	mehr	 an	 ;	 sondern	
ihre	 Blumen	 verderben	 oder	
fallen	 ab,	 ohne	 nur	 eine	
Anregung	 zur	 Entwickelung	
ihrer	 Fruchtknoten	 gezeigt	 zu	
haben.	
Some	 individuals	 of	 those	 species	
and	many,	 less	 fertile	 hybrids	 also	
put	 no	 more	 on	 fruits	 and	 seeds;	
but	 its	 flowers	 perish	 or	 fall	 off,	
without	showing	only	a	suggestion	
to	 the	 development	 of	 their	
ovaries.	
393	
1	 ohne	 die	 mindeste	
Entwickelung	 der	 Ovarien	 zu	
zeigen	wie	
without	 showing	 the	 least	
development	of	the	ovaries	as	
395	
1	 Bei	 aller	 Unstätigkeit	 der	
Zeugungskraft	 der	 Bastarde	 ist	
es	 uns	 aber	 noch	 nicht	
gelungen,	 durch	 Cultur	 eine	
Veranderung	 in	 der	
Entwickelung	 der	
Zeugungsorgane	 der	 Bastarde	
wirken	
In	 all	 Unstätigkeit	 the	 generative	
power	 of	 hybrids,	 however,	 we	
have	 not	 yet	 succeeded	 act	 by	 a	
culture	 alteration	 in	 the	
development	 of	 the	 reproductive	
organs	of	hybrids	
395	
2	 Da	 jedoch	 das	
Zeugungsvermögen	 und	 die	
Fruchtbarkeit	 der	 Gewächse	
von	 der	 Entwickelung	 der	
Geschlechtsorgane	 abhangt,	
und	die	Umstande,	welehe	der	
Entwickelung	 und	 Ausbildung	
derselben	 in	 den	 sterilen	
However,	 since	 the	 generation	
capacity	 and	 the	 fertility	 of	 the	
plants	 depends	 on	 the	
development	 of	 the	 sex	 organs,	
and	 the	 circumstance	 welehe	 to	
shape	 and	 develop	 the	 same	
Siehen	 in	 the	 sterile	 hybrids	 in	
ways	 still	 unknown:	 it	 must	 here	
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Bastarden	 im	 Wege	 siehen,	
noch	 unbekannt	 sind:	 so	
mussen	 hierüber	 noch	 weitere	
Untersuchungen	 angestellt	
werden:	 wenn	 es	 gleich	 eine	
constatirte	 Thatsache	 ist,	 dass	
der	 Hybriditismus	 der	
Fruchtbarkeit	 uberhaupt	
hinderlich	ist	
about	 further	 research	 be	
conducted:	 if	 it	 is	 equal	 a	
constatirte	 fact	 is	 that	 the	
Hybriditismus	 fertility	 is	 at	 all	 a	
hindrance	
1	 Der	 Lychnicucubalus	 albus	
zeigte	 fur	 sich	 selbst	 nicht	 die	
geringste	 Entwickelung	 des	
Ovariums	
The	 Lychnicucubalus	 albus	 did	 not	
show	for	themselves	the	 	
slightest	development	of	the	ovary	
425	
1	 hatte	 für	 sich	 selbst	 nicht	 die	
mindeste	 Entwickelung	 des	
Kelchs	 oder	 des	 Ovariums	
gezeigt,	 diese	 sind	 vielmehr	
nach	einigen	Tagen	verdorben	
…	had	not	shown	itself	for	the	least	
development	 of	 the	 calyx	 or	 the	
ovary,	 these	 are	 rather	 spoiled	
after	a	few	days	
426	
2	 es	 trat	 aber	 an	 den	 mit	 dem	
Pollen	 der	 L.	 syphilitica	
bestaubten	 Blumen	 ein	
plötzlicher	 Stillstand	 der	
Entwickelung	 ein,	 die	 Kelche	
wurden	 gelb	 und	 die	 Eichen	
hatten	 nicht	 den	 geringsten	
Grad	 einer	 Entwickelung	
erfahren:	 der	 Akt	 der	
Befruchtung	 scheint	 also	 hier	
zuerst	 auf	 die	 äusserste	
Umhüllung	 des	 Pistills	 gewirkt	
zu	haben.	
but	 it	 came	 to	 the	 dusty	 with	
pollen	from	flowers	of	L.	syphilitica	
a	 sudden	 stop	 of	 development,	
which	chalices	were	yellow	and	the	
oaks	 had	 not	 experienced	 the	
slightest	 degree	 of	 development:	
the	 act	 of	 fertilization	 seems	 here	
first	 on	 the	 outermost	 covering	 of	
the	pestle	to	have	worked.	
426	
1	 Die	 Befruchtung	 unter	
gemischten	Bastarden,	oder	auf	
diese	 Art	 entstandenen	
Varietäten,	 gibt	 keine	 gleichen	
Produkte:	 sondern	 es	 scheint	
ein	 unbestimmtes	 Wogen	 der	
beiden	
Befruchtungsthätigkeiten	 bei	
Erzeugung	 der	 Keime	
obzuwalten,	 wodurch	 in	 Einer	
Befruchtung	 und	 in	 Einem	
Ovarium	 Keime	 mit	
verschiedenen	
Entwickelungsformen	 gebildet	
werden	
The	 fertilization	 mixed	 hybrids,	 or	
on	 this	 kind	 incurred	 varieties	 are	
no	identical	products:	but	it	seems	
a	 vague	 waves	 of	 the	 two	
Befruchtungsthätigkeiten	 upon	
generation	 of	 germs	 obzuwalten,	
which	 are	 formed	 in	 one	
insemination	 and	 in	 one	 ovary	
nuclei	 with	 different	 forms	 of	
development	
428	
1	 Die	 Bastardpflanzen	 also,	 The	 Bastard	 plants	 so	 that	 should	 458	
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welche	 zu	 diesem	
Umwandelungsversuche	
dienen	 sollen,	 müssen	
nothwendig	 noch	 einen	
gewissen	 Grad	 weiblichen	
Conceptionsvermögens	
besitzen:	 so	 dass,	 wenn	 sie	
auch	für	sich	selbst	unfruchtbar	
oder	 ihr	 Pollen	 impotent	 sein	
sollte;	 doch	 der	
stammelterliche	
Befruchtungsstoff	 noch	 eine	
Befruchtung	 bewirken	 kann,	
welcher	 dann	 bei	 der	
kiinstlichen	 Bestaubung	 und	
der	 Schwangerung	 der	
hybriden	 Eichen	 keinen	
anderen	 Einfluss	 zulässt	 und	
die	 Richtung	 bestimmt,	welche	
die	 Entwickelung	 des	 hiedurch	
erzeugten	Embryos	bei	den	aus	
diesen	 Samen	 entstandenen	
Samlingen	nehmen	muss.	
serve	 this	 Umwandelungsversuche	
must	necessarily	still	have	a	certain	
degree	 female	
Conceptionsvermögens:	 so	 that	 if	
they	 should	 be	 impotent	 for	
themselves	infertile	or	their	pollen;	
but	 the	 derived	 parental	
fertilization	 fabric	 still	 can	 cause	
fertilization,	 which	 then	 does	 not	
allow	 any	 other	 influence	 in	
artificial	 pollination	 and	 the	 Swan	
Gerung	 the	 hybrid	 oaks	 and	 the	
direction	 is	 determined,	 which	
must	 take	 the	 development	 of	 the	
embryo	by	this	means	generated	in	
the	 seedlings	 resulting	 from	 these	
seeds.	
1	 Die	Versuche	 sind	nur	 in	Reihe	
von	 Jahren	 zu	 bewerkstelligen	
und	zu	beendigen;	weil	 in	dem	
langsamen	 Verlauf	 der	
Zeugungen	 und	 in	 dem	 langen	
Hin-Ziehen	 der	 Entwickelungen	
sowohl,	 als	 durch	 die	
verschiedenen	
Fruehtbarkeitszustände	 der	
Yersuchs-Individuen	 sehr	 leicht	
und	oft	Störungen	und	Ausfälle	
eintreten	 können,	 welche	 das	
begonnene	Werk	unterbrechen	
und,	 wenn	 es	 noch	 gut	 geht,	
das	 Resultat	 um	 einen	
Jahrs-Cyclus	hinausschieben.	
The	experiments	are	accomplished	
only	 in	 number	 of	 years	 and	 quit;	
because	 in	 the	 slow	 course	 of	 the	
beliefs	 and	 in	 the	 long	 round	
pulling	 the	 developments	 both,	
very	 easily	 and	 often	 can	 occur	
faults	 and	 failures	 through	 the	
various	Fruehtbarkeitszustände	the	
Yersuchs	 individuals,	 which	
interrupt	 the	work	 begun	 and	 if	 it	
still	 goes	well,	 the	 result	postpone	
a	year-cycle.	
476	
1	 Der	 Verf.	 legt	 ein	 besonderes	
Gewicht	 für	 eine	 solche	
Umwandelung	darauf,	dass	das	
Thlaspi	 in	 allen	 seinen	
Entwickelungsstufen	 mit	 dem	
Reps	parallel	gehe.	
The	 author.	 Places	 particular	
emphasis	 for	 such	 Umwandelung	
that	 the	Thlaspi	 in	all	 its	 stages	of	
development	 with	 the	 Reps	 go	
parallel.	
487	
1	 die	15te	zeigte	aber	schon	beim	
Keimen	 Verschiedenheiten,	
But	 the	 15	 th	 already	 showed	
differences	 in	 germination,	 and	 a	
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und	 eine	 langsame	
Entwickelung	 und	 kränkelnde	
Beschaffenheit.	
slow	 development	 and	 ailing	
condition.	
1	 Während	 ihrer	 Entwickelung	
glichen	diese	Knospen	selbst	 in	
Hinsicht	der	weissen	Farbe	der	
Blumenblätter,	 mit	 Ausnahme	
ihrer	 doppelten	 Grösse,	 ganz	
denen	des	Thlaspi	arvense.	
During	 their	 development,	 these	
buds	 aligned	 itself	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
white	color	of	 the	petals,	with	 the	
exception	 of	 double	 size,	 all	 of	
which	Thlaspi	arvense.	
488	
1	 Der	 Verf.	 ist	 geneigt	mit	 Thaer	
das	 Trifolium	 fragiferum	 für	
eine	 Varietät	 des	 T.	 repens	 zu	
halten,	 dass	 sich	 das	 erstere	
nur	auf	einer	niederen	Stufe	der	
Entwickelung	befinde,	und	dass	
sein	 Erscheinen	 urspünglich	
durch	 Bodenverhältnisse	
bedingt	werde.	
The	author	is.	Inclined	to	keep	with	
the	 Thaer	 Trifolium	 fragiferum	 for	
a	 variety	 of	 T.	 repens,	 that	 the	
former	 is	 located	 only	 at	 a	 lower	
stage	of	development,	and	that	his	
appearance	would	originally	due	to	
soil	conditions.	
493	
3	 Werde	 dieses	 ursprüngliche,	
die	 vollständige	 Entwickelung,	
ja	 die	 Existenz	 der	 Art	
bedingende,	 Verhältniss	
aufgehoben,	 so	 sei	 die	
Abweichung	 einer	 Pflanze	 von	
ihrem	 Normaltypus	 die	
nothwendige	Folge	davon	,	d.	i.	
die	 Entwickelung	 und	 Bildung	
einer	 jeden	 Pflanze	 beruhe	 auf	
gewissen	 Gesetzen,	 und	werde	
durch	diese	bedingt,	 und	diese	
Gesetze	 sprechen	 sich	 aus	 in	
den,	 zur	 vollkommenen	
Entwickelung	 einer	 Pflanze	
nothigen,	 verschiedenen	
Verhaltnissen	 der	 Einwirkung	
der	 ausseren	 Momente,	 Licht,	
Feuchtigkeit,	 Boden,	
Luftbeschaffenheit,	 Wärme	 u.	
s.	 w.	 Noch	 kennen	 wir	 freilich	
diese	 Gesetze	 so	 gut	 als	 gar	
nicht;	 ihr	 Vorhandensein	 lasse	
sich	 aber	 durchaus	 nicht	 mehr	
verkennen,	 wir	 seien	 vielmehr	
durch	 eine	 Menge	 von	
Erscheinungen	 gezwungen,	 sie	
als	vorhanden	anzunehmen.	
Get	 this	original,	 full	 development,	
so	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 species	
conditional,	 Relationship	 repealed,	
the	 deviation	 of	 a	 plant	 from	 its	
normal	 type	 is	 the	 necessary	
consequence	 of	 which,	 ie	 the	
development	 and	 formation	 of	
each	 plant	 based	 on	 certain	 laws,	
and	will	due	to	this,	and	these	laws	
are	in	favor	of	the,	nothigen	to	the	
perfect	 development	 of	 a	 plant,	
different	 ratios	of	 exposure	 to	 the	
outer	 moments,	 light,	 moisture,	
soil,	 air	 quality,	 heat	 etc	 Yet	 we	
certainly	 know	 these	 laws	 as	 well	
as	not;	but	their	presence	 is	by	no	
means	 let	 more	 mistaken,	 we	 are	
forced	 rather	 by	 a	 set	 of	
phenomena,	to	accept	them	as	yet.	
494	
1	 Nur	 gewissen	 bestimmten	 Only	 certain	 specific	 families	 is	 495	
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Familien	 sei	 eine	 solche	 eigen,	
und	diese	 seien	 solche,	welche	
die	 niederen	
Entwickelungsstufen	 des	
Pflanzenreichs	 uberhaupt,	oder	
einer	 Familie,	 oder	 endlich	
einer	 Gattung	 darstellen,	 in	
welcher	 die	 Einheit	 noch	 nicht	
zur	 Vollkommenheit	 gelangt	
sei,	 um	 sich	 gegen	 die	
veränderten	 äusseren	
Verhältnisse	 in	 ihrer	 Integritat	
zu	 behaupten,	 und	 diese	
gleichsam	 überwinden	 zu	
konnen,	
such	 a	 self,	 and	 these	were	 those	
which	 at	 all	 the	 lower	 stages	 of	
development	of	the	plant	kingdom,	
or	 a	 family,	 or	 finally	 constitute	 a	
genre	in	which	the	unit	had	not	yet	
reached	 that	 perfection	 to	 stand	
up	 to	 the	 changing	 external	
conditions	 to	 maintain	 in	 their	
integrity,	and	 to	overcome	 this,	as	
it	can	be,	
1	 Die	 gewohnlichen	 kleinen	
Linsen,	 unter	 welchen	 die	
Kichern	 sich	 befunden	 hatten,	
blieben	 in	 ihrer	 ganzen	
Entwickelung	 ganz	
unverändert.	
he	 common	 small	 lenses,	 under	
which	 the	 giggles	 had	 been	 had	
remained	completely	unchanged	in	
its	whole	development.	
497	
1	 der	 Limbus	 im	 Anfang	 der	
Entwickelung	 der	 Blumen	
schmal	und	mehr	gerundet	mit	
leichter	 Andeutung	 der	
Lappenspitzen,	 die	 Lappen	
mehr	 nur	 angedeutet,	 als	
unterschieden	
the	 limbus	 in	 the	 early	
development	 of	 the	 flowers	 small	
and	 more	 rounded	 with	 a	 slight	
hint	 of	 rag	 tops,	 the	 lobes	 longer	
just	indicated,	as	distinguished	
512	
1	 Bei	 der	 weiteren	 Entwickelung	
der	 Pflanzen	 und	 beim	
vollendeten	 Wachsthum	
zeigten	 sich	 die	 spater	
entwickelten	 Blumen	 noch	
weniger	 von	 denen	 der	 N.	
angustifolia	verschieden	
In	 the	 further	 development	 of	 the	
plant	and	the	completed	growth	of	
the	 later-developed	 flowers	
showed	 even	 less	 differen	 from	
those	of	N.	angustifolia	
512	
1	 Aber	eine	hieherbezügliche,	 im	
Jahr	 1826	 veranstaltete,	
Bestäubung	 des	 Bastards	
Nicoliana	rustico-paniculata	mit	
dem	 Pollen	 des	 Hyoscyamus	
agrestis	 haben	 wir	 noch	
besonders	beizufügen,	dass	von	
6	 Befruchtungen	 zwei	
angeschlagen	 zu	 haben	
schienen;	 indem	 zwei	 kleine	
Früchte	 mit	 je	 zwei	
vollkommenen	Samen	erhalten	
But	 a	 hieherbezügliche,	 organized	
in	 1826,	 pollination	 of	 Bastards	
Nico	 Liana	 Rustico-paniculata	 with	
the	 pollen	 of	 Hyoscyamus	 agrestis	
we	 do	 not	 have	 particularly	
accompanied	 to	 have	 that	 posted	
by	 6	 inseminations	 two	 rails;	 by	
two	 small	 fruits	 were	 obtained	
with	two	perfect	seeds,	which	have	
however	only	two	germinated,	and	
only	 one	 plant	 has	 come	 to	 a	
complete	development.	
314	
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wurden,	 wovon	 jedoch	 nur	
zwei	 gekeimt	 haben,	 und	 nur	
eine	einzige	Pflanze	zur	völligen	
Entwickelung	gekommen	ist.	
1	 Ebenso	 auch	 die	
Blumenentwickelung.	
The	flower-development	 518	
1	 indem	 Eigenschaften,	 welche	
bei	 den	 Hybriden	 angetroffen	
werden,	 auch	 bei	 den	 reinen	
Arten	 durch	 alterirte	
Entwickelung	 hervorgebracht	
werden:	
by	 properties	 which	 are	
encountered	 in	 the	 hybrids	 are	
produced	 by	 altered	 development	
even	in	the	pure	species:	
518	
2	 sondern,	 dass	 ein	 grosser,	 ja	
der	 grosste	 Theil	 derselben	 in	
verschiedenen	 Graden	 der	
Entwickelung	 stehen	 geblieben	
ist	 (s.	 oben	 Unvollkommene	
Befruchtung	S.	93),	obgleich	im	
sonstigen	 Gang	 und	 der	
Entwickelung	 der	 Früchte,	
selbst	 in	 der	 Reifungszeit	 der	
Samen	 vielfältig	 kerne	
Abweichung	zu	bemerken	ist.	
but	that	a	large,	indeed	the	biggest	
part	has	remained	the	same	are	 in	
different	 degrees	 of	 development	
(see	 Fig.	 above	 imperfect	
fertilization	 p	 93),	 although	 to	
notice	 diverse	 cores	 deviation	 in	
other	 transition	 and	 the	
development	 of	 the	 fruit,	 even	 in	
time	of	ripening	of	the	seeds	is.	
519	
1	 Bei	 noch	 andern	 setzt	 sich,	
wenn	 auch	 die	 erste	
Entwickelung	 kein	 Hinderniss	
gefunden	 hat,	 das	 Siechthum	
der	 Samlinge	 fort;	 sie	 treiben	
zwar	Aesle	und	Blätter,	können	
aber	nicht	zur	Entwickelung	der	
Blumen	 gelangen,	 oder	 wenn	
sie	 auch	 bei	 besonders	
günstiger	 Witterung	 solche	
ansetzen	
In	 yet	 another	 set	 when	 the	 first	
development	 has	 found	 no	
obstacle,	 the	 infirmity	 of	 the	
seedlings	continued;	Although	they	
drive	Aesle	and	leaves,	but	can	not	
get	 to	 the	 development	 of	 the	
flowers,	or	if	they	fix	those	even	in	
the	most	favorable	weather	
520	
1	 Vielleicht	 mögen	 auch	 äussere	
Einflüsse	 zum	 Siechthum	
mehrerer	 dieser	 Bastarde	
Veranlassung	 gegeben	 haben:	
wie	 wir	 dann	 auch	 an	 dem	
Verbascum	
Thapso-phoeniceum	 in	 dem	
nassen	 und	 kühlen	 Sommer	
von	 1831	 zwar	 Blätter,	 Stengel	
und	 Aeste	 treiben,	 aber	 keine	
Blumen	 zur	 Entwickelung	
kommen	sahen.	
Maybe	 external	 influences	 to	
infirmity	 more	 of	 these	 bastards	
may	have	given	rise:	as	we	also	to	
the	 Verbascum	
Thapso-phoeniceum	in	the	wet	and	
cool	 summer	 of	 1831,	 although	
leaves,	 stems	 and	 branches	 drive,	
but	 saw	 no	 flowers	 come	 for	
development.	
520	
1	 Aber	 nur	 wenige	 Samen	 But	few	seeds	seem	to	find	in	their	 525	
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scheinen	 in	 ihrer	 natürlichen	
Anlage	eine	Veranderung	durch	
die	 Verzögerung	 ihres	 Keimens	
zu	erfahren,	wir	kennen	nur	die	
Melonen,	Gurken	und	Kürbisse,	
welche	 in	der	Entwickelung	der	
Sexualorgane	 durch	 das	
Aufschieben	 des	 Keimens	 der	
Samen	 eine	 andere	 Richtung	
bekommen	(s.	oben	S.	370).	
natural	 plant	 an	 alteration	 by	 the	
delay	 of	 its	 germination,	 we	 only	
know	 the	 melons,	 cucumbers	 and	
pumpkins,	 which	 get	 in	 the	
development	 of	 the	 sexual	 organs	
by	 pushing	 the	 germination	 of	
seeds	a	different	direction	(see	Fig.	
Above	p	370).	
1	 Eine	der	ausgezeichnetsten	und	
allgemeinsten	 Eigenschaften;	
der	 Pflanzenbastarde	 ist	 die	
Luxuriation	 in	 allen	 ihren	
Theilen	 indem	 sich	 bei	 sehr	
vielen	 derselben	 eine	
Ueppigkeit	 des	 Wachsthums	
und	 der	 Entwickelung	 von	
Wurzelschossen,	 Aesten,	
Blattern	 und	 Blumen	 zeigt,	
welche	 bei	 den	 Stammeltern	
auch	 bei	 sorgfältiger	 Cultur	
nicht	angetroffen	wird	
One	 of	 the	 highest	 and	 most	
general	properties;	plant	hybrids	is	
the	 Luxuriation	 in	 all	 its	 parts	 by	
themselves	 in	 very	 many	 of	 the	
same	shows	a	luxuriance	of	growth	
and	 development	 of	 root	 stem	
elongation,	 branches,	 leaves	 and	
flowers,	 which	 is	 not	 encountered	
in	 the	 first	 parents,	 even	 with	
careful	cultivation	
526	
1	 Gewohnlich	 erlangen	 aber	 die	
Bastardpflanzen	 nur	 im	 freien	
Boden	 die	 vollkommene	
Entwickelung	 ihrer	 Theile,	 wie	
schon	Kolreuter	bemerkt	hat:	
But	 usually	 get	 the	 bastard	 plants	
only	 in	 the	 free	 soil	 the	 perfect	
development	 of	 their	 parts,	 as	 has	
been	noted	Kolreuter	
526	
1	 Die	 verschiedenen	 Bastarde	
von	 Datura	 …	 wachsen	 zu	
grossen	 umfangreichen	
Baumen	 aus,	 deren	 Aeste	 und	
Blätter	 die	 Stamme	 beinahe	
niederdrücken,	 ohne	 noch	 zur	
Entwickelung	 ihrer	 unzahligen	
Blumen	gelangt	zu	sein.	
The	 various	 hybrids	 of	 Datura	 …	
grow	 into	 big	 bulky	 trees,	 whose	
branches	 and	 leaves	 almost	
depress	 the	 tribe,	 but	 not	 yet	
attained	 to	 the	 development	 of	
their	innumerable	flowers.	
527	
1	 Ist	 die	 Luxuriation	 in	 dem	
hybriden	 Pflanzenkörper	 schon	
vor	der	Entwickelung	der	Blüthe	
sichtbar	und	vorhanden	
Is	 the	 Luxuriation	 in	 the	 hybrid	
plant	 body	 even	 before	 the	
development	 of	 the	 flower	 visible	
and	available	
528	
1	 Beschleunigung	 und	
Vermehrung	 der	
Blumenentwickelung.	
Acceleration	 and	 propagation	 of	
flower-development	
529	
1	 Mit	 dem	 beschleunigten	 und	
erhöhten	 Wachsthum	 und	 der	
frühen	 Entwickelung	 des	
hybriden	 Pflanzenkörpers	 steht	
With	the	accelerated	and	increased	
growth	 and	 early	 development	 of	
the	hybrid	plant	body	is	the	earlier	
flowering	 of	 hybrids	 in	 the	 closest	
530	
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das	 frühere	 Blühen	 der	
Bastarde	 in	 der	 engsten	
Verbindung.	
connection.	
1	 Kolreuter	 ist	 geneigt,	 den	
Grund	 des	 früheren	 Blühens	
und	 der	 fortdauernden	
zahlreichen	
Blumenentwickelung	 ebenfalls	
in	 der	 Unfruchtbarkeit	 der	
Bastarde	 zu	 suchen;	weil	 diese	
Eigenschaften	 bei	 den	 im	
hochsten	 Grade	 unfruchtbaren	
Hybriden	 in	 einem	 vorzüglich	
hohen	 Grade	 angetroffen	
werden.	
Kolreuter	 is	 inclined	 also	 to	 seek	
the	reason	for	the	earlier	flowering	
and	 the	 continuing	 numerous	
flower-development	 in	 the	 sterility	
of	 hybrids;	 because	 these	
properties	 are	 encountered	 in	 the	
unfruitful	 in	 the	 highest	 degree	
hybrids	in	an	excellent	high	grade.	
532	
1	 Die	 Luxuriation	 der	 Bastarde,	
die	Productivity	 in	Blumen	und	
ihre	langere	Dauer	konnte	man	
dem	 Mangel	 der	 Entwickelung	
und	 Verstaubung	 des	 Pollens	
zuschreiben	
The	Luxuriation	 the	hybrids	whose	
productivity	 in	 flowers	 and	 their	
Longer	 duration	 could	 be	
attributed	 to	 the	 lack	 of	
development	and	dusting	of	pollen	
533	
1	 Abends	 gegen	 5	 Uhr	 (im	 Juni)	
begann	 aber	 die	
Geruchsentwickelung	 und	 stieg	
bis	gegen	Mitternacht	
In	 the	 evening	 around	 5	 clock	 (in	
June)	 but	 odor	 began	 developing	
and	rose	up	around	midnight	
536	
1	 es	 setzten	 bios	 rudimentäre	
Kapseln	 an,	 mit	 staubartig	
vertrockneten	 Eichen,	 und	
keines	 derselben	 zeigte	 nur	
einen	 Schein	 von	 einiger	
Entwickelung	
it	sat	bios	rudimentary	capsules	at,	
with	 dust-like	 withered	 oaks,	 and	
none	 of	 them	 showed	 only	 a	
semblance	of	some	development	
539	
1	 das	 dritte	 Exemplar	 dauerte	
fünf	 Jahre	 und	 trieb	 die	
gleichen	 gebänderten	 Triebe	
aus	 der	 Wurzel,	 an	 welchen	
jedoch,	 wie	 am	 Hauptstamm,	
niemals	 eine	 Blume	 zur	
Entwickelung	gekommen	ist	
the	 third	 copy	 took	 five	 years	 and	
drove	 the	 same	 banded	 shoots	
from	 the	 root,	 to	which,	 however,	
as	 the	 main	 stem,	 never	 a	 flower	
has	come	for	development	
560	
1	 die	 Corollen	 kamen	 durch	 die	
Luxuriation	und	Krümmung	der	
Staubfäden	 und	 die	
unförmlichen	 Antheren	 nicht	
zur	 regelmässigen	
Entwickelung,	 sondem	 wurden	
in	 röthlich-grüne,	
filamentartige	 Lacinien	 getheilt	
und	mit	 den	 kraus	 in	 einander	
the	 corollas	 came	 through	 the	
Luxuriation	 and	 curvature	 of	 the	
stamens	and	anthers	shapeless	not	
for	regular	development,	Segregate	
were	 divided	 into	 reddish-green,	
filamentous	 Lacinien	 and	
presumably	 grow	 with	 the	 frizzy	
tangled	in	each	other	stamens	
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verschlungenen	 Staubgefässen	
verm	wachsen	
1	 An	 vier	 Pflanzen	 dieser	 Art,	
welche	 aus	 dem	 gleichen	
Samen	aus	einer	und	derselben	
Schote	 aufgegangen	 waren,	
wurden	 alle	 Blumenknöpfe	 vor	
ihrer	 Entwickelung	 und	
eingetretenen	 Reife	 der	
Antheren	 zu	 gleicher	 Zeit	
castrirt	
At	four	plants	of	this	species,	which	
had	 gone	 up	 from	 the	 same	 seed	
from	 one	 and	 the	 same	 pod,	 all	
flowers	 buttons	 were	 castrated	
before	 their	 development	 and	
maturity	of	the	anthers	occurred	at	
the	same	time	
566	
2	 Das	 Alter	 der	 Samen	 hat	 nach	
dem	Zeugniss	vieler	bewährten	
Blumisten	(s.	oben	S.	92)	einen	
wesentlichen	 Einfluss,	 bei	 der	
Geschlechtsentwickelung	 bei	
den	 Dichogamen	 (s.	 oben	 S.	
370),	 so	 auch	 auf	 die	
Entwickelung	 der	 Füllung	 der	
Blumen	bei	mehreren	Pflanzen,	
namentlich	 den	 Levcojen,	
Balsaminen	 und	 Nelken	 nach	
Huffner	 Rossnagel,	 Lecoq	 und	
FüRST	
The	 age	 of	 the	 seeds	 after	 the	
testimony	 of	 many	 has	 proven	
Blumisten	 (see	 Fig.	 Above,	 p	 92)	
has	 a	 significant	 influence	 on	 the	
development	 of	 sex	 at	 the	
Dichogamen	 (see	 Fig.	 Above	 S.	
370),	 as	 well	 as	 on	 the	
development	 of	 the	 filling	 of	 the	
flowers	 on	 several	 plants,	 namely	
the	 Levcojen,	 balsams	 and	 cloves	
after	Huffner	Rossnagel,	Lecoq	and	
Fürst	
567	
1	 Nur	wenige	Blumen	der	Lychnis	
diurnoflos	cuculi	(s.	oben	S.	50,	
105,	 348)	 kamen	 zu	 ihrer	
vollkommenen	Entwickelung	
Only	 a	 few	 flowers	 of	 Lychnis	
diurnoflos	cuculi	(see	Fig.	Above,	p	
50,	105,	348)	came	to	their	perfect	
development	
570	
1	 Kelch	 und	 Corolle	 waren	 noch	
weit	 in	 der	 Entwickelung	
zurück.	
Calyx	 and	 corolla	were	 far	 back	 in	
the	development.	
570	
1	 Es	 ist	 ersichtlich,	 dass	 diese	
Auswüchse	 rait	 andern	 an	
reinen	 Arten	 nicht	 selten	
vorkommenden	
übereinkommen,	 und	 nichts	
Aussergewöhnliches	 darbieten,	
deren	 häufigere	 Entwickelung	
aber	 der	 Luxuriation	 der	
Hybriden	 in	 diesem	 Falle	
beizumessen	sein	dürfte.	
It	 can	be	 seen	 that	 these	excesses	
rait	other	to	pure	species	agree	not	
rare,	and	nothing	unusual	present,	
the	more	frequent	development	of	
luxuriance	of	the	hybrids	is	likely	to	
be	accorded	in	this	case.	
571	
3	 Die	Hemmung	und	der	Mangel	
der	 Frucht-	 und	 Samenbildung	
scheint	 hier	 nur	 durch	 die	
beschleunigte	 Erzeugung	 und	
das	gesteigerte	Hervorsprossen	
einer	 fast	 unendlichen	 Menge	
The	 inhibition	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 the	
formation	 of	 fruit	 and	 seed	
appears	 here	 only	 by	 the	
accelerated	 production	 and	
increased	 emphasis	 sprouts	 an	
almost	 infinite	 amount	 voa	
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voa	 Blumen,	 und	 die	 langere	
Dauer	 dieser	 Entwickelung	
ersetzt	 zu	 werden.	 Die	
allgemeinen	
Entwickelungsgesetze	 der	
Theile	 der	 Gewächse	 scheinen	
daher	 durch	 die	 Irybride	
Zeugung	 keine,	 den	 Sinnen	
perceptible	 Aenderung	 zu	
erfahren;	 sondern	 alle	
Entwickelungen	 und	
Veränderungen	 des	 hybriden	
Pflanzenkörpers	 nach	
denselben	 Gesetzen	 zu	
erfolgen,	 wie	 bei	 den	 reinen	
Arten;	die	Zeugungsorgane	und	
die	ateriellen	
Grundstoffe	der	Zeugung	allein	
ausgenommen.	
flowers,	and	the	Longer	duration	of	
this	 development	 to	 be	 replaced.	
The	general	law	of	development	of	
the	 parts	 of	 the	 plants	 therefore	
appear	 by	 the	 Irybride	 generation	
to	learn	no,	the	senses	perceptible	
change;	but	to	be	made	all	changes	
and	 developments	 of	 the	 hybrid	
plant	 body	 according	 to	 the	 same	
laws	 as	 the	 pure	 species;	 the	
reproductive	 organs	 and	 the	
ateriellen	 	
Raw	materials	of	procreation	alone	
excepted.	
1	 so	 scheint	 es	 unerklarlich	 zu	
sein,	warum	die	Corolle	bei	den	
absolut	 sterilen	 Bastarden,	
deren	 es	 doch	 sehr	 viele	 gibt,	
keine	 Storung	 oder	
Beschleunigung	 in	 ihrer	
Entwickelung	 oder	 Bildung	
erfahrt;	
it	seems	to	be	inexplicable	why	the	
corolla	 at	 the	 absolutely	 sterile	
hybrids,	 of	 which	 there	 are	 still	
very	 many,	 no	 disturbance	 or	
acceleration	 learn	 in	 their	
development	or	formation	
572	
1	 besonders	 können	 von	 Seiten	
der	männlichen	Organe	alle	die	
Umstände	 die	 Bastardzeugung	
begünstigen	 und	 die	
Fremdbestäubung	 erleichtern,	
welche	 ihrer	 zeitgemässen	
Entwickelung	 im	Wege	 stehen,	
z.	 B.	 anhaltender	 Regen,	
feuchte	 und	 kalte	 Witterung,	
heftige	Winde,	 allzugrosse	 und	
anhaltende	 Sonnenhitze,	
welche	 atmosphärische	
Einflüsse	 das	 Oeffnen	 der	
Staubbeutel	 hindern,	 den	
Pollen	 verderben	 oder	
unkräftig	machen	
particularly	to	the	part	of	the	male	
organs	 of	 all	 the	 circumstances	
favor	 the	 bastard	 procreation	 and	
facilitate	 the	 cross-pollination,	
which	their	current	development	in	
the	way	of	 such.	B.	and	rainy,	wet	
and	 cold	 weather,	 strong	 winds,	
too	large	and	persistent	heat	of	the	
sun,	which	 atmospheric	 influences	
the	opening	of	the	anthers	prevent	
the	 pollen	 from	 spoiling	 and	
weakening	
585	
1	 Bei	 den	 weiblichen	 Organen	
aber	kann	ihre	nicht	seiten	
vorkommende	 frühzeitige	
Entwickelung	 und	 das	
But	 in	 the	 female	 organs	 can	 not	
part	their	 	
effect	occurring	early	development	
and	 the	 emergence	 penetrating	
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Hervordringen	 der	 Narbe	 aus	
der	 noch	 enggeschlossenen	
Blumenknospe	 und	 ihre	
hiedurch	 moglich	 gewordene	
Bestaubung	 durch,	 auf	
verschiedene	 Weise	
hergeführten,	 Pollen	 zur	 Zeit	
ihrer	Conceptionsfähigkeit	 eine	
Bastardbefruchtung	 im	 Freien	
bewirken	
the	 stigma	 from	 the	 still	 tightly	
closed	 flower	 bud	 and	 its	 By	 this	
means	 become	 possible	 through	
pollination,	hergeführten	in	various	
ways,	 pollen	 at	 the	 time	 of	 their	
Conceptionsfähigkeit	 a	
hybridisation	outdoors	
1	 4)	 durch	 das	 Gesetz	 der	
Gleichzeitigkeit	 der	
Entwickelung	 der	 beiderlei	
Befruchtungsorgane	 in	 einer	
Blume	
4)	by	the	law	of	the	simultaneity	of	
the	 development	 of	 both	
reproductive	organs	in	a	flower	
586	
1	 es	 ist	 also	 derjenige	 Theil	 in	
dieser	 heterogenen	
Verbindung,	 welcher	 mit	
seinem	 Safte	 nach	 Quali-	 und	
Quantität	 die	 Emte	 oder	 das	
aufgesetzte	Auge	ernähert,	und	
also	 den	 ersten	 und	 stärksten	
Einfluss	 auf	 das	 Wachsthum	
und	 die	 weitere	 Entwickelung	
der	aufgesetzten	Knospe	haben	
muss	
So	 it	 is	 that	 part	 in	 this	
heterogeneous	 connection,	 which	
ernähert	 the	 Emte	 or	 the	 patched	
eye	 with	 its	 juice	 according	 to	
quality	and	quantity,	and	therefore	
must	 have	 the	 first	 and	 strongest	
influence	 on	 the	 growth	 and	
further	 development	 of	 the	 patch	
bud	
607	
1	 über	 die	 weitere	 Folge	 der	
Entwickelung	 der	 Emte	 ihrer	
Blätter	 und	 Früchte	 u.	 s.	 w.	 ist	
aber	 in	 der	 Beschreibung	 kein	
genauer	Bericht	gegeben.	
etc.	on	the	further	consequence	of	
the	 development	 of	 Emte	 of	 their	
leaves	and	fruits	but	is	given	in	the	
description	of	an	exact	report.	
618	
1	 Für	 die	 Blumencultur	 ist	 die	
grosse	 Ausbreitung	 und	
gigantische	 Grösse,	 welche	
manche	Bastarde	entwickeln,	z.	
B.	 von	 den	 Gattungen	
Verbascum,	 Lobelia,	 Digitalis,	
Althaea,	 Lavatera,	 Malva	
Datura,	 Mirabilis	 u.	 s.	 w.	 und	
die	 damit	 verbundene	
unerschöpfliche	 Entwickelung	
von	 Blumen	 ein	 nicht	
unbedeutender	Gewinn	
For	 the	 Blumencultur	 is	 the	 large	
spread	 and	 gigantic	 size,	 which	
develop	 some	 hybrids,	 z.	 Example	
of	 the	 genus	 Verbascum,	 Lobelia,	
digitalis,	 Althaea,	 Lavatera,	 Malva	
Datura,	 Mirabilis,	 etc	 and	 the	
associated	 inexhaustible	
development	 of	 flowers	 a	 not	
insignificant	profit	
643	
1	 Dass	 Alles	 dieses,	 sowie	 die	
Verhütung	 der	 Verwechselung	
und	die	 Pflege	 der	 Samlinge	 in	
dem	 mehr	 als	 gewohnliche	
That	all	this,	and	the	prevention	of	
confusion	 and	 the	 care	 of	 the	
seedlings	 in	 the	 more	 than	
ordinary	 further	 course	 of	 their	
649	
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ferneren	 Verlauf	 ihrer	
Entwickelung	 eine	
Aufmerksamkeit	 und	 Ausdauer	
erfordert,	liegt	wohl	am	Tage	
development	 requires	 attention	
and	 perseverance,	 is	 probably	 the	
day	
1	 es	 ist	 noch	 das	 Keimen	 der	
Samen,	 die	 Entwickelung	 der	
Bastardsämlinge	 abzuwarten	
und	 ihr	 Fruchtbarkeitszustand,	
ihre	 Dauer	 u,	 s.	 w.	 zu	
beobachten	
it	 is	 still	 the	 germination	of	 seeds,	
await	 the	 development	 of	 the	
seedlings	 of	 hybrid	 and	 their	
fertility	 status,	 duration,	 &	 c	
observed	
650	
1	 Durch	 dieses	 strenge	 und,	
wenn	 man	 will,	 minutiöse	
Verfahren	 gewann	 aber	 der	
Verf.	den	grossen	Vortheil,	dass	
er	 seine	 Pfleglinge	 und	 jede	
einzelne	Hybride	während	ihrer	
Entstehung,	 Entwickelung	 und	
ihrer	 ganzen	 Lebensdauer	
keinen	 Augenblick	 aus	 den	
Augen	verlor:	
Through	 this	 rigorous	 and,	 if	 you	
will,	 meticulous	 process	 but	 won	
the	 author	 the	 great	 advantage	
that	 during	 their	 formation,	
development	and	all	its	life,	he	lost	
his	Pfleglinge	and	each	hybrid	for	a	
moment	from	his	eyes.:	
651	
1	 um	 die	 Vegetation	 und	 die	
weitere	 Entwickelung	 dieser	
Pflanzen	nicht	zu	unterbrechen	
oder	zu	storen	
to	 the	 vegetation	 and	 the	 further	
development	of	these	plants	not	to	
interrupt	or	interfere	
662	
1	 sondern	 auch	 weil	 die	
Entwickelung	 aller	 Theile	 der	
Blume	 durch	 ihre	 Einwirkung	
sehr	begunstigt	wird	
but	 also	 because	 the	 development	
of	 all	 parts	 of	 the	 flower	 is	 very	
favored	by	their	action	
665	
1	 Die	 wirklichen	 Bastardpflanzen	
erlangen	 zwar	 im	 freien	 Lande	
gewöhnlich	 eine	
vollkommenere	 Entwickelung,	
und	 zeigen	 ein	 üppigeres	
Wachsthum	 des	 Stammes,	 der	
Aeste	 und	 der	 Blätter	 und	
erzeugen	 daher	 auch	 eine	 viel	
grössere	 Anzahl	 von	 Blumen,	
welche	 gemeiniglich	 aber	 alle	
unbefruchtet	 bleiben	 oder	
abfallen:	
The	real	hybrid	plants	become	true	
in	the	open	ground	usually	a	more	
perfect	 development,	 and	 show	 a	
more	 luxuriant	 growth	 of	 the	
trunk,	 the	 branches	 and	 leaves,	
and	 therefore	 also	 generate	 a	
much	 larger	 number	 of	 flowers,	
which	 commonly	 but	 all	 remain	
unfertilized	or	fall:	
667	
1	 Andererseits	 haben	 wir	 aber	
auch	 in	 einzelnen	 Fallen	
unseren	 Zweck	 dadurch	
erreicht,	 dass	 wir	 die	
Blüthenentwickelung	 der	
spateren	Art	durch	die	Stellung	
der	 Pflanzen	 in	 eine	 wärmere	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 we	 have	
achieved	 in	 individual	 cases	 our	
purpose,	 we	 accelerated	 the	
flower-development	 the	 later	 type	
by	 the	 position	 of	 the	 plants	 in	 a	
warmer	location,	
668	
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Lage	beschleunigt,	
1	 oder	 die	 Blumen	 mit	 reinem	
besprengt,	 wodurch	 die	
Entwickelung	 der	 Antheren	
ohne	Nachtheil	fur	die	Kraft	des	
Befruchtungsstoffs,	
or	the	flowers	sprinkled	with	pure,	
whereby	 the	 development	 of	 the	
anthers	 without	 disadvantage	 for	
the	 power	 of	 the	 fertilization	
substance,	
668	
2	 War	 aber	 das	 eine	 oder	 das	
andere	 Individuum	 der	 zu	
verbindenden	 Arten	 in	 der	
Entwickelung	 seiner	 Blumen	
und	 Sexualorgane	 um	 Etwas	
zurück:	 so	 setzten	 wir	 die	
betreffende	 Pflanze	 im	 Topfe	
einer	 kräftigen	 Einwirkung	 des	
Sonnenlichts	 und	 der	 Wärme	
aus,	wodurch	die	 Entwickelung	
des	 einen	 oder	 des	 anderen	
Befruchtungsorgans	 befördert	
wurde.	
But	 it	 was	 one	 or	 the	 other	
individual	 of	 the	 species	 to	 be	
joined	 in	 the	 development	 of	 his	
flowers	 and	 sexual	 organs	 to	
something	 back:	 so	 we	 put	 the	
question	 plant	 in	 the	 pot	 a	 strong	
influence	 of	 the	 sunlight	 and	 the	
heat	out,	making	 the	development	
of	 one	 or	 the	 other	 fertilization	
organ	was	promoted.	
669	
1	 Durch	 die	 zweckmassige	
Anwendung	 dieser	 Mittel	
waren	 wir	 im	 Stande,	 die	
Entwickelung	 der	
Zeugungsorgane	 einander	
näher	 zu	 bringen:	 um	 zur	
geeigneten	 Zeit	 die	
Fremdbestäubung	 zu	
vollbringen	 und	 manche	
Versuche	 auszuführen,	 welche	
ohne	 dieselben	 nicht	 hätten	
ausgeführt	werden	können.	
Were	 assigned	 by	 the	 massive	
application	 of	 this	 means	 we	 able	
to	 bring	 the	 development	 of	 the	
organs	of	generation	closer:	at	the	
appropriate	 time	 to	 perform	 the	
cross-pollination	 and	 carry	 out	
some	experiments	which	could	not	
have	 been	 without	 them	 can	 be	
performed.	
669	
1	 Bei	 allen	 Versuchen	 des	 Verf.	
und	 bei	 der	 Pflege	 seiner	
Versuchs	 -Exemplare	 war	 aber	
zugleich	seine	Sorge	stets	dahin	
gerichtet,	 dass	 dadurch	 der	
naturliche	 Gang	 ihrer	
Entwickelung	 und	 ihres	
Wachsthums	 nicht	 gehindert	
oder	unterbrochen	wurde.	
In	 all	 experiments,	 the	 Author.,	
And	 in	 the	 care	 of	 his	 trial	 copies	
shall	 at	 the	 same	 time	 but	 was	
always	 addressed	 his	 concern	 as	
meaning	 that	 characterized	 the	
natural	 course	 of	 their	
development	and	their	growth	was	
not	prevented	or	interrupted.	
670	
1	 so	 ist	 es	 nothwendig,	 die	
vollständige	 Entwickelung	 der	
Pflanzen	 aus	 den	 ausgesaten	
Samen	 abzuwarten,	 welche	
erst	 die	 völlige	 Gewissheit	
geben	 können,	 dass	 eine	
Bastardzeugung	 und	 keine	
so	it	is	necessary	to	wait	for	the	full	
development	of	the	plants	from	the	
seeds	 ausgesaten,	 which	 only	 can	
give	 the	 complete	 certainty	 that	 a	
hybrid	 procreation	 and	 no	 after	
fertilization	 was	 done,	 as	 well	 as	
Herbert	W.	
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Afterbefruchtung	 geschehen	
war,	wie	auch	W.	Herbert	
1	 Eine	weitere	Aufgabe	ist	es,	die	
Sämlinge	aus	diesen	Aussaaten	
Alle,	 so	 viel	 es	 ihrer	 sind,	 zu	
erhalten	und	zur	vollkommenen	
Entwickelung	 zu	 bringen	 und	
abgesondert	 zu	 erziehen,	 um	
über	 die	 Typen	 und	 ihre	
Gleichförmigkeit	 oder	
Ungleichheit	 in	 Gewissheit	 zu	
kommen	
A	 further	 object	 is	 to	 get	 the	
seedlings	 from	 these	 sowings	 all,	
so	much	 is	 their	 are,	 and	 to	 bring	
to	 the	 perfect	 development	 and	
secreted	to	educate,	to	come	upon	
the	 types	 and	 their	 uniformity	 or	
inequality	in	certainty	
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1	 Wenn	 nun	 aber	 auch	 mit	 der	
vollstandigen	 Entwickelung	 der	
Bastardpflanzen	 der	
Hauptzweck	 unserer	 Versuche	
erreicht	 war:	 so	 waren	 erst	
noch	 die	 einzelnen	 Pflanzen	
jeder	Art	 in	Beziehung	 auf	 den	
Zustand	 ihrer	
Befruchtungsorgane	 und	 ihrer	
Fruchtbarkeit	 zu	 untersuchen:	
was	 nicht	 nur	 in	
physiologischer	 Beziehung	
überhaupt	 von	 Wichtigkeit,	
sondern	 auch	 in	 praktischer	
Hinsicht	 fur	 die	 Umwandelung	
zu	wissen	nöthig	war.	
When	 was	 now	 but	 also	 of	 the	
complete	 development	 of	 hybrid	
plants,	 the	 main	 purpose	 of	 our	
experiments	achieved	so	were	only	
nor	 the	 individual	 plants	 of	 each	
kind	 to	 examine	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
state	 of	 their	 reproductive	 organs	
and	 fertility:	 what	 not	 only	 in	
physiological	 relationship	 at	 all	 of	
importance,	 but	 was	 to	 know	 in	
practical	 terms	 for	 the	
Umwandelung	necessary.	
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2	 Es	steht	nun	zu	erwarten:	1)	ob	
dieselben	 Wurzeln	 im	 zweiten	
Trieb	(1849)	wieder	ebensolche	
verschiedene	 Samen	 erzeugen	
werden,	 als	 aus	 der	 ersten	
Entwickelung	 hervorgingen.	 2)	
Wie	 sich	 diese	 verschiedenen	
Samen	 in	 ihrer	 weiteren	
Entwickelung	 (im	 Jahr	 1849)	 in	
Absicht	 auf	 den	 Typus	 der	
Pflanzen	 und	 ihrer	
Samenerzeugung	 verhalten	
werden.	
It	 is	 now	 expected	 to:	 1)	 whether	
the	same	roots	 in	the	second	train	
(1849)	will	again	produce	just	such	
different	 seeds,	 as	 emerged	 from	
the	 first	 development.	 2)	 How	 do	
these	various	seeds	in	their	further	
development	 will	 behave	 in	 intent	
to	the	type	of	plants	and	their	seed	
production	in	1849.	
679-680	
1	 6)	 Bezeichnet	 (mit	 H)	 die	
vollständige	Entwickelung	des	
Bastards	 und	 seine	 Aufnahme	
in	 die	 Sammlung:	 der	 Beisatz	
(Ic.)	 bedeutet	 die	 Abbildung	
desselben	 im	Ganzen	 oder	 nur	
6)	 Identifies	 (with	 H)	 the	 full	
development	of	the	 	
hybrids	 and	 its	 inclusion	 in	 the	
collection:	 the	 garnish	 (.	 Ic)	 is	 the	
image	 of	 the	 same	 in	 whole	 or	 in	
flower.	
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in	der	Blume.	
1	 Lee	re	Befruchtung:	Die	Corolle	
fällt	bald	ab5	oder	verdirbt,	der	
Kelch	 und	 der	 Fruchtknoten	
wachsen	 ein	wenig,	 die	 Eichen	
aber	 erfahren	 keine	
Entwickelung,	 womit	 	
vollkommene	 Unfruchtbarkeit	
stattfindet.	
Lee	re-fertilization:	the	corolla	falls	
soon	 AB5	 or	 spoils,	 the	 calyx	 and	
the	 ovary	 grow	 a	 little,	 but	 the	
oaks	 undergone	any	 development,	
thus	perfect	infertility	occurs.	
681	
1	 Mangelhafte	 Befruchtung:	 Der	
Zustand	 der	 Blumenkrone	 und	
des	 Kelches	 wie	 bei	 c),	 die	
ausseren	 Fruchtumhüllungen	
zuweilen	 ziemlich	 ausgebildet	
mit	 einiger	 Entwickelung	 der	
Eichen	in	ihren	Umhüllungen	
Poor	 fertilization:	 The	 state	 of	 the	
corolla	 and	 the	 calyx	 as	 in	 c),	 the	
outer	 fruit	 servings	 sometimes	
quite	 formed	 with	 some	
development	 of	 the	 oaks	 in	 their	
enclosures	
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1	 Vollkommene	Befruchtung:	Die	
Fruchte	 meistens	 vollkommen,	
doch	 auch	 haufig	 klein	 und	
mager,	 mit	 alien	 Graden	 und	
Formen	 der	 Entwickelung	
hybrider	 Samen,	 und	 wenigen,	
ja!	zuweilen	nur	einem	einzigen	
oder	ein	paar	keimungsfähigen,	
vollkommenen	Samen.	
Perfect	 fertilization:	 The	 fruits	
usually	perfect,	but	too	often	short	
and	 thin,	 with	 alien	 forms	 and	
degrees	 of	 development	 of	 hybrid	
seeds,	 and	 a	 few,	 yes!	 sometimes	
only	 one	 or	 a	 few	
keimungsfähigen,	perfect	seeds.	
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1	 der	 Pollen	 des	 Cucubalus	
viscosus	 bewirkt	 dagegen	 eine	
normale	 Entwickelung	 des	
Pericarps	 mit	 vielen	
vertrockneten	 Eichen,	 vielen	
eckigen,	 eingeschrumpften	
Samenbalgen	 und	 einigen	
wenigen	guten	Samen:	
the	pollen	of	Cucubalus	viscosus	in	
contrast,	 causes	 a	 normal	
development	 of	 the	 pericarp	 with	
many	 withered	 oaks,	 many	
angular,	 shrunken	 seeds	 bellows	
and	a	few	good	seeds:	
684	
1	 Die	 Bestaubung	 der	 Lychnis	
diurna	 mit	 dem	 Pollen	 der	
Saponaria	 officinalis,	 Silene	
bellidifolia	 und	 Lychnanthus	
volubilis	 bewirkte	 gar	 keine	
Entwickelung	 des	 Pericarps,	
sondern	 hatte	 eine	 todtliche	
Wirku	 auf	 die	 ganze	 Blume.(S.	
oben	Pollenwirkung.)	
The	 pollination	 of	 Lychnis	 diurna	
with	 the	 pollen	 of	 Saponaria	
officinalis,	 Silene	 bellidifolia	 and	
Lychnanthus	 volubilis	 caused	 no	
development	 of	 the	 pericarp,	 but	
had	a	todtliche	Wirku	on	the	whole	
flower.	(S.	Above	pollen	effect.)	
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